MADRAS HIGH COURT
P. PATHRAKAH NADACHI VS V. SUBBIAH NADAR ON 19
AUGUST, 1980
Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Introduction:
This appeal has been referred to this Bench because Mohan J.
before whom it came up for hearing, was of the view that there is a difference
of opinion between Ananchaperumal v. Muthiah, 1944 Trav LR 595; (34 Trav LJ
503) (FB) and Shanmughathayee Animal v. Devasahayarn Nadar, AIR 1954 Trav Co
497: ILR (1954) Trav Co 826 (FB), on the question whether custom prevalent
among the Hindu Nadar Christians in the matter of succession is obliterated by
reason of the Travancore Christian Succession Act (Travancore Act 11 of 1092 M.
E.) and hence an authoritative ruling by a Bench' of this court would be highly
desirable.
Facts of the Case:
The brief narration of facts required for determination of the
question. of law is as given under. One Ponnammal under the original of Ex. B-2
dated 29-51095 M, E., had purchased the suit property corresponding to 13-1-1920.
This Ponnammal was originally married to a person of Poothapandi and through
him she had a son and a daughter by name Gnanaprakasi who later embrased the
Christian faith. After the death of her husband, Ponnammal married a second
husband, by name, Elapyaperumal and through him she had two sons, viz. the
first defendant (Kutti Nadar) and one Poliah Nader. Ponnammal died in or about
the year 1099 M. E.
The plaintiff's case was that Elayaperumal had purchased - the
suit property benami in the name of Ponnammal. He claimed,that after
Ponnammmal's death, her sons succeeded to.the property and were dealing with it
as owners thereof and h6 had purchased the southern half portion of the
property from Polishfiadar one of the sons of Pininammal, under a registered
sale deed dated 9-7-1949,- Ex. A-1.
He claimed that subsequent to the purchase he was in possession
and enjoyment of the southern portion and he had also redeemed a mortgage over
the property, but, inasmuch as the first defendant, taking advantage of the,
property not having been divided by metes and ,bounds, attempted to commit
encroachment by extending his house to the southern portion of the property, it
had become necessary for him to approach the court to effect a partition of the
property into northern and southern portions and delineate the boundaries.
Besides claiming title under the sale deed, the plaintiff also claimed title by
adverse possession.
Observation of Court:
We are of opinion that the legal propositions extracted above are
undoubtedly indisputable, but what has been overlooked by the counsel is that
what we are now called upon to decide is, not about the wisdom and equitable
nature of the customary law, but whether it continued to have operative force
in spite of the inroads made into it by the Christian Succession Act. Examined
from that angle, the passages do not have any relevance to the debate in the
appeal. Another passage is also 'cited by the counsel and that is found at page
161 of Mullah's Hindu Law, 14th Edn. and the passage relates to the effect of
the Caste Disabilities Removal Act.
We do not think to is a fit case for granting certificate because,
firstly, the question of law involved is not of such general importance as
needs determination by the Supreme Court, and, secondly, after the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 came into force, the question as to whether Christian
Nadars can claim right of succession to the properties owned by their Hindu
relations on the foot of customary law, which itself, in our opinion, became
obliterated by reason of the passing of the Travancore-Cochin Succession Act,
cannot at all arise.
Judgement:
Hence, we decline to grant leave, Appeal dismissed.
------------------------------------------------------------
Complete Judgement
MADRAS HIGH COURT
P. PATHRAKAH NADACHI VS V. SUBBIAH NADAR ON 19 AUGUST, 1980
Try out our Premium Member services: Virtual
Legal Assistant, Query Alert Service and an ad-free experience. Free for one
month and pay only if you like it.
Equivalent citations:
AIR 1981 Mad 287, (1981) 1 MLJ 463
Author: Natarajan
Bench: Natarajan,
Sethuraman
JUDGMENT Natarajan, J.
1. This appeal has been referred to this Bench
because Mohan J. before whom it came up for hearing, was of the view that there
is a difference of opinion between Ananchaperumal v. Muthiah, 1944 Trav LR 595;
(34 Trav LJ 503) (FB) and Shanmughathayee Animal v. Devasahayarn Nadar, AIR
1954 Trav Co 497: ILR (1954) Trav Co 826 (FB), on the question whether custom
prevalent among the Hindu Nadar Christians in the matter of succession is
obliterated by reason of the Travancore Christian Succession Act (Travancore
Act 11 of 1092 M. E.) and hence an authoritative ruling by a Bench' of this
court would be highly desirable.
2. The 3rd defendant in 0. S. No. 18 of 1968 on
the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Padmanabhapuram, who succeeded
before the trial Court, but lost the case before the Subordinate Judge,
Padmanabhapuram, in A. S. No. 245 of 1972 on the file of this court is the
appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to in the
order of their array in the trial Court.
3. The brief narration of facts required for
determination of the question. of law is as given under. One Ponnammal under
the original of Ex. B-2 dated 29-51095 M, E., had purchased the suit property
corresponding to 13-1-1920. This Ponnammal was originally married to a person
of Poothapandi and through him she had a son and a daughter by name
Gnanaprakasi who later embrased the Christian faith. After the death of her
husband, Ponnammal married a second husband, by name, Elapyaperumal and through
him she had two sons, viz. the first defendant (Kutti Nadar) and one Poliah
Nader. Ponnammal died in or about the year 1099 M. E.
4. The plaintiff's case was that Elayaperumal
had purchased - the suit property benami in the name of Ponnammal. He
claimed,that after Ponnammmal's death, her sons succeeded to.the property and
were dealing with it as owners thereof and h6 had purchased the southern half
portion of the property from Polishfiadar one of the sons of Pininammal, under
a registered sale deed dated 9-7-1949,- Ex. A-1. He claimed that subsequent to
the purchase he was in possession and enjoyment of the southern portion and he
had also redeemed a mortgage over the property, but, inasmuch as the first
defendant, taking advantage of the, property not having been divided by metes
and ,bounds, attempted to commit encroachment by extending his house to the
southern portion of the property, it had become necessary for him to approach
the court to effect a partition of the property into northern and southern
portions and delineate the boundaries. Besides claiming title under the sale
deed, the plaintiff also claimed title by adverse possession. The plaintiff,
besides impleading the 2nddefendant who is the son of the first defendant, also
impleaded the first defendant's wife as the 3rd defendant on the ground that
the 3rd defendant claimed to have acquired title , to the property by means of
a sale deed executed by Gnanprakasi. The plaintiff's case was that Gnanprakasi
who had become an apostate had no title to the property and hence any sale deed
executed by her was invalid and ineffective.
5. The case of the defendants, as set out in the
written statements filed by them, was that Ponnammal was not a benamidar, but
was the absolute owner of the suit property and she purchased the property from
out of the funds derived by her by sale of a property left to her by her first
husband. They claimed that notwithstanding Gnanaprakasi embracing Christianity,
she succeeded to the property on the death of her mother Ponnammal in
accordance with the custom or usage prevalent among the Nadars in Travancore
State. In other words, they claimed that - the principles of Hindu law governed
the rights of parties -and therefore, the daughter succeeded to the properties
of her mother in preference to the sons notwithstanding her -conversion to
Christianity. They disputed the plaintiff's claim of acquisition of title by
hostile possession.
6. The trial Court found that Ponnammal was the
absolute owner of. The property and that she was riot a benamidar. It further
found that notwithstanding the apostasy of Gnanaprakasi, ship, succeeded to the
properties -of Ponnammal in accordance with the' customary law governing the
Nadars of.;Hindu and Christian faiths in Travancore State and the customarv law
had not been affected in any manner by the State enacting the Travancore
Christian Succession Act and, as such, sale deed executed by Gnanaprakasi in
favour of the 3rd defendant was a valid and enforceable one. The trial court
further found that the plaintiff. had not derived title to the southern portion
of the property either under the sale deed executed by Poliah Nadar or by
adverse possession. Consequently, the trial Court sustained the case of the
defendants and dismissed the suit.
7. In the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the
lower appellate court confirmed the trial Court's finding on the question of
adverse possession and,about Ponnammal being the absolute owner of the
property. But, in so far as the rights of Gnanaprakasi are concerned, the
appellate court followed the ratio laid down in Ananchaperumal v. Muthiah, 34
Trav LJ 503: 1944 Trav LR 595 (FB) and held that after the passing of the
Travancore Christian Succession Act, Gnanaprakasi had no right to inherit the
estate of her mother and the estate devolved only on the two sons of Ponnammal.
In accordance with that conclusion, the appellate Court upheld the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff and passed a preliminary decree in his favour for
partition and separate possession of the southern half share in the suit
property. It is against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate Court,
the 3rd defendant has filed the second appeal.
8. In view of the concurrent findings of the
courts below that Ponnammal was the full owner of the suit property and not
merely a benamidar and that the plaintiff had not acquired title to the half
share by adverse possession, it is not open to the respondents' counsel to
canvass the correctness of those findings and Miss 0, K. Sridevi, Aearned
counsel, frankly conceded this position. Therefore the only question requiring
consideration by us is whether the custom prevalent among the Nadars of the
erstwhile Travancore State that conversion to Christianity was not a bar for
inheriting the properties of the original family had become obliterated by
reason of the enactment of the Travancore Christian Succession Act.
9. Mr. Selvaraj, learned counsel for the
appellant, in support of his contention that among the 14adars of the erstwhile
Travancore State, conversion to Christianity was not a bar for a male
coparcener to inherit, properties belonging to tke caparcenary in accordance
with the principles of Hindu Law, and likewise, for a daughter to inherit
property belonging to her mother as per the custom prevailing in that State,
relied upon the admissions made by the plaintiffs' witnesses in their evidence
and also upon the ruling of the erstwhile Travancore High Court in some cams.
P.W. I admitted in cross-examination that in his family there are Hindus as
well as Christians and it a suitable bridegroom was available in a Christian
Nadar family, alliance would be sought fdr Hindu Nadar girls. P.W. 3, a close
relation of Ponnammal, admitted that by reason of conversion into Christianity
a Hindu Nadar male member will not be treated as an apostate and likewise, a
Hindu Nadar girl marrying a Christian will not be sent out of the family. By
reason of their evidence, the courts below have held that a custom was
prevalent in that part of the country among the members of the Nadar community
that conversion to Christianity would not operate as a bar for inheriting the
properties in the original Hindu family, The prevalence of this custom received
judicial recognition in the following case. In Sivanaduma Nadar v.
Gopalakrishna Pillai~ 22 Trav LR 246, it was held that by custom among the
Shanars, conversion does act deprive the convert of his rights to inherit a
share in his -family properties nor deprive him of his right to management. It
was pointed out in that case that the principle that degradation from caste
which accompanies conversion entailed forfeiture of a man's civil status and
loss of caste and likewise, that conversion operated as civil death under Hindu
law, would not apply to lower orders of Hindu society, since they had no
recognised status and they lost nothing by change of faith. The court noticed
that social intercourse between converts and non-converts continued as free as
ever and claims of inheritance by the converts were recognised. The decision in
the abovesaid case was, followed in Muthiah Nadar v. Bhagavaibi Pillai Nadachi
(1932) 22 Trav LJ 60 and the court held that there existed among Shanars a
practice by which a convert was ,given a- share in the ancestral property
notwithstanding, his change of religion and among Shanars change of religion
worked no forfeiture of the civil rights of the convert in the original family.
10.The correctness of the view taken in Muthiah
Nadar, v. Magavathi Fillet Wadachi,(I932) 22 Trav-LJ,60 came to be considered
by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Ananchaperumal Nader v. Muthiah
Nadar, 34 Trav IJ 503: 1944 Trav LR 595 (FB). In separate but concurring
judgments, Krishnaswanki Iyer C. J. and Krishna Pill4 J. laid down that the
usage permitting an apostate to succeed having prevailed only under conditions
where Hindu Law governed both the deceased and thq heir, there is no scope left
after the Christian Succession Act for the usage to operate; the result of the
Act was to abrogate the usage in its entirety as regards the Christian converts
for whom it established a fresh Code of Rules of succession in substitution of
Hindu Law..Abraharn J. took a different view and gave dissenting judgment.
Giving his reason for disapproving the ratio adopted in Muthiah Nadar v.
Bhagavathi Pillai Nadachi, (1932) 22 Trav 11 60, Krishnaswami Iyer C. J. held
as follows.-
"In arriving at a decision, the learned
Judges, in (19321 22 Trav LJ 60 had reference only to the usage amongst Shsnars
and never adverted to another important factor that had arisen for
consideration even then in the case, viz. the effect upon the usage obtaining
amongst the Shanars of the passing of the Christian Succession Act of 10ft M. R
There could be no doubt that, as an authority on the points decided them, we
should undoubtedly, have followed the decision in (1932) 22 Trav 11 60, had we
not to consider in the present the further point riot raised and considered in
(11932) 22 Trav Li 60 vm, that effect, of the passing of the Christian
Succession Act. 1092 M. X involving a more careful definition and understanding
the usage than was then called for."
Later down, dealing with the usage prevalent
amongst the Nadar community, the learned Chief Justice spoke as follows--'
"It must be noticed that the usage, as !1as been established and as
recognised in the~ cases of this court, was limited to circumstances of a
three-fold character -7(l) the converts were converts to Christianity; (2),
Both the converts and the non-converts as between whom the question of
succession or survivorship may arise, were governed by the Writ Law in general;
(3) Both of them were governed by one system of inheritance under the Hindu
law, In this sense that all of them were regarded as belonging to one fold of
persons governed by the tie of the common Hindu Law with possible mutual rights
of succession, or. survivorship. These appear to me to be the true conditions
of the usage, and the question now arises, as to the effect of the Christian
Succession Act upon that usage. It has been contended that the usage as a usage
meant no more than this, that amongst Hindu Nadars apostasy as a ground of
exclusion from inheritance stood completely abolished and the rules. of
succession and survivorship under the Hindu Law, were not limited by any other
considerations. I feel myself entirely unable to overlook the precise facts and
circumstances governing the usage. Where a usage in variance with the law has
been established to prevail amongst persons governed by the Hindu law, the
advantages and disadvantages resulting from that usage must be preserved in all
their integrity in Livery individual case to which the usage is sought to be
applied. Where a Hindu Madar can be an heir to a Christian Madar and vice versa
and as between such Nadars following the Hindu Law, the usage excluded the
disqualification of exclusion from inheritance on the ground of apostasy, is it
permissible to infer that the usage can subsist where, under changed
conditions, the Hindu , Nadar could not succeed to the Christian Nadar under
the Hindu Law as theretofore and this disparity has arisen by a statutory
interference? It appears to me that it is of the essence of the usage that the
person'succeeding anct the person succeeded to must both be governed by Hindu
law for the usage to qpply But where the apostate becomes not only an apostate
to the Hindu faith but also become an apostate to the Hindu law, if I may use
that expression. I find it impossible to predicate that the known usage could
at all apply to those conditions. Usage must be based upon what has been
observed and what has been done. The applicability of usage to these changed
conditions would only be an attempt, I believe, in effectual, to extend the
usage and not to apply the usage in its original integrity In the conditions
and the atmosphere under which it prevailed "
Krishna Pillai J. who concurred with the view of
the learned Chief Justices, gave expression to his view in the following manner
"The time-honoured custom pf Christians being recognised as forming part
of a Hindu family was thus effectively put an end to, with the result, that the
Hindu law, purged of the custom, - became - thereafter the law governing the
Hindu sect and the Christian Succession Act untainted by the custom which had,
become obnoxious to the Christian Nadars was made the basic law for all matters
of success*on and inheritance amongst them. In this view, it is not possible to
see how any part of the custom which was so abrogated can be said to have
survived the Act. To concede that survivorship was destroyed, but reversion
continued, is to say the least illogical".
11. We shall refer to the dissenting judgment of
Abraham J. at a later stage, since Mr. Selvaraj placed reliance on that
judgment and canvassed for its acceptance. In the later Full Bench case, which,
according to the learned single Judge, appeared to conflict with the view taken
in Ananchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah Nadar. 34 Trav Li 503; 1944 Trav LR 595
(FB), the controversy was limited in scope and did not deal with the general
question as to the impact made by the Christian Succession Act on the customary
law of succession followed by the Nadars. What arose for consideration in
Shanmughathavi Ammal v. Devasahavarn Nader. ILR (19M) Trav-Co 826 : AIR 1954
TravCo 497 (FB) was whether a Nadar Christian woman who succeeded to the
properties left by her husband as a limited owner in accordance with the
principles of Hindu Witakshara law followed by them can be deemed to have
acquired absolute title to the properties by reason of the Christian Succession
Act being enacted. Inter alia a question was raised whether the second
plaintiff in that suit, who was born a Christian, could lay claim to the
property as a rev46rsioner on the footing that succession amongst Christians
Nadar was governed by the principles of Hindu law as per custom. The Full Bench
held that since the last full owner died in 1068 M. E. L e before the Christian
Succession Act was enacted, the second plaintiff, though a Christian, was
entitled to claim reversionary rights on the basis of the customary law. On the
other question regV# the enlargement of rights of the I Red female owner, the
Full Bench pointed out that under Sec. 3 of the Christian Succession Act, the
provisions of the Regulation would not apply to any Intestacy occurring before
the date on which the Regulation came into force.' The Full Bench followed the
ratio ig WO earlier cases, viz.--Gumamony v. Chempakakutty, (1212) 2 Traw LT
574 v, and Narayans. Muthu v. Abrahan, (1935) 25 Trav LJ 766,and deelined to
follow the view taken in Akkanchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah Nadar, 34 Trav LJ
503:.1944 Trav LR 595 (FB), and held that the Christian Succession Act
contained no provision which would justify the court holding that a widow's
estate would get converted into an absolute estate by -the passing of the
Christian Succession Act.We may mention here that in Ananchaperumal Nadar v.
Muthiah Nhdar, 34 Trav LJ 503: 1944 Trav LR 595 (FB) it was held that the
limited estate held by Nadar woman under the Hindu law became converted into
absolute estate with full powers under the Christian Succession Act .It is only
with this statement of law that. the latter Full Bench differed and held that
it cannot approve of that statement. In such circumstances, we have to point
-but that as far as the debate contained in the second appeal is concerned,
there is no conflict of views between Ananchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah Nadar, 34
Trav Li 503: 1944 Trav LR 595 (FB) and Shanmughathayi Animal v. Devasahayam
Nadar, ILR (1954) Trav Co 826: AIR 1954 Trav Co 497 (FB).
12. In view of this position, we can dispose -of
the appeal by holding that the first appellate Judge has applied the correct
principles of law and decreed the suit and as such the appeal must fail.
However_ Mr. Selvaraj contended before us that we should independently examine
the correctness of the ratio laid down in Ananchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah
Nadar, 34 Trav Li 503: 1944 Trav LR 595 (FB) and render judgment in the case.
Learned counsel stated that the Christian Succession Act had been enacted only
to consolidate and amend the rules of law applicable to intestate succession
among the Indian Christians in. Travancore and the legislation had not
interfered with or abrogated the customary law followed by the Hindu Nadars of
Travancore State, which permitted members of Nadar families belonging to the
Christian faith also being admitted to inheritance and succession. Learned
counsel argued or impliedly impinge upon the, usage adopted by the Hindu Nadars
in refraining from treating the converts to Christianity as apostates and
instead, treating them as members of the family and admitted them to succession
in accordance with the principles of Hindu Law. As such, - any change brought
about by the Christian Succession Act to regulate the law of succession
relating to Christian converts cannot have the effect of ' extinguishing the
customary law followed by the Nadars of the Hindu faith and consequently, the
customary law will continue to govern the Hindu and Christian Nadars so far as
the rights of succession to properties left behind by Hindu Nadars are
concerned. To put it differently, the submission of learned counsel was that
though the converts would, subsequent to the passing of the Act, be governed by
the Christian Law of succession. the non converts i.e., Hindus would continue
to be governed by the old and subsisting law governing them. In this context,
learned counsel. placed very great reliance on the dissenting judgment of
Abraham J. in Ananchaperumal Nadar V. Muthiah Nadar, 34 Trav LJ 503; 1944 Trav
LR 595 (FB). The relevant portions in the judgment read as follows:-
"Indeed, the gist of the argument was that
with the passing of the Christian Succession Act which applied to the Nadar
converts, the usage primarily existing stood abrogated, for want of mutuality.
It seems to me impossible to accept this argument for the simple reason that in
spite of the Christian Succession Act ' the law of the Hindu Nadar remained the
same and should govern the devolution of his property. Part of that law was an
established usage whereby apostasy did not work any forfeiture of rights to
property or succession There was absolutely no disqualification from the
religious, social or proprietary point of view. The disqualification was
removed not by Hindu Law, but in spite of it and by custom. If, in those
circumstances, before the Christian Succession Act came into force, family properties
had be actually divided between the convert and his Hindu relations, such
division would not still have re-introduced any peculiar disqualification or
abrogated the custom in use. The Christian Succession Act practically brought
about this division by transforming the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common.
Parcenership and its concomitent survivorship ceased to exist. That was all.
The convert would, therefore, thereafter, be governed by the Christian Law of
succession and ' the Hindu, by the old and subsisting law governing him."
13. Eventually, Abraham J. held as follows:-
"If any change is deemed necessary, it
should be, brought about by legislation, and not by judicial interference. It
is not for the court to make up for any mutuality previously enjoyed, , by
.changing the law for the Hindu Nadars -what it now obtains?"
14. Mr. Selvaraj submitted -that, the view taken
by the dissenting judge, Abraham J. had eventually found favour with Government
and this is reflected by the extension of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act
(21 of 1850) to Kanyakumari District in 1951 (1126 M. E.). Section 1 of that
Act reads as follows:-
"l. Law or usage which inflicts forfeiture
of, or affects, rights on change of religion or loss of caste to cease to be
enforced:-
So much of any law or usage now in force within
India as inflicts on any person forfeiture of rights of property, or may be
held in any way to impair or afflict any right of inheritance by reason of his
or her renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of any religion,
or being deprived of caste, shall cease to be enforced as law in any
court." Since this Act has been extended to Kanyakumari district to which
the parties belong, long after the death of Ponnammal, its provisions cannot have
application to. the f acts of the case, and hence it, is not necessary for us
to dwell at length on the change brought about by the legislation on the
personal law or usage which affected the rights of inheritance of any person by
reason of exclusion from the communion of any religion or deprival of caste. it
will however be apposite to point out that we are not now dealing with any
usage which affected the rights of inheritance of persons on the ground of
religious or caste considerations, but on the other hand, we are concerned with
the continuance of a custom which accorded with the underlying object of the
Caste Disabilities Removal Act. While pure Hindu Law as such treated converts
to Christianity as apostates and forfeited the rights to property or succession
of the converts, the customary law practised by the Nadars, in so far as the
Christian converts should not be treated as outcastes and they would not be
deprived of their right to property or succession. In our opinion, the
modification of the, personal law by.custom by long and continuous usage which
resulted in the customary law be ing recognised as i valid and enforceable by
courts, cannot be viewed from one angle alone, but on the other hand, must be
viewed in its entire perspective. Seen from the side of the converts alone. it
is no doubt 'true that the Christian Act did not affect the, rights of Hindu
Nadars to overlook, the conversion to Christianity of, their family members and
recognise their rights also to claim the properties of the family under the
rule of survivorship, reversion etc.
But, what is of significance is whether,
on this ground alone, the appellant's contention that the Act in question did
not interfere with the practice of the customary law can be accepted. For a
proper appreciation of the matter, we must bear in mind the underlying reason
for the members of the Nadar community deviating from the principles of Hindu
Law and admitting to succession and inheritance the members of the family who
had gone over to the Christian faith. Obviously, the members of the community.
must have felt that notwithstanding the conversion to Christianity of some of
the family members, the ties of relationship as well as social communion,
marital rites, funeral rites, etc. need not stand affected and, likewise, so
long as the converts were prepared to be governed by the system of inheritance
under the Hindu law, there need not be any exclusion of the Christian converts
from property rights. Stated differently, it means that the members of the Hindu
faith agreed to give shares in the properties to the Christian converts,
provided, in return, their right to succeed to the properties of the Christian
converts also remained unaffected and was recognised by the converts by
agreeing to have a common system of inheritance under the Hindu Law. It is this
mutuality which should 'have impelled the -Nadar community to deviate from the
ancient texts and evolve a customary law that created rights and liabilities in
favour of the converts as well as the non-converts. To forget this feature and
contend that the usage was a completely one-sided affair and the Hindu Nadars
were bound by it for ever and anon irrespective of the curtailment of their
mutual rights by enactments like the Christian Succession Act, is too sweeping
an argument to merit acceutance. As pointed out bV Krishnaswami Iyer C. J.
where a usage at variance with the personal law had been established to prevail
amongst persons, the advantages and disadvantages resulting from that usage
must be preserved in their full integrity in every individual case to which the
usage is sought to be applied. Otherwise, the blind application of the ,usage
to one section of the people alone will make the taw of, inheritance a lopsided
one in favour of the converts. By way of illustration, it may be stated that a
convert can lay claim to the properties of a Hindu as a survivor or as a
reversioner, but correspondingly, a Hindu will not be entitled to claim such
rights against the properties left by a convert, since the latter's properties
will be governed by the Christian Succession Act in the matter of succession.
Therefore, the continuance of the usage is irretrievably linked with both
parties, viz. Hindu as well as Christian converts being governed by the Hindu
Law of inheritance. Once legislation intervened and placed the Christian
converts outside the fold of Hindu Law, in the matter of inheritance in respect
of their properties, the usage must be held to have been disrupted in its form.
content and applicability resulting in As discontinuance. We are unable to
share the opinion of Abraham J. that notwithstanding the converts being
governed by the Christian law of succession, the Hindu Nadars will continue to
be governed by the customary law practised by them hitherto and that a change
in the state of affairs can be brought about only by legislation and not
judicial interference. The learned Judge has Wed to note that no legislation
was called for since the customary law died a natural death by reason of the
Christian Succession Act robbing the customary law of its content of mutuality,
and as such, all that the court had done in Ananchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah
Nadar, 34 Trav LJ 503: 194-4 Trav LR 595 (FB) was only to have noticed this
feature and determined the rights of parties accordingly.
15. In the course of his arguments, Mr. Selvaraj
submitted that once materials were placed before court to prove the practice of
a customary law by a certain section of the public then the bounden duty of the
courts was to respect the usage and administer the law accordingly and it is
not open to courts to fashion the law according to its own views of justice and
fair play or refuse to administer the customary law on the ground that it
suffered from shortcomings such as lack of mutuality etc. TO buttress his
contention, the counsel referred to a passage from Salmond on Jurisprudence,
12th Edn. at page 32 and the observation of the Privy Council in the Collector
of Madurai v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathi, (1867-69) 12 Moo Ind App 397. The
passage from Salmond on Jurisprudence reads as follows:-
"Speaking generally, it is well that courts
of justice, in seeking for those rules of- right, which it is their duty 'to
administer, should be content to accept those which have already in their
favour the prestige and authority of long acceptance, rather than attempt the
more dangerous task of fashioning a set of rules for themselves by the light of
nature. The national -conscience may well be accepted by the courts as an
authoritative guide; and of this conscience national custom is the external and
visible sign."
16. In the Collector of Madura v. Moottoo
Ramalinea. Sethupati (1867-69) 12 Moo Ind App 397, the Privy Council has
observed as follows-
"The duty of a Judge to administer Hindu
Law is not so much to inquire whether the doctrine disputed is fairly deducible
from the earliest authorities, as to ascertain whether it is one that has been
received by the particular school of Hindoo Law, which prevails in the district
in which the case arises with which he has to deal, and whether such doctrine
has been sanctioned by usage; as by the Hindoo system of law clear proof of
usage will outweigh the written opinion of text writers."
We are of opinion that the legal propositions
extracted above are undoubtedly indisputable, but what has been overlooked by
the counsel is that what we are now called upon to decide is, not about the
wisdom and equitable nature of the customary law, but whether it continued to
have operative force in spite of the inroads made into it by the Christian
Succession Act. Examined from that angle, the passages do not have any
relevance to the debate in the appeal. Another passage is also 'cited by the
counsel and that is found at page 161 of Mullah's Hindu Law, 14th Edn. and the
passage relates to the effect of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act. It runs as
follows:-
"Change of religion and loss of caste which
at one time were grounds of forfeiture of property and of exclusion from
inheritance ceased to be so after the passing of the Castes Disabilities
Removal Act 1850."
The reference to this passage is not called for
in this appeal, because the Caste Disabilities Removal Act was extended to
Kanyakumari District long after the death of the owner of the suit property
Ponnammal. Even if the Act had been extended before her death, it cannot have
any application, because what the law sought to achieve had already been
achieved by the members of the Nadar community by evolving a customary law
which ran counter to the prescription given by the orthodox Hindu Law. The
benevolent usage, however, was materially affected by the Christian Succession
Act taking away the Christian converts outside the fold of Hindu Law in so far
as succession to their properties was concerned and this caused a fundamental
disruption of the usage which deprived it of its uniform applicability to Hindu
Nadars as well as Christian Nadars and conferring in the process mutual rights
of succession in favour of both. We are therefore clearly of the view that the
ratio decidendi in Ananchaperumal Nadar v. Muthiah Nadar, 34 Trav LJ 503: 1944
Trav LR 595 (FB) is fully worthy of acceptance and, secondly, there is no
conflict of opinion between that case and Shanmughathayi Ammal v. Devasahayam.
Nadar, ILR (1954) Trav Co 826: AIR 1954 Trav Co, 497 (FB),
17. As the lower appellate Court has applied the
correct principles of law and decreed the suit, it follows that the second
appeal has to fail and will accordingly stand dismissed. We, however. ma1w no
order as to costs.
18. The learned counsel for the appellant makes
an oral application for certificate of leave being granted under Article 133 of
the Constitution of India, for an appeal being preferred to the Supreme Court
against our Judgment. We do not think to is a fit case for granting certificate
because, firstly, the question of law involved is not of such general
importance as needs determination by the Supreme Court, and, secondly, after
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, the question as to whether
Christian Nadars can claim right of suc_ cession to the properties owned by
their Hindu relations on the foot of customary law, which itself, in our
opinion, became obliterated by reason of the passing of the Travancore-Cochin
Succession Act, cannot at all arise.
19. Hence, we decline to grant leave
20. Appeal dismissed.
------------------------------------------------
ABHISHEK
03012020
No comments:
Post a Comment