MADRAS HIGH COURT
PALANIA PILLAI AND ANOTHER VS STATE ON 19
JANUARY, 1990
Summarised
Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Introduction:
The appellants Palania Pillai and K.
Rasheed Ahmed were tried in C.C. No. 11 of 1985 on the fire of the IX
Additional Special Judge, Madras, for offences punishable under S. 5(1)(d) read
with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and S. 161, I.P.C.
The second appellant was charged with the
aid of S. 109, I.P.C. Both the appellants were found guilty as charged and both
of them were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay
a fine of Rs. 1,000/ -; in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
months for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. No separate
sentence was imposed in respect of the offence under S. 161, I.P.C.
Facts of the Case:
The facts leading to the conviction of the
two appellants need narration. The appellants will henceforth the referred to
as A1 and A2 respectively. A1 at the relevant time was the Junior Engineer,
Madras Telephone, Mambalam External. A2 was the Phone Inspector, Madras
Telephones, attached to the same office. P.W. 2, Murugesan, a resident of West
Jones Road, Saidapet, was a finance broker, carrying on his business under the
name and style of "Sivasankar Agencies" Sivakami, the daughter of
P.W. 2, was suffering from several ailments inclusive of skin disease, throat
infection and ulcer in her stomach. In view of the sickness of his daughter,
P.W. 2 wanted to have a casual telephone connection for a period of 60 days.
The need for the request of a casual
telephone connection was to facilitate emergency calls being made to the Doctor
as and when necessary. P.W. 2, therefore, sent his application Ex. P. 2, dated
11-9-1984 to the Deputy Area Manager (South), Madras Telephones.
Observation & Judgement:
On facts, I have held that the defence
case of Rs. 300/- having been paid as donation for the Conference was not
entitled to credence. The case law put forth before me by the appellants does
not help them.
The evidence extracted in detail by me
certainly indicate that the appellants had acted in unison and it will not be
possible to exclude either of them from the charges framed against them. The
judgment of the Trial court convicting the appellants as charged is perfectly
justified, and needs no interference. The sentence imposed is only the minimum
sentence, which has to be unhasitatingly sustained.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed.
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Complete
Judgement
MADRAS HIGH COURT
PALANIA PILLAI AND ANOTHER VS STATE ON 19
JANUARY, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991 CriLJ 1563
Bench: T Arunachalam
JUDGMENT
1. The appellants Palania Pillai and K. Rasheed
Ahmed were tried in C.C. No. 11 of 1985 on the fire of the IX Additional
Special Judge, Madras, for offences punishable under S. 5(1)(d) read with S.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and S. 161, I.P.C. The second
appellant was charged with the aid of S. 109, I.P.C. Both the appellants were
found guilty as charged and both of them were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/ -; in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. No separate sentence was imposed in respect of
the offence under S. 161, I.P.C.
2. The facts leading to the conviction of the
two appellants need narration. The appellants will henceforth the referred to
as A1 and A2 respectively. A1 at the relevant time was the Junior Engineer,
Madras Telephone, Mambalam External. A2 was the Phone Inspector, Madras
Telephones, attached to the same office. P.W. 2, Murugesan, a resident of West
Jones Road, Saidapet, was a finance broker, carrying on his business under the
name and style of "Sivasankar Agencies" Sivakami, the daughter of
P.W. 2, was suffering from several ailments inclusive of skin disease, throat
infection and ulcer in her stomach. In view of the sickness of his daughter,
P.W. 2 wanted to have a casual telephone connection for a period of 60 days.
The need for the request of a casual telephone connection was to facilitate
emergency calls being made to the Doctor as and when necessary. P.W. 2,
therefore, sent his application Ex. P. 2, dated 11-9-1984 to the Deputy Area
Manager (South), Madras Telephones. Along with Ex. P. 2, P.W. 2 enclosed a
medical certificate Ex. P. 3 - issued by the Skin Specialist, affirming the
need for frequent medical advice and medical care either in person or over the
telephone. P.W. 2 went over to the Office of the Deputy Area Manager (South),
Madras Telephones, on 15-9-1984. He was then directed to deposit a sum of Rs.
920/ within 15 days. A demand notice was also issued to him. On 21-9-1984 P.W.
2 deposited Rs. 920/ in cash, as advised. Even after such deposit, the casual
telephone was not installed. Hence, on 29-9-1984 P.W. 2 got in touch with the
Office of the Deputy Manager (South) over the Telephone. He was then informed
that the casual telephone connection had been sanctioned even on 29-9-1984 and
the telephone number allotted to him was 446001. He was also directed to got in
touch with the Assistant Engineer, Telephone Exchange, Mambalam, for further
details. Thereafter at or about 12 noon on 29-9-1984 P.W. 2 contacted the
Office of the Assistant Engineer, Telephone Exchange, Mambalam, over the
telephone. His call was answered by P.W. 6 V. J. Niyasudeen, the Assistant Engineer,
P.W. 6 informed P.W. 2 that no communication had been received from the Office
of the Deputy Area Manager. P.W. 2 again got in touch with the Office of the
Deputy Area Manager (South) and learnt that even on 22-9-1984 a communication
by registered post as well as by telex had been forwarded to P.W. 6. Again P.W.
2 contacted P.W. 6 over the telephone and furnished this information. P.W. 6
promised to look into the records and in case an advice note had been received,
he would direct further action. P.W. 6 noted in Ex. P. 13, a scribbling pad,
about the casual connection enquiry, made by P.W. 2 on 29-9-1984. P.W. 6, on
verification, found that his Office had received the advice note Ex. P. 14 from
the Deputy Area Manager (South) even on 27-9-1984 for providing a casual
telephone connection immediately for 60 days from the date of installation, to
P.W. 2. P.W. 6 thereafter contacted A1, the Junior Engineer, at or about 2 p.m.
over the telephone and directed him to provide a casual telephone connection
immediately at the residence of P.W. 2, in view of the sanction accorded by the
Deputy Area Manager.
3. It is the further case of P.W. 2 that on
29-9-1984 at or about 4 p.m., A2 contacted him at his residence and introduced
himself as the Telephone Inspector. He told P.W. 2 that a telephone connection
had been sanctioned to him and his visit was to inspect the place and fix the
location of the telephone to be installed. A2 also told P.W. 2 that A1 had sent
him and that both A1 and A2 were the main persons responsible for providing a
telephone connection at the residence of P.W. 2. A2 also informed P.W. 2 that
there were complications in immediately providing a telephone connection which
could be overcome, if P.W. 2 agreed to pay Rs. 300/- as bribe. In the event of
the payment of the bribe amount intended for both the accused, it was possible
to install the telephone even on Monday (1-10-1984). In the event of
non-payment of bribe as demanded, there was bound to be delay installing the
casual telephone connection. A2 also informed P.W. 2 that both he and A1
intended to meet P.W. 2 at his residence at 12 noon on 1-10-1984 when the
telephone connection would be given and that P.W. 2 should keep Rs. 300/- ready
for payment as demanded. The evidence of P.W. 2 does not indicate his re-action
to the deemed made by A2 and his part of the conversation with the latter.
4. P.W. 2 was unwilling to pay any bribe to the
accused as demanded and, therefore, at 9.15 a.m. on 1-10-1984 he went to the
C.B.I. Office and met the Superintendent of Police (not examined). The
Superintendent of Police directed P.W. 5 Y. Chelladurai, Inspector of Police
S.P.E., C.B.I., Madras, to take necessary action forthwith. Ex. P. 4 the
complaint preferred by P.W. 2 to the Superintendent of Police C.B.I. on
1-10-1984 bears the endorsement of the Superintendent, directing P.W. 5 to
register a case and take necessary action. P.W. 5 registered Crime No. 60 of
1984 on Ex. P. 4 for an offence under S. 161, I.P.C. and prepared the printed
first information report Ex. P. 12. P.W. 5 questioned P.W. 2 with regard to Ex.
P. 4, the complaint preferred by him. On being questioned by P.W. 5, P.W. 2
agreed to co-operate with the investigation. P.W. 5 directed P.W. 2 to get Rs.
300/- and come back to his office within 20 or 25 minutes. After P.W. 2 left,
P.W. 5 made arrangement to get at P.W. 3, a lower Division Clerk in the Office
of the Director of Inspection, situated at Shastri Bhavan and Raman (not
examined) a cashier in the Office of the Joint Director of Field Publicity,
situated in Shastri Bhavan. P.W. 5 contacted his informants over the telephone
and enquired about the antecedents of the accused. At or about 10 a.m. P.W. 3
and Raman met P.W. 5 at his Office. Sometime later P.W. 2 also joined them.
P.W. 5 introduced P.W. 2 to P.W. 3 and Raman. He directed P.W. 2 to narrate the
details of his complaint to both the witnesses, which was accordingly done by
P.W. 2. When questioned by P.W. 5, P.W. 2, stated that he had brought Rs. 300/-
and handed it over to P.W. 5. The sum of Rs. 300/- was in the denomination of
two hundred rupee notes, one fifty rupee note, one twenty rupee note and three
ten rupee notes. P.W. 5 noted the number of the currency, which are M.Os. 1 to
7. P.W. 5 smeared phenolpthelin powder on both sides of the currency notes and
gave them to Raman (not examined) and asked him to count the notes. P.W. 5
asked Raman to dip his fingers in the Sodium Carbonate solution kept ready in a
glass tumbler. When Raman did so, the liquid which was colourless, turned pink.
P.W. 5 explained the significance of the phenolpthelin test to P.Ws. 2, 3 and
Raman. Later P.W. 5 searched P.W. 2 and found in his possession a sum of Rs.
three, a handkerchief and a bunch of keys. Thereafter M.Os. 1 to 7 treated with
phenolpthelin powder, were placed inside the shirt pocket of P.W. 2, with the
direction not to touch the currency notes till a demand was made by the
accused. P.W. 2 was also directed to give a signal by wiping his face with a
kerchief in the event of the acceptance of the money by the accused. P.W. 3 was
directed to accompany P.W. 2 and observe all the happenings. A mahazar Ex. P. 5
was prepared incorporating all these details and the number of the currency
notes M.Os. 1 to 7. P.W. 3 and Raman attested Ex. P. 5.
5. On the directions of P.W. 5, P.Ws. 2 and 3
went in advance on motor cycle to the house of the former. A little later P.W.
5 along with other Officers and Raman went over to the house of P.W. 2 in a
police van. When P.Ws. 2 and 3 reached the residence of P.W. 2 at or about
11.30 a.m. they found 4 or 5 lineman already engaged in the work of providing a
telephone connection. P.W. 5 and others hid themselves at some distance. By
about 12 noon the linemen had finished their job. At or about that time both
the accused reached the house of P.W. 2 and met the latter, who was seated in
the main hall in the company of P.W. 3. A2 introduced A1 to P. W. 2. A1 went
over to the toilet and A2 started reading the newspaper. A little later A1
returned to the hall. A1 had a handkerchief in his hand. A1 asked P.W. 2 to
give the money. P.W. 2 asked A1 "How much money ?" A1 replied that
P.W. 1 could pay as told by A2. P.W. 2 told A1 that A2 had asked for Rs. 300/-
and that A1 must accept Rs. 200/-. However, A1 replied that P.W. 3 must pay the
amount specified by A2, P.W. 2 then removed Rs. 300/- from his shirt pocket,
and handed over to A1. A2 asked A1 to count the currency, which was promptly
done by A1. After counting, A1 kept the currency notes in his right hand along
with kerchief, M.O.B. P.W. 2 after passing off the currency notes to A1, gave
the pre-arranged signal by wiping his face with his kerchief. Immediately P.W.
5 and his party entered the hall. P.W. 5 introduced himself as well as Raman to
both the accused. He questioned the first accused as to whether he had received
"the money". On hearing this question, A1 appeared to shiver out of
panic. P.W. 2 was sent out of the hall. P.W. 5 then prepared Sodium Carbonate
solution and directed A-1 to dip his right hand fingers in it. A-1 on doing so,
the colourless solution turned pink. The change in colouration was pointed out
to the witnesses and the accused and the liquid was poured into two clean glass
bottles which were closed, sealed and stamped. The signatures of the witnesses
were also taken on the bottles. M. Os. 9 and 10 are those two bottles. P.W. 5
again prepared a fresh solution of Sodium Carborate and directed A-1 to dip his
left hand fingers. On doing so, the liquid became pink. M.Os. 11 and 12 are the
two bottles which contained the solution which turned pink on the second
occasion.
6. P.W. 5 asked A-1 to produce the money to
which he replied that the money was on the table. P.W. 5 took the money from
the table, verified the numbers of the currency and found them to tally with
the numbers already noted in Ex. P. 5. P.W. 5 seized M.Os. 1 to 7. For a third
time Sodium Carbonate solution was prepared in which M.O. 8 the kercheef of A-1
was dipped. The solution turned pink and the liquid was poured into two clean
bottles, as done earlier, and were closed, scaled and stamped. These bottles
are M.Os. 13 and 14. Exs. P. 7 and P. 8 contain the specimen impression of the
seal used, in which the signatures of the witnesses were also obtained.
7. Later A-1 was searched. He had in his
possession a railway season ticket, a bunch of keys and Rs. 265.45 in cash.
These articles were returned to A-1. A-2 was then searched. He had in his
possession an identification card a key bunch, a money purse, a comb and Rs.
232/- in cash, which were all returned to him. Two diaries along with some
papers kept in the cycles of the accused were recovered by P.W. 5. He also
seized Ex. P. 6 from D.W. 3. The signatures of the witnesses were obtained in
Ex. P. 6, which is the slip relating to telephone No. 446001 allotted to P.W.
2. P.W. 2 was later directed to come inside the hall. He was searched and sent
away. Ex. P. 9 prepared at the residence of P.W. 2 incorporates all that had
happened at the residence of P.W. 2. P.W. 3, Ramu and D.W. 3 have attested Ex.
P. 9. Copies of P. 9 were given to both the accused and their acknowledgments
were obtained. P.W. 5 contacted P.W. 6, the Assistant Engineer and directed him
to keep certain documents in safe custody. The House search of both the accused
did not yield anything incriminating. Later the accused were left in their
respective houses. P.W. 3 K. G. Ramachandran, who accompanied P.W. 2 and who is
an attestor to Exs. P. 5 and P. 9 has deposed about all the events in detail.
P.W. 7 Rajee Vekshan, Inspector of Police, S.P.E., C.B.I. took up investigation
on 17-10-1984. He scrutinised the documents and on 19-10-1984 gave a
requisition Ex. P. 15 to the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras for sending M.Os.
9, 11 and 13 for chemical analysis. On 24-10-1984 he visited the house of P.W.
2 and examined him. He inspected the spot where the trap was laid. On
16-11-1984 he examined P.W. 5 and another. He questioned A. 1 on 29-12-1984. On
31-12-1984 he examined P.W. 3 and another and questioned A-2. On 2-1-1985 he
examined P.W. 6 and collected from him certain documents including Exs. P. 13
and P. 14. He also obtained from P.W. 6 Ex. P. 16 the whereabouts register with
reference to the entries made on 1-10-1984. On 3-1-1985 P.W. 7 examined the
persons mentioned in Ex. P. 16 and learnt that they did not attend to that
particular work. P.W. 7 scrutinised Ex. P. 6 and found that Venkatesan did not
attend to the work mentioned in the slip. He also examined D.W. 3. As requested
by P.W. 7, M.Os. 9, 11 and 13 were sent for chemical analysis. Ex. P. 11 the
report of the Chemical Examiner shows that the liquids in these bottles were
phenolpthelin and sodium carbonate. P.W. 1 the Area Manager (South) Madras
Telephones who is competent to remove the accused from service, on receiving a
report from the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Madras after perusing the
relevant documents and satisfying himself accorded sanction to prosecute both
the accused. Ex. P. 1 is the sanction order which has been proved by the Area
Manager himself, who was examined as P.W. 1. P.W. 4 is the Scientific
Assistant, Grade I, Attached to the Forensic Science Department, who has
deposed about Ex. P. 11, the report Analyst, having been forwarded to the
Special Court.
8. After completing investigation P.W. 7 laid
the charge sheet against the accused before the Special Court on 29-3-1985.
9. When the accused were questioned under
Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the trial court, to afford them
an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against them in evidence,
they denied a major portion of the prosecution version. They stated that even
on 29-9-1984 at their officer P.W. 2 agreed to give Rs. 300/- as donation to
the Union Conference and in pursuance thereof on 1-10-1984, P.W. 2 himself gave
the amount as donation, at his residence. They stated that they did not demand
any bribe and they did not accept any money as bribe. A-1 also filed certain
documents to be read as part and parcel of his statement.
10. The accused examined D.Ws. 1 to 3 to
substantiate their version D.W. 1 Sreetharan is the Junior Engineer in the
Mambalm External Unit No. 1. He has deposed about the maintenance of the
Tell-Tala sheet Ex.D. 1 and entries made therein referable to the movements of
A-2 on 29-9-1984.
11. D.W. 2 Ranganathan, is a wireman attached to
the External Unit No. 1. It is his evidence that at or about 9 a.m. on
29-9-1984 P.W. 2 came to his office and was seen in conversion with A. 1 on his
pointing out the latter P.W. 2 asked A. 1 if the telephone connection could be
given immediately, to which A. 1 replied that if orders had been received,
connection could be given forthwith. P.W. 2 insisted, that telephone connection
should be given, on the same day. At that stage A. 2 who was near A. 1 asked
P.W. 2 to donate to the Conference. P.W. 2 stated that he did not have funds
them and accused to pay Rs. 300/- as donation, when A. 2 would go over to his
house, to give telephone connection. Thereafter P.W. 2 took three donation
receipts of Rs. 100/- denomination each and signed in the counter-foils. The
counter-foils containing the signatures of P.W. 2 have been marked as D. 3 to
D. 5.
12. D.W. 5 Masilamani, a Mazdoor in Mambalam
External Unit I, went to the house of P.W. 2 on the morning of 1-10-1984 to do
the necessary, work to facilitate causal telephone connection being given, on
the directions of A-1. He has also deposed about A-1 having instructed him to
collect from P.W. 2 the donation amount promised, in the event of the latter
giving It to him. He also speaks about both the accused meeting P.W. 2 at his
residence at 12. Noon and P.W. 2 handing over money to A-1.
13. The trial court, on an appreciation of the
oral and documentary evidence placed before it by the prosecution and the
defence, accepted the prosecution case, rejected the defence version and
convicted and sentenced the appellants as stated earlier.
14. The point for consideration in this appeal
is whether the prosecution had established its initial onus of the accused
having received the bribe money, and if it be so, whether the defence had by
preponderance of probability, displaced the presumption under Section 4(1) of
the Act, so as to cast a doubt on the truth of the prosecution case and the
probability of Rs. 300/- having been paid voluntarily by P.W. 2 as a donation
for the Union Conference ? In effect it has to be considered, whether the guilt
of both the appellants had been established beyond doubt, on the totality of
the evidence placed before Court ?
15. Sri N. T. Vanamamalai the learned Senior
counsel appearing for the first appellant (A. 1) and Sri N., Natarajan, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the second appellant (A. 2) contended that
the demand alleged to have been made by A. 1 had not been established beyond
doubt. Ex.D. 1 the Tell-tale Sheet, taken along with Ex. D. 2 would be
sufficient to erase the alleged story of demand on the evening of 29-9-1984.
They vehemontly urged that Exs. D. 3 to D. 5, the counterfoils of the donation
tickets allegedly containing the signatures of P.W. 2 should not have been
rejected by the trial Judge, especially when D.W. 2 who was present when P.W. 2
obtained the donation tickets had deposed about his having seen P.W. 2, signing
in those donation tickets - They would further contend that once the defence
was able to demonstrate before the Court that the admitted signatures of P.W. 2
found in the complaint Ex. P. 4 and other prosecution records prima facie
tallied with Exs. D. 3 to D. 5 the onus was on the prosecution to disprove that
possibility by examining a Handwriting Expert. Mr. Natarajan submitted that
there was no abuse of authority and in the normal way in an expeditious
pattern, telephone connection was given to P.W. 2, which perfectly synchronised
with the defence placed before the Court. He would also point out that P.W. 3
had not deposed about the demand made by A. 2 on 1-10-1984 and this coupled
with non-recovery of any money from A-2 would be sufficient to exculpate him
from the crime.
16. Mr. N. T. Vanamamalai, submitted that the
installation of the telephone was done and the work completed even before the
money was paid and the last act of giving connection alone remained and for all
practical purposes, the work had reached a point beyond recall and, therefore,
the ingredients of the offence were not attracted. He further submitted that
the alleged demand had not been corroborated and P.W. 2 must be assumed to have
a grudge, since the linemen had not come to his house till he left for the
office of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption, on the
morning of 1-10-1984. D.Ws. 1 to 3 are Government servants and their evidence
cannot be discarded merely because they worked in the same Department, as the
appellants. In conclusion, he submitted that both the appellants, on the
totality of the evidence, were entitled to the benefit of doubt.
17. Per contra, Thiru B. Sriramulu, the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that P.W. 2 was an utter
stranger to the appellants and he had no animosity whatsoever against them.
According to him, the appellants had taken advantage of the situation in which
P.W. 2 was placed requiring an urgent telephone connection. The contents of the
first information report Ex. P. 4 fully corroborated the present version of
P.W. 2. The appellants having gone to the house of P.W. 2 at or about 12 Noon
on 1-10-1984, was a powerful circumstance, which strongly corroborated the
evidence of P.W. 2 since in Ex.P. 4, the earliest document. P.W. 2 has stated
that A. 2 had informed him that he in the company of A. 1 would go over to his
residence at or about 12 Noon on Monday (1-10-1984) to receive the demanded
amount and simultaneously give the phone connection. He would submit that S.
4(1) of the Act contemplated a legal presumption contra distinguished from S.
114 of the Indian Evidence Act, which related to factual pre-sumption. He also
contended that if, in fact, P.W. 2 had agreed to buy the donation tickets even
on the morning of 29-9-1984 as alleged by the accused, there was no need for
P.S. 2 to get intouch with P.W. 6, the Assistant Engineer, after 12 Noon on
29-9-1984 and P.W. 6 informing A. 1 at or about 2 p.m. about the allotment of a
casual telephone connection to P.W. 2, which had to be executed. He pleaded for
rejection of Exs. D. 1 to D. 5, since they had not been proved by the persons,
who had maintained them, while supporting the reasons given by the trial Judge,
for rejection of those documents, as sustainable. Both the counsel referred to
the Law laid down by the Supreme Court, which will be referred to at the
relevant context.
18. After the arguments were concluded on
6-10-1989 and judgment was reserved, on my careful comparison of the signatures
of P.W. 2 found in Exs. D. 3 to D. 5 (disputed) and his admitted signatures in
Exs. P. 2, P. 4 and in his deposition in Court, I was of the opinion that it
was better that a Handwriting Expert offered his opinion regarding the admitted
and disputed signatures of P. W. 2 to vacilitate arriving at a safe conclusion
with regard to the identity of the signatures in Exs. D. 3 to D. 5, which
formed the sheet-ancher of the defence case. On 24-10-1989 I heard the defence
counsel as well as the counsel for the respondent and basing my view on the principle
of law laid down by the Apex Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram
I directed that the disputed writings of P.W. 2 in Exs. D-3 to D-5 and the
admitted writings of P.W. 2 in his court deposition, Exs. P-2 and P-4 be
forwarded to the Handwriting Expert attached to the State Forensic Laboratory
for comparison and opinion. Accordingly, the aforementioned documents were sent
to the Handwriting Expert, who by his reported dated 4-12-1989, offered his
opinion. On 7-12-1989 on the plea made by the learned counsel for the defence
as well as the prosecution, I directed issue of summons to A. S. Ramu,
Scientific Assistant Grade-I, Forensic Science Department, Madras-4, to appear
before Court with all necessary material to give evidence in respect of his
opinion offered in D.O.C. No. 359 of 1989 dated 4-12-1989 and T. No. 7220/89
DOC. 359/89, dated 4-12-1989 on 13-12-1989. I also directed the Office to take
Xerox copies of the opinion of the Expert and furnish those copies to the
prosecution as well as the accused on or before 11-12-1989.
19. On 13-12-1989 the Expert was examined in
Court and both the parties were afforded an opportunity to question the Expert.
The disputed signatures in Exs. D-3 to D-5 were marked by him as Q-1, Q-2 and
Q-3 respectively. The admitted signature of P.W. 2 in Ex.P-2 was numbered by
him as S-1. The admitted signature of P.W. 2 on the reverse of Ex. P. 4 was
marked as S-2. The admitted signatures of P.W. 2 in his deposition before IX
Additional Special Judge, in seven sheets, were marked as S-3 to S-15. The
deposition itself was marked as Ex. C-1 before this Court. Out of the seven
sheets, the first six sheets contain the signature of P.W. 2 on either side,
while in the last sheet, it is found only on one page, where the deposition has
ended, the other side of the paper being blank. The Expert deposed that he had
examined the above signatures found in Q-1 to Q-3 and S-1 to S-15 carefully and
that the person who wrote the red enclosed signatures stamped and marked as S-1
to S-15, did not write the red enclosed signatures similarly stamped and marked
as Q-1 to Q-3. The reasoning sheet enclosed by him was marked as Ex. C-2. The
enlargements of the signatures of P.W. 2 (admitted as well as disputed) were
marked as Ex. C-3. The opinion expressed by him in Court, forms part of his
report as well, which is included in Ex. C-2. The Expert has deposed that he
has been giving evidence in Courts for the last 5 years and he has offered his
opinion in more than 100 cases. The learned counsel for the appellants,
strenuously cross-examined him on various aspects, and in ultimate analysis,
his opinion was that the variations pointed by the defence were only natural
variations and were not distinctly different. He deposed that in Ex.C-2, one was
the opinion and the other was the reasoning. When he was questioned about the
signature of the Scientic Officer in the report, he stated that he (A. S. Ramu)
analysed the admitted and disputed signatures and the Scientific Expert
appended his signature after seeing the analysis done by him, because it was
the procedure in the Department, that a Gazetted Officer had to put his
signature. He was questioned about the quality of paper, pen pressure,
different kinds of movements, pen lifts etc. He conceded that in the report he
had only given the differences in the admitted and the disputed signatures and
had not given the similarities which, however, had been taken into
consideration, when the report was given. Usually, similarities were not noted
down. He categorically replied that a person cannot forge his signature, though
he could disguise it. He clarified it, by stating that if one wanted to
disguise, he can do it in a different way. Forgery meant, according to him,
trying to put the genuine signature of the man concerned, deceptively. It is
not a case of P.W. 2 attempting to forge his own signature, since the man did
not write in the usual manner he does. To a Court question, he definitely
stated that from a study of S-1 to S-15 and Q-1 to Q-3, the persons who had put
the signatures S-1 to S-15 had not put in differently in Q-1 to Q-3.
20. After the recording of the evidence of the
Court witness, I again heard the submissions of the prosecuting and the defence
counsel. They referred to me, passages from "Hand-writing and Thumb-print
Identification and Forensic Science by H. R. Hardless, 1970 Edition as well as
from Metha's Treatise on Hand-writing Identification and Finger Prints. They
also referred to certain decisions of the Supreme Court on the acceptability or
otherwise of the opinion of the Hand-writing. Expert, while drawing my
attention to the relevant recorded evidence.
21. As far as the evidence of the Handwriting
Expert is concerned, the law is settled that such opinion evidence, cannot be
stated to be conclusive. The Court is competent to compare the disputed and
admitted writings, even without examining an Expert to satisfy itself from its
own observations, to arrive at conclusions; but, as a matter of prudence and
caution, it was always better to have the opinion of an Expert, to facilitate
the scrutiny of those signatures, through the eyes of the Court. It will be
relevant at this stage to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in
Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1967 SC 1325 at p 1328 : (1967 Cri
LJ 1197) paras 10 and 11) :-
"Evidence of the identity of hand-writing
receives treatment in three sections of the Indian Evidence Act. They are Ss.
45, 47 and 73. Handwriting may be proved on admission of the writer, by the
evidence of some witness in whose presence he wrote. This is direct evidence
and if it is available the evidence of any other kind is rendered unnecessary.
The Evidence Act also makes relevant the opinion of a handwriting expert (S.
45) or of one who is familiar with the writing of a person who is said to have
written a particular writing. Thus besides direct evidence which is of course
the best method of proof, the law makes relevant two other modes. A writing may
be proved to be in the handwriting of a particular individual by the evidence
of a person familiar with the handwriting of that individual or by the
testimony of an expert competent to the comparison of handwritings on a
scientific basis. A third method (S. 73) is comparison by the Court with a
writing made in the presence of the Court or admitted or proved to be the
writing of the person.
Both under Section 45 and S. 47, the evidence is
an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the
basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experience. In
either case the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the
opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the Court is to apply its own
observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the
disputed one, not to become an handwriting expert but to verify the premises of
the expert, in the one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the
other case. This comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in
the admitted or proved writings and the finding of the same characteristics in
large measure in the disputed writing. In this way the opinion of the deponent
whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start
with becomes probative. Where an expert's opinion is given, the Court must see
for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion
whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person.
This is not to say that the Court must play the role of an expert but to say
that the Court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on
its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert
or other witness."
22. While on the topic of appreciation of the
evidence of Expert, it will be relevant to refer to the observations of the
Supreme Court in two of its pronouncements. In Bhagwan Das v. State of
Rajasthan the Supreme Court took the view that where the opinions of the author
were neither shown to have been given in regard to circumstances exactly
similar to those in the particular case before Court; nor were they put to the
medical witness, it was not a satisfactory way of disposing of the evidence of
the witness to discredit it on the ground that the Doctor was a comparatively
young man and his statements did not accord with the opinions expressed in the
books.
23. Similarly, in (Sunderlal v. State of Madhya
Pradesh), the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 258; 1954 Cri LJ) :-
"The conviction of the accused by the High
Court was mainly based on passages from the text book of Modi on Medical
Jurisprudence and Texicology and these passages had not been put to Dr. Dube
when he was in the witness box with the result that the High Court was not
right in coming to the conclusion adverse to the accused by merely relying upon
these passages. It is therefore evident that before reliance can be placed on
authoritative text books by either party to attack the evidence of an expert,
it would be necessary to draw the attention of the expert to those passages and
furnish him an opportunity to explain the same".
24. We will now revert back to the appreciation
of the evidence on record, in the light of the comments made by the opposing
counsel, to find out the merits and deficiencies in the prosecution case, and
the defence placed, in the light of the onus placed on it by the Special Act
regarding the feasibility of upholding or reversing the judgment of the trial
Court. As far as the receipt of Rs. 300/- from P.W. 2 by A-1 in the presence of
A-2 is concerned, there is no dispute whatsoever, between the prosecution and
the accused. It is the case of P.W. 2 that Rs. 300/- was paid as bribe in
pursuance of a demand, while it is the specific case of the defence that they
neither demanded a bribe nor accepted it; but P.W. 2 had given that amount as a
donation to Union Conference, as agreed to by him on the earlier day. In view
of the specific stand taken by the appellants, it will not be necessary to
delve in very great detail, about the prior events that had happened on the application
Ex. P. 2, sent by P.W. 2 to the concerned authority, requesting for a casual
telephone connection. The events on 29-9-1984 and 1-10-1984 will certainly
require in particular a careful scrutiny due to the divergent stands of the
prosecution and the defence.
25. P.W. 2 has deposed that though he had
deposited Rs. 920/- for the casual telephone connection on 21-9-1984, since
nothing had happened further, he contacted the Mambalam Telephone Exchange on
29-9-1984 and learnt that even on 22-9-1984 a casual telephone connection to
his residence, had been ordered and the telephone number was to be 446001. He
was also directed to get in touch with the Assistant Engineer, Mambalam
Exchange External, for further details. Accordingly, at 12 Noon on 29-9-1984,
P.W. 2 got in touch with P.W. 6 over the telephone. P.W. 6 informed P.W. 2 that
he had not received any communication from the Deputy Area Manager, in respect
of the casual telephone connection to P.W. 2. This answer of P.W. 6
necessitated P.W. 2 telephoning the Office of the Deputy Area Manager,
Mambalam, over again, which resulted in his being informed, that even on
22-9-1984, by registered post and telex P.W. 6 had been notified about this
casual telephone connection. P.W. 2 accordingly informed P.W. 6, who promised
to verify the records and inform him.
26. This part of the evidence of P.W. 2 is fully
and completely corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 6, the Assistant Engineer.
P.W. 6 has deposed that at or about 1 p.m. on 29-9-1984 one Murugesan (P.W. 2)
contacted him over the telephone and enquired him about the allotment of a
casual telephone connection in his favour. He promised to verify the records
and take action, if allotment had been made. P.W. 6 has made a note of his
conversation with P.W. 2 on 29-9-1984 in Ex. P. 13, which is his scribbling
pad. On verification of records P.W. 6 noticed, that even on 27-9-1984 advice
with regard to the temporary telephone connection for P.W. 2 had been received
by his Office. The relevant advice note has been marked as Ex. P. 14. The
details in the advice note, Ex.P. 14, have also been incorporated by P.W. 6 in
his note Ex. P. 13. Thereafter at 2 p.m. he got in touch with the first
appellant over the telephone and directed him to take further steps to give a casual
telephone connection at the residence of P.W. 2.
27. Therefore, all that had happened between 12
Noon and 2 p.m. on 29-9-1984, as spoken to by P.W. 2, is amply corroborated by
the evidence of P.W. 6. P.W. 2, a finance broker, who does not appear to be
very affluent, certainly has no animosity against the appellants, to falsely
implicate them in this grave crime. Nothing worthwhile has been elicited from
P.W. 2 to even remotely suggest that he had a motive to falsely implicate the
appellants. All that had happened later, has been deposed to by P.W. 2 and it
is to the following effect.
"At or about 4 p.m. the second appellant,
who had not known P.W. 2 earlier, went over to the house of the latter
introduced himself as the Telephone Inspector, while furnishing information,
that a telephone connection had been ordered in his favour. A-2 also told P.W.
2 that he had come to visit the place to locate the venue of the installation
of the telephone, at the instance of the Junior Engineer, Palania Pillai, who is
the first appellant. According to P.W. 2, A-2 told him that he and A-1 were the
important persons concerned in giving the casual telephone connection to P.W. 2
and that the procedure in giving connection involved several problems and if
P.W. 2 was prepared to pay a bribe of Rs. 300/- to both of them, it was
possible to give the connection even on Monday, which would correlate to
1-10-1984. If the bribe demanded was not paid, there would be delay in
installing the telephone. A-2 further told P.W. 2, that he and A-1 would go
over to the house of the latter at 12 Noon on 1-10-1984. When the telephone
connection would be given, at which time, P.W. 2 must keep Rs. 300/- ready for
payment to them, as demanded".
The evidence of P.W. 2 discloses that he did not
desire to give a bribe, though he has not specifically stated that he informed
A-1 of his unwillingness. This part of the substantive evidence of P.W. 2 is
corroborated by the contents of the first information report Ex. P. 4 lodged by
him before the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation,
Madras, at or about 9-15 a.m. on 1-10-1984. Ex. P. 4 narrates all details from
the stage of P.W. 2 sending an application to the Deputy Area Manager,
Telephones, for a casual telephone connection, leading to his contacting P.W. 6
over the telephone on the afternoon of 29-9-1984 and culminating in the visit
of A-2 to his house at or about 4 p.m. when the demand for a bribe of Rs. 300/-
was made on behalf of both A-2 and A-2 coupled with the promise of giving the
phone connection at 12 Noon on Monday (1-10-1984) when they would go over to
his house to receive the demanded bribe amount, as well. At this stage, it
cannot be overlooked that both A-1 and A-2 had no prior acquaintance with P.W.
2. The facts plainly and crisply stated in Ex. P. 4 by P.W. 2, certainly lands
assurance to his present version in Court. In the entire fabric of the version
of P.W. 2, there appears to be no underlying current of truth. If, in fact, as
claimed by the defence, P.W. 2 had gone over to the Mambalam Exchange External
at or about 9 a.m. on 29-9-1984 and agreed to pay Rs. 300/- as donation, after
learning that a temporary telephone connection had been allotted to him, from
A-1 and A-2, there was no need whatsoever for P.W. 2 to get in touch with P.W.
6, the Assistant Engineer of the Mambalam Exchange External, who himself became
aware of Ex. P. 14, only after the telephone call of P.W. 2 to him past noon on
29-9-1984. The evidence of P.W. 6, a responsible officer of the Mambalam Exchange
External fully confirm the truth of P.W. 2's version. All that had happened at
the Office of the Investigating Officer on 1-10-1984 leading to the preparation
of the extrustment Mahazar Ex. P. 5 and the further actual trip of P.W. 5, the
Inspector of Police S.P.E., C.B.I. in the company of P.Ws. 2 and 3 to the house
of P.W. 2 need not have to detain, us, in view of the admission of the
appellants of their presence at the residence of P.W. 2 at or about 12 Noon on
1-10-1984 and the receipt of Rs. 300/- by A-1 then, from P.W. 2.
28. The next stage relates to all that had
happened at the residence of P.W. 2 on the fateful morning. P.W. 2, in the
company of P.W. 3, an independent witness, working as an Assistant in the
Office of Director, of Inspection, Madras, reached his residence at 11-30 a.m.
Four or Five linemen were engaged in giving the telephone connection. They
finished their work at or about 12 Noon and were waiting in the open space,
outside the residence of P.W. 2. Exactly at 12 Noon, both the appellants came
to the house of P.W. 2 and reached the main hall where P.Ws. 2 and 3 were
seated. A-2 introduced A-1 to P.W. 2. A-1 went over to the toilet, while A-2
started perusing the newspaper. A-1 was having a kerchief in his hand. A-1
asked P.W. 2 to give the money. When P.W. 2 questioned the quantum to be paid,
A-1 directed P.W. 2 to pay cash as told earlier by A-2. P.W. 2 asked A-1 to
take Rs. 200/- instead of Rs. 300/- demanded by A-2, which evoked a reply from
A-1 that P.W. 2 must pay the amount stipulated by A-2. Soon thereafter, P.W. 2
took out Rs. 300/- from his shirt pocket and handed it over to the first
appellant. A-2 suggested counting of the notes by A-1, which the latter did and
kept the currency along with his kerchief in his right hand. P.W. 2 gave the
pre-arranged signal of wiping his face with a kerchief to denote that payment
had been effected to A-1. P.W. 5 thereafter, on noticing the signal given by
P.W. 2, came over to the spot and introduced himself and another mahazar witness
to A-1. P.W. 5 questioned A. 1 as to whether he had received money. This
question of P.W. 5 shocked and stunned P.W. 2 was directed to go out and was
called in again only after about an hour. The investigating officer went away
latter with the accused and the witnesses. The telephone connection was given
on 3-10-1984. P.W. 2 has identified M.Os. 1 to 7 as the currency notes handed
over by him to A-1 and M.O. 8, as the kerchief possessed by A-1 at that point
of time.
29. The happenings inside the house of P.W. 2,
on 1-10-1984 have been spoken to by P.Ws 3 and 5. as well as D.W. 3. P.W. 3 was
called by P.W. 5, on the morning of 1-10-1984 to be a witness for the trap
along with another Raman, not examined. He corroborates the evidence of P.W. 2
of having reached the latter's house around at 11-15 a.m. on 1-10-1984. He has
spoken about the linemen working for installing a telephone, at the residence
of P.W. 2. He sat along with P.W. 2 in the hall. The workmen, after finishing
their work, went out of the house of P.W. 2 at or about 12 Noon. P.W. 5 was
seated in the outer verandah near the window. At or about 12 Noon both the
appellants came inside of the house of P.W. 2 and sat in the hall. A-2
introduced A-1 to P.W. 2 and started perusing the newspaper, while A-1 went to
the toilet. A. 1, when he returned from the toilet, had with him a kerchief.
P.W. 2 served tea. Till this portion the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 fully tally.
However, according to P.W. 3, both the accused asked P.W. 2 to hand over the
money P.W. 2 bargained for the reduction of the demand from Rs. 300/- to Rs.
200/- A-1 replied as follows : "the quantum had already been decided. We
will share this amount. We have to leave the place soon after getting the
amount from you". Thereafter, P.W. 2 took out Rs. 300/- from his shirt
pocket and handed over to A-1. At the instance of A-2, A-1 counted the money
and kept it along with his kerchief. On the signal made by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and
Raman came inside and questioned the accused. On being questioned, the first
appellant was in a state of shock. Before proceeding further with the
discussion of the evidence, it is better to dispose of the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellants that there is a vital divergence between the
evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 with regard to the demand made on 1-10-1984.
While according to P.W. 2, A-1 made the demand and when questioned about the
quantum he wanted to be paid as suggested by A-2 and further the bargain to
reduce, not having fructified, in that A-1 told P.W. 2 that the amount
stipulated by A-2 had to be paid, P.W. 2 offered the bribe amount of Rs. 300/-.
However, P.W. 3 would have it that the demand was made by both A-1 and A-2 and
while the quantum was bargained, A-1 told P.W. 2 that already the deal had been
concluded and both of them will share the proceeds and they were in a hurry to
go, after obtaining the sum fixed, from P.W. 2. It is obvious that there is
divergence in the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 with regard to the actual words
spoken as well as the demand being unilateral or joint. It is seen from the
cross-examination of P.Ws. 3 and 7 that the former had not stated during
investigation that both the accused demanded money from P.W. 2 and that A-1
asked P.W. 2 to give money, as already agreed, since he and A-2 would share the
said money. It is, therefore, apparent that this discrepancy does not
materially effect the basic structure of the prosecution case. Further these
witnesses had deposed in Court in September, 1985, in respect of an occurrence,
which had happened one year ago. Human memory being frail, these minute
details, which do not strike at the root of the prosecution case, will not be
sufficient to throw out the version of P.W. 2, as incredible. It appears that
during investigation, both these witnesses had stated that A-2 made the demand
on 1-10-1984. As I have observed earlier, since payment had been accepted by
the accused, all that needs consideration is, whether the payment was a bribe
made on demand, or a mere passing of money by P.W. 2 as a donation. I am
satisfied that the main facet of the prosecution case that in pursuance of the
demand made by A-2 on 29-9-1984, both the accused had reached the house of P.W.
2 at or about 12 Noon on 1-10-1984, must be true and be it by A-1 or A-2, a
demand had been made from P.W. 2 for the payment of bribe, in pursuance of a
prior understanding between both the accused. That, there must have been a
prior understanding between A-1 and A-2 is clear from the evidence of P.W. 2,
who has spoken in detail about all that had transpired between him and A-2 on
29-9-1984, which has been truthfully put in writing in Ex.P. 4, the earliest
document regarding the demand of bribe. The conduct of the appellants on
1-10-84, affirms this position. Both P.Ws. 2 and 5 have deposed about the
phenolphthalein test administered on A-1, proving positive; but, as stated
earlier, the receipt of money having been accepted, this test may be of no
consequence in this case.
30. P.W. 5 had witnessed the happenings in the
hall of the house of P.W. 2, though he was not able to clearly hear the
conversation between the accused and P.W. 2. He had noticed A-1 receiving
currency from P.W. 2 and retaining it in his right hand along with the
handkerchief. He has also deposed about the state of shock in which A-1 was
found on being questioned. The currency notes were recovered from the nearby
table where A-1 told, that the money had been placed.
31. D.W. 3 is a Mazdoor working in the Mambalam
Exchange External. He is obviously a subordinate of A-1 and A-2. He has deposed
that A-1 had asked him to collect from P.W. 2 the amount due for donation
tickets, if the latter paid him, since he had already handed over the tickets
to P.W. 2. He went along with five workmen to the house of P.W. 2 to give connection.
At or about 12 Noon both the accused came there. The work was in progress. P.W.
2 served tea for all of them. A-1 received the money paid by P.W. 2. D.W. 3 was
standing near the compound at that time, and noticed the aforesaid payment from
there. The C.B.I. police caught hold of A-1. In cross-examination, D.W. 3 has
admitted that he was not asked by A-1, to demand donation from P.W. 2. He was
only asked to take the money in the event of P.W. 2 offering it. The quantum of
donation due was also not informed to him, by A-1. He has frankly admitted that
he was deposing about this fact for the first time in Court on 25-9-1985, more
than a year after the occurrence. It is patent from the evidence of P.W. 7 that
D.W. 3 was examined during investigation and the investigation disclosed that
D.W. 3 was not present in the hall when the money was tendered. Further the
admission of D.W. 3 that he was deposing about the happenings inside the hall
of P.W. 2's house, for the first time in Court would certainly show that he was
trotting out a story, which he did not choose of divulge during investigation.
The evidence of D.W. 3, which does not impress, or inspire confidence cannot
certainly override the positive evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 5. I reject the
evidence of D.W. 3, as an absolute afterthought.
32. The prosecution evidence certainly appears
to merit acceptance. Now, the defence evidence has to be considered from two
different angles. The first approach will be to note, if any dent has been
caused by the defence in the case put forth by the prosecution and secondly if
on the inherent merits of its case, the defence had established by
preponderance of probability, that its case was acceptable, to cast a suspicion
on the basic truth of the prosecution case.
33. The evidence of D.W. 3, has already been
discussed and rejected. The evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 will have to be analysed,
to appreciate the defence, of the money having been paid as donation to A-1, by
P.W. 2. D.W. 1 is a Junior Engineer in the Mambalam External Unit. He has
chosen to prove the tell-tale sheet Ex. D-1. Ex. D-1 is sought to be connected
with the attendance register marked as Ex. D-2. According to him, in the
Telephone Department there are three branches. The first is the Exchange
itself, otherwise described as internal. The second is the external or the
outdoor unit. The final unit is called the cables. All the three units, in this
prosecution, relate to Mambalam Division. These three units operate from
different places. The external or outdoor unit is concerned with the maintenance
of the telephone lines from the distribution point to the subscriber's point,
as well as giving new telephone connections. The movements of the employees of
the outdoor unit, like the Phone Inspector, Linemen and Technicians, will be
entered in the tell-tale sheet. After a perusal of Ex. D-1 relating to
29-9-1984, D.W. 1 has deposed, that between 3-45 p.m. and 4-25 p.m. on
29-9-1984, A-2 was in the external unit, in the Office itself. D.W. 1 has been
cross-examined in extenso by the prosecution. He has frankly admitted that he
is not the author of the entries in Ex. D-1. Two phone Inspectors were in
charge of the entries and one of them was Bhaskaran. The entries have been made
in Ex. D-1 in respect of A-2, by One Inspector in the forenoon and another in the
afternoon. Admittedly Bhaskaran is still in service. D.W. 1 was certain that he
had seen Ex. D-1 for the first time in Court. There was no indication in Ex.
D-1, of its having been verified by higher authorities, in the regular course
of business. The numbers given below the letters "O.D." in Ex. D-1,
would indicate the serial number in the attendance register, marked as Ex. D-2.
At the relevant time, the authority, who had the supervisory power with regard
to Ex. D-1, was the first appellant. He admits that he was subordinate to A-1
and P.W. 6 was their higher authority. To a specific suggestion that the
entries in Ex. D-1 would be made, only when people go out of the unit, he had
answered that it was not so. He has also conceded that he was not the author of
Ex. D-2. Before we scrutinise the entries in Exs. D-1 and D-2, it will be
relevant to refer to the evidence of P.W. 6 regarding tell-tale sheets. He has
deposed that the words "O.D." indicate out door. According to him,
the tell-tale sheet will contain entries as to the time when the linemen and
inspectors had talked over the phone and the place from which they had
conversed. He was not aware as to when exactly, in the tell-tale sheet, the
letters "O.D." would be incorporated. However, he has specifically
denied the suggestion made by the accused, that the letters "O.D."
would show that the employee, working in the unit was inside the office itself.
A perusal of the Exchange tell-tale sheet shows, that there is a column,
christened as fault particulars. This relates to particular telephone numbers,
the time when the fault-complaint was given, the time when it was cleared and
the actual clearance time itself, All these details may have to be
incorporated, in that column. The last column has the heading "clearance".
The very details found in print, in the tell-tale sheet, would show that the
particulars to he noted, may have to relate to the outdoor work and normally
cannot be correlated to the indoor work. Looking at the tell-tale sheet and considering
the evidence of P.W. 6 and D.W. 1, it appears that the evidence of P.W. 6
deserves full credence in the light of the contents of Ex. D-1, and the
evidence of D.W. 1 has to be rejected as untrue. It is rather strange that only
for the entries made in respect of A-2, the letters "O.D." are
written in ink; whereas for the other employees, it has not been so noted. This
is one more factor which even prima facie creates a suspicion of fabrication,
especially when we take note of the fact, admitted by D.W. 1, that A-1 was the
supervisory authority, with regard to this document.
34. The entries in Ex. D-1, were sought to be
correlated with the entries made on the same day, in the attendance register
marked as Ex. D-2. Serial Nos. 30, 34, 35 and 36 are stated to relate to the
second accused, whose name is K. Rasheed Ahmed. The initial of A-2 is put in
this document as K.R. Ex. D-2 shows the following timings against K.R. Against
serial No. 30, 3-45 p.m. is noted; while against 34, it is 4 p.m. and 4-05 p.m.
against serial No. 35. Against serial No. 36, the time noted is 4-25 p.m. Prima
facie it appeared, that this document had been maintained in the regular course
of business, though this document did not indicate that at the relevant timings
noted therein, the persons concerned must be presumed to have worked inside the
office itself. However, a careful scrutiny of this document creates a
substantial doubt about the truth of the entries. Entry 31 is an entry against
some other person at 3-45 p.m. Items 32 and 33 in the left hand column,
referable to 29-9-1984, relate to two other employees, at 4 p.m. The last entry
in the left hand column is No. 34 and it is stated to relate to A-2. However,
on the right hand side after serial No. 35, we have serial No. 32 noted against
some other person at 3-50 p.m. It is, therefore, apparent that after item 31 on
the left hand side on 29-9-1984 at 3-45 p.m. there was no other entry. The next
entry No. 32 at 3-50 p.m. had been made on the right hand side. To provide a
defence, it appears that serial Nos. 32, 33 and 34, on the left side and 35 and
36 on the right side have been purposely entered in this document. If it were
not to be so, it will be very difficult to have serial Nos. 32 in between 35
and 36 on the right hand side. Item 32 relates to an entry at 3-50 p.m., which
fits in with the earlier entry made at 3-45 p.m. noted as item 31. The
interlineation in this document is so patent, that with an ulterior motive of
setting up a defence, this document had been tampered with and so suit Ex. D-2,
obviously D-1 also had been brought into existence. On the basis of this
document, it is not possible to hold that A-2 must have been working inside the
office of the Telephone Exchange at Mambalam between 3-45 p.m. and 4-25 p.m.,
negativing the prosecution case of A-2 having met P.W. 2 at his residence at 4
p.m. on 29-9-1984. If the tell-tale sheet in the corresponding attendance
register must relate to the out door work, it stands to reason that as noted in
item 30, K. R. the second accused had to go out door at 3-45 p.m. on 29-9-1984.
This entry relating to item 30 appears to be real and only thereafter, as put
forth by the prosecution, A-2 had got in touch with P.W. 2 at the latter's
residence. Ex. D-2, instead of helping the defence, has certainly magnified the
truth of P.W. 2's version of A-2 having met him at 4 p.m. on 29-9-1984. If it
could thus be safely concluded that A-2 had met P.W. 2 on 29-9-1984, though
disclaimed by the former, the prosecution case of demand certainly deserves credence.
I have no hesitation in rejecting the evidence of D.W. 1 with regard to Exs.
D-1 and D-2. I further hold that Ex. D-1 and certain entries in Ex. D-2 have
been created for the purpose of shaping the defence.
35. The evidence of D.W. 2, who is a wire man
and the subordinate of A-1 will have to be next considered. Exs. D-3 to D-5 are
sought to be proved through him. It is his evidence that at or about 9 a.m. on
29-9-1984, P.W. 2 was at his office, stating that a telephone connection had
been allotted to him by the Area Manager and was anxious to find out if that
connection could be given, on the same day. He expressed a desire to meet the
Assistant Engineer (P.W. 6). D.W. 2, who learnt, that the area where P.W. 2
lived, was within the jurisdiction of the Junior Engineer (A-1), informed the
said fact to the latter. Both the accused were then available in the Office
along with another Junior Engineer, Iswaran, not examined. P.W. 2 immediately
went over to A-1 and asked him if the telephone connection could be given
immediately. A-1 is stated to have replied that if there was an order for
telephone connection, it could immediately be executed. When P.W. 2 wanted the
connection to be given on the same day, A-2, who was near A-1, told P.W. 2 that
he had to give a donation for their Conference, which was being organised.
According to D.W. 2, P.W. 2 replied that he had no funds then and would make
the payment when they go over to this house for installing the telephone. Three
donation receipts for Rs. 100/- each were given to P.W. 2, who signed on the
counterfoils. Those counterfoils; where P.W. 2 affixed his signatures have been
marked as D. 3 to D-5. Both the accused assured him that if an order had been
received, they would give connection immediately. P.W. 2 thereafter left the
office. In cross-examination D.W. 2 has admitted that he is the Divisional
Secretary of the Union. He was directed on the morning of 1-10-1984 to give the
telephone connection, at the residence of P.W. 2. The relevant order is Ex. P.
16. A-2 has signed in it. Apart from D.W. 2, one Venkatesan was also directed
to attend to this job. D.W. 5 states that he and Venkatesan did not attend to
this work in view of his pre-occupation with Union activities. He had also
audaciously stated that he went out of the Office, without informing anyone
else and he was not aware as to who was deputed to attend to this work, in his
absence. He learnt only on the next day that D.W. 3 was deputed. He has
conceded that he was depositing about all that had happened on the morning of
29-9-1984 for the first time in Court. He admits of the investigating officer
having examined him with reference to Ex. P. 16 and his not having informed the
Inspector of Police about all that had happened on the morning of 29-9-1984. According
to his evidence, each ticket book would contain 5 leaves. He was not aware, in
whose custody the book containing Exs. D-3 to D-5 had been handed over. He
sought to identify the signatures in Exs. D-3 to D-5 as that of P.W. 2, in view
of the said signatures having been affixed in his presence by P.W. 2. A
suggestion put to him, that P.W. 2 did not affix his signatures in Exs. D-3 to
D-5, was denied.
36. P.W. 2 has been extensively questioned on
this portion of the defence case. He has categorically denied that the
signatures found in Exs. D-3 to D-5 were his. According to him, he did not go
to the Office of A-1 on the morning of 29-9-1984 and, therefore, there was no
scope for his having talked with the appellants or D.W. 2. The evidence of P.W.
2 certainly must be true for if as stated by the accused he had already met
them at or about 9 a.m. on 29-9-1984 and told D.W. 2, that already a telephone
connection in his favour had been ordered by the Area Manager, there was no
need for him to have contacted P.W. 6 to find out the position regarding his
application. As soon as he knew from the Office of the Area Manager, that
allotment had been made, he had got in touch with P.W. 6 once at 12 Noon and
again at 1 p.m., as suggested by the Office of the Area Manager. The evidence
of P.W. 2, as stated earlier on this aspect, is not only corroborated by the
oral evidence of P.W. 6, but also by the documentary evidence produced as Ex.
P. 3. That the evidence of P.W. 2 must be true is further strengthened by the evidence
of P.W. 6 that he had informed A-1 over the telephone at 2 p.m. on 29-9-1984
about the allotment of a telephone connection to P.W. 2 with a direction to him
to take further action. The statement of A-1 that he was so informed by P.W. 6
only at 4-30 p.m. cannot be accepted. If the prosecution case of A-2 having met
P.W. 2 at 4 p.m. on 29-9-1984 is acceptable, as already found, the case of A-1,
as though he knew about this telephone connection only at 4-30 p.m. is not
entitled to acceptance.
37. Further the defence evidence is completely
divergent to the stand taken by the accused when they were examined under
Section 313, Cr.P.C. A-2 has accepted the statement of A-1 and had prayed the
Court to treat the statement of A-1 as his, as well, along with the additional
circumstance of his not having visited the house of P.W. 2 on the evening of
29-9-1984, proved by the tell-tale sheet Ex. D-1. A-1 had stated that be made a
demand from P.W. 2 for donation of Rs. 300/- for the Union Conference, which
was readily acceded to by the latter. Thereafter A-2 wrote the name of P.W. 2
in three tickets, which fact was known to D.W. 2 and Iswaran, not examined.
P.W. 2 told him that he would pay later. When the telephone connection was to
be given. He directed A-2 to carry out the work relating to P.W. 2's telephone
on the next day. He also directed D.W. 3, who went for work in P.W. 2's house,
to collect the donation. Then he admits having received Rs. 300/- from P.W. 2
which was a donation and not bribe. The evidence of D.W. 2 is that the donation
was asked for by A-2 and not by A-1. If, in fact, A-1 had asked D.W. 3 to
collect the donation, there was no need for him to visit the house of P.W. 2 at
12 Noon on 1-10-1984. The very visit of A-1 and A-2 at 12 Noon on 1-10-1984
taken in conjunction with the averments in Ex. P. 4, confirmed, by the
substantive evidence of P.W. 2 in Court, leads to the only conclusion, that in
pursuance of the demand made by A-2 for a bribe on 29-9-1984, both the
appellants went to the house of P.W. 2 at 12 Noon on 1-10-1984, and accepted
it. It may not be possible generally, to reject the defence only because it was
inconsistent, but when the defence was palpably false, in the background of
onus cast on them, these conclusions become inevitable. The foundation of the
defence is shattered, since it is palpably false. The prosecution on its own
merit, sans defence, had established its case beyond reasonable doubt against
the appellants.
38. Before closing the consideration of the
defence case, the evidence of the Handwriting Expert, examined by me, will have
to be considered. The evidence of the Expert is categoric that the person who
had written S-1 to S-15 had not written Q-1 to Q-3. I have carefully perused
the evidence of the Expert and I am satisfied that the reasons given by him are
acceptable. I am not taking the evidence of the Expert as conclusive, to arrive
at a conclusion, but I have taken his opinion to lend assurance to my own study
of the admitted and disputed signatures. A close look at the admitted and
disputed signatures with a magnifying glass certainly shows that the author of
Q-1 to Q-3 could not be P.W. 2. The way in which the first four letter
"Muru" have been written in D-3 to D-5 portrays a mechanical
immitation. Even the first letter 'S' is patently at variance, so also the
penultimate letter 'A', and the letter 'g'. It is, of course, true that the
Expert has been cross-examined on, the several movements, pen lifts, pen
pressure, pen score, hesitation symptoms etc. The answers given by the Expert,
on the differences pointed out to him, as natural variations, to my mind, is
certainly acceptable. I am unable to agree that P.W. 2 himself had sought to
forge his signature, by writing differently, in Exs. D-3 to D-5. When I consider
the case law placed before me, I will refer to the authoriative text books, on
handwriting and finger prints with specific reference to the passages brought
to my notice by the learned counsel for the appellants. Suffice to say that I
am satisfied that P.W. 2 had not signed Exs. D-3 to D-5 and the case of the
defence that P.W. 2 had signed those documents on 29-9-1984, has to be
rejected, outright.
39. While considering Exs. D-3 to D-5, the trial
Judge had taken note of the documents filed along with the statement of A-1.
Those documents show that A-1 had functioned as President of the Southern
Division between 1978 and 1984. It may, therefore, be that A-1 was taking an
active interest in the Union activities. However, as rightly pointed out by the
trial Judge, there is no material placed before the Court to hold that A-1 had
a leading role in organising the All India Conference at Madras between 12th
and 16th October, 1984. As stated earlier, we do not have any evidence from the
signatories, who were office-bearers, found in those documents as having
authorised the appellants to collect donation. It may be that the defence need
not have to prove its case by strict standards of proof, as is expected of the
prosecution, but, at the same time, when a partial onus is thrust on them, the
defence must basically inspire confidence, as probable. That inspiration is not
forthcoming in the defence trotted out in this case.
40. In paras 16 and 19 I have already considered
four of the cases relating to the appreciation of evidence of hand-writing
experts. Two other cases have been cited on this aspect, which I will presently
refer to.
41. In Iswari Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa , the
Supreme Court while considering S. 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, regarding
relevancy of opinions of experts held, that the evidence given by experts of
handwriting can never be conclusive, because it was after-all opinion evidence.
In that case the Supreme Court, sans the evidence of the two experts, who
contradicted themselves, arrived at the conclusion that the evidence given by
the attesting witnesses, the scribe and the appellant, was wholly satisfactory
to prove execution of the document by the respondent and that the said evidence
did not really need to be corroborated by the opinion of experts. On facts, in
this appeal, P.W. 2, having denied his signatures in Exs. D-3 to D-5 and the
evidence of D.W. 3 having been rejected, and my comparison of the admitted and
the disputed writings of P.W. 2, having been found to enure in favour of the prosecution,
the evidence of expert has played only a minor role, in helping me to arrive at
my conclusions. Further, the expert evidence has not been considered, for proof
of the prosecution case, but only to the limited extent of the defence case
being probable by preponderance.
42. In Ram Narayan v. State of U.P. the Supreme
Court held that the opinion of the handwriting expert given in evidence was no
less fallible than any other expert opinion, but such opinion was worthy of
acceptance if there was internal and external evidence relating to the writing
in question supporting the expert's view. The question in each case calls for
determination on the Court's appreciation of evidence. Ultimately the facts
unfurled in each case, would dictate to the Court, the weight that could be
attached to the evidence of expert in the light of its own observation relating
to the admitted and the disputed writings. As I have already held, on reasons
assigned by me that P.W. 2 had not written Exs. D-3 to D-5, no further discussion
on the expert's evidence would be necessary. However, reference to text-books
cited by Sri N. T. Vanamamalai need mention. H. R. Hardless in his book
"Handwriting and Thumb-print Identification and forensic Science, 1970
Edition, has stated at page 2 that a competent expert assigns reasons for his
opinion in a report. The reasons are specific and not mere generalities and the
points of similarity or dissimilarity marked and indicated in the photographs
are both apparent and appealing to laymen. An expert's opinion is accepted by a
Court when the reasons given are both apparent and convincing. At page 10 that
Author has stated as follows :-
"These persons are unaware of the fact that
variations in the signatures of the same person must exist in the forms of
corresponding letters. A human hand is not a printing machine to give
exactitude in regard to forms of letters on all occasions and under different
occasions".
On these passages it was argued that the expert
has not specifically dealt with the similarities and the opinion being general
would be of no probative value. Further, in view of the human hand not being a
printing machine, allowances should have been given by the expert on the
features like pen pressure, pen score, pen lifts, hesitation, quality of paper
etc. As I have discussed earlier, the expert has been cross-examined and I am
satisfied, that he has offered his opinion, in the background of these features
and the variations pointed out by the defence between the admitted and the
disputed signatures, were only natural.
43. Mehta in his book on "Handwriting
Identification and Finger prints" has stated at page 38 that the pen
pressure of a forged writing is usually not smooth and it shows a varying
density due to the constant interruptions in movement and speed. At pages 47,
48, 49, 51 and 52 the Author refers to the writing habits viz., (1) The
movement of writing;
(2) The Pen position;
(3) The pen pressure;
(4) The shading;
(5) The relative positions of the letters;
(6) The formation of the letters;
(7) The alignment;
(8) The spacing;
(9) The variations;
(10) The slant;
(11) The arrangement;
(12) The style;
(13) The condition of the strokes;
(14) The size and proportions; and (15) The
general execution.
The Author states that these are other technical
reasons which are advanced by the experts. Though the expert has been
questioned in general on these aspects, specific passages from the Authors had
not been brought to his notice to furnish him an opportunity to explain his
opinion on that basis. The expert has stated in his evidence that the
characteristics in the handwriting in Exs. D-3 to D-5 differed significantly
from the standard handwriting, which included among other things the five
categories suggested by the defence. The expert has also answered that he had
noticed all the characteristics, though he had not specified them in the
report. I am satisfied that the dissimilarities noticed by him in the admitted
and the disputed writings would be sufficient to hold against the defence. To
arrive at my conclusion of dissimilarities, the expert's opinion was to some
extent helpful and the findings against the accused are not based solely on the
evidence of the expert. Therefore, the discussion on expert's evidence need not
have to detain us any more.
44. The Supreme Court has considered the
presumption under S. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the
essentials to be proved, in several of its pronouncements. The consistent view
is that to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act, the prosecution
has to prove that the accused had received gratification other than legal
remuneration. When it was shown that the accused had received a certain sum of
money, which was not his legal remuneration, the condition prescribed by the
section was satisfied and the presumption must be raised. Further the more
receipt of money would be sufficient to raise the presumption. On the onus cast
on the accused, the Supreme Court has held that the burden of proof lying upon
the accused under Section 4(1) of the Act would be satisfied if he established
his case by preponderance of probability, as is done by a party in civil
proceedings. It was not necessary that he should establish his case by the test
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Useful reference could be made in the
following decisions :
(1) ; (V. D. Jhignan v. State of U.P.), (2) ;
(C. I. Emden v. State of U.P.), (3) ; (Mansingh v. Delhi Administration), (4)
1983 LW (Crl) Short Notes page 7 (R. Poova Gounder In Re.)
45. On the need and the nature of corroboration
required for demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the Supreme Court
in State of U.P. v. G. K. Ghosh observed that in a case of offence of demanding
and accepting illegal gratification, depending on the circumstances of the
case, the Court may feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis
of the oral evidence of the complainant and the police officers, even if the
trap witnesses turned hostile or were found not to be independent. When
deciding such evidence, if there was circumstantial evidence, which was consistent
with the guilt of the accused and not inconsistent with his innocence, there
should be no difficulty in upholding the prosecution case.
46. In Kishnanchand v. State of Rajasthan the
Supreme Court while dealing with the circumstantial evidence in a bribery case,
where the complainant had died prior to the commencement of the trial, observed
that the visit of the accused to the factory of the complainant-demand of bribe
by the accused from complainant-visit of complainant and raiding party to the house
of the accused - accused asking complainant whether he brought money-the latter
taking out the currency notes from his diary and giving the same to the accused
- accused keeping them under pillow of his cot-recovery of currency notes and
numbers tallied with memorandum already prepared events subsequent to prior
demand, remaining unexplained by accused it could not be said that there was no
evidence of prior demand - accused could not be said to be unwilling victing
nor a pence sitter. In the same case the Supreme Court held, that so-called
inner variations between the evidence of those two witnesses (mahazar
witnesses) and omissions of trivial details, would not cause any dent in the
testimony of those two witnesses. The case on hand will be covered by this
decision with the additional circumstances of the availability of the evidence
of the complainant himself, who has been examined as P.W. 2.
47. In Prakash Chand v. State , considering S. 8
of the Indian Evidence Act and the necessity for corroboration of the evidence
of the trap witness, the Supreme Court observed that where circumstances
justified it, a Court may refuse to act upon the uncorroborated testimony of a
trap witness. On the other hand, a Court may well be justified in acting upon
the uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, if the Court was satisfied from
the facts and circumstances of the case that the witness was a witness of
truth. However, in Pannalal D. Rathi v. State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court
held that there could be no doubt that evidence of the complainant should be
corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of S. 165-A of the
Indian Penal Code, making the person, who offers bribe, guilty of abetment of
bribery, the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an
accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused
with the crime has to be insisted upon.
48. In a later case reported in 1980 (II) SCWR
161 : (1980 Cri LJ 564). (Hazharilal v. State), the Supreme Court observed that
there was no rule of prudence which had crystallised into a rule of law, nor
indeed any rule of prudence, which required that the evidence of such officers
should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplice and there
should be insistence of corroboration.
49. In the State of Gujarat v. Raghunath the
Supreme Court had the following observations to make (at page SC 1094; AIR
1985) :
"...... In appreciating oral evidence, the
question in each case is whether the witness is a truthful witness and whether
there is anything to doubt his veracity in any particular matter about which he
deposes. Where the witness is found to be untruthful on material facts that is
an end of the matter. Where the witness is found to be partly truthful or to
spring from tainted sources, the Court may take the precaution of seeking some
corroboration, adequate and reasonable to meet the demands of the situation,
but a court is not entitled to reject the evidence of a witness merely because
they are government servants, who, in the course of their duties or even
otherwise, might have come into contact with investigating officers and who
might have been requested to assist the investigating agencies. If their
association with the investigating agencies is unusual, frequent or designed,
there may be occasion to view their evidence with suspicion. But merely because
they are called in to associate themselves with the investigation as they
happened to be available or it is convenient to call them, it is no ground to
view their evidence with suspicion. Even in cases where officers who, in the
course of their duties, generally assist the investigating agencies, there is
no need to view their evidence with suspicion as an invariable rule
........", The net result of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, is to
the effect, that depending on the facts of each case the need for corroboration
of the trap witness or the attesting witness may have to be decided and any
need for corroboration, cannot be universally relegated to a strait jacket
formula. On facts, the evidence of P.W. 2 is not only true, but has also been
corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of P.W. 3, whose presence
at the time of trap, has been accepted by the appellants. The contents of the first
information report also corroborate the oral evidence of P.W. 2. The actual
passing of money by P.W. 2 to A-2 has been noticed by P.W. 5, as well. I have
no hesitation in accepting the evidence of P.W. 2 which is corroborated in
material particulars, by the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 5 and the other
circumstantial evidence.
50. The Supreme Court in J. L. Surange v. State
of Maharashtra held as follows (at page SC 358; AIR 1970 :-
"Held, that the accused could be rightly
convicted under Section 5(1)(d) and S. 161 Penal Code as the circumstances
found against the accused were (i) that he informed complainant that his name
was entered in the records although he kept the entries open and his plea that
he did so for demanding money for Small Savings Certificates was wrong, (ii) No
receipt was given by the accused to the complainant for the amount received
(iii) along with the amount he did not ask for an application signed by the
complainant for purchase of certificates which was an essential thing. (iv) On
the very first occasion when the accused was asked by his superior authorities
he did not put forward the explanation that the alleged sum was received by him
for purchase of certificates (v) the sum was accepted not in the office or in
the house of accused but at the house of a third person (vi) there was nothing
on the record to show that there was any enmity between the accused and the
complainant".
In this Appeal, we have the following
circumstances :
(1) A. 2 had informed the complainant that a
casual telephone connection had been allotted to the latter and that
complications in immediately providing telephone connection could be overcome
by payment of bribe of Rs. 300/- for him and A-1 which could lead to the
installation of of phone even on 1-10-1984 :
(2) The Statement of A-2 to P.W. 2 that the
non-payment of bribe as demanded would entail a delay in the installation of
the casual telephone connection;
(3) The Statement of A-2 that both A-1 and A-2
would visit the house of the complainant on 1-10-1984 to receive the demanded
amount and simultaneously give the phone connection;
(4) The presence of the appellants on 1-10-1984
at 12 Noon, at the residence of P.W. 2 in pursuance of a prior arrangement and
acceptance of Rs. 300/- by A-1 from P.W. 2.
(5) On the very first occasion when A-1 was
questioned by P.W. 5, he did not put forth an explanation, as though the
alleged sum was received by him as a donation for the Annual Conference;
(6) Not having intimated their higher
authorities about the receipt of Rs. 300/- as donation, by the appellants,
though they had received a copy of Ex. P. 9, the seizure mahazar, which
contains the details of Rs. 300/- having been paid by P.W. 2 as a bribe; and,
(7) There was nothing on record to show that there was any enmity between the
accused and the complainant.
These circumstances clinchingly connect the
appellants with the crime and more so when the defence has been rejected as a
complete afterthought.
51. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court
in Sumanlal v. State of Gujarat (1977 Cr. LJ 626) while considering the scope
of S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code, held that amount received by a public
servant from the complainant, for doing an official act, even if received as
contribution to Flag Day Fund, the case filed under Section 161, IPC, and the
conviction under Section 161 read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act were justified. If a public servant insisted upon a particular payment,
which did not amount to a legal remuneration as consideration for discharge of
his duties, he did commit an act amounting to an offence, even though it was
found that he had received the amount not for his personal purpose, but for a
charitable purpose. Discharge of duties, which are of public nature, cannot be
refused and any payment a condition precedent cannot be imposed, however
laudable the cause may be.
52. On facts, I have held that the defence case
of Rs. 300/- having been paid as donation for the Conference was not entitled
to credence. The case law put forth before me by the appellants does not help
them. The evidence extracted in detail by me certainly indicate that the
appellants had acted in unison and it will not be possible to exclude either of
them from the charges framed against them. The judgment of the Trial court
convicting the appellants as charged is perfectly justified, and needs no
interference. The sentence imposed is only the minimum sentence, which has to
be unhasitatingly sustained. The appeal fails and it is dismissed.
53. Appeal dismissed.
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