tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-75412325281165870422024-03-16T14:55:01.687+05:30Tapuriah Jain & Associates21, Skipper House, 9, Pusa Road, New Delhi - 110005,
Mobile : 91-98-100-46108, E-Mail : caindia@hotmail.comwww.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.comBlogger919125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-30716180416085943022024-01-08T15:19:00.020+05:302024-03-07T12:55:23.741+05:30<p align="center"><span style="color: #cc0000; font-size: x-large">India 2024</span></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="color: #444444;">
<b>
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVXXX3CqlEndcoezek7dAGXBuMb4_gbD3FZzvuY14p9_BpKk9Wx9YdSV5KZ2msmRDxhDwj_ocWa556nSKf9Ff5o-TOJaJPHKmhcFCwZbxsD4swqdi3doXva9TITJXD-Nnp8CGSUk3x_9C5BDVCGHKNlMyruaBZ8k79LqcG1R-3JA19J4rx44K1tto9_LE/s2000/budget%20cover.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="2000" data-original-width="1414" height="600" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVXXX3CqlEndcoezek7dAGXBuMb4_gbD3FZzvuY14p9_BpKk9Wx9YdSV5KZ2msmRDxhDwj_ocWa556nSKf9Ff5o-TOJaJPHKmhcFCwZbxsD4swqdi3doXva9TITJXD-Nnp8CGSUk3x_9C5BDVCGHKNlMyruaBZ8k79LqcG1R-3JA19J4rx44K1tto9_LE/w424-h600/budget%20cover.png" width="424" /></a></b></span></p>
<p align="justify">
<span style="color: #444444; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in">
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has presented its last budget
before the country heads for general elections in the coming months. The interim
budget focuses on the government’s objective of making India a $5 trillion
economy and a developed nation by 2047.The interim budget or a stop-gap
financial plan will come into effect from 1 April until a new government
presents a full-fledged budget after coming to power<a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2024/01/your-software-rights-trademark-patent.html">......................click
here to read further</a></span></p>
<p> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="color: #cc0000; font-size: x-large">One Nation
One Election</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj-qABO-J6wLh9Vq1iXub0qlbqBLiC3PzXeup3JuHVLGpkKpaql4GHoIkaw0FDC6Uymci-2qGePKZ5vr_VCzEjaF_JURQXn_1X5TV8lgCuxiBDdbivufTmA9mVgcmWOCFNAoJuogdduCRtx_3ZKkpE0omAAeOy0YqLC4BcowR0Vx5B28JwuJ-4q3optu-Q/s631/Elections1.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="359" data-original-width="631" height="330" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj-qABO-J6wLh9Vq1iXub0qlbqBLiC3PzXeup3JuHVLGpkKpaql4GHoIkaw0FDC6Uymci-2qGePKZ5vr_VCzEjaF_JURQXn_1X5TV8lgCuxiBDdbivufTmA9mVgcmWOCFNAoJuogdduCRtx_3ZKkpE0omAAeOy0YqLC4BcowR0Vx5B28JwuJ-4q3optu-Q/w580-h330/Elections1.jpg" width="580" /></a></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 21.4667px">
CA A. K. Jain</span></p>
<div align="center">
<center>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse: collapse" bordercolor="#111111" width="49%">
<tr>
<td width="100%">
<p align="justify">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 21.4667px">
<b>Public Notice for inviting suggestions from members of the
general public for making appropriate changes in the existing
legal administrative framework to enable simultaneous
elections in the country.</b></span></td>
</tr>
</table>
</center>
</div>
<p>
<span style="color: #444444; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in">
First of all, we express our approbation to the Government of India for the
constitution of a high-level committee to discuss the ‘One Nation One Election’
policy vide gadget notification number 211 of September 2nd, 2023. This is the
need of the time. As desired, we offer our observations below<a style="color: #0000FF; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in; text-decoration: none" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/one-nation-one-election-ca-a.html">......................click
here to read further</a></span></p>
<p> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">Long and
Short Range Missiles Offer Excellent<br>
Business Prospects To Indian Industry</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKJ-xa-lWXqCZ8RXx2Fi_coyzO_Y8E887VdrEDe-7KJG7o6DQMZL4qmmdsHTJbk7Yka8CbKL7kXiVY-P-tHTikJZSND9jgYqptcnKn8WjNoxIbklo3gSz-dA-jW1xc9URMAzspbzUIH9ZDCm79U0eo9pmimVSZCtE1WHQlkpJ8ZcIzeZ9gOxt6HLLLosg/s606/1.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<span style="color: black;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="342" data-original-width="606" height="340" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKJ-xa-lWXqCZ8RXx2Fi_coyzO_Y8E887VdrEDe-7KJG7o6DQMZL4qmmdsHTJbk7Yka8CbKL7kXiVY-P-tHTikJZSND9jgYqptcnKn8WjNoxIbklo3gSz-dA-jW1xc9URMAzspbzUIH9ZDCm79U0eo9pmimVSZCtE1WHQlkpJ8ZcIzeZ9gOxt6HLLLosg/w600-h340/1.jpg" width="600" /></span></a></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 21.4667px">
CA A. K. Jain</span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
recent years, the global geopolitical landscape has seen a surge in demand for
advanced defence technologies, particularly in the domain of missile systems.
Military operations and war threats in Russia Ukraine, Israel Yemen, Lebanon,
Syria, Iran, Taiwan, Pakistan and Korea are extremely heated markets for all
kinds of warfare materials including all kinds of missile systems</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/long-and-short-range-missiles-offer.html">......................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">USA DOLLAR'S
GOVERNANCE IS OVER?</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwFvYTLKLV3_PjbBHXLxTfEVlYSlAd4ppln5dG1ALI5XpWGvt7JeZuxCiJuryjrme8fSHvI8W5PNafoGRNEQg1Vp8Qg2yXwtu10UJluoqDRYX2tuorL7PnsYxYJ9WjcjsKOkzsUoIGsVxAILupRLlvxA9xjBgIVQgLdzr3LNzm91VDuZkFZkWkL9r7/s606/Untitled-1.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="342" data-original-width="606" height="378" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwFvYTLKLV3_PjbBHXLxTfEVlYSlAd4ppln5dG1ALI5XpWGvt7JeZuxCiJuryjrme8fSHvI8W5PNafoGRNEQg1Vp8Qg2yXwtu10UJluoqDRYX2tuorL7PnsYxYJ9WjcjsKOkzsUoIGsVxAILupRLlvxA9xjBgIVQgLdzr3LNzm91VDuZkFZkWkL9r7/w669-h378/Untitled-1.jpg" width="669" /></a></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 21.4667px">
CA A. K. Jain</span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Two events in the past few weeks point to a change in the global balance of
power. The first was the peace deal in Beijing between once sworn enemies Iran
and Saudi Arabia, where China played peacemaker. Considering that Iran and Saudi
Arabia have been at each other's throats for decades, this was quite a
diplomatic achievement for Xi Jinping.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The second event was the recent meeting between Xi and Putin in Moscow. These
two leaders have met one-on-one 40 times in the last ten years, which is a
record for both. Putin says that Xi is the only world leader he has celebrated
his birthday with, and calls him “his best and bosom friend”</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/usa-dollars-governance-is-over.html">......................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">PROTECT YOUR
SOFTWARE RIGHTS<br>
(Trademark / Patent / Copyright)</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOmE1d34vCY1O65h_6cyXTLF2yH0aBr8BldDfX3dr24SAccrP0e5y5Dmym0uu4ZbvOBShmI-sO_RAGY8OE9Znhw4SmUuSxXQKCgnFesR90JCDzqoerEjZrXVY-WWOvdoOjhDLGtDET0mE/s1600/2.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="495" data-original-width="932" height="338" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOmE1d34vCY1O65h_6cyXTLF2yH0aBr8BldDfX3dr24SAccrP0e5y5Dmym0uu4ZbvOBShmI-sO_RAGY8OE9Znhw4SmUuSxXQKCgnFesR90JCDzqoerEjZrXVY-WWOvdoOjhDLGtDET0mE/s640/2.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Software Patent Registration<br>
Creators and inventors of software products have always strived to protect their
intellectual property rights and obtain patent registration for software
products. The rapid growth of the internet and fast increasing competition has
further increased the demand for software patents in India. However, patenting
of software was not allowed for a long time in India, due to restrictions in the
patent laws of India. But to cope up with the demand, boost innovation and
safeguard the rights of inventors, the Indian Patent Office has evolved detailed
guidelines for patenting Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). In this article, we
look at patentability of software and Computer Related Inventions in detail</font></span><span style="color: #444444; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in">.<a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2019/01/protect-your-software-rights-trade-mark.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">BUYING A
PROPERTY IN BANK AUCTION</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjETgTKne2Nc8NM7A_WeI0IBafeXjNkYX5XrWeG1Mmhpdb8IMgUU7-Mu4nItYdpouliKEu0oM4uyEelRmlJqn7O4c6rsnoG_4k-cmszvOX8-VuR-pbTag2drurDQjK3vf77H-S1h8aVrI/s1600/Bank-Auction-Property.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="330" data-original-width="570" height="370" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjETgTKne2Nc8NM7A_WeI0IBafeXjNkYX5XrWeG1Mmhpdb8IMgUU7-Mu4nItYdpouliKEu0oM4uyEelRmlJqn7O4c6rsnoG_4k-cmszvOX8-VuR-pbTag2drurDQjK3vf77H-S1h8aVrI/s640/Bank-Auction-Property.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The traditional channels of searching real estate listings and working with real
estate agents aren't the only ways to acquire a property. Experienced real
estate investors often purchase properties at auctions. But auctions aren't
limited to professionals; novices have purchased their homes at auctions, too.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
How Do Properties End Up at Auction?</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The two main types of property auctions are foreclosure auctions and tax lien
auctions. Before a property reaches this stage, several things have to happen.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
First, the homeowner has to have not paid the mortgage for several months. Then,
the bank files a notice of default with the county recorder. If the homeowner
doesn't pay the balance owed or renegotiate the omrtgage with the lender, the
home can be put up for auction. The amount of time it takes from when the
homeowner stops paying the mortgage to when the home ends up at auction varies,
but can be anywhere from a few months to a year or more</font><span style="color: #444444; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2019/01/buying-property-in-auction-traditional.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">DOUBLE
TAXATION AVOIDANCE PACT WITH HONG KONG</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitR5oqFWhULQwPCw05e5xY-5dl6BbNWPScVKBL0uwAcC3nzECqeyThHA5Dv80Zr20FIGkrHAVUEMDzgriM4Dr_Eoz1iNFZnwjEcIz3u5fKCFT8I5zEg_CW06Cp_qs6ORiGXGBrHBNt9HI/s1600/HONG+KONG+FLAG.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="480" data-original-width="852" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitR5oqFWhULQwPCw05e5xY-5dl6BbNWPScVKBL0uwAcC3nzECqeyThHA5Dv80Zr20FIGkrHAVUEMDzgriM4Dr_Eoz1iNFZnwjEcIz3u5fKCFT8I5zEg_CW06Cp_qs6ORiGXGBrHBNt9HI/s640/HONG+KONG+FLAG.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India, desiring to
conclude an Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, have agreed as follows</font><span style="color: #444444; font-family: 'times new roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 19.9333px; text-indent: -0.25in"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/03/india-signs-double-taxation-avoidance.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SALARY TO NON
RESIDENT DIRECTOR</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPV4EKr8RjQj5i2Nk4Oc-gatvqnl8ifICCt4h7bd2Su_12buYyitN59SsKqCHIGtm2uZo63Raop3uGaDrMGhEteVJJRaYM5-wa7fGSgzwHFwgk2vb8MJvqpKSbcOYYCokCz33_FtK2LSE/s1600/download.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="664" data-original-width="1000" height="424" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPV4EKr8RjQj5i2Nk4Oc-gatvqnl8ifICCt4h7bd2Su_12buYyitN59SsKqCHIGtm2uZo63Raop3uGaDrMGhEteVJJRaYM5-wa7fGSgzwHFwgk2vb8MJvqpKSbcOYYCokCz33_FtK2LSE/s640/download.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">TAXABILITY OF SALARY PAID TO NON RESIDENT</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Scope of Total Income - Section 5(2) of
Income Tax Act.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
total income of any previous year of a person who is a non-resident includes all
income from whatever source derived which-</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">(a) is received or is deemed to be received
in India in such year by or on behalf of such person ; or</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">(b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue
or arise to him in India during such year.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Explanation 1.-Income accruing or arising
outside India shall not be deemed to be received in India within the meaning of
this section by reason only of the fact that it is taken into account in a
balance sheet prepared in India<a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/11/salaryto-non-resident-director.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></font></span></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">AUDIT UNDER
CGST ACT, 2017</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMww3_P60EnKbV4oUl4ORfPHXKxCf1u9Qqz_BWo_DfXAcLRe0nSuEOalQ0B8IcjR1CuY2nvG09ATVk57pHunfUTZfW1BTuEwpDi9p0R1NCAcCTm1_dTgGTLvtOD5LsvZl01yhO5MnDTPE/s1600/AUDIT+UNDER+GST+IMAGE.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="574" data-original-width="1065" height="344" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMww3_P60EnKbV4oUl4ORfPHXKxCf1u9Qqz_BWo_DfXAcLRe0nSuEOalQ0B8IcjR1CuY2nvG09ATVk57pHunfUTZfW1BTuEwpDi9p0R1NCAcCTm1_dTgGTLvtOD5LsvZl01yhO5MnDTPE/s640/AUDIT+UNDER+GST+IMAGE.png" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
According to Section 2(13) of the CGST Act, 2017 “Audit” means the examination
of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by the
registered person under the GST Acts or the rules made there under or under any
other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of turnover
declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed, and to assess
his compliance with the provisions of the GST Acts or the rules made thereunder</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/11/audit-under-cgst-act2017-accordingto.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SETTLEMENT
COMMISSION</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_Am8J087hDZQy3eTeGw0S3tzuq5kZJNC9s8KfSM_xnaB5eA7JmgizLmO9G3_tITAOc1C1gMQW2aOevgBm6vNiNSQa5UhsyfVH2yEeGIPawR4MEmLOLqVTyDST0G0ujim_eodGGUx5MyU/s1600/MAIN+IMAGE.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="110" data-original-width="215" height="204" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_Am8J087hDZQy3eTeGw0S3tzuq5kZJNC9s8KfSM_xnaB5eA7JmgizLmO9G3_tITAOc1C1gMQW2aOevgBm6vNiNSQa5UhsyfVH2yEeGIPawR4MEmLOLqVTyDST0G0ujim_eodGGUx5MyU/s400/MAIN+IMAGE.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Income Tax Settlement Commission is a premier
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) body in India. Its mandate is to resolve
tax disputes in respect of Indian Income Tax & Wealth Tax Laws between the two
disputing parties, Income Tax Department on one side and litigating tax payer on
the other.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
This institution was set up in 1976 by the Central Government on the
recommendations of the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (1971) set up under the
Chairmanship of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, the retired Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of India. The Wanchoo Committee had conceived of the Settlement Commission
as a mechanism to allow a one-time tax evader or an unintending defaulter to
make clean breast of his affairs. At present, there are Seven benches of the
Commission located at New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/05/settlement-commission-by-ca-a.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">PAKISTAN PM
ANNOUNCES TAX AMNESTY SCHEME</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0-7FjKvFkufuj0UyEw5YNrqoe-uZB0TKM22on_z0uM9N73Lejla_PMMTEqmUrSHExfut5PVLs6d7PV767q_S_FkTlr1xzWTOn-genln-3rkcGk7CDpfPn6Nw0DVqFoXnFweed75Gz0zI/s1600/l_301050_053706_updates.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="650" height="372" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0-7FjKvFkufuj0UyEw5YNrqoe-uZB0TKM22on_z0uM9N73Lejla_PMMTEqmUrSHExfut5PVLs6d7PV767q_S_FkTlr1xzWTOn-genln-3rkcGk7CDpfPn6Nw0DVqFoXnFweed75Gz0zI/s640/l_301050_053706_updates.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, after a meeting of the Economic Advisory
Council, announced tax reforms aimed at clamping down on tax evaders. Building
his case for the government's new package, the prime minister noted that only
1.2 million Pakistanis file income tax returns. He further noted that of the
1.2m filers, only 700,000 actually paid tax, while others filed returns but paid
no income tax. Presenting his package as an incentive for more people to enter
the tax net, PM Abbasi stressed that he felt this to be the most optimum way to
maximise the government's revenues keeping in mind the significant challenges it
faces</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/04/pakistan-pm-announces-tax-amnesty.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SAMOSA IS
COOKED FOOD<br>
JUDGMENT ( 09.03.2018 ) BY UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrcoDReB61jMNvhfD4J_Yk0SMFgAf0OB2myS4yfjvSR43gyU_MyEdvPxlrPxoKD4V1uKQMmr-snR2nzThPAF8iF5YNJoH-E-i2Omx19uhlWzvpVEBo7y-TTEBzf1hPmrZY8zTPTqSqbrk/s1600/samosa.png" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="261" data-original-width="618" height="261" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrcoDReB61jMNvhfD4J_Yk0SMFgAf0OB2myS4yfjvSR43gyU_MyEdvPxlrPxoKD4V1uKQMmr-snR2nzThPAF8iF5YNJoH-E-i2Omx19uhlWzvpVEBo7y-TTEBzf1hPmrZY8zTPTqSqbrk/s1600/samosa.png" width="618" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The Uttarakhand High Court has ruled that samosa is considered to be cooked
food, hence it would attract higher tax rate. In the instant case Assessee is
running shop and engaged in the activity of selling sweets, namkeen, samosa,
milk and curd etc. and he has filed his return of income for the relevant
assessment year and declared his taxable income at Rs.50,720 on the basis of the
total turnover of Rs.11,55,900. During the course of assessment proceedings, the
Assessing Officer (AO) recomputed the income of the Assessee and declared his
total income at Rs.13,66,400 while completing the assessment</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/03/samosa-is-cooked-food-judgment-09.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">Hon’ble F. M.
Arun Jaitley - Budget 2018</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDqW-woyGdWO3wXJ3nv2Ik5SA3FldSwFJSupV_js44bEX-HTkVoZtvkM1R8jM4wudQzLobyUdqGY6T0RZsICq44D9TixvjFaujaQ-z0-S3fWcyKcybYUrYOuB9jAsBRU6xi-v14an2cSY/s1600/budget2018-1516021177.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="451" data-original-width="660" height="436" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDqW-woyGdWO3wXJ3nv2Ik5SA3FldSwFJSupV_js44bEX-HTkVoZtvkM1R8jM4wudQzLobyUdqGY6T0RZsICq44D9TixvjFaujaQ-z0-S3fWcyKcybYUrYOuB9jAsBRU6xi-v14an2cSY/s640/budget2018-1516021177.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 21.4667px">
CA A. K. Jain</span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Once again the Finance Minister of India has gone through the ritualistic Annual
Budget exercise on 1st of February, 2018. As, this is the last functional
financial budget in the present tenure of this BJP Government, Economic and
Financial wizards around the world were holding their breath in the expectation
of some far-fetched fiscal announcements on this day.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
There was also a feeling that, the budget documents will be election driven. So
far, international investors and Indian industry has shown its stout confidence,
conviction and admiration in the leadership of this regime. Pragmatic
decisiveness on demonetarization and tax reforms also raised optimism for
incredible proclamations through budget documents 2018.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Although, it will be hasty and unreasonable to judge and conclude the far
reaching implications and affects of this presentation, but apparently it
appears that, a lot is missing …………….. an opportunity is lost……… fiscal issues
are inadequately balanced………common person is somewhat confused on his choice of
…………!!!</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
the juggleries of financial politics and democratic limitations, we as a nation
are the worst victim of appeasement practices and policies. It is distressing to
say that, “the illiterate farming community and allied classes of Indian
Diaspora, which supersede in electoral numbers have restrained our finest
leadership from dynamic fiscal decisions in the interest of nation as a whole”.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">If
India has to stand in the frontline, we have to compulsorily grow consistently
at least 12% plus rate for next three to five years. Revenue from direct and
indirect taxes can by no means fulfill the necessities of the nation. Steel,
Power, Transport, Industries are the backbone of growth cycle. Massive capital
investment is required in Infrastructure, education and health sector. There is
no answer for all this in budget documents.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">On
multiple occasions it is governmentally acknowledged that, abundant financial
resources are held / parked by our own fellow Indians outside India. In the
interest of the Nation, the Hon’ble Finance Minster should not be shy in
acknowledging this reality of the economics. The issue is, “why can’t, we find a
respectable mutually acceptable solution so that, these staggering funds can
voluntarily flow back to country and contribute in our economic growth”. I once
again accentuate that, tax revenue can, on no account meet the resource needs of
India.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Besides, it is also noteworthy that, good intent, announcements and allocations
of Finance Minster are not getting to the last point. The administrative
machinery is extremely enervated and inefficient. Historically, there appears to
be lack of synchronisation and harmonisation amongst Ministry of Finance,
Commerce, Law, Reserve bank of India, Judiciary etc. The Hon’ble Prime Minister
must find a way out so that, there is conceptual understanding of action from
conceivement to execution.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
his budget documents, additional tax collection provisions through increase in
direct taxes may not be purposeful. Capital gain tax may negatively impact the
sentiments of capital market. In nutshell, economic sentiments can be better
managed through greater dependence on indirect taxes rather than direct taxes.
Some of the penal provisions introduced in Direct Taxes appear to be too harsh
and impractical. Being our representative on national mission, we expect our
Finance Minister to be a friend and a philosopher in his approach while drafting
his budget proposals. We are sure he will have a relook at some of the penal
provisions in Budget Documents. Besides, it is worth mentioning that, the
present rates of individual and corporate taxes are still very high as compared
to other progressive nations. Higher rates can definitely be justified only in
the circumstances where social security scheme and other welfare programmes are
effectively serving every citizen of the country</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/02/chamoli.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SHELL,
DORMANT & DEFUNCT COMPANIES</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicXyELcTbsfvcStV7PF-WkaDbBsqKBQX8s0PtlFUeZpfDQ5TRpulhSjYtJ8avJdx51YNnfgX8wW_xZsiMKu4ldDB0Kltc5MyfIpq2QqtUdsQOsPNu3umv3I4Bp2wHfAx3QltrIKNS82UY/s1600/DEFUNCT.png" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="571" data-original-width="960" height="379" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicXyELcTbsfvcStV7PF-WkaDbBsqKBQX8s0PtlFUeZpfDQ5TRpulhSjYtJ8avJdx51YNnfgX8wW_xZsiMKu4ldDB0Kltc5MyfIpq2QqtUdsQOsPNu3umv3I4Bp2wHfAx3QltrIKNS82UY/s640/DEFUNCT.png" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
SHELL COMPANIES</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
What are shell companies?</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
The Companies Act, 2013 has not defined what a ‘shell company’ is and as to what
kind of activities would lead to a company being termed a ‘shell’. Shell
companies are typically corporate entities which do not have any active business
operations or significant assets in their possession. The government views them
with suspicion as some of them could be used for money laundering, tax evasion
and other illegal activities.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">Is
there a law governing shell companies?</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
India, there is no specific law relating to “shell companies.” However, some
laws help, to an extent, in curbing illegal activities such as money laundering
and can indirectly be used to target shell companies - Benami Transaction
(Prohibition) Amendment Act 2016; The Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002
and The Companies Act, 2013</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/12/shell-dormant-companies-shell-companies.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">KEY FEATURES
OF BUDGET 2017 - 18</font></p>
<p align="center">
<span>
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrqgADfmvL9Cxsan_HwZVqzbE-dP8JxBnj6RnFiR5lOaswyvbrCN9l8k1H8I9VHt80v6Asl-K34Na4Bt5N-FKM9BA5g7sk7ctKkMLZvzmpLyVHKx36RwDjegY1czM4hgHY2UjBXIP25217/s1600/india+budget.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="450" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrqgADfmvL9Cxsan_HwZVqzbE-dP8JxBnj6RnFiR5lOaswyvbrCN9l8k1H8I9VHt80v6Asl-K34Na4Bt5N-FKM9BA5g7sk7ctKkMLZvzmpLyVHKx36RwDjegY1czM4hgHY2UjBXIP25217/s640/india+budget.jpg" width="640" /></a></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
INTRODUCTION</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">1.
In the last two and half years administration has moved from discretionary,
favouritism based to system and transparency based.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">2.
Inflation brought under control. CPI-based inflation declined from 6% in July
2016 to 3.4% in December, 2016.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">3.
Economy has moved on a high growth path. India’s Current Account Deficit
declined from about 1% of GDP last year to 0.3% of GDP in the first half of
2016-17. FDI grew 36% in H1 2016-17 over H1 2015-16, despite 5% reduction in
global FDI inflows. Foreign exchange reserves have reached 361 billion US
Dollars as on 20th January, 2017.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">4.
War against black money launched.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">5.
Government continued on path of fiscal consolidation, without compromising on</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/02/key-features-of-budget-2017-18.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">PLACE OF
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjH1YDdkQDKcNoUFRGg8r4Xo_eUoDMSk2hlfoPyygwI65d7svzF-mBktdTeIgfVQzWO8WIamlfSyEkw2saQgObx_1l5ndyFhr3-GS5MCjDmzeK_j3lG__kB3yytHdaAMI89pCYq1NoggDKB/s1600/POEM-2.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="479" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjH1YDdkQDKcNoUFRGg8r4Xo_eUoDMSk2hlfoPyygwI65d7svzF-mBktdTeIgfVQzWO8WIamlfSyEkw2saQgObx_1l5ndyFhr3-GS5MCjDmzeK_j3lG__kB3yytHdaAMI89pCYq1NoggDKB/s640/POEM-2.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
CLARIFICATORY CIRCULAR BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
Circular No. 06 of 2017 / F. No. 142/11/2015-TPL / Government of India /
Ministry of Finance / Department of Revenue / Central Board of Direct Taxes /
Dated: 24th January, 2017.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Section 6(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), prior to its amendment by
the Finance Act, 2015, provided that a company is said to be resident in India
in any previous year, if it is an Indian company or if during that year, the
control and management of its affairs is situated wholly in India. This allowed
tax avoidance opportunities for companies to artificially escape the residential
status under these provisions by shifting insignificant or isolated events
related with control and management outside India. To address these concerns,
the existing provisions of section 6(3) of the Act were amended vide Finance
Act, 2015, with effect from 1st April,2016 to provide that</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/01/circular-by-government-of-india.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">FUTURE
CURRENCY : DIGITALISED BITCOIN</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisah3Ig8WlJtdVylKpJSlZov9QT5JOhOO-XvSBbT1dhDd6fqGHyVWxbVz4PezOOjzhyTKH2OG73sPtzWAr0xhoebU14zrDSR2Lmn0_zEfZiRWppac5cKt-etokS0vipZh377vJWkXtkJ4/s1600/1.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="194" data-original-width="259" height="479" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisah3Ig8WlJtdVylKpJSlZov9QT5JOhOO-XvSBbT1dhDd6fqGHyVWxbVz4PezOOjzhyTKH2OG73sPtzWAr0xhoebU14zrDSR2Lmn0_zEfZiRWppac5cKt-etokS0vipZh377vJWkXtkJ4/s640/1.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Bitcoin is a form of digital currency, created and held electronically. No one
controls it. Bitcoins aren’t printed, like dollars or euros they’re produced by
running computers using software. It is a crypto-currency. Bitcoin is designed
around the idea of using cryptography to control the creation and transfer of
money, rather than relying on central authorities. The first Bitcoin concept was
published in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto. However, Satoshi left the project in late
2010 without revealing much about himself. The community has since grown
manifolds</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/01/future-currency-digitalised-bitcoin.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
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<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">ASSET
DISPOSAL - GOVERNMENT E-COMMERCE PLATFORM CAN SAVE BILLIONS</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQPWiiPaCCpHWvkmkRM_XoDL70uFyTqjTdMvVS2DCDo48vA1t2dr9_1r8oEBplQpJsSeVT3RalWi-0Mfq1iEKmgjq6TG25AxYPzgh_xGvwYl3A9oA39PDl_0LWDD46youVNqCYyMnrgcVt/s1600/rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQPWiiPaCCpHWvkmkRM_XoDL70uFyTqjTdMvVS2DCDo48vA1t2dr9_1r8oEBplQpJsSeVT3RalWi-0Mfq1iEKmgjq6TG25AxYPzgh_xGvwYl3A9oA39PDl_0LWDD46youVNqCYyMnrgcVt/s640/rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
NEED FOR E- COMMERCE PLATFORM <br>
General lack of transparency and inefficiencies in the handling and disposal of
the seized, confiscated, obsolete, surplus, unused assets has time and again
created embarrassing situation for the government’s functionaries. Non -
standardized assets disposal policies have also resulted into enormous financial
losses, bribery, bungling, corruption and crime in this sector.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">1.
GENERATION OF DISPOSABLE ASSETS<br>
High value disposable assets in considerable quantum are regularly generated by
all Government departments, financial institution, banks, public sector
organization, local bodies etc. Besides, revenue departments like Income Tax,
Customs, VAT, Excise regularly seize / confiscate valuable assets in course of
raids or at the time of recovering their dues. NPA accounts are also generating
disposal assets in the hands of government</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/08/asset-disposal-government-e-commerce.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">REVIEW AND
HIGHLIGHTS - BUDGET 2016</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjp0FQwZF2n6mYRb555LkZEX6CY-oiujtKduExysDGaTIiohNNN3Z1Kaz2og0RjGEm70zQZCi0DRAqz0McbT6yew6MWjYMzPA3nCpkyf37o3j9Q5Qns5v9b5M6mr9QCfASJtN4dSG1BZSmQ/s1600/04-Union-Budget-2016-Arun-jaitly4.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="378" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjp0FQwZF2n6mYRb555LkZEX6CY-oiujtKduExysDGaTIiohNNN3Z1Kaz2og0RjGEm70zQZCi0DRAqz0McbT6yew6MWjYMzPA3nCpkyf37o3j9Q5Qns5v9b5M6mr9QCfASJtN4dSG1BZSmQ/s640/04-Union-Budget-2016-Arun-jaitly4.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
ANALYSIS: The 2016 Budget of the Narendra Modi Government, which was delivered
on 29th February, was eagerly awaited. With increasing criticism of the
perceived gap between promises made and action taken on the ground, this Budget
was the key opportunity to regain lost ground and accelerate the process of
converting the ‘Make in India’ dream into a reality. Indeed, there was little in
the run-up to the Budget that generated cheer or optimism. The data from the
manufacturing, banking, and real estate sectors were depressing. The ill-timed
notice from the Indian tax department of over Rs. 14,000 crore to Vodafone two
weeks ago seriously cast doubts on whether the Prime Minister’s Office and the
Finance Ministry were pursuing a common agenda of making India an
investment-friendly destination. The only large silver lining on the dark
economic cloud was the drastic fall in oil prices</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/03/union-budget-2016-2017-by-finance.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">"STARTUP
INDIA" A Step Forward in Right Direction</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhz4cXz8v4pzfMZCZjs-ksNlWgpEN75I69csRD3zO8jpwPbYoSIPAOPyvBohQZLBKu-arIibRlVd7N8QjxYzatRnJxdFg0j1YGRQ_O2fttOB-7O5pz4sasDoHAUvRy-Y9q9OV8sBH_8SYzo/s1600/A+Step+Forward+in+Right+Direction.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="354" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhz4cXz8v4pzfMZCZjs-ksNlWgpEN75I69csRD3zO8jpwPbYoSIPAOPyvBohQZLBKu-arIibRlVd7N8QjxYzatRnJxdFg0j1YGRQ_O2fttOB-7O5pz4sasDoHAUvRy-Y9q9OV8sBH_8SYzo/s640/A+Step+Forward+in+Right+Direction.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
STARTUP INDIA is a flagship initiative of the Government of India, intended to
build a strong eco-system for nurturing innovation and Startups in the country
that will drive sustainable economic growth and generate large scale employment
opportunities. The Government through this initiative aims to empower Startups
to grow through innovation and design. In order to meet the objectives of the
initiative, Government of India is announcing this Action Plan that addresses
all aspects of the Startup ecosystem</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/01/startup-india-step-forward-in-right.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: medium; font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">INDIAN
GOVERNMENT OPENS COMPLIANCE WINDOW FOR BLACK MONEY DISCLOSURE</font></p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SCHEME OPEN
UPTO SEPT. 30, 2015</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRhJnr3K-E8GF3PUii9wQQ8F0uZAvMSx2r8nBeZrj1dgb2AUGE7aqjCwQIE81SF81vge2VO-nP9zm4GNn5cuZ7EV9EurDOSqWW0segc5szzZSIGbKqGuqErQMAK29nJ9u8_-QJT1SlV8kY/s1600/blackmoney.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="348" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRhJnr3K-E8GF3PUii9wQQ8F0uZAvMSx2r8nBeZrj1dgb2AUGE7aqjCwQIE81SF81vge2VO-nP9zm4GNn5cuZ7EV9EurDOSqWW0segc5szzZSIGbKqGuqErQMAK29nJ9u8_-QJT1SlV8kY/s640/blackmoney.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Those assessee with any undeclared overseas income or assets will have a 3 month
window to come clean beginning on July 1, 2015 and a further 3 months to deposit
the appropriate tax and penalty till Dec 31, 2015. Ministry of Finance,
Government of India has announced details of a compliance window to curb black
money. Central government has notified on 30th September, 2015, as the date on
or before which a person can make a declaration in respect of an undisclosed
asset located outside India. The last date for depositing tax is December 31,
2015</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2015/07/indian-government-opens-compliance.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">
HIGHLIGHTS UNDISCLOSED FOREIGN INCOME & ASSETS BILL, 2015 INTRODUCED IN LOK
SABHA ON 20TH, MARCH 2015, 2015</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi20pbO6wUs9AUM3B5h1U65F8ZcLbzliUCiW-gHhL2cT1VOSpKCQpf56rR_aVNkdzEFdMm5PLIz3URLC-w8sX8PGATjfvYwoVwC30EOOr211uzfyRHuK01f52y7uW5SDpusZJ7gWLjbJgeB/s1600/Arun-Jaitley222_19315.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="326" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi20pbO6wUs9AUM3B5h1U65F8ZcLbzliUCiW-gHhL2cT1VOSpKCQpf56rR_aVNkdzEFdMm5PLIz3URLC-w8sX8PGATjfvYwoVwC30EOOr211uzfyRHuK01f52y7uW5SDpusZJ7gWLjbJgeB/s1600/Arun-Jaitley222_19315.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify">
<span style="font-size:15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, while acknowledging the
limitations under the existing law, had conveyed the considered
decision of the Government to enact a comprehensive new law on black
money to specifically deal with black money stashed away abroad. He
also promised to introduce the new Bill in the current Session of
the Parliament.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
order to fulfil the commitment made by the Government to the people of India
through the Parliament, the Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets (Imposition of
Tax) Bill, 2015 has been introduced in the Parliament on 20.03.2015. The Bill
provides for separate taxation of any undisclosed income in relation to foreign
income and assets. Such income will henceforth not be taxed under the Income-tax
Act but under the stringent provisions of the proposed</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2015/03/highlights-undisclosed-foreign-income.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">PM NARENDRA
MODI NEEDS NEW FISCAL SYSTEM TO GOVERN</font></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-q4OE0_8fEAoSgs8r8LgVteob9ldL5vebN8miWAOh7DwWrhzblLztyodb3Mk-o613ARJPtAtrTBCwP3rKAT88lazV2WsJLvL_vdQJvH1iAB5Rl8yS20uCu_E2fASaMAXZ4wFzjn02K-XA/s1600/1.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-size: medium;">
<img border="0" height="340" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-q4OE0_8fEAoSgs8r8LgVteob9ldL5vebN8miWAOh7DwWrhzblLztyodb3Mk-o613ARJPtAtrTBCwP3rKAT88lazV2WsJLvL_vdQJvH1iAB5Rl8yS20uCu_E2fASaMAXZ4wFzjn02K-XA/s1600/1.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">A
few years back, when the world was looking at us with high expectation of growth
and stability, the apathetic fiscal management severely dented the Indian
economic system. The erstwhile Indian Government failed to appreciate the ground
rules and requirements of a growing Indian economy. When Indian corporate was
looking at world map for their next destination, some over-enthusiastic
Economists did everything possible to rattle the aspiration, ambition and
dignity of the entrepreneurs and their enterprise. Why did they do it? This is a
question for everyone.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
Anyway, that is past. India has to come back and cover the losses of sixty seven
years. In 1947, one rupee was giving us one dollar and today we have to pay
almost sixty rupees for a dollar. As a person of basic virtues, I am more than
confident that, an emotional connect to country and little financial
sensibilities in economic policy framing can progressively take us back to 1917.
I am sure, our new PM will show us again, those respectable days.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
Although, Mr. Modi has the best of the technology and talent around him to
coordinate his plans and proposal, with all the humbleness, I would like to
mention some suggestive ideas for the desired upgradation of Indian Fiscal
System.</font></p>
<div align="center">
<center>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse: collapse" bordercolor="#111111">
<tr>
<td width="100%">
<font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
<a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-jQnv8rL2w">
www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-jQnv8rL2w</a></font></td>
</tr>
</table>
</center>
</div>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">It
is foremost important that the fiscal system should not be draconian,
excruciating and compelling. It should be appeasable and amenable. Present
Indian fiscal system is not only perplexing but also mystifying for a common
person. In existing format, Government is collecting revenue through multiple
and multilevel tax legislation. The basic concept of Indian tax laws is
centuries old and had its origin somewhere in Egypt. It is written in thousands
of pages and most seasoned tax professional are often found totally befuddled in
their interpretation and application. That is why the end result is recent cases
of Nokia and Vodaphone. These two cases have disgraced and embarrassed the
country around the world. We need to have fundamentally something very different
from the present</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/05/pmnarendra-modi-needs-new-fiscal-system_23.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">INDIAN GOVT.
CAN COLLECT RS. 80,000 CRORES LYING INSIDE<br>
NEW DELHI RAILWAY STATION</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMNue_95EljL8eJJYKTQYCnAbIZD5C3jhLfbuJDIJl9QVNorStQ6TIkXSVwISHOFXkADnNLAQj34OnOQcqEIphf2nLwj3X_r8jJEW0-HI2sYu0nfaLbApwHxqWHJ3SWPD4_CeLiIfKkSs/s1600/2+%25281%2529.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="664" data-original-width="800" height="531" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMNue_95EljL8eJJYKTQYCnAbIZD5C3jhLfbuJDIJl9QVNorStQ6TIkXSVwISHOFXkADnNLAQj34OnOQcqEIphf2nLwj3X_r8jJEW0-HI2sYu0nfaLbApwHxqWHJ3SWPD4_CeLiIfKkSs/s640/2+%25281%2529.jpg" width="640" /></a></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">INTRODUCTION</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Railway Minister Shri D. V. Sadananda Gowda,
in his 2014 Budget Speech has mentioned, “in the last 10 years, 99 New Line
projects worth` 60,000 crore were sanctioned out of which only one project is
complete till date. In fact, there are 4 projects that are as old as 30 years,
but are still not complete.” The principal reason attributed by the Hon’ble
Minister for the dismal performance is lack of availability of adequate
financial resources. The Hon’ble Minister has further announced some new
projects. But the big question is how the Railways will fund these schemes.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Traditional funding sources have already been
exploited to their optimum level. Now the Railway Board has to look for some
unconventional sources to fund the operational and developmental projects.…..
including Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s Bullet Train. If, the authorities
involved in the process look beyond their centuries old rule book……. solutions
are not far from reach. To be more precise, the freely available Railway Real
Estate assets have the required potential to generate enormous surplus to meet
its financial needs and also to strengthen the Railways Balance Sheet to the
envy of any successful corporate in the world. India has at least 500 - 700
major Railway Stations Real Estates assets, which can be developed for
augmenting Railway revenue. Each of the Railway Station occupies sizable land.
This station land over the platforms and adjoining Railway lines can be easily
monetized. A multi-story multipurpose complex can be constructed without
disturbing the regular functioning and movement, over the Railway platforms.
This real estate can be easily marketed to generate capital and revenue profits.
The monetary valuations of these properties can run into astronomical figures.
Keeping in view the size of the city, a multistory complex can be erected over
any railway stations. The construction can be done on BOT basis or contract
basis etc. depending on various factors. The research data suggests, the space
available can be easily marketed as the railway stations are always city centers
and enjoy tremendous locational advantages</font></span><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/07/indian-railway-stations-can-be-world.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">BUDGET
2014-2015 BY FINANCE MINISTER ARUN JAITLEY</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFZzja_OB3OHZy07Tzkxa-MBBsO2d1u9ZGbW54NPJsIC-uA2Ma7ClWnJV8jh6Z-Q9mdhA0IPC-M71DVOdGGKaDLF7bsKbu_XUorvduEgkXBP-o5zY2s82vBOXa8Cqy3buYyOJq9pJATmKY/s1600/2.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<img border="0" height="356" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFZzja_OB3OHZy07Tzkxa-MBBsO2d1u9ZGbW54NPJsIC-uA2Ma7ClWnJV8jh6Z-Q9mdhA0IPC-M71DVOdGGKaDLF7bsKbu_XUorvduEgkXBP-o5zY2s82vBOXa8Cqy3buYyOJq9pJATmKY/s1600/2.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">The final Budget for the year is on the floor and
will be shortly enacted to rule the country. This time, the expectations from
Budget were extremely high but for the reasons best known to the Budget Makers,
much has been left to be addressed in future. Whatever may be the reasons for
going cautious, if India has to progress and survive in this competitive world
and amongst aggressively progressing neighbouring countries, then some out of
the box thinking, dynamic decision making and fearless actions are the only
choices. We hope to look forward an aggressive Indian regime determined to put
India on self sustaining growth course of over 10%. May be by 15th August our
Hon’ble Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi will chalk out his new economic and
development programme and unfurl the same with the flag of the nation.</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Various Budget provisions have been comprehensively summarized herein below. We
note from the detailed budget document that, with regards to Income Tax budget
proposals several changes have been proposed which will have far reaching impact
on the economy and business. These subtle changes although very important have
not become the headlines of any media. Particularly changes about advance
against assets, survey / search rules, charitable institutions, long term
capital gains, dividend distribution tax, debt based mutual funds, investment
allowance, institutions governed by section 35, overseas borrowing and divided,
transfer pricing, FII income clarifications, MAT, TDS, anonymous donation,
presumptive taxation u/s 44AE, commodity transaction tax, compulsory
acquisitions, speculative gains, asset valuations, loan transactions u/s 269SS,
attachment of property etc. must be studied meticulously.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The Current Economic Situation And The Challenges</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Decisive vote for change represents the desire of the people to grow, free
themselves from the curse of poverty and use the opportunity provided by the
society. Country in no mood to suffer unemployment, inadequate basic amenities,
lack of infrastructure and apathetic governance</font><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: medium"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/07/india-budget-2014-2015-by-finance.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">INDIA
DESPERATELY NEEDS NEW FISCAL SYSTEM TO ACCOMPLISH MODI DREAM</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">A
few years back, when the world was looking at us with high expectation of growth
and stability, the apathetic fiscal management severely dented the Indian
economic system. Anyway, that is past. Let’s look forward to a brighter future
in the hands of indomitable team of Governors. In 1947, one rupee used to fetch
one dollar and let’s hope the time returns. I am confident that, an emotional
connects to nation and financial sensibilities in economic policy framing can
show us again those respectable days.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
Present Indian fiscal system is perplexing to all concerned. Government is
collecting revenue through multiple tax legislations. The basic tax concept is
centuries old and had its origin somewhere in Egypt and travelled through Greece
U. K. to India with British. Revenue laws are written in thousands of pages and
most seasoned tax professional are often found totally befuddled in their
interpretation and application. That is why the end result is recent cases of
Nokia and Vodaphone. These two cases have disgraced the country around the
world. We need to have fundamentally something very different from the present
and aptitude to accept out of box thinking.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
With complete new mindset, the entire revenue collection law can be framed in
less than hundred pages. A suggestive scheme which will be manageable without
the fleet of tax collecting agencies can be drafted on following lines. The
simplicity itself will boost revenue collection by manifolds. The scheme may be
referred as “Consolidated Revenue Act of India.”</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/06/india-desperately-needs-new-fiscal.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">DOUBLE
TAXATION AVOIDANCE AGREEMENTS</font></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" height="264" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQzgSSwv4otYEE_4A-Hy-hDJKw4VSbdzwW6ykKvj3aZG7O0LwQx6zxeB1XuI4MoaSBbsCVJajlQzcETTPnXQdn5tvXFsHxu29bN-2_uVVOA2ueesERMnYAeBwntSA0F29gDayqOL95PPtD/s1600/3.jpg" width="640" /></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">To
finance the welfare and the administrative expenditure, governments around the
world impose certain taxes on their subjects. The taxation system helps in
collecting revenue besides it also provides direction to the economic growth and
also brings economic equilibrium amongst various classes. In any taxation
system, the residential status of the taxpayer is of crucial significance.
Residential status confirms the jurisdiction and the application of taxation
account abilities.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
However, in cases, where cross country economic activity is carried out, it is a
tricky affair to identify and justify the appropriate jurisdiction of tax
authorities. In order to mitigate the hardships of multiple jurisdictions, the
Governments enter into bilateral arrangements, which are commonly denoted as
“Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements” (DTAA). DTAA refers to an accord between
two countries, aiming at elimination of double taxation. These are bilateral
economic agreements wherein the countries concerned assess the sacrifices and
advantages which the treaty brings for each contracting nation. It would promote
exchange of goods, persons, services and investment of capital among such
countries.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font style="font-size: 15pt" face="Times New Roman,serif">
Indian Government is actively pushing DTAA negotiations with several countries
to help its residents in understanding their tax jurisdictions and
accountability towards the appropriate authorities. So far India has signed DTAA
with 81 countries and discussion is on with many others. The natures of DTAA’s
entered by India are greatly diverse in their nature and contents.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
OECD and DTAAs<br>
The first international initiative regarding DTAA was taken by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD presented the first draft of
DTAA in ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital’. DTAA was proposed as a
tool of standardization and common solutions for cases of double taxation to the
taxpayers who are engaged in industrial, financial or other activities in other
countries. The double tax treaties are negotiated under international law and
governed by the principles laid down under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties</font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2012/06/double-taxation-avoidance-agreements.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">GENERAL
ELECTION YOUR ELECTION MANIFESTO WILL BE ROAD TO SUCCESS</span></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhmTUfEBTFsUgOyDInmQWUKU8T0pmFUyEdbbiSx41IkSriiJ8UAiKPySQ63QcCCoS4-LnRHjy4KwZakUwxR_7bqYMsL7DSgaExO3yNAsgghA5WPT0vZ3k6LsC4ovNKEXKOgId97Wdg3Hm9/s1600/5.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<img border="0" height="176" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhmTUfEBTFsUgOyDInmQWUKU8T0pmFUyEdbbiSx41IkSriiJ8UAiKPySQ63QcCCoS4-LnRHjy4KwZakUwxR_7bqYMsL7DSgaExO3yNAsgghA5WPT0vZ3k6LsC4ovNKEXKOgId97Wdg3Hm9/s1600/5.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">The next General Elections are due in 2014.
All political aspirants have already started working out policies and strategies
to approach public for support and vote. However, it is no longer an easy
mission to convince Indian voters to vote for any party or individual.
Television programmes and print media have turned Indians into a conscious and
informed class. Now, people are looking forward towards strong programmes and
policies rather than traditional individuals and parties. It will be now be very
tricky to play sentimental issues for electoral success.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">In this note, we are providing a evocative
programme for effectively setting forth election strategy to the aspiring
national players. We are confident, if an organization adopts policies and
programme on the lines suggested herein below and delivers on promises, nothing
can restrain them from winning and ruling this country for next several decades.<br>
The suggestive programme is outlined herein below</font></span><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2013/03/election-manifesto-that-can-bring.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">GIFT RECEIVED
FROM HUF IS NOT TAXABLE</span></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; text-align: justify;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg25UChp81ZuZg-j31b4PHGBQ7Mj4k-p9RczIfMCwQV1f8UKnwTik9QxOgxrfhnjDVjS-Yk15vDhJk919G_wJzcaxq8BHsCifqP_3_ttcujR6lbpHANDq6ZiR3FrESxnpPBTFgNN3tUnil_/s1600/10.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg25UChp81ZuZg-j31b4PHGBQ7Mj4k-p9RczIfMCwQV1f8UKnwTik9QxOgxrfhnjDVjS-Yk15vDhJk919G_wJzcaxq8BHsCifqP_3_ttcujR6lbpHANDq6ZiR3FrESxnpPBTFgNN3tUnil_/s1600/10.jpg" width="640" /></a></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">Rajkot Bench of ITAT in the case of Vineetkumar
Raghavjibhai Bhalodia v. Income tax Officer, Rajkot has discussed the
controversial issue of tax ability of gifts from HUF to its members. The issues
taken up were.</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">1. Whether a gift received from 'relative',
irrespective of whether it is from an individual relative or from a group of
relatives is exempt from tax under provisions of section 56(2)(vi)?</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">Answer: Held, yes.</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">2. Whether HUF is a group of relatives and
therefore, gift received from HUF would be exempt from tax under section
56(2)(vi)?</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">Answer: Held, yes</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">3. Whether for getting exemption under section
10(2) two conditions are to be satisfied, firstly, a person must be a member of
HUF and secondly he should receive sum out of income of such HUF, may it be
income of earlier year?</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">Answer: Held, yes</span></font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2012/02/gift-received-from-huf-is-not-taxable.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">AN OVERVIEW -
COPYRIGHT LAW</span></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiJS3tYj3tvefM-5sdAzbtamXqQF9tZ-u9ysTeqkkk9vX5wsBCjjT9rZbl4w5x6B3ossyrNplViu-ONS_5NmLFcuGmIyIfb0gc-0OPRPiSYuCF5o3My_L-t7V7LLS6VI3gEX8E_QxIpTEe/s1600/12.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<img border="0" height="401" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiJS3tYj3tvefM-5sdAzbtamXqQF9tZ-u9ysTeqkkk9vX5wsBCjjT9rZbl4w5x6B3ossyrNplViu-ONS_5NmLFcuGmIyIfb0gc-0OPRPiSYuCF5o3My_L-t7V7LLS6VI3gEX8E_QxIpTEe/s1600/12.jpg" width="640" /></span></a></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">INTRODUCTION</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Copyright is a legal term refers to
protecting a creator’s work. It is a type of intellectual property that provides
exclusive publication, distribution, and usage rights for the creator. This
means whatever content is created cannot be used or published by anyone else
without the consent of the creator. The length of copyright protection may
differ from country to country, but it usually lasts for the life of the author
plus 50 to 100 years.</font></span></p>
<p align="justify"><span style="font-size: 15pt">
<font face="Times New Roman,serif">Copyright is generally given by the law to
creators of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and producers of
cinematograph films and sound recordings. It is a pack of rights including,
inter alia, rights of reproduction, communication to the public, adaptation and
translation of the work. In modern times, copyright protection has been extended
to websites and other online content. This is important in the digital age,
since large amounts of content can be easily copied</font></span><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2013/02/an-overview-copyright-law.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY PANACEA FOR POLICE PROBLEMS</span></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1R7RoXb1GdxFplo0CKj3QZNbj34uqxBU0Wf-FCPBP8vGJXEuZbwizs_5O0OpstBdK7lNY7KOXGn1_XOfWIBNqor-WhxKqYt_SFRSEoKJEZragx_Vjb9_tPIxgoauUFSYyWgbZHKesRE0o/s1600/11111.png" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<img border="0" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1R7RoXb1GdxFplo0CKj3QZNbj34uqxBU0Wf-FCPBP8vGJXEuZbwizs_5O0OpstBdK7lNY7KOXGn1_XOfWIBNqor-WhxKqYt_SFRSEoKJEZragx_Vjb9_tPIxgoauUFSYyWgbZHKesRE0o/s1600/11111.png" width="640" /></span></a></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">With the development of Net Based Technologies
along with availability of advanced software and hardware systems, it has become
feasible to systematize and present the most complex data system in simple
formats. This facilitates the quality of data storage system and also improves
the retrieval of the information efficiently and accurately. Through the
application of software based technologies it has become possible to design and
maintain large database structures and provide user friendly application. These
databases can be used for criteria based queries and also can be supplemented
with other technologies like Biometric Solution etc.</span></font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif">
<span style="font-size: 15pt">Delhi Police is handling extremely complex and
multi dimensional activities. The operations of Delhi Police are spread over
very large area which needs to be constantly monitored and controlled. In fact,
the operation of Delhi Police is as complex and multifaceted as any top
corporate house. The operations just do not end with crime recording /
investigation but also involve the application of finest management techniques,
personal management skills, financial management acumen, deep knowledge of
engineering and medicine sciences .The application of Information Technology can
make many complex and strenuous tasks of Delhi Police Executives effortless and
error free</span></font><font style="font-size: medium" face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2011/01/information-technology-panacea-for.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">DON'T PANIC,
IF INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT RAIDS YOU</font></p>
<p align="center">
<span style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyqPboBucwLFROZ5QRU3AQrWJZYmou7YPMyzOT3lRHaI51-LqLaKyX6bjbYe3wx5Ey4P5NVLOL4lNRqTHTTH4Sab783Ao8o86Yx9T0euWTCNhQY_vhlBzD_ttNWjCcKgMMDFjJ_zhJibY0/s1600/000.jpg" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center; text-decoration-line: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyqPboBucwLFROZ5QRU3AQrWJZYmou7YPMyzOT3lRHaI51-LqLaKyX6bjbYe3wx5Ey4P5NVLOL4lNRqTHTTH4Sab783Ao8o86Yx9T0euWTCNhQY_vhlBzD_ttNWjCcKgMMDFjJ_zhJibY0/s1600/000.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></span></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
The term “Raid in Indian Income Tax Law” is incredulous and any unexpected
encounter with IT sleuths generally leads to chaos and vacuity. If you are
likely to experience such action it is better to familiarise with the subject,
so that, the situation can be faced with confidence and serenity. Income Tax
Raid is conducted with the sole objective to unearth tax avoidance. It is the
process which authorizes IT department to search any residential / business
premises, vehicles and bank lockers etc. and seize the accounts, stocks and
valuables.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">To
face the situation efficiently, it is extremely important to understand some
nitty-gritty of I.T. law on the subject. Lack of knowledge leads to panic and
all the discomfort. The knowledge of your legal rights and responsibilities
always protects you</font><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: medium"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2010/11/dont-panic-if-income-tax-department.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="font-size: 15pt;font-weight:400">
------------------------------------------------------------</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p align="center"><font style="font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000">SURVEY UNDER
INCOME TAX ACT, 1961</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Survey has not been defined in the Income Tax Act. According to Concise Oxford
Dictionary, The expression "survey" means general view, casting of eyes or mind
over somethings, inspection or investigation of the condition, amount, etc. of
something, account given of result of this etc.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
According to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, the meaning of the word 'survey'
is to view comprehensively and extensively, to examine in detail, to examine the
structure of a building, to obtain by measurements data for mapping, to
perceive, collection of data, an organisation or body of men for that purpose.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">In
short the term 'survey' in context of the Income Tax Act means collection of
data or information for the purposes of the Act.</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Objects of Survey</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: 15pt">
Survey is an important weapon in the armoury of the Income Tax Department to
call for information of various kinds as may be found necessary for making
proper assessments. Survey is mainly conducted with the object of broadening the
tax base by discovering new assessees, o gather information about possible tax
evasions by assessees, spot checking of available cash and stock and to verify
in a surprise and systematic manner, whether or not accounts are maintained
properly and on day to day basis etc</font><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: medium"><span style="font-size: 15pt"><a style="text-decoration: none; color: #0000FF" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2011/12/survey-under-income-tax-act-1961.html">.....................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p align="justify"> </p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhinxdgrvKgPO5iCZebjbTHHyAsWOGcDWyHnLNsSH67uy04kOgjNUhkA1hXGrC8OXQK-PaF39R4tXTFAEaAHpHKzT7a2EPX0zgEDlskp9PB8ohmLtFIsjWpG3ewYN1ARhcrkwLiR6ds3A4/s1600/adv2.png" style="font-weight: 400; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration-line: none;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="49" data-original-width="444" height="49" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhinxdgrvKgPO5iCZebjbTHHyAsWOGcDWyHnLNsSH67uy04kOgjNUhkA1hXGrC8OXQK-PaF39R4tXTFAEaAHpHKzT7a2EPX0zgEDlskp9PB8ohmLtFIsjWpG3ewYN1ARhcrkwLiR6ds3A4/s1600/adv2.png" width="444" /></a><font face="Times New Roman,serif" style="font-size: medium"><br>
</font><font face="Times New Roman,serif"><span style="font-size: medium"><br>
</span></font></p>
www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-43799369157049865132024-01-08T12:56:00.040+05:302024-01-10T10:11:29.350+05:30<p style="text-align: center;"></p><p align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 24pt;">Long and Short
Range Missiles Offer Excellent<o:p></o:p></span></p><p align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 24pt;">Business
Prospects To Indian Industry</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 24pt;"> </span></p><p align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDJAzE5xhr0a7sFA4I7zyTWBPaSkvDsHw2K3228_-43HxuP0JMe7kr7AqGFq8IcGlz3pm9lOaQrWYkk7JF-HkQ_z9QU2RIePyLL9Oi5RadAZBwJgrZK1yMVzrehoMJ6hlcRmihY5H-6xcnZdmWvSrFMHaZmZmlEwahgyvD-X7u89QusCoorCy63Fbtg8w/s577/1.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="348" data-original-width="577" height="379" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDJAzE5xhr0a7sFA4I7zyTWBPaSkvDsHw2K3228_-43HxuP0JMe7kr7AqGFq8IcGlz3pm9lOaQrWYkk7JF-HkQ_z9QU2RIePyLL9Oi5RadAZBwJgrZK1yMVzrehoMJ6hlcRmihY5H-6xcnZdmWvSrFMHaZmZmlEwahgyvD-X7u89QusCoorCy63Fbtg8w/w627-h379/1.jpg" width="627" /></a></div><br /><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 24pt;"><o:p></o:p></span><p></p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: center;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt;">CA A. K. Jain</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><i>( I take the
privilege of beginning this business advisory note with my<br />heartfelt tributes to the </i></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">“Missile Man of India” and President of
India,<br />Bharat Ratna, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam </i><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">an epitome of intellect,<br />wisdom and simplicity. A People's President, </i><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">who left a lasting<br />impact on severalfields ranging from science to politics. )</i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">In recent years, the
global geopolitical landscape has seen a surge in demand for advanced defence
technologies, particularly in the domain of missile systems. Military operations
and war threats in Russia Ukraine, Israel Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Taiwan,
Pakistan and Korea are extremely heated markets for all kinds of warfare
materials including all kinds of missile systems.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">As India emerges as a
significant player on the global stage, there lies a compelling opportunity for
its industries to venture into the manufacturing of long and short-range
missiles. Not only does this promise to bolster India's defence capabilities,
but it also presents a lucrative avenue for revenue generation through exports,
potentially transforming the nation from an importer to a key exporter in the
global arms market.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi's vision for the defence sector under the "Make in
India" initiative involves bolstering domestic production capabilities,
reducing dependency on imports, and fostering indigenous development of defence
equipment. The goal is to transform India into a global manufacturing hub for
defence equipment and technology. This initiative aims to encourage foreign investment,
collaboration, and technology transfer while nurturing local defence industries
and start-ups. The objective is to enhance self-reliance in defence production,
reduce costs, generate employment, and ultimately strengthen India's defence
capabilities.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">The journey from
importer to acknowledged exporter in the realm of missile systems is not just a
business strategy; it's a paradigm shift for India's industrial prowess. By
harnessing its technological acumen, fostering innovation, and establishing itself
as a dependable supplier, India can ascend as a prominent player in the global
armament market.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">India's defense
industry has already made strides in missile technology, as seen with the
successful deployment of Agni, Prithvi, and BrahMos missiles. Leveraging this
expertise while continuously innovating and adapting to evolving global
security needs can indeed be a profitable venture.As the nation charts its
trajectory toward self-reliance and international influence, missile production
emerges as a beacon of opportunity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Strategic Advantages</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Defense Capabilities :
Developing indigenous missile systems ensures reducing dependency on imports.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Technology : Investment in missile tech. fosters
innovationand positioning India as a global leader intechnology.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Economic Growth : Missilesexport holds immense economic
potential for India's GDP and employment opportunities.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Importer to Exporter :
Indian missile manufacturers can capture a substantial share of the global
market.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Strategic
Partnerships: Collaborations with other nations for joint manufacturing can
enhance expertise.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Global Arms Market : Adherence
standards will bolster India's reputation as a reliable supplier in the global
arms market.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Challenges</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">While the prospect of
venturing into missile production holds immense potential but also offers
several challenges. To support the new entrepreneurs’ regulatory mechanisms
should be simplified in the entire defense manufacturing sector.The government
may instruct lending institutions to consider this as a priority sector of
their business besides foreign investment can also be invited aggressively.
Appropriate fiscal incentives may be granted. Technology and skill development
must be proactively promoted. A centralized market system can be developed for
all those who need the services.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Major Missile Producing
Countries & Companies</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• United States : Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman,
and Boeing like the Tomahawk, Hellfire, and Patriot missiles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Russia : Almaz-Antey,
Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV), and NPO Mashinostroyenia produce
Iskander, S-400, and Kalibr.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• China : China
Aerospace Science (CASC) and China Aerospace Science (CASIC) produce the DF
series.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• France : MBDA develop
missiles like the Meteor and Scalp.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Israel : Israel
Aerospace Industries (IAI) & Rafael Advanced Defense produce the Iron Dome,
David's Sling, & Spike .<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• India : Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) produces Agni series and the BrahMos .<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Pakistan : Kahuta
Research Laboratories (KRL), National Engineering and Scientific Commission
(NESCOM), Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Space Research Commission.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Bangladesh :
Government-owned Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory manufactures missile systems.
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• North Korea: Missile
program involves various organizations, They produce missiles like the Hwasong
series.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Germany : ASRAD
produces Stinger, RBS-70 mk2, Igla, Mistral, Starburst missiles<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Iran : Bavar,Ya Zahra
,Raad ,Mehrab<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Japan : Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, IHI Corporation, NECCorporation, Fujitsu Limited.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Myanmar :
GYD-1B(KS-1M) missile production facility <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Poland : Polish SPZR
Poprad<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Romania : CA-94,CA-95<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• South Africa :
Umkhonto, Marlin<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Sweden : MSHORAD
(Bolide missile) <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Switzerland : RSA,
RSC-54<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Taiwan : Sky Bow I<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">This is not an
exhaustive list. Several other countries and companies are also involved in the
manufacturer of different types of missile systems.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTableGrid" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-padding-alt: 0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-yfti-tbllook: 1184;">
<tbody><tr>
<td colspan="3" style="border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 6.65in;" valign="top" width="638">
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Indicative Pricing of
Various Missile Systems</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Country</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Type<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Pricing</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Russian<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Kh-101 cruise missile<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">$13 million<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Kalibr cruise missile<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">$ 6.5 million<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Kinzhal ballistic missile<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">$15 million<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
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<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Iskander<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">$3 million<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
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<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">USA<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">US Air Force ICBM<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">$75 to $118 million<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
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<tr>
<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">India<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Agni-5 ICBM<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rs. 50 cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<tr>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Akash<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rs. 2.5cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Brahmos<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">25-35 cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Prithvi<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rs.4 cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Pralay<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rs. 5 cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-top: none; border: 1pt solid black; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Parahar<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-bottom: 1pt solid black; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid black; border-top: none; mso-border-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: text1; mso-border-left-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: text1; mso-border-right-themecolor: text1; mso-border-themecolor: text1; mso-border-top-alt: solid black .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: text1; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 159.6pt;" valign="top" width="213">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rs.4 cr.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif";">
</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif";">Global Arms Business
Outlook</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI ) identified India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Australia and China as the top five arms importers in 2018-22, accounting for
36 per cent of global arms imports during this period. India's share globally was
11 per cent followed by Saudi Arabia with 9.6 per cent and Qatar with 6.4 per
cent.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Imports of major arms
by European states increased by 47% between 2013-17 and 2018–22 in the backdrop
of the war in Ukraine.The U.S. share of global arms exports increased from 33%
to 40% while Russia’s fell from 22% to 16%.Arms imports by Pakistan increased
by 14% between 2013–17 and 2018–22 and accounted for 3.7% of the global total
with China supplying 77% of Pakistan’s arms imports in 2018–22.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Indian Arms Import
Outlook</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">According to SIPRI
Trends in International Arms Transfers 2022 report, with an 11% share of total
global arms imports, India was the world’s biggest importer of major arms in
2018–22, a position it has held for the period 1993–2022.Russia was India’s largest
arms supplier in the periods between 2013-17 and 2018-22, but its share of arms
imports to India fell from 64% to 45% while France emerged as the
second-largest arms supplier to India between 2018-22 at 29%, followed by the
US at 11%.India also imported arms during this five-year period from Israel,
South Korea, and South Africa which are among the top arms exporters globally.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Procurement from
foreign countries in 2017-18 was Rs 30,677.29 crore, while it went up to Rs
38,115.60 crore in 2018-19 and Rs 40,330.02 crore in 2019-20, Minister of State
for Defence Ajay Bhatt had informed the Lok Sabha in February this year.(16 May
2023)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Headquartered in
Hyderabad, Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), was incorporated on 16 July, 1970 as
a Public Sector Undertaking under the Ministry of Defence, Government of India
to be the manufacturing base for guided missile systems and allied equipment
for the Indian Armed Forces.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDmJCV9LnRXQhy9wIiwG21_uxuKNkuhMnKNLY65t6-5u3ZQmo9eJsRoFYYzwQJNU3xPOrppZerRmkRYUToyjp-9YOdElxZLxTn9RPs1HkcxCoUKcNsSb0Hi7CArJ5rrgZEMekLAfXYVT4rwk8diHdH8Iz-WqpuOHZx97tRF8TL-If0Rt2EltantstDSDg/s603/2.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="497" data-original-width="603" height="559" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDmJCV9LnRXQhy9wIiwG21_uxuKNkuhMnKNLY65t6-5u3ZQmo9eJsRoFYYzwQJNU3xPOrppZerRmkRYUToyjp-9YOdElxZLxTn9RPs1HkcxCoUKcNsSb0Hi7CArJ5rrgZEMekLAfXYVT4rwk8diHdH8Iz-WqpuOHZx97tRF8TL-If0Rt2EltantstDSDg/w677-h559/2.jpg" width="677" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">India has successfully
tested hypersonic technology missiles, joining the US, Russia, and China as
countries with operational hypersonic missiles. This achievement has propelled
India to the seventh rank in the world's most powerful missiles for 2022, with
the AGNI-5 system.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Ministry of Defence has
set a target of achieving a turnover of $26 Billion in defence Manufacturing by 2025, which includes
$5 Billion exports. Till April 2023, a total of 606 Industrial Licences have
been issued to 369 companies operating in Defence Sector.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Technology</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Missile manufacturing
involves a blend of advanced technologies across various domains. Some key
technologies involved include :<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Materials and
Metallurgy : High-Strength Alloys : Materials that withstand extreme conditions
like high temperature, pressure, and stress.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Composite Materials :
Lightweight but strong materials like carbon-fiber composites that offer high
strength and reduced weight.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Precision Engineering
: Computer Numerical Control (CNC) Machining: Utilized for precise shaping and
cutting of components.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• 3D Printing/Additive
Manufacturing : Allows for rapid prototyping, customization, and production of
complex parts.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Guidance and Control
Systems : Inertial Navigation Systems (INS): Provides accurate guidance by
using gyroscopes and accelerometers.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• GPS and Satellite
Navigation : Enables precise positioning and guidance.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Propulsion: Rocket
Propulsion : Utilizes advanced propulsion techniques like solid or liquid fuel
systems for propulsion.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Advanced Thrust
Vectoring : Provides greater maneuverability and precision.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Radar Systems : For
tracking and detecting targets.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Infrared Sensors :
Detecting heat signatures for target acquisition.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Lidar Systems : For
precise distance measurement.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Embedded Systems : Microprocessors
and control systems embedded within the missile for computations and control.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Advanced Software
Algorithms : For navigation, target tracking, and control.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Simulation and
Modeling : To predict missile behavior and performance before physical testing.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Wind Tunnels and Test
Ranges : To test aerodynamics and performance in controlled environments.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Automation and
Robotics : Streamlining production processes and ensuring precision.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Quality Control
Systems : Ensuring adherence to strict quality standards throughout
manufacturing.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">• Encryption and Cyber
Defense : Protecting sensitive data and preventing cyber threats targeting
missile systems.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">The integration and
advancement in these technologies play a vital role in the development,
manufacturing, and enhancement of missile systems, ensuring accuracy,
reliability, and effectiveness in various defense applications.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Project Cost</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">The cost of
manufacturing missiles can vary significantly based on various factors,
including the type of missile, its complexity, range, guidance systems,
payload, and production volume. Military-grade missiles are highly
sophisticated and can require substantial investment in research, development,
testing, and manufacturing.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Recently, BrahMos Aerospace sought 200-acre land for the BrahMos missile
manufacturing project which is the part of Defence Corridor being developed in
UP. The delegation from Aerospace had
met CM Yogi Adityanath. The estimated cost of the project is about Rs
300 crore. The CM has also estimated that over 5,000 people will get direct
employment from the venture.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Recommendations to GOI</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">1. Investment in
R&D : Allocate funds and collaborate with academic institutions and private
sectors. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">2. Public-Private
Partnerships : Aggressively foster partnerships between government and private
companies to leverage expertise, resources, and capabilities. Incentivize
private sector involvement through tax breaks, subsidies, or joint ventures.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Skill Development:
Establish specialized training programs to develop a skilled workforce tailored
to the defense industry's needs. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Streamlining
Regulations: Simplify and expedite regulatory processes to ease the
complexities involved in obtaining licenses, permits, and approvals for defense
manufacturing. Create a conducive environment for businesses by reducing
bureaucratic hurdles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Infrastructure
Development: Build state-of-the-art infrastructure facilities, including
specialized industrial zones or clusters focused on defense production. This
includes technology parks, testing facilities, and manufacturing hubs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Encourage Innovation
and Startups: Provide meaningful
incentives and support to startups and small-to-medium enterprises
(SMEs) engaged in defense manufacturing.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Quality Standards and
Certifications: Emphasize on international quality standards and certifications
to ensure the produced goods meet global benchmarks.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Long-term Procurement
Plans: Develop a clear, long-term procurement strategy to provide stability and
assurance to manufacturers. Predictable demand can encourage investments in
manufacturing capabilities. Centralised marketing mechanism can be established
for exports.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Incentivize Localization:
Provide preferential treatment to domestically manufactured products in
government procurements to boost demand and incentivize localization.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Implementing these
recommendations will require a multi-faceted approach involving collaboration
between government, private sector, academia, and international stakeholders to
build a robust and self-reliant defense manufacturing ecosystem in India.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Demand Trend</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">Washington, Feb 17, 2023 (Reuters) - European demand for U.S. weaponry is soaring, but instead of
big-ticket items like jets and tanks, shopping lists are focused on cheaper,
less-sophisticated items such as shoulder-fired missiles and drones that have
proven critical. Countries close to
Russia like Poland, Finland and Germany are striking deals to build U.S.
weapons in Europe, negotiating new deals to buy arms and looking to speed up
existing contracts, according to interviews with military officials and
industry executives, and a Reuters review of recent announcements by
governments and defense manufacturers. RTX, maker of the Patriot, AMRAAM,
Sidewinder, Javelin, Stinger, and other missiles featuring significantly in the
war in Ukraine and in the defense preparations of neighboring NATO countries
has logged about $2 billion in replenishment orders as a result of the conflict
and expects to top that figure in the coming year. Raytheon Technologies has logged large orders
for AIM-120 AMRAAM and other missiles, and that all 18 countries using the
Patriot air defense system are ordering Tactical (GEM-T) rounds for their
Patriot launchers. India inked an export
deal with the Philippines, signing a $375 million contract for the BrahMos
shore-based anti-ship missile system.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;">Conclusion</span><o:p style="font-size: 14pt;"></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">The best approach to
venture in this project for the new entrepreneur will be to tie - up with an
existing manufacturer outside India and reduce technology and financial risk.
Nevertheless, it's crucial to weigh all aspects comprehensively before
venturing into such a specialized and sensitive industry. Collaboration with
government agencies, leveraging existing expertise, ensuring compliance with
international regulations, and understanding market dynamics are key to success
in the defense sector. Embracing missile manufacturing not only fortifies
national security but also emerges as a significant contributor to the nation's
economic growth and technological prowess on the world stage.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;">----------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%;"><i>Note : CA A. K. Jain
( caindia@hotmail.com ) the author
of this article a Chartered Accountant by profession is inspired by
various developmental initiatives of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to make India
self reliant in Defence sector and boost industrial employment . For Indian
industries and entrepreneurs this is a superb business opportunity which offers
very high profit margins and huge market both in India and outside India.</i></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">( Information Source : Multiple Google
Locations )</span></p><p></p>www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-55994546981451808792022-02-04T12:27:00.023+05:302023-04-28T17:57:09.095+05:30<body style="text-align: justify">
<p style="text-align: center;"></p><p style="text-align: center;"></p><p style="text-align: center;"></p><p style="text-align: center;"></p><p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: x-large;">
USA Dollar's Governance Is Over ?</span></p><p style="text-align: center;">
</p>
<p align="center"><class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihsySNtwEbZv4KakcJkGhN0xG4PYyYGPnLApGTv7VTziiJsZNRHiYIYU9ht0v-rOdM4QhlFSi0BnbJezYTCDuLyAnzTkqkEtD3I-TZ_dKZMIWZsFxHegKSuL4jtTgpy2LASyxKLDlu6pCwNkggsYhnkF9eGjYabV5zaKtIWJARISju5sdmNKRcCxqp/s606/Untitled-1.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="342" data-original-width="606" height="346" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihsySNtwEbZv4KakcJkGhN0xG4PYyYGPnLApGTv7VTziiJsZNRHiYIYU9ht0v-rOdM4QhlFSi0BnbJezYTCDuLyAnzTkqkEtD3I-TZ_dKZMIWZsFxHegKSuL4jtTgpy2LASyxKLDlu6pCwNkggsYhnkF9eGjYabV5zaKtIWJARISju5sdmNKRcCxqp/w612-h346/Untitled-1.jpg" width="612" /></a><br />
</p>
<p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">
<font style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;">Two
events in the past few weeks point to a change in the global balance of power.
The first was the peace deal in Beijing between once sworn enemies Iran and
Saudi Arabia, where China played peacemaker. Considering that Iran and Saudi
Arabia have been at each other's throats for decades, this was quite a
diplomatic achievement for Xi Jinping.</font></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
<font style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;">The
second event was the recent meeting between Xi and Putin in Moscow. These two
leaders have met one-on-one 40 times in the last ten years, which is a record
for both. Putin says that Xi is the only world leader he has celebrated his
birthday with, and calls him “his best and bosom friend”. </font>
<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/usa-dollars-governance-is-over.html" style="text-decoration: none;">
<span style="color: blue; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 19.9333px;">...........................click
here to read further</span></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: x-large;">Budget 2023 Overview</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
</p><p style="text-align: center;"></p>
<p align="center"><class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<font face="Times New Roman"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAx5l_PTuZIKy5sFUEsZpLOtMSoWgg_PumCq49WVnHZ5Js1RSnAuQm-MqA0AR0ji0OwTdsmn3ru2Taz0KEEA61mlWwzbEi-51vpq-oYRY1TnkrHZoqdmgXLfqdeoe-iLZP6xTawK7kcMx6bMnpX3dLVDYShxhjGjfBHcJtT3aOVpJH9GHPYTAz0E4N/s601/Budget5-2023.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="317" data-original-width="601" height="380" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAx5l_PTuZIKy5sFUEsZpLOtMSoWgg_PumCq49WVnHZ5Js1RSnAuQm-MqA0AR0ji0OwTdsmn3ru2Taz0KEEA61mlWwzbEi-51vpq-oYRY1TnkrHZoqdmgXLfqdeoe-iLZP6xTawK7kcMx6bMnpX3dLVDYShxhjGjfBHcJtT3aOVpJH9GHPYTAz0E4N/w720-h380/Budget5-2023.jpg" width="720" /></a></font>
<font face="Times New Roman"><br /></font></p>
<p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">
<font style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt">The Budget 2023 presented on 1st February 2023, indicates an extremely cautious
approach of the Finance Minister, Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman’s towards balancing
this critical
<span style="color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 13.5pt;">
phase of Indian economy.</span></font></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
<font style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt">Indian economy is facing multifaceted challenges due to soaring inflation and
interest rates, post covid unemployment, rising debt burden &interest payments,
international oil prices, growing borrowings, border tensions, falling rupee
value, ethnic disturbances, frequent elections, deficit on current and capital
account, corruption, banking frauds, black money, international uncertainties,
internal law and order disturbances and high growth {GDP} expectations from
fiscal governance. Further, the issues have become more complex due to lack of
adaptiveness of contemporary and unconventional fiscal tools available within
the country for additional non- tax resource mobilisation. In these
circumstances, our finance minister can definitely be excused for playing safe
in her position<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; "><a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/budget-overview-2023.html" style="color:black; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt">.</a></span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; "><a style="color: #0000FF; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/budget-overview-2023.html">..........................click
here to read further</a></span></font></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
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<p style="text-align: justify;">
</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: x-large;">
Are Income Tax Raids Truly Treacherous & Terrifying?</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
</p>
<p align="center"><class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<font face="Times New Roman"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEihvBGQPzAEbsHm6nYWu8NPesHRa7k1QEDU7J1U-Vo4c-armksAeF4Ohd3Tx0LAX8_n9r6cwxWW6sGMqPVx7DTt_4N3Xs6Gb0KQeJxvTMUOQfBwzXjiaJ4eVbaZnmXM62KsWVQsdMtTBN3wO-C-i-em5Z4QXAuS73yuhXHwEN4eO8jWZyrozlfhAgH1=s630" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="458" data-original-width="630" height="466" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEihvBGQPzAEbsHm6nYWu8NPesHRa7k1QEDU7J1U-Vo4c-armksAeF4Ohd3Tx0LAX8_n9r6cwxWW6sGMqPVx7DTt_4N3Xs6Gb0KQeJxvTMUOQfBwzXjiaJ4eVbaZnmXM62KsWVQsdMtTBN3wO-C-i-em5Z4QXAuS73yuhXHwEN4eO8jWZyrozlfhAgH1=w640-h466" width="640" /></a></font>
</p>
<p align="justify">
<font face="Times New Roman"><br /></font>
<font style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt">Through this article, I intend to share my professional experience with regards
to one of the most draconian and terrifying subject, commonly mentioned as
income tax raids. In legislation, this word is referred as search and seizure. I
am sure many of you have passed through this traumatic experience and some of
you may be expecting this due to your appreciative business success and
admirable financial acquisitions and achievements. If you think it is inevitable
at some time in future, please do organise yourself so that, it’s not a surprise
and you sail through smoothly. Although this can be discussed in details but for
the sake of general over view, I will just share a few tips to familiarise you
with the subject.<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;color:black">. <a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/are-income-tax-raids-truly-treacherous_85.html" style="text-decoration: none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt">.......</a></span><a style="color: #0000FF; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/are-income-tax-raids-truly-treacherous_85.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; ">..........click
here to read further</span></a></font></p>
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<p> </p>
<p align="center">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: x-large; text-align: center;">
Case Laws - Benami Property</span></p>
<p align="center"> </p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_Y3CR2ueH-WGbUvaGXUqav2mIJsrBYMebm3EWyzlgEJX9Hxsj5ZExJ7ew0c_jOFwbF27B3Aw7qucKTFtbVaaidpSE1EyArT6QxrhCZ1j-wdLn5Z9F0Tt-kVbHU8ZBRqo-hW_rGClCtx0/s1600/TJA.jpg" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;">
<img align="center" border="0" data-original-height="1061" data-original-width="1600" height="424" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_Y3CR2ueH-WGbUvaGXUqav2mIJsrBYMebm3EWyzlgEJX9Hxsj5ZExJ7ew0c_jOFwbF27B3Aw7qucKTFtbVaaidpSE1EyArT6QxrhCZ1j-wdLn5Z9F0Tt-kVbHU8ZBRqo-hW_rGClCtx0/s640/TJA.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
<font style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt">
<font style="font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-family: Times New Roman">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; color:black; font-size:13.5pt">D</span></font><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; ">y. Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Manpreet Estates LLP 26th
March, 2019 Appellate Tribunal Smt. P. Leelavathi (D) by LRS Vs V.
Shankarnarayana Rao (D) on 09 April, 2019 Supreme Court </span>
<a style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: #0000FF; text-decoration: none" href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;">...............click
here to read furthe</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; color:#0000FF">r</span></font></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
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<p style="text-align: justify;">
</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; color: #CC0000">F</span><span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: x-large; font-weight: 400;">AQ's
on Filing of MCA Form DPT-3</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqAPksPt2B5TB0GFKzVKoL0MO82wkGSWj_2RrCIrFRBhwbHdH0E37_ABjaG4uD1C2ZmPNu4SMO2vhJgAx9SxUy43fc_Gf4HnZDRqlQYqGyP9B4OHQgGCVlsk8v6KA1rXGF9uFt8KWlOd4/s1600/images+%25281%2529.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="163" data-original-width="309" height="337" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqAPksPt2B5TB0GFKzVKoL0MO82wkGSWj_2RrCIrFRBhwbHdH0E37_ABjaG4uD1C2ZmPNu4SMO2vhJgAx9SxUy43fc_Gf4HnZDRqlQYqGyP9B4OHQgGCVlsk8v6KA1rXGF9uFt8KWlOd4/s640/images+%25281%2529.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></p>
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<h1 style="text-align:justify; margin-left:0in; margin-right:0.55pt; margin-top:2.25pt; margin-bottom:0.0001pt">
<span style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400">
With Companies (Acceptance of Deposits), Amendment Rules, 2019,
MCA introduced Form DPT-3 which mandates Filing of Details of Loan
with ROC. Language of Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Amendment
Rules, 2019: Sub Rule 3 of Rule 16A : Every company other than
Government company shall file a onetime return of outstanding
receipt of money or loan by a company but not considered as
deposits, in terms of clause (c) of sub-rule 1 of rule 2 from the
01st April, 2014 to the date of publication of this notification
in the Official Gazette, as specified in Form DPT-3 within ninety
days from the date of said publication of this notification along
with fee as provided in the Companies (Registration Offices and
Fees) Rules, 2014.”<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2019/05/faqs-on-filing-of-mca-form-dpt-3.html" style="text-decoration: none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;">.................click
here to read further</span></a></span></h1>
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<h1 style="text-align:justify; margin-left:0in; margin-right:0.55pt; margin-top:2.25pt; margin-bottom:0.0001pt">
</h1>
<h1 style="text-align:center; margin-left:0in; margin-right:0.55pt; margin-top:2.25pt; margin-bottom:0.0001pt">
<span style="font-weight: 400; color:#cc0000; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">Protect Your Software Rights<br />
(Trademark / Patent / Copyright)</span></h1>
<align="center">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
<align="center">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
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<font face="Times New Roman">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOmE1d34vCY1O65h_6cyXTLF2yH0aBr8BldDfX3dr24SAccrP0e5y5Dmym0uu4ZbvOBShmI-sO_RAGY8OE9Znhw4SmUuSxXQKCgnFesR90JCDzqoerEjZrXVY-WWOvdoOjhDLGtDET0mE/s1600/2.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="495" data-original-width="932" height="338" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOmE1d34vCY1O65h_6cyXTLF2yH0aBr8BldDfX3dr24SAccrP0e5y5Dmym0uu4ZbvOBShmI-sO_RAGY8OE9Znhw4SmUuSxXQKCgnFesR90JCDzqoerEjZrXVY-WWOvdoOjhDLGtDET0mE/s640/2.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></font></h1>
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<align="center">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13pt; font-weight: 700;">
Software Patent Registration</span><p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;color:black; font-weight:400">
Creators and inventors of software products have always strived to
protect their intellectual property rights and obtain patent
registration for software products. The rapid growth of the
internet and fast increasing competition has further increased the
demand for software patents in India. However, patenting of
software was not allowed for a long time in India, due to
restrictions in the patent laws of India. But to cope up with the
demand, boost innovation and safeguard the rights of inventors,
the Indian Patent Office has evolved detailed guidelines for
patenting Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). In this article, we
look at patentability of software and Computer Related Inventions in
detail.<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2019/01/protect-your-software-rights-trade-mark.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; text-decoration:none">............click
here to read further</a></span></span><p style="text-align: justify;">
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<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;" align="center">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;" align="center">
<span style="font-weight: 400; color:#cc0000; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">
Buying A Property In Bank Auction</span>
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<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
<align="center">
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
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<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;" align="center">
<font face="Times New Roman">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjETgTKne2Nc8NM7A_WeI0IBafeXjNkYX5XrWeG1Mmhpdb8IMgUU7-Mu4nItYdpouliKEu0oM4uyEelRmlJqn7O4c6rsnoG_4k-cmszvOX8-VuR-pbTag2drurDQjK3vf77H-S1h8aVrI/s1600/Bank-Auction-Property.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" data-original-height="330" data-original-width="570" height="370" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjETgTKne2Nc8NM7A_WeI0IBafeXjNkYX5XrWeG1Mmhpdb8IMgUU7-Mu4nItYdpouliKEu0oM4uyEelRmlJqn7O4c6rsnoG_4k-cmszvOX8-VuR-pbTag2drurDQjK3vf77H-S1h8aVrI/s640/Bank-Auction-Property.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></font>
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<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;" align="justify">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">The traditional channels of searching real estate listings and
working with real estate agents aren't the only ways to acquire a
property. Experienced real estate investors often purchase
properties at auctions. But auctions aren't limited to
professionals; novices have purchased their homes at auctions, too<br>
<br>
How Do Properties End Up at Auction?<br>
<br>
The two main types of property auctions are foreclosure auctions
and tax lien auctions. Before a property reaches this stage,
several things have to happen.<br>
<br>
First, the homeowner has to have not paid the mortgage for several
months. Then, the bank files a notice of default with the county
recorder. If the homeowner doesn't pay the balance owed or
renegotiate the mortgage with the lender, the home can be put up
for auction. The amount of time it takes from when the homeowner
stops paying the mortgage to when the home ends up at auction
varies, but can be anywhere from a few months to a year or more<span style="font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; color:black"><a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2019/01/buying-property-in-auction-traditional.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; text-decoration:none">........click
here to read further</a></span></span></p>
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</p>
<p style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;" align="center">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">Double
Taxation Avoidance Pact With Hong Kong</span></p>
<style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: medium; font-weight: normal;"><h1 align="center" style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
</h1>
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA</b></h1>
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FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME</span></h1>
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The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India,
desiring to conclude an Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, have
agreed as follows<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/03/india-signs-double-taxation-avoidance.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none">.........click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">Salary To
Non Resident Director</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 24px;"><b><br /></b></span></p>
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<span style="font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">TAXABILITY
OF SALARY PAID TO NON RESIDENT<br>
<br>
Scope of Total Income - Section 5(2) of Income Tax Act<br>
<br>
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous
year of a person who is a non-resident includes all income from whatever
source derived which—<br>
(a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on
behalf of such person ; or<br>
(b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India
during such year.<br>
<br>
Explanation 1.— Income accruing or arising outside India shall not be
deemed to be received in India within the meaning of this section by
reason only of the fact that it is taken into account in a balance sheet
prepared in India.<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/11/salaryto-non-resident-director.html" style="text-decoration: none">.........click
here to read further</a></span></span></h1>
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Act, 2017</span></span></h1><align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-weight: normal;"><dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><dir="ltr" trbidi="on"><class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><h1 align="center" style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;color:black; font-weight:400">
According to Section 2(13) of the CGST Act, 2017 “Audit” means the
examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished
by the registered person under the GST Acts or the rules made there under or
under any other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of
turnover declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed,
and to assess his compliance with the provisions of the GST Acts or the
rules made there under. </span>
<a href="https://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.com/2018/11/audit-under-cgst-act2017-accordingto.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">............click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">Settlement
Commission</span></h1>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">
Income Tax Settlement Commission is a premier Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) body in India. Its mandate is to resolve tax disputes in respect of
Indian Income Tax & Wealth Tax Laws between the two disputing parties,
Income Tax Department on one side and litigating tax payer on the other.<br>
<br>
This institution was set up in 1976 by the Central Government on the
recommendations of the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (1971) set up under
the Chairmanship of Justice K. N. Wanchoo, the retired Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of India. The Wanchoo Committee had conceived of the
Settlement Commission as a mechanism to allow a one-time tax evader or an
unintending defaulter to make clean breast of his affairs. At present, there
are Seven benches of the Commission located at New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata
and Chennai<a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/05/settlement-commission-by-ca-a.html" style="text-decoration: none">..............click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: 400;">Pakistan PM
Announces Tax Amnesty Scheme</span></span></h1>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black">Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, after a meeting of the Economic Advisory
Council, announced tax reforms aimed at clamping down on tax evaders. Building
his case for the government's new package, the prime minister noted that only
1.2 million Pakistanis file income tax returns. He further noted that of the
1.2m filers, only 700,000 actually paid tax, while others filed returns but
paid no income tax. Presenting his package as an incentive for more people to
enter the tax net, PM Abbasi stressed that he felt this to be the most optimum
way to maximise the government's revenues keeping in mind the significant
challenges it faces<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; color:black; font-weight:400">.</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/04/pakistan-pm-announces-tax-amnesty.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: 400;">Samosa is Cooked
Food<br />
Judgment ( 09-03-2018 ) by Uttarakhand High Court</span></span></h1>
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The Uttarakhand High Court has ruled that samosa is considered to be cooked
food, hence it would attract higher tax rate. In the instant case Assessee is
running shop and engaged in the activity of selling sweets, namkeen, samosa,
milk and curd etc. and he has filed his return of income for the relevant
assessment year and declared his taxable income at Rs.50,720 on the basis of
the total turnover of Rs.11,55,900. During the course of assessment
proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) recomputed the income of the Assessee
and declared his total income at Rs.13,66,400 while completing the assessment.</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/03/samosa-is-cooked-food-judgment-09.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
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Hon’ble F. M. Arun Jaitley – Budget 2018</span></h1>
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CA Anil Kumar Jain</span></h1><align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-weight: normal;"><dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><dir="ltr" trbidi="on"><class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><h1 align="center" style="margin: 2.25pt 0.55pt 0.0001pt 0in;">
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Once again the Finance Minister of India has gone through the
ritualistic Annual Budget exercise on 1st of February, 2018. As,
this is the last functional financial budget in the present tenure
of this BJP Government, Economic and Financial wizards around the
world were holding their breath in the expectation of some
far-fetched fiscal announcements on this day.<br>
<br>
There was also a feeling that, the budget documents will be
election driven. So far, international investors and Indian
industry has shown its stout confidence, conviction and admiration
in the leadership of this regime. Pragmatic decisiveness on
demonetarization and tax reforms also raised optimism for
incredible proclamations through budget documents 2018.<br>
<br>
Although, it will be hasty and unreasonable to judge and conclude
the far reaching implications and affects of this presentation,
but apparently it appears that, a lot is missing …………….. an
opportunity is lost……… fiscal issues are inadequately
balanced………common person is somewhat confused on his choice of
…………!!!<br>
<br>
In the juggleries of financial politics and democratic
limitations, we as a nation are the worst victim of appeasement
practices and policies. It is distressing to say that, “the
illiterate farming community and allied classes of Indian
Diaspora, which supersede in electoral numbers have restrained our
finest leadership from dynamic fiscal decisions in the interest of
nation as a whole”.<br>
<br>
If India has to stand in the frontline, we have to compulsorily
grow consistently at least 12% plus rate for next three to five
years. Revenue from direct and indirect taxes can by no means
fulfill the necessities of the nation. Steel, Power, Transport,
Industries are the backbone of growth cycle. Massive capital
investment is required in Infrastructure, education and health
sector. There is no answer for all this in budget documents.<br>
<br>
On multiple occasions it is governmentally acknowledged that,
abundant financial resources are held / parked by our own fellow
Indians outside India. In the interest of the Nation, the Hon’ble
Finance Minster should not be shy in acknowledging this reality of
the economics. The issue is, “why can’t, we find a respectable
mutually acceptable solution so that, these staggering funds can
voluntarily flow back to country and contribute in our economic
growth”. I once again accentuate that, tax revenue can, on no
account meet the resource needs of India.<br>
<br>
Besides, it is also noteworthy that, good intent, announcements
and allocations of Finance Minster are not getting to the last
point. The administrative machinery is extremely enervated and
inefficient. Historically, there appears to be lack of
synchronisation and harmonisation amongst Ministry of Finance,
Commerce, Law, Reserve bank of India, Judiciary etc. The Hon’ble
Prime Minister must find a way out so that, there is conceptual
understanding of action from conceivement to execution.<br>
<br>
In his budget documents, additional tax collection provisions
through increase in direct taxes may not be purposeful. Capital
gain tax may negatively impact the sentiments of capital market.
In nutshell, economic sentiments can be better managed through
greater dependence on indirect taxes rather than direct taxes.
Some of the penal provisions introduced in Direct Taxes appear to
be too harsh and impractical. Being our representative on national
mission, we expect our Finance Minister to be a friend and a
philosopher in his approach while drafting his budget proposals.
We are sure he will have a relook at some of the penal provisions
in Budget Documents. Besides, it is worth mentioning that, the
present rates of individual and corporate taxes are still very
high as compared to other progressive nations. Higher rates can
definitely be justified only in the circumstances where social
security scheme and other welfare programmes are effectively
serving every citizen of the country<a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/03/samosa-is-cooked-food-judgment-09.html" style="text-decoration: none">.........click
here to read further </a></span></h1>
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<span style="font-size: x-large; font-weight: 400; color:#cc0000; font-family:Times New Roman">Shell, Dormant & Defunct
Companies</span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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SHELL COMPANIES</span></h3>
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What are shell companies?</span></h3>
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The Companies Act, 2013 has not defined what a ‘shell company’ is and as
to what kind of activities would lead to a company being termed a ‘shell’.
Shell companies are typically corporate entities which do not have any
active business operations or significant assets in their possession. The
government views them with suspicion as some of them could be used for
money laundering, tax evasion and other illegal activities.</span></h3>
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Is there a law governing shell companies?</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">In India, there is no specific law relating to “shell companies.” However,
some laws help, to an extent, in curbing illegal activities such as money
laundering and can indirectly be used to target shell companies - Benami
Transaction (Prohibition) Amendment Act 2016; The Prevention of Money
Laundering Act 2002 and The Companies Act, 2013<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman";font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400"><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2018/03/samosa-is-cooked-food-judgment-09.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">........click
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<span style="font-weight: 400; color:#cc0000; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large; text-align:justify">Key Features of Budget 2017 - 18</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: large;">
INTRODUCTION</span></h3><h3 class="post-title entry-title" style="background-color: white; font-stretch: normal; margin: 0.75em 0px 0px; position: relative;">
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<img border="0" height="450" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrqgADfmvL9Cxsan_HwZVqzbE-dP8JxBnj6RnFiR5lOaswyvbrCN9l8k1H8I9VHt80v6Asl-K34Na4Bt5N-FKM9BA5g7sk7ctKkMLZvzmpLyVHKx36RwDjegY1czM4hgHY2UjBXIP25217/s640/india+budget.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></span></font></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">1. In the last two and half years administration has moved from
discretionary, favouritism based to system and transparency based.<span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; color:black; font-weight:400"><br />
</span>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400;color:black">
<br />
2. Inflation brought under control. CPI-based inflation declined from 6% in
July 2016 to 3.4% in December, 2016.</span></span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; font-weight: 400">3. Economy has moved on a high growth path. India’s Current Account Deficit
declined from about 1% of GDP last year to 0.3% of GDP in the first half of
2016-17. FDI grew 36% in H1 2016-17 over H1 2015-16, despite 5% reduction in
global FDI inflows. Foreign exchange reserves have reached 361 billion US
Dollars as on 20th January, 2017.<span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; color:black; font-weight:400"> </span></span></h3>
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4. War against black money launched. </span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size:13.5pt; color:black; font-weight:400">
5. Government continued on path of fiscal consolidation, without
compromising on</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/02/key-features-of-budget-2017-18.html" style="text-decoration: none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">........click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: x-large; font-weight: normal; text-align: justify;">
Place of effective Management</span></p>
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<span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; color:black; font-weight:400">CLARIFICATORY CIRCULAR BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA</span></span></h3>
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<span style="font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; color:black">Circular No. 06 of 2017 / F. No. 142/11/2015-TPL / Government of India /
Ministry of Finance / Department of Revenue / Central Board of Direct Taxes /
Dated: 24th January, 2017</span></h3><align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="font-size: medium; font-weight: normal;"><h3 class="post-title entry-title" style="background-color: white; font-stretch: normal; margin: 0.75em 0px 0px; position: relative;">
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
Section 6(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), prior to its amendment
by the Finance Act, 2015, provided that a company is said to be resident in
India in any previous year, if it is an Indian company or if during that
year, the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly in India.
This allowed tax avoidance opportunities for companies to artificially
escape the residential status under these provisions by shifting
insignificant or isolated events related with control and management outside
India. To address these concerns, the existing provisions of section 6(3) of
the Act were amended vide Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 1st April,2016
to provide that</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/01/circular-by-government-of-india.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">........click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; font-weight: normal; text-align: justify">
Future Currency : Digitalised Bitcoin</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
Bitcoin is a form of digital currency, created and held
electronically. No one controls it. Bitcoins aren’t printed, like
dollars or euros they’re produced by running computers using
software. It is a crypto-currency. Bitcoin is designed around the
idea of using cryptography to control the creation and transfer of
money, rather than relying on central authorities. The first Bitcoin
concept was published in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto. However, Satoshi
left the project in late 2010 without revealing much about himself.
The community has since grown manifolds</span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400"><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2017/01/future-currency-digitalised-bitcoin.html" style="text-decoration: none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">........click
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Asset Disposal - Government E-Commerce Platform Can Save Billions</span></p>
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NEED FOR E- COMMERCE PLATFORM </span></h3>
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General lack of transparency and inefficiencies in the handling and
disposal of the seized, confiscated, obsolete, surplus, unused assets
has time and again created embarrassing situation for the government’s
functionaries. Non - standardized assets disposal policies have also
resulted into enormous financial losses, bribery, bungling, corruption
and crime in this sector.</span></h3>
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1. GENERATION OF DISPOSABLE ASSETS</span></h3>
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High value disposable assets in considerable quantum are regularly
generated by all Government departments, financial institution, banks,
public sector organization, local bodies etc. Besides, revenue
departments like Income Tax, Customs, VAT, Excise regularly seize /
confiscate valuable assets in course of raids or at the time of
recovering their dues. NPA accounts are also generating disposal assets
in the hands of government </span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/08/asset-disposal-government-e-commerce.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">........click
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Review And Highlights - Budget 2016</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
ANALYSIS: The 2016 Budget of the Narendra Modi Government, which was
delivered on 29th February, was eagerly awaited. With increasing
criticism of the perceived gap between promises made and action taken on
the ground, this Budget was the key opportunity to regain lost ground
and accelerate the process of converting the ‘Make in India’ dream into
a reality. Indeed, there was little in the run-up to the Budget that
generated cheer or optimism. The data from the manufacturing, banking,
and real estate sectors were depressing. The ill-timed notice from the
Indian tax department of over Rs. 14,000 crore to Vodafone two weeks ago
seriously cast doubts on whether the Prime Minister’s Office and the
Finance Ministry were pursuing a common agenda of making India an
investment-friendly destination. The only large silver lining on the
dark economic cloud was the drastic fall in oil prices</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/03/union-budget-2016-2017-by-finance.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.............click
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"STARTUP INDIA" A Step Forward in Right Direction</span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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STARTUP INDIA is a flagship initiative of the Government of India,
intended to build a strong eco-system for nurturing innovation and
Startups in the country that will drive sustainable economic growth and
generate large scale employment opportunities. The Government through
this initiative aims to empower Startups to grow through innovation and
design. In order to meet the objectives of the initiative, Government of
India is announcing this Action Plan that addresses all aspects of the
Startup ecosystem.</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2016/01/startup-india-step-forward-in-right.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400"><span style="font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">........click
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INDIAN GOVERNMENT OPENS COMPLIANCE WINDOW FOR BLACK MONEY DISCLOSURE</span></h3>
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SCHEME OPEN UPTO SEPT. 30, 2015</span></h3>
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Those assessee with any undeclared overseas income or assets will have a 3 month
window to come clean beginning on July 1, 2015 and a further 3 months to deposit
the appropriate tax and penalty till Dec 31, 2015. Ministry of Finance,
Government of India has announced details of a compliance window to curb black
money. Central government has notified on 30th September, 2015, as the date on
or before which a person can make a declaration in respect of an undisclosed
asset located outside India. The last date for depositing tax is December 31,
2015</span><span style="font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; color:black"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">.</span><span style="font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400"><a style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none" href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2015/07/indian-government-opens-compliance.html">........click
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HIGHLIGHTS UNDISCLOSED FOREIGN INCOME & ASSETS BILL, 2015 INTRODUCED
IN LOK SABHA ON 20TH, MARCH 2015</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color: black">The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, while acknowledging the
limitations under the existing law, had conveyed the considered
decision of the Government to enact a comprehensive new law on black
money to specifically deal with black money stashed away abroad. He
also promised to introduce the new Bill in the current Session of
the Parliament.<br />
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In order to fulfil the commitment made by the Government to the
people of India through the Parliament, the Undisclosed Foreign
Income and Assets (Imposition of Tax) Bill, 2015 has been introduced
in the Parliament on 20.03.2015. The Bill provides for separate
taxation of any undisclosed income in relation to foreign income and
assets. Such income will henceforth not be taxed under the
Income-tax Act but under the stringent provisions of the proposed</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2015/03/highlights-undisclosed-foreign-income.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400"><span style="font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">........click
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<a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/05/pmnarendra-modi-needs-new-fiscal-system_23.html" style="text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none; color:#cc0000; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">
<span style="color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line:none; text-decoration:none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:x-large">
PM </span></a>Narendra Modi Needs New Fiscal System To Govern</span></h3>
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A few years back, when the world was looking at us with high expectation
of growth and stability, the apathetic fiscal management severely dented
the Indian economic system. The erstwhile Indian Government failed to
appreciate the ground rules and requirements of a growing Indian
economy. When Indian corporate was looking at world map for their next
destination, some over-enthusiastic Economists did everything possible
to rattle the aspiration, ambition and dignity of the entrepreneurs and
their enterprise. Why did they do it? This is a question for everyone.</span><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
<br />
Anyway, that is past. India has to come back and cover the losses of
sixty seven years. In 1947, one rupee was giving us one dollar and today
we have to pay almost sixty rupees for a dollar. As a person of basic
virtues, I am more than confident that, an emotional connect to country
and little financial sensibilities in economic policy framing can
progressively take us back to 1917. I am sure, our new PM will show us
again, those respectable days.</span></span></h3>
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Although, Mr. Modi has the best of the technology and talent around him
to coordinate his plans and proposal, with all the humbleness, I would
like to mention some suggestive ideas for the desired upgradation of
Indian Fiscal System.</span></h3>
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<img border="0" height="340" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-q4OE0_8fEAoSgs8r8LgVteob9ldL5vebN8miWAOh7DwWrhzblLztyodb3Mk-o613ARJPtAtrTBCwP3rKAT88lazV2WsJLvL_vdQJvH1iAB5Rl8yS20uCu_E2fASaMAXZ4wFzjn02K-XA/s1600/1.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="400" /></a></font></td>
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<span style="color: blue;">
www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-jQnv8rL2w</span></a></td>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
It is foremost important that the fiscal system should not be draconian,
excruciating and compelling. It should be appeasable and amenable. Present
Indian fiscal system is not only perplexing but also mystifying for a
common person. In existing format, Government is collecting revenue
through multiple and multilevel tax legislation. The basic concept of
Indian tax laws is centuries old and had its origin somewhere in Egypt. It
is written in thousands of pages and most seasoned tax professional are
often found totally befuddled in their interpretation and application.
That is why the end result is recent cases of Nokia and Vodaphone. These
two cases have disgraced and embarrassed the country around the world. We
need to have fundamentally something very different from the present</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/05/pmnarendra-modi-needs-new-fiscal-system_23.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">........click
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<span style="color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large">
Indian Govt. Can Collect Rs. 80,000 Crores Lying Inside New Delhi Railway
Station</span></p>
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INTRODUCTION</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
Railway Minister Shri D. V. Sadananda Gowda, in his 2014 Budget Speech
has mentioned, “in the last 10 years, 99 New Line projects worth` 60,000
crore were sanctioned out of which only one project is complete till
date. In fact, there are 4 projects that are as old as 30 years, but are
still not complete.” The principal reason attributed by the Hon’ble
Minister for the dismal performance is lack of availability of adequate
financial resources. The Hon’ble Minister has further announced some new
projects. But the big question is how the Railways will fund these
schemes.</span></h3>
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Traditional funding sources have already been exploited to their optimum
level. Now the Railway Board has to look for some unconventional sources
to fund the operational and developmental projects.….. including Prime
Minister, Narendra Modi’s Bullet Train. If, the authorities involved in
the process look beyond their centuries old rule book…….solutions are not
far from reach. To be more precise, the freely available Railway Real
Estate assets have the required potential to generate enormous surplus to
meet its financial needs and also to strengthen the Railways Balance Sheet
to the envy of any successful corporate in the world. India has at least
500 - 700 major Railway Stations Real Estates assets, which can be
developed for augmenting Railway revenue. Each of the Railway Station
occupies sizable land. This station land over the platforms and adjoining
Railway lines can be easily monetized. A multi-story multipurpose complex
can be constructed without disturbing the regular functioning and
movement, over the Railway platforms. This real estate can be easily
marketed to generate capital and revenue profits. The monetary valuations
of these properties can run into astronomical figures. Keeping in view the
size of the city, a multistory complex can be erected over any railway
stations. The construction can be done on BOT basis or contract basis etc.
depending on various factors. The research data suggests, the space
available can be easily marketed as the railway stations are always city
centers and enjoy tremendous locational advantages</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/07/indian-railway-stations-can-be-world.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400"><span style="font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">.........click
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Budget 2014-2015 By Finance Minister Arun Jaitley</span></p>
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The final Budget for the year is on the floor and will be shortly enacted
to rule the country. This time, the expectations from Budget were
extremely high but for the reasons best known to the Budget Makers, much
has been left to be addressed in future. Whatever may be the reasons for
going cautious, if India has to progress and survive in this competitive
world and amongst aggressively progressing neighbouring countries, then
some out of the box thinking, dynamic decision making and fearless actions
are the only choices. We hope to look forward an aggressive Indian regime
determined to put India on self sustaining growth course of over 10%. May
be by 15th August our Hon’ble Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi will chalk
out his new economic and development programme and unfurl the same with
the flag of the nation.</span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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Various Budget provisions have been comprehensively summarized herein
below. We note from the detailed budget document that, with regards to
Income Tax budget proposals several changes have been proposed which will
have far reaching impact on the economy and business. These subtle changes
although very important have not become the headlines of any media.
Particularly changes about advance against assets, survey / search rules,
charitable institutions, long term capital gains, dividend distribution
tax, debt based mutual funds, investment allowance, institutions governed
by section 35, overseas borrowing and divided, transfer pricing, FII
income clarifications, MAT, TDS, anonymous donation, presumptive taxation
u/s 44AE, commodity transaction tax, compulsory acquisitions, speculative
gains, asset valuations, loan transactions u/s 269SS, attachment of
property etc. must be studied meticulously.</span><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"><br />
</span>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
<br />
The Current Economic Situation And The Challenges</span></span></h3>
<ol>
<li>
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<span style="font-weight: 400; color:black; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
Decisive vote for change represents the desire of the people to grow,
free themselves from the curse of poverty and use the opportunity
provided by the society. Country in no mood to suffer unemployment,
inadequate basic amenities, lack of infrastructure and apathetic
governance</span><span style="color: black;font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400"><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"> </span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/07/india-budget-2014-2015-by-finance.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span></span></h3>
</li>
</ol>
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</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none">
India Desperately Needs New Fiscal System To Accomplish Modi Dream</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
A few years back, when the world was looking at us with high
expectation of growth and stability, the apathetic fiscal
management severely dented the Indian economic system. Anyway,
that is past. Let’s look forward to a brighter future in the
hands of indomitable team of Governors. In 1947, one rupee used
to fetch one dollar and let’s hope the time returns. I am
confident that, an emotional connects to nation and financial
sensibilities in economic policy framing can show us again those
respectable days.</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
Present Indian fiscal system is perplexing to all concerned.
Government is collecting revenue through multiple tax
legislations. The basic tax concept is centuries old and had its
origin somewhere in Egypt and travelled through Greece U. K. to
India with British. Revenue laws are written in thousands of
pages and most seasoned tax professional are often found totally
befuddled in their interpretation and application. That is why
the end result is recent cases of Nokia and Vodaphone. These two
cases have disgraced the country around the world. We need to
have fundamentally something very different from the present and
aptitude to accept out of box thinking.</span></h3>
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<span style="font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; color:black">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
With complete new mindset, the entire revenue collection law can
be framed in less than hundred pages. A suggestive scheme which
will be manageable without the fleet of tax collecting agencies
can be drafted on following lines. The simplicity itself will
boost revenue collection by manifolds. The scheme may be referred
as “Consolidated Revenue Act of India.”</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2014/06/india-desperately-needs-new-fiscal.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none; font-weight: 400">
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
To finance the welfare and the administrative expenditure, governments
around the world impose certain taxes on their subjects. The taxation
system helps in collecting revenue besides it also provides direction to
the economic growth and also brings economic equilibrium amongst various
classes. In any taxation system, the residential status of the taxpayer is
of crucial significance. Residential status confirms the jurisdiction and
the application of taxation account abilities.</span></h3>
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<img border="0" height="264" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQzgSSwv4otYEE_4A-Hy-hDJKw4VSbdzwW6ykKvj3aZG7O0LwQx6zxeB1XuI4MoaSBbsCVJajlQzcETTPnXQdn5tvXFsHxu29bN-2_uVVOA2ueesERMnYAeBwntSA0F29gDayqOL95PPtD/s1600/3.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
However, in cases, where cross country economic activity is carried out,
it is a tricky affair to identify and justify the appropriate jurisdiction
of tax authorities. In order to mitigate the hardships of multiple
jurisdictions, the Governments enter into bilateral arrangements, which
are commonly denoted as “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements” (DTAA).
DTAA refers to an accord between two countries, aiming at elimination of
double taxation. These are bilateral economic agreements wherein the
countries concerned assess the sacrifices and advantages which the treaty
brings for each contracting nation. It would promote exchange of goods,
persons, services and investment of capital among such countries.</span><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"><br />
</span>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
<br />
Indian Government is actively pushing DTAA negotiations with several
countries to help its residents in understanding their tax jurisdictions
and accountability towards the appropriate authorities. So far India has
signed DTAA with 81 countries and discussion is on with many others. The
natures of DTAA’s entered by India are greatly diverse in their nature and
contents.<br />
<br />
OECD and DTAAs</span><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"><br />
</span>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt;font-weight:400; color:black">
The first international initiative regarding DTAA was taken by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD presented the
first draft of DTAA in ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital’.
DTAA was proposed as a tool of standardization and common solutions for
cases of double taxation to the taxpayers who are engaged in industrial,
financial or other activities in other countries. The double tax treaties
are negotiated under international law and governed by the principles laid
down under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2012/06/double-taxation-avoidance-agreements.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400"><span style="font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</span></a></span></h3>
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<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none; font-weight: 400">
General Election Your Election Manifesto Will Be Road To Success</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
The next General Elections are due in 2014. All political aspirants
have already started working out policies and strategies to approach
public for support and vote. However, it is no longer an easy
mission to convince Indian voters to vote for any party or
individual. Television programmes and print media have turned
Indians into a conscious and informed class. Now, people are looking
forward towards strong programmes and policies rather than
traditional individuals and parties. It will be now be very tricky
to play sentimental issues for electoral success.</span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhmTUfEBTFsUgOyDInmQWUKU8T0pmFUyEdbbiSx41IkSriiJ8UAiKPySQ63QcCCoS4-LnRHjy4KwZakUwxR_7bqYMsL7DSgaExO3yNAsgghA5WPT0vZ3k6LsC4ovNKEXKOgId97Wdg3Hm9/s1600/5.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">
<img border="0" height="176" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhmTUfEBTFsUgOyDInmQWUKU8T0pmFUyEdbbiSx41IkSriiJ8UAiKPySQ63QcCCoS4-LnRHjy4KwZakUwxR_7bqYMsL7DSgaExO3yNAsgghA5WPT0vZ3k6LsC4ovNKEXKOgId97Wdg3Hm9/s1600/5.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></span></a></h3>
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</span>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
In this note, we are providing a evocative programme for
effectively setting forth election strategy to the aspiring
national players. We are confident, if an organization adopts
policies and programme on the lines suggested herein below and
delivers on promises, nothing can restrain them from winning
and ruling this country for next several decades.</span></h3>
<h3 class="post-title entry-title" style="background-color: white; font-stretch: normal; margin: 0.75em 0px 0px; position: relative;">
<span style="font-weight: 400; color:black; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; color:black">
The suggestive programme is outlined herein below</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2013/03/election-manifesto-that-can-bring.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; color: #cc0000; text-decoration-line: none; text-decoration: none; font-weight: 400">
Gift Received From Huf Is Not Taxable</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
Rajkot Bench of ITAT in the case of Vineetkumar Raghavjibhai
Bhalodia v. Income tax Officer, Rajkot has discussed the
controversial issue of tax ability of gifts from HUF to its
members. The issues taken up were.</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
1. Whether a gift received from 'relative', irrespective of
whether it is from an individual relative or from a group of
relatives is exempt from tax under provisions of section
56(2)(vi)?<br />
Answer: Held, yes.</span></h3>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg25UChp81ZuZg-j31b4PHGBQ7Mj4k-p9RczIfMCwQV1f8UKnwTik9QxOgxrfhnjDVjS-Yk15vDhJk919G_wJzcaxq8BHsCifqP_3_ttcujR6lbpHANDq6ZiR3FrESxnpPBTFgNN3tUnil_/s1600/10.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg25UChp81ZuZg-j31b4PHGBQ7Mj4k-p9RczIfMCwQV1f8UKnwTik9QxOgxrfhnjDVjS-Yk15vDhJk919G_wJzcaxq8BHsCifqP_3_ttcujR6lbpHANDq6ZiR3FrESxnpPBTFgNN3tUnil_/s1600/10.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></a></span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
2. Whether HUF is a group of relatives and therefore, gift
received from HUF would be exempt from tax under section
56(2)(vi)?<br />
Answer: Held, yes</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; color:black">
3. Whether for getting exemption under section 10(2) two
conditions are to be satisfied, firstly, a person must be a
member of HUF and secondly he should receive sum out of income
of such HUF, may it be income of earlier year? Answer:
Held, yes</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2012/02/gift-received-from-huf-is-not-taxable.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: small; font-weight: 400;">
<br />
</span>
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-large; text-decoration-line:none; text-decoration:none; font-weight:400">
An Overview - Copyright Law</span></h3>
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<br />
</span>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color: black">INTRODUCTION<span style="font-weight: 400; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; color:black"><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;font-family:Times New Roman; font-weight:400; color:black"><br />
</span>
<br />
Copyright is a legal term refers to protecting a creator’s work.
It is a type of intellectual property that provides exclusive
publication, distribution, and usage rights for the creator.
This means whatever content is created cannot be used or
published by anyone else without the consent of the creator. The
length of copyright protection may differ from country to
country, but it usually lasts for the life of the author plus 50
to 100 years.</span></span></h3>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiJS3tYj3tvefM-5sdAzbtamXqQF9tZ-u9ysTeqkkk9vX5wsBCjjT9rZbl4w5x6B3ossyrNplViu-ONS_5NmLFcuGmIyIfb0gc-0OPRPiSYuCF5o3My_L-t7V7LLS6VI3gEX8E_QxIpTEe/s1600/12.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">
<img border="0" height="401" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiJS3tYj3tvefM-5sdAzbtamXqQF9tZ-u9ysTeqkkk9vX5wsBCjjT9rZbl4w5x6B3ossyrNplViu-ONS_5NmLFcuGmIyIfb0gc-0OPRPiSYuCF5o3My_L-t7V7LLS6VI3gEX8E_QxIpTEe/s1600/12.jpg" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></span></a></span></h3>
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</span>
<span style="font-weight: 400; color:black; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; color:black">
Copyright is generally given by the law to creators of
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and producers
of cinematograph films and sound recordings. It is a pack of
rights including, inter alia, rights of reproduction,
communication to the public, adaptation and translation of
the work. In modern times, copyright protection has been
extended to websites and other online content. This is
important in the digital age, since large amounts of content
can be easily copied.</span><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2013/02/an-overview-copyright-law.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span><font face="Times New Roman"><br />
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<span style="font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; text-decoration-line: none; font-size: x-large; font-family: Times New Roman; color: #cc0000">
Information Technology Panacea For Police Problems</span></h3>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color:black">
With the development of Net Based Technologies along
with availability of advanced software and hardware
systems, it has become feasible to systematize and
present the most complex data system in simple
formats. This facilitates the quality of data storage
system and also improves the retrieval of the
information efficiently and accurately. Through the
application of software based technologies it has
become possible to design and maintain large database
structures and provide user friendly application.
These databases can be used for criteria based queries
and also can be supplemented with other technologies
like Biometric Solution etc.</span></h3>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1R7RoXb1GdxFplo0CKj3QZNbj34uqxBU0Wf-FCPBP8vGJXEuZbwizs_5O0OpstBdK7lNY7KOXGn1_XOfWIBNqor-WhxKqYt_SFRSEoKJEZragx_Vjb9_tPIxgoauUFSYyWgbZHKesRE0o/s1600/11111.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">
<img border="0" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1R7RoXb1GdxFplo0CKj3QZNbj34uqxBU0Wf-FCPBP8vGJXEuZbwizs_5O0OpstBdK7lNY7KOXGn1_XOfWIBNqor-WhxKqYt_SFRSEoKJEZragx_Vjb9_tPIxgoauUFSYyWgbZHKesRE0o/s1600/11111.png" style="cursor: move;" width="640" /></span></a></span></h3>
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<br />
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<span style="font-weight: 400; color:black; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400; color:black">
Delhi Police is handling extremely complex and multi
dimensional activities. The operations of Delhi Police
are spread over very large area which needs to be
constantly monitored and controlled. In fact, the
operation of Delhi Police is as complex and multifaceted
as any top corporate house. The operations just do not
end with crime recording / investigation but also
involve the application of finest management techniques,
personal management skills, financial management acumen,
deep knowledge of engineering and medicine sciences. The
application of Information Technology can make many complex
and strenuous tasks of Delhi Police Executives effortless
and error free</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight:400"><font color="#0000FF"><span style="font-weight: 400; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman; text-decoration:underline">.</span></font></span><span style="font-weight: 400; color:black; font-size:13.5pt; font-family:Times New Roman"><a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2011/01/information-technology-panacea-for.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">........click
here to read further</a></span></h3>
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<span style="font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; text-decoration-line: none; font-size: x-large; font-family: Times New Roman; color: #cc0000">
Don't Panic, If Income Tax Department Raids You</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400; color: black">
The term “Raid in Indian Income Tax Law” is
incredulous and any unexpected encounter with IT
sleuths generally leads to chaos and vacuity. If you
are likely to experience such action it is better to familiarise with the subject, so that, the situation
can be faced with confidence and serenity. Income Tax
Raid is conducted with the sole objective to unearth
tax avoidance. It is the process which authorizes IT
department to search any residential / business
premises, vehicles and bank lockers etc. and seize the
accounts, stocks and valuables.</span></p>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; color: black">To face the situation efficiently, it is extremely
important to understand some nitty-gritty of I.T. law on
the subject. Lack of knowledge leads to panic and all
the discomfort. The knowledge of your legal rights and
responsibilities always protects you<a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2010/11/dont-panic-if-income-tax-department.html" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 13.5pt; text-decoration: none; font-weight:400">.........click
here to read further</a></span><font face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><br />
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<span style="font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; text-decoration-line: none; font-size: x-large; font-family: Times New Roman; color: #cc0000">
Survey Under Income Tax Act, 1961</span></p>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400;">Survey has not been defined in the Income
Tax Act. According to Concise Oxford Dictionary, The expression "survey" means
general view, casting of eyes or mind over somethings, inspection or
investigation of the condition, amount, etc. of something, account given of
result of this etc.<br />
<br />
According to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, the meaning of the word 'survey'
is to view comprehensively and extensively, to examine in detail, to examine the
structure of a building, to obtain by measurements data for mapping, to
perceive, collection of data, an organisation or body of men for that purpose.<br />
<br />
In short the term 'survey' in context of the Income Tax Act means collection of
data or information for the purposes of the Act.<br />
Objects of Survey.</span></h3>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 13.5pt; font-weight: 400;">Survey is an important weapon in the armoury of the Income Tax Department to
call for information of various kinds as may be found necessary for making
proper assessments. Survey is mainly conducted with the object of broadening the
tax base by discovering new assessees,to gather information about possible tax
evasions by assessees, spot checking of available cash and stock and to verify
in a surprise and systematic manner, whether or not accounts are maintained
properly and on day to day basis etc<a href="http://anilkumarjainca.blogspot.in/2011/12/survey-under-income-tax-act-1961.html" style="text-decoration: none; font-family:Times New Roman; font-size:13.5pt; font-weight:400">..........click
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<font face="Times New Roman"><br /></font><p></p>www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-51574732992890861982020-01-27T18:14:00.002+05:302020-01-27T18:14:51.967+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SUPREME COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SMT. SARBATI DEVI V. SMT. USHA DEVI , 6TH DECEMBER 1983</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDY-nhWufRluo3PazDOz6YYsBkNSdjWbylsmYAC6tycyLOj3_UgtIezHALR5X557uBZzUBoEJyJSWiZt0O8zwIG3XF_BQ3mMK308T09qbArCXbufcSla-L5yq7yUKQvLgr8TxkmKSwOnM/s1600/Supreme+court.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="360" data-original-width="640" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDY-nhWufRluo3PazDOz6YYsBkNSdjWbylsmYAC6tycyLOj3_UgtIezHALR5X557uBZzUBoEJyJSWiZt0O8zwIG3XF_BQ3mMK308T09qbArCXbufcSla-L5yq7yUKQvLgr8TxkmKSwOnM/s640/Supreme+court.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;"><br /></span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Fact of the Case:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><br /></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Jag Mohan Swarup who was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 died intestate on June 15, 1967 leaving behind his son, Alok Kumar (plaintiff No. 2), his widow Usha Devi (defendant) and his mother Sarbati Devi (plaintiff No. 1) as his heirs. He had during his lifetime taken out two insurance policies for Rs. 10,000 each and had nominated under section 39 of the Act his wife Usha Devi as the person to whom the amount was payable after his death. On the basis of the said nomination, she claimed absolute right to the amounts payable under the two policies to the exclusion of her son and her mother-in-law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thereupon Sarabati Devi and Alok Kumar (minor) represented by his next friend Atma Ram who was the father of Jag Mohan Swarup filed a suit in Civil Suit No. 122 of 1970 on the file of the Ist Additional Civil Judge. Dehradun for a declaration to the effect that they were together entitled to 2/3rd share of the amount due and payable under the insurance policies referred to above. Usha Devi, the defendant resisted the suit. Her contention was that on the death of the assured, she as his nominee became absolutely entitled to the amounts due under the insurance policies by virtue of section 39 of the Act The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the decree of the trial court was dismissed by the District Judge, Dehradun. The second appeal filed by them against the judgment of the District Judge before the High Court of Allahabad was dismissed in limine under Rule 11, Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiffs have filed this appeal after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The only question which requires to be decided in this case is - Whether, on policy-holder dying intestate, nominee would become entitled to absolute beneficial interest in amount received under life insurance policy to the exclusion of heirs of deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Observation & Judgement of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauja Singh's case (supra) and in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra) do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy, The amount; however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>Judgement:</b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In view of the above conclusion, the judgments and decrees of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. Since it is not disputed that the plaintiffs are under the law of succession governing them each entitled to 1/3 share in the estate of the deceased, it is hereby declared that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to 1/3rd share in the amount received under the insurance policies in question and the interest which may have been earned by its investment. The suit stands decreed accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="color: black; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Complete Judgement</span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SUPREME COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SMT. SARBATI DEVI V. SMT. USHA DEVI , 6TH DECEMBER 1983</span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: 1984 AIR 346, 1984 SCR (1) 992<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: E Venkataramiah<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITIONER:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">SMT. SARABATI DEVI & ANR.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vs.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RESPONDENT:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">SMT. USHA DEVI<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATE OF JUDGMENT06/12/1983<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">MISRA, R.B. (J)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CITATION:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1984 AIR 346 1984 SCR (1) 992<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1984 SCC (1) 424 1983 SCALE (2)869<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CITATOR INFO : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">RF 1986 SC1863(49)</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Insurance Act, 1938 (Act IV of 1938), Section 39- Assured of a life insurance policy dies intestate leaving behind him his mother, his widow, and a son, but for the </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">purpose of Section 39 has nominated his widow alone-Whether the nominee of a life insurance policy, on the assured dying </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">intestate would become entitled to the beneficial interest in the amount received under the policy to the exclusion of </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">the heirs of the assured.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The appellants being mother and son of one Jagmohan Swarup who was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">and who died intestate on June 15, 1967 filed Civil Suit No. 122 of 1970 on the file of the first Additional Civil Judge, </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Dehradun for a declaration to the effect that they were together entitled to 2/3rd share of the amount due and </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">payable under the insurance policies though the deceased assured has nominated the respondent his widow as the person </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">to whom the amounts were payable. The respondent contested the suit claiming that she has the absolute right to the </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">amounts to the exclusion of her son and her mother-in-law. The suit was dismissed. The First Appeal before the Dt. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Judge, Dehradun and the Second Appeal before the High Court were dismissed. Hence the appeal after obtaining special</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">leave of the Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">HELD: 1.1 A mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 does not have the effect of </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">of the accused. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. [1009G, 1004 B-D]</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.2 An analysis of the provisions of Section 39 of the Act clearly established that the policy holder continues to </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">hold interest in the policy during his life time and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">the life time of the holder. If that is so, on the death of the policyholder the amount payable under the policy becomes </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. such succession may be </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">testamentary or intestate. The tenuous character of the right of a nominee becomes more pronounced when one </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">contrasts the provisions of Section 39 with that of 993 Section 38. Section 39 of the Act was not intended to act as </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">a third</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">mode of</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">succession provided</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">by</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">the </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">stature</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">and incorrectly styled</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">as "statutory</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">testament" by</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">the</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Delhi </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">High Court. [998 C-E]</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.3 The language of Section 39 of the Act is neither capable of altering the course of succession under law nor </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">can be said to have equated a nominee to an heir or legatee.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip Singh & Ors. AIR 1978 Delhi 276; Mrs. Uma Sehgal & Anr. v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal and Ors.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">AIR 1982 Delhi 36; overruled.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Rama Bhallav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar Nathmall AIR 1966 Cal. 275; D.Mohananardu Mudaliar and Anr. v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem and Anr. AIR 1957 Madras 115; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Kerala 126, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1970 Cal. 413; Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad and Anr. AIR 1972 All. 167; Mallidei and Anr. v. Kanchan Prana Dei AIR 1973 Orissa 83; Lakshmi Amma and Anr. v. Saguna Bhagathi & Ors. ILR 1973 Karnataka 827; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunavantiben and Ors. AIR 1977 Gujarat 134 approved.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Karuppa Gounder & Ors. v. Palaniammal & Ors. AIR 1963 Madras 245; B. M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. AIR 1977 Mad. 72, discussed and distinguished.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1972.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">From the Judgment and Order dated 23rd December, 1971 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 3082 of 1971.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Yogeshwar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">B. R. Agarwala, R. H. Pancholi and Ms. Vijayalakshmi Menon for the Respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATRAMIAH, J. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether a nominee of a life insurance policy under section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (Act No. IV of 1938) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the assured dying intestate would become entitled to the beneficial interest in the amount received under the policy to the exclusion of the heirs of the assured.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The facts leading to this appeal are these: One Jag Mohan Swarup who was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 died intestate on June 15, 1967 leaving behind his son, Alok Kumar (plaintiff No. 2), his widow Usha Devi (defendant) and his mother Sarbati Devi (plaintiff No. 1) as his heirs. He had during his lifetime taken out two insurance policies for Rs. 10,000 each and had nominated under section 39 of the Act his wife Usha Devi as the person to whom the amount was payable after his death. On the basis of the said nomination, she claimed absolute right to the amounts payable under the two policies to the exclusion of her son and her mother-in-law. Thereupon Sarabati Devi and Alok Kumar (minor) represented by his next friend Atma Ram who was the father of Jag Mohan Swarup filed a suit in Civil Suit No. 122 of 1970 on the file of the Ist Additional Civil Judge. Dehradun for a declaration to the effect that they were together entitled to 2/3rd share of the amount due and payable under the insurance policies referred to above. Usha Devi, the defendant resisted the suit. Her contention was that on the death of the assured, she as his nominee became absolutely entitled to the amounts due under the insurance policies by virtue of section 39 of the Act The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the decree of the trial court was dismissed by the District Judge, Dehradun. The second appeal filed by them against the judgment of the District Judge before the High Court of Allahabad was dismissed in limine under Rule 11, Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiffs have filed this appeal after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The only question which requires to be decided in this case is whether a nominee under section 39 of the Act gets an absolute right to the amount due under a life insurance policy on the death of the assured. Section 39 of the Act reads:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"39. Domination by policy-holder.- (1) The holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided that where any nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the policy-holder to appoint in the prescri</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">bed manner any person to receive the money secured by the policy in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Any such nomination in order to be effectual shall unless it is incorporated in the text of the policy itself, be made by an endorsement on the policy communicated to the insurer and registered by him in the records relating to the policy and any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed by an endorsement, or a further endorsement or a will, as the case may be, but unless notice in writing of any such cancellation or change has been delivered to the insurer, the insurer shall not be liable for any payment under the policy made bona fide by him to a nominee mentioned in the text of the policy or registered in records of the insurer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) The insurer shall furnish to the policy-holder a written acknowledgement of having registered a nomination or a cancellation or change thereof, and may charge a fee not exceeding one rupee for registering such cancellation or change. (4) A transfer or assignment of a policy made in accordance with section 38 shall automatically cancel a nomination:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided that the assignment of a policy to the insurer who bears the risk on the policy at the time of the assignment, in consideration of a loan granted by that insurer on the security of the policy within its surrender value, or its reassignment on repayment of the loan shall not cancel a nomination, but shall affect the rights of the nominee only to the extent of the insurer's interest in the policy. (5) Where the policy matures for payment during the lifetime of the person whose life is insured or where the nominee or, if there are more nominees than one, all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment, the amount secured by the policy shall be payable to the policy-holder or his heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate, as the case may be.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(6) Where the nominee or if there are more nominees than one, a nominee or nominees survive the person whose life is insured, the amount secured by the policy shall be payable to such survivor or survivors.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(7) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any policy of life insurance to which section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874 applies or has at any time applied :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided that where a nomination made whether before or after the commencement of the Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1946, in favour of the wife of the person who has insured his life or of his wife and children or any of them is expressed, whether or not on the face of the policy, as being made under this section the said section 6 shall be deemed not to apply or not to have applied to the policy."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">At the out set it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip Singh & Ors. and Mrs. Uma Sehgal & Anr. v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal & Ors in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav DhanJhania v. Gangadhar Nathmall. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd. & Anr., D. Mohanaeelu Muldaliar & Anr. v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem & Anr., Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunavantiben & Ors., Malli Dei and Lakshmi Amma Anr. v. Sagnna Bhagath & Ors., Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length. The law in force in England on the above question is summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Vol. 25, Para 579 thus :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"579. Position of third party, The policy money payable on the death of the assured may be expressed to be payable to a third party and the third party is then prima facie merely the agent for the time being of the legal owner and has his authority to receive the policy money and to give a good discharge; but he generally has no right to sue the insurers in his own name. The question has been raised whether the third party's authority to receive the policy money is terminated by the death of the assured; it seems, however, that unless and until they are otherwise directed by the assured's personal representatives the insurers may pay the money to the third party and get a good discharge from him."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bon fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub-section (7) of section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in paragraph 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra). If section 39 of the Act is contrasted with section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As observed in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad & Anr. which has interpreted section 39 of the Act correctly, the judgment of that High Court in Kesari Devi's case (supra) related to a different set of facts. In Kesari Devi's case (supra) the dispute arose regarding the person who was entitled to the succession certificate in respect of the amount payable under a life insurance policy which had been taken out by the assured between the widow of the assured and the widow of the nominee under section 39 of the Act. On going through the judgment in Kesari Devi's case (supra) we feel that the Court in that case paid little heed to the earlier judicial precedents of its own Court. The decision of the Full Bench in Raja Ram's case (supra) set at rest all doubts which might have been created by Kesari Devi's case (supra) about the true import of section 39 of the Act in so far as the High Court of Allahabad was concerned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Fauja Singh's case (supra) there is reference only two three cases-Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd. (supra), Matin v. Mahomed Matin and Kesari Devi's case (supra). The Court expressed its dissent from the Calcutta decision on the ground that decision had not considered sub-section (6) of section 39 of the Act. The Lahore case was one decided before the Act came into force. The distinguishing features of Kesari Devi's case (supra) are already mentioned. Otherwise there is not much discussion in this case about the effect of section 39 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's (case) supra. In this case of the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and that his rights would spring up only on the death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to examine the possibility of an existence of a conflict between the law of succession and the right of the nominee under section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would prevail. We are of the view that the language of section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance placed by it on the effect of the amendment of section 60(1) (kb) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 providing that all moneys payable under a policy of insurance on the life of the judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate with all plus and minus points'. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of 'devaluing' the earlier decisions which upheld the right of a creditor of the estate of the assured to attach the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such a right in such creditor which he could have exercised but for the amendment. It is because it was attachable the Code of Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of Parliament in making the amendment. The Delhi High Court has committed another error in appreciating the two decisions of the Madras High Court in Karuppa Gounder & Ors. v. Palaniammal & Ors. and in B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. The relevant part of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra) reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. "In Karuppa Gounder v. Palaniammal, AIR 1963 Mad. 245 (para 13), K had nominated his wife in the insurance policy. K died. It was held that in virtue of the nomination, the mother of K was not entitled to any portion of the insurance amount.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. I am in respectful agreement with these views, because they accord with the law and reason. They are supported by S. 44 (2) of the Act. It provides that the commission payable to an insurance agent shall after his death, continue to be payable to his heirs, but if the agent has nominated any person the commission shall be paid to the person so nominated. It cannot be contended that the nominee u/s 44 will receive the money not as owner but as an agent on behalf of someone else vide B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation, AIR 1977 Mad. 72. Thus, the nominee excludes the legal heirs."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Two mistakes committed by the Delhi High Court in the above passage are these. In Karuppa Gounder's case (supra), the question was whether the amount payable under the insurance policy in question was joint family property or separate property of the assured. In that connection, the High Court of Madras observed thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"But where a coparcener has effected insurance upon his own life, though he might have received the premia from out of the funds which he might have received from the joint family, it does not follow that the joint family insured the life of the member or paid the premia in relation thereto. It is undeniable that a member of a coparcenary may with the moneys which he might receive from the coparcenary effect an insurance upon his own life for the benefit of the members of his immediate family. His intention to do so and to keep the property as his separate property would be manifested if he makes a nomination in favour of his wife or children as the case may be. It would therefore appear that no general proposition can be advanced in the matter of the insurance policy of a member of a coparcenary and that each case must be dealt with in accordance with the circumstances surrounding it."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is obvious from the above passage that the above case has no bearing on the meaning of section 39 of the Act. The fact of nomination was treated in that case as a piece of evidence in support of the finding that the policy was not a joint family asset but the separate property of the coparcener concerned. No right based on the ground that one party was entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased in preference to the other or along with the other under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act was asserted in that case. The next error committed by the Delhi High Court is in drawing an analogy between section 39 and section 44(2) of the Act thinking that the Madras High Court had done so in B. M. Mundkur's case (supra). In B.M. Mundkur's case (supra), the High Court of Madras instead of drawing an analogy between section 39 and section 44(2) of the Act actually contrasts them as can be seen from the following passage:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"There are vital differences between the nomination contemplated under Section 39 of the Act and the nomination contemplated under the proviso to Section 44(2) of the Act. In the first place, the sum assured, with which alone Sec. 39 was concerned, was to be paid in the event of the death of the assured under the terms of the contract entered into between the insurer and the assured and consequently it was the contractual right which remained vested in the insured with reference to which the nomination happened to be made. It should be pointed out that the nomination as well as the liability on the part of the insurer to pay the sum assured become effective simultaneously, namely, at the moment of the death of the assured. So long as he was alive, the money was not payable to him, in the case of a whole life policy, and equally, having regard to the language of Section 39(1) of the Act, the nominee's right to receive the money arose only on the death of the assured, Section 39 itself did not deal with the title to the money assured, which was to be paid by the insurer to the nominee who was bound to give discharge to the insurer. It was in this context that the Court took the view that the title remained with the estate of the deceased, and therefore, with the heirs of the deceased, that the nomination did not in any way affect the title and that it merely clothed the nominee with the right to receive the amount from the insurer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. On the other hand, the provisions and purport of Section 44 of the Act are different. In the first place under Section 44(1) it was a statutory right conferred on the agent to receive the commission on the renewal premium notwithstanding the termination of the agreement between the agent and the insurer, which provided for the payment of such commission on the renewal premium. The statute also prescribed the qualification which rendered the agent eligible to receive commission on such renewal premium. Section 44(1) provides for the payment of the commission to the agent during his lifetime only and does not contemplate the contingency of his death and the commission being paid to anybody even after his death. It is S. 44(2) which deals with the payment of commission to the heirs of deceased for so long as such insurance agent been alive. Thus it was not the general law of inheritance which conferred title on the heirs of the deceased insurance agent to receive the commission on the renewal premium, but it was only the particular statutory provision, namely, Section 44(2) which conferred the right on the heirs of the deceased agent to receive the commission on the renewal premium. In other words, the right of the heirs to receive the commission on renewal premium does not arise under any law of succession and it is a right directly conferred on the heirs by Section 44(2) of the Act, even though who the heirs of the deceased insurance agent are will have to be ascertained under the law of succession applicable to him. Thus the statute which conferred such a right on the heirs is certainly competent to provide for an exception in certain cases and take away such a right from the heirs; and the proviso which has been introduced by the Government of India notification 1962 has done exactly this in taking away the right of the heirs conferred under the main part of Section 44(2), in the event of the agent, during his lifetime, making a nomination in favour of a particular person and not cancelling or altering that nomination subsequently. If the statute itself was competent to donfer such a right for the first time on the heirs of the deceased agent it is indisputable that the statute could take away that right under stated circumstances."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The reasons given by the Delhi High Court in this case in support of its view are not tenable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauja Singh's case (supra) and in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra) do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy, The amount; however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In view of the above conclusion, the judgments and decrees of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. Since it is not disputed that the plaintiffs are under the law of succession governing them each entitled to 1/3 share in the estate of the deceased, it is hereby declared that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to 1/3rd share in the amount received under the insurance policies in question and the interest which may have been earned by its investment. The suit stands decreed accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Parties shall, however, bear their own costs throughout.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-72043991947304976852020-01-27T18:13:00.000+05:302020-01-27T18:13:16.044+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">HARSHA NITIN KOKATE V. SARASWAT CO-OP. BANK LTD. - 101 SCL 145 - 20TH APRIL 2010<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Fact of the Case<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Plaintiff married one Nitin Kokate on 3rd December 2004. Her husband expired on 5th July 2007. Nitin Kokate held certain shares in D- mat Account with the Depository Participant Cell of Defendant No.1. Her husband executed a nomination in the prescribed form following the prescribed procedure set out by the Depository Participant, Defendant No.1 Bank in favour of the Defendant No.3, his nephew on 11th July 2006. The Plaintiff claims an interest in the said shares as his heir and legal representative. She claims to have them sold.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This Suit is not concerned with the reason why she claims the sale of the shares. The Plaintiff must show her legal right, title and interest in those shares. If that is shown, the Plaintiff would be entitled to sell or transfer those shares or to hold them as her own.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Following question raised before the court –<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether intent of nomination is to vest property in shares which includes ownership rights thereunder in nominee upon nomination validly made as per procedure prescribed<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether if procedure prescribed by law for nomination is followed, nominee would become entitled to all rights in shares to exclusion of all other persons<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether upon nomination, nominee would be made beneficial owner and, therefore, all rights incidental to ownership would follow which would include right to transfer shares, pledge shares or hold shares.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether where plaintiff’s husband had executed nominations in respect of certain shares in D-mat Account with depository participant cell of defendant No. 1 in favour of his nephew, plaintiff would have no right to get shares of her deceased husband sold or to otherwise deal with same<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Observation & Judgement of Court:</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">A reading of Section 109A of the Companies Act and 9.11 of the Depositories Act makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the nomination is to vest the property in the shares which includes the ownership rights thereunder in the nominee upon nomination validly made as per the procedure prescribed,, as has been done in this case. These Sections are completely different from Section 39 of the Insurance Act set out (supra) which require a nomination merely for the payment of the amount under the Life Insurance Policy without confirming any ownership rights in the nominee or under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act which allows the Society to transfer the shares of the member which would be valid against any demand made by any other person upon the Society. Hence these provisions are made merely to give a valid discharge to the Insurance Company or the Co-operative Society without vesting the ownership rights in the Insurance Policy or the membership rights in the Society upon such nominee. The express legislature intent under Section 109A of the Companies Act and Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act is clear.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Judgement:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Since the nomination is shown to be correctly made by her husband who was the holder of the Suit shares, the Plaintiff would have no right to get the shares of her deceased husband sold or to otherwise deal with the same. Consequently the Notice of Motion is dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">-------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Complete Judgement</span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">BOMBAY HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">HARSHA NITIN KOKATE V. SARASWAT CO-OP. BANK LTD. - 101 SCL 145 - 20TH APRIL 2010<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: R. S. Dalvi</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 2351 OF 2008<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">SUIT NO. 1972 OF 2008<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Harsha Nitin Kokate<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...Plaintiff<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. ig<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...Defendants<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. A.K. Maheshwari for Plaintiff<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Ms. Shyama Parkar i/b. M.P.Rege & Co., for Defendant No.1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. H.S. Shreepad Murthy for Defendant No.3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM : SMT. ROSHAN DALVI, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATED : 20TH APRIL, 2010 JUDGMENT:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. The Plaintiff married one Nitin Kokate on 3rd December 2004. Her husband expired on 5th July 2007. Nitin Kokate held certain shares in D- mat Account with the Depository Participant Cell of Defendant No.1. Her husband executed a nomination in the prescribed form following the prescribed procedure set out by the Depository Participant, Defendant No.1 Bank in favour of the Defendant No.3, his nephew on 11th July 2006. The Plaintiff claims an interest in the said shares as his heir and legal representative. She claims to have them sold.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. This Suit is not concerned with the reason why she claims the sale of the shares. The Plaintiff must show her legal right, title and interest in those shares. If that is shown, the Plaintiff would be entitled to sell or transfer those shares or to hold them as her own.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The Defendant No.3 claims right, title and interest in the shares pursuant to the nomination executed in his favour. The nomination has been executed well prior to the death of the deceased and well after his marriage with the Plaintiff. The Defendant No.1 Bank has stated that the nomination is executed as required and has been so registered with the Depository Participant. The effect of the nomination is, therefore, to be seen. The nomination form itself shows that the rights of transfer and/or the amount payable in respect of the securities held by Nitin Kokate, Defendant No.3 vests in him as the said nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. The law relating to nomination is set out in 109A of the Companies Act pursuant to the amendment which came into effect on 31st October 1998. It is common knowledge that prior to 1996 shares were not held in de- materialised form. Consequent upon the Dematting of the shares the Share Certificates in physical form are not mandatorily required to be issued by the Limited Companies listed on the Stock Exchanges. Shares can be transferred by word of mouth or on the Internet from person to person. Upon such transfer the membership rights of the holder of the shares changes. Since the share is an intangible movable property it is bequeathable estate The nomination in respect of the shares is, therefore, important. Section 109A sets out the rights of the holder of shares to nominate as well as the rights of the nominees thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">S.109A. Nomination of shares - (1) Every holder of shares in, or holder of debentures of a company may, at any time, nominate, in the prescribed manner, a person to whom his shares in or debentures of, the company shall vest in the event of his death. (2) ...........<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such shares in, or debentures of, the company, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to vest the shares in, or debentures of, the company, the nominee shall, on the death of the shareholder or holder of debentures of the company or, as the case may be, on the death of the joint holders become entitled to all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company or, as the case may be, all the joint holders, in relation to such shares in, or debentures of the company to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4).........<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It can be seen from the aforesaid provision that nomination is required to be made in the prescribed manner. Upon such nomination the shares would vest in the nominee in the event of the death of the holder. Further upon it being made in the prescribed manner the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares of the Company to the exclusion of all other persons. That is the effect of vesting the shares in the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Mr. Maheshwari drew my attention to the Depositories Act 1996. Section 9.11 thereof relates to transmission of securities in the case of nomination. Section 9.11 runs thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11. TRANSMISSION OF SECURITIES IN THE CASE OF NOMINATION:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.1. In respect of every account, the Beneficial Owner(s) ("Nominating Person(s)") may nominate any person ("Nominee") to whom his securities shall vest in the event of his death in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules from time to time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.2. The securities held in such account shall automatically be transferred in the name of the Nominee, upon the death of the Nominating Person, or as the case may be, all the Nominating Persons subject to the other Bye Laws mentioned hereunder.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.3........<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.4. Beneficial Owner(s) may substitute or cancel a nomination at any time. A valid nomination, substitution or cancellation of nomination shall be dated and duly registered with the Participant in accordance with the Business Rules prescribed therefor. The closure of the account by the Nominating Person(s) shall conclusively cancel the nomination.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.5. A Nominee shall not be entitled to exercise any right conferred on Beneficial Owners under these Bye Laws, upon the death of the Nominating Person(s), unless the Nominee follows the procedure prescribed in the Business Rules for being registered as the Beneficial Owner of the securities of the Nominating Person(s) in the books of the Depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.6. A nominee shall on the death of the Nominating Person(s) be entitled to elect himself to be registered as a Beneficial Owner by delivering a notice in writing to the Depository, along with the certified true copy of the death certificate issued by the competent authority as prescribed under the Business Rules. Subject to scrutiny of such election, the securities in the Account shall be transmitted to the account of the Nominee held with any depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.11.7. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other disposition and/or nominations made by the Nominating Person(s) under any other law for the time being in force, for the purposes of dealing with the securities lying to the credit of deceased Nominating Person(s) in any manner, the Depository shall rely upon the last nomination validly made prior to the demise of the Nominating Person(s). The Depository shall not be liable for any action taken in reliance upon and on the basis of nomination validly made by the Nominating Person(s).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(underlining supplied)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Upon such nomination the securities automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of shares. The nomination is required to be dematted duly registered with the Depository Participant (Bank) in accordance with the Business Rules. The nominee is required to follow the prescribed procedure in the Business Rules. Upon the death of the holder of the shares the nominee would be entitled to elect to be registered as an beneficiary owner by notifying the Bank along with the certified copy of the death certificate. The Bank would be required to scrutinise the election and nomination of the nominee registered with it. Such nomination carries effect notwithstanding anything contained in a Testamentary Disposition or nominations made under any other law dealing with the Securities. The last of the many nominations would be valid.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Under the said Section the holders of the shares would nominate any person in whom the securities would vest in the event of his death. This nomination has to be made in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. It can be seen that since all the shares are held in Demat form with the Depository Participant and the portfolio of the holder may change each day.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence one nomination is specifically required to be made as provided in the aforesaid legislation. The nomination would have the effect of vesting in the nominee complete title in the shares. He would be entitled to elect to be registered as a beneficial owner of the shares or he would have the right to transfer the shares. These are inter alia the rights of every shareholder of a listed Companies. These rights show that the vesting of the shares is upon the death of the shareholder provided only that the nomination is made as per the procedure set out by the Depository Participant. This procedure is the registration of the form of nomination constituting the nomination of the nominee with his photograph signed by the holder as well as the nominee and witnessed by at least 2 persons and registered with the Bank. The purpose and object of this Section is clear. It is simplifies the procedure relating to the transmission of shares which is otherwise an intangible movable property. As the shares are now held in Dmat form and can be purchased and sold in the market by word of mouth or on the Internet, and no physical share certificates are issued by Companies, only one nomination for all the shares in all the companies need be made. That can be registered only with the Depository Participant who records all the share transactions of the holder of the shares who is mandatorily required to open a Dmat account with the Depository Participant. Hence the legislature has simplified and specified the procedure for vesting of shares by nomination made in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of the Plaintiff contends that the nomination only makes a nominee a trustee for the shares. He holds the shares in trust for the estate of the deceased, the deceased died intestate and hence the Plaintiff as the widow would be entitled to the shares to the exclusion of the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10.Mr. Maheshwari drew my attention to the case of Smt. Sarbati Devi Vs. Smt. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 SC 346 for which a nomination made under the Insurance Act in respect of the Life Insurance Policy under Section 39 of the Act came to be considered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 39 of the Insurance Act runs thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">39. Nomination by policy-holder - (1) The holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11.Under the Insurance Act the nomination entails payment by the Insurance Company to the nominee to obtain a complete discharge. Once the amount under the Policy is paid to the nominee, the nominee would hold it in Trust or the Estate because under the Insurance Act there is no legislative provision that the nominee would obtain any other right.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.It may be mentioned that the position under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act is similar for nominees in respect of shares in a Housing Society.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 30 of The Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act runs thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30.(1) On the death of a member of a society, the society shall transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to a person or persons nominated in accordance with the rules or, if no person has been so nominated, to such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal representative of the deceased member:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided that, such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be, is duly admitted as a member of the society:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided further that, nothing in this sub-section or in section 22 shall prevent a minor or a person of unsound mind from acquiring by inheritance or otherwise, any share or interest of a deceased member in a Society.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2).......<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3).......<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) All transfers and payments duly made by a society in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be valid and effectual against any demand made upon the society by any other person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence in a Co-operative Society also the shares of the member can be simplicitor transferred to the nominee which transfer would effectually discharge the Society as against any other person making a demand.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Such a transfer, therefore, cannot and does not result in vesting of the flat in such nominee. Hence such nominee is merely a trustee for the estate of the deceased. The Society is not concerned with the dispute amongst the heirs of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13.The provision pursuant to the amendment of the Companies Act is quite the contrary. The nomination under Section 109A of the Co-operative Act does not entail mere payment of the amount of shares. It specifically vests the property in the shares in the nominee, in the event of the death of the holder of the shares. The analogy drawn from the judgment in the case of Sarbati Devi is completely misplaced.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14.The meaning and definition of the word "Vest" is required to be considered. Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition at page 1594 shows the meaning of "Vest" thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Vest:1. To confer ownership of (property) upon a person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. To invest (a person) with the full title to property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. To give (a person) an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Hist. To put (a person) into possession of land by the ceremony of investiture.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vested: Having become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute<a estate.="" href="https://www.blogger.com/null" in="" interest="" o:p="" the="" vested=""></a></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Further the meaning of vested right is given in the aforesaid Dictionary at page 1349 thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Vested right. A right that so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person's consent".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15.The meaning of Vested Interest in the said Dictionary is explained at page 829 thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Vested interest. An interest the right to the enjoyment of which, either present or future, is not subject to the happening of a condition precedent".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16.The meaning of Vested Estate at page 588 is shown thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Vested estate. An estate with a present right of enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17.Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition 2007 at page 2677 when explains the term Vested Legacy thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">VESTED LEGACY. A legacy the interest in which is so fixed as to be transmissible to the personal representative of the legatee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. The judgment in the case of The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. The Delhi Improvement Trust, A.I.R. 1957 SC 344 at page 353 holds that the word "Vest" can be used differently upon considering the English Law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19.It is observed that the word "Vest" is a word of variable import even under Indian Statutes. The illustrations given in the judgment are the Insolvency Act which provides that the property vests in the Receiver. Such vesting is held to be temporary and only for the purpose of management of the properties of the insolvent for payment of his debts after distributing his assets. Consequently, the Receiver would have no interest of his own in the property vested in him. The vesting under the Land Acquisition Act is shown to be different. Under that Act the property would vest "absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". Hence upon such vesting the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any conditions or limitation either as to its title or possession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Consequently, it is held at page 353 runs thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20.Hence under that judgment which considered the provisions of theU.P. Town Improvement Act it was held that the land vesting in the Municipal or Legal Body was so vested only for the purpose of managing that land and would not transfer ownership of the property to the Authority.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21.In the case of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui Vs. Union of India A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605 the concept of vesting the property in the Acquiring Authority came to be considered under the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act (33 of 1993). Considering the pith and substance of the Act, which was for the acquisition of the property at Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid site under a legislation, it was held that vesting of the disputed land (Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid) was limited to holding it by the Civil Government as Statutory Receiver and vesting of the area in excess of the disputed structure was absolute.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, it is seen that the intention of the Legislature is of primary importance in considering the effect of the term "vest" in a given legislation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22.In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (2001) 8 SCC 143 the vesting of watercourse in the Municipal Corporation was held not to be except for entrustment of the duty of the Municipality to maintain them in the manner provided under Section 220A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This would be in consonance with the intention of the legislation - no land can become of the ownership of the Municipality merely because the Municipality is enjoined to maintain it and for which the vesting in possession alone would take place; the ownership would not vest.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">23.Considering some of these judgments it has been held in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. 2002 (8) SCALE 388 that the term vest in common English acceptation would mean and imply conferment of ownership of properties upon a person and in similar vein it gives immediate and fixed right of present and future enjoinment. However, it is observed, following the decision in the case of Fruit and Vegetables (supra) and Dr. M Faruqui (supra) that the term vest is a word of variable import. In that judgment the right, title and interest of the Coke oven plant which is vested in the Central Government under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was considered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In that case the Appeal of the Company, in which the right, title and interest of the owners of the plants were to have vested under the aforesaid legislation, was dismissed holding that pursuant to the legislation the right, title and interest could not stand transferred to the Government Company since no infraction by the title holders was seen.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">24.In the light of these judgments Section 109A of the Companies Act is required to be interpreted with regard to the vesting of the shares of the holder of the shares in the nominee upon his death. The act sets out that the nomination has to be made during the life time of the holder as per procedure prescribed by law. If that procedure is followed, the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares to the exclusion of all other persons. The nominee would be made beneficial owner thereof. Upon such nomination, therefore, all the rights incidental to ownership would follow. This would include the right to transfer the shares, pledge the shares or hold the shares. The specific statutory provision making the nominee entitled to all the rights in the shares excluding all other persons would show expressly the legislative intent. Once all other persons are excluded and only the nominee becomes entitled under the statutory provision to have all the rights in the shares none other can have it. Further Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act 1996 makes the nominee's position superior to even a testamentary disposition. The non-obstante Clause in Section 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the Testamentary Disposition itself. Hence, any other disposition or nomination under any other law stands subject to the nomination made under the Depositories Act. Section 9.11.7 further shows that the last of the nominations would prevail. This shows the revocable nature of the nomination much like a Testamentary Disposition. A nomination can be cancelled by the holder and another nomination can be made. Such later nomination would be relied upon by the Depository Participant. That would be for conferring of all the rights in the shares to such last nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">25.A reading of Section 109A of the Companies Act and 9.11 of the Depositories Act makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the nomination is to vest the property in the shares which includes the ownership rights thereunder in the nominee upon nomination validly made as per the procedure prescribed,, as has been done in this case. These Sections are completely different from Section 39 of the Insurance Act set out (supra) which require a nomination merely for the payment of the amount under the Life Insurance Policy without confirming any ownership rights in the nominee or under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act which allows the Society to transfer the shares of the member which would be valid against any demand made by any other person upon the Society. Hence these provisions are made merely to give a valid discharge to the Insurance Company or the Co-operative Society without vesting the ownership rights in the Insurance Policy or the membership rights in the Society upon such nominee. The express legislature intent under Section 109A of the Companies Act and Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act is clear.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26.Since the nomination is shown to be correctly made by her husband who was the holder of the Suit shares, the Plaintiff would have no right to get the shares of her deceased husband sold or to otherwise deal with the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27.Consequently the Notice of Motion is dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(SMT. ROSHAN DALVI, J.)</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-62953988642884976742020-01-27T18:11:00.002+05:302020-01-27T18:11:30.620+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SUPREME COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">RAM CHANDER TALWAR V. DEVENDER KUMAR TALWAR - 105 SCL 109 – 6TH OCTOBER 2010<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Fact of the Case<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Appellant who was the nominee in the bank account held by his deceased mother claims full rights over the money lying in the account, to the exclusion of the respondent who is none else than his full brother. The claim is based on section 45 ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, which according to him, makes the nominee of the depositor the sole beneficiary, vested with all the rights of sole depositor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. Swetank Shantanu, counsel appearing for the appellants, strenuously argued that by virtue of sub-section 2 of section 45 ZA, the nominee of the depositor, after the death of the depositor acquires all his/her rights to the express exclusion of all other persons and, therefore, the respondent can not lay any claim to the money in the account or in regard to the articles that might be lying in the bank locker held by their deceased mother.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Following question raised before the Court<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 45ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 - Provisions relating to certain operations of banking companies - Nomination for payment of depositors’ money – <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Whether section 45ZA(2) merely puts nominee in shoes of depositor after his death and clothes him with exclusive right to receive money lying in account and gives him all rights of depositor so far as depositor’s account is concerned but it by no stretch of imagination makes nominee owner of money lying in account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether all monies receivable by nominee by virtue of section 45ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of estate of deceased depositor and devolve according to rule of succession by which depositor may be governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The submission is quite fallacious and is based on a complete misconception of the provision of the Act. Sub-section 2 of the 45ZA, reads as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Observation & Judgement of Court:</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><br /></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount to deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 45ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of section 45 ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We find that the High Court has rightly rejected the appellant's claim relying upon the decision of this Court in V.N. Khanchandani & Anr. v. V.L. Khanchandani & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The provision under Section 6(1) of the Government Saving Certificate Act, 1959 is materially and substantially the same as the provision of Section 45ZA(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and the decision in V.N. Khanchandani applies with full force to the facts of this case. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">-------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Complete Judgement</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">SUPREME COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt; line-height: 27.6px;">RAM CHANDER TALWAR V. DEVENDER KUMAR TALWAR - 105 SCL 109 – 6TH OCTOBER 2010<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: ...................J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: Aftab Alam, R.M. Lodha<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">REPORTABLE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1684 OF 2004<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RAM CHANDER TALWAR & ANR.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...APPELLANTS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">VERSUS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DEVENDER KUMAR TALWAR & ORS.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...RESPONDENTS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Heard counsel appearing for the appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Appellant no.1, who was the nominee in the bank account held by his deceased mother claims full rights over the money lying in the account, to the exclusion of the respondent who is none else than his full brother. The claim is based on section 45 ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, which according to him, makes the nominee of the depositor the sole beneficiary, vested with all the rights of sole depositor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. Swetank Shantanu, counsel appearing for the appellants, strenuously argued that by virtue of sub-section 2 of section 45 ZA, the nominee of the depositor, after the death of the depositor acquires all his/her rights to the express exclusion of all other persons and, therefore, the respondent can not lay any claim to the money in the account or in regard to the articles that might be lying in the bank locker held by their deceased mother.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The submission is quite fallacious and is based on a complete misconception of the provision of the Act. Sub-section 2 of the 45ZA, reads as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">45ZA xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount to deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 45ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of section 45 ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We find that the High Court has rightly rejected the appellant's claim relying upon the decision of this Court in V.N. Khanchandani & Anr. v. V.L. Khanchandani & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">724. The provision under Section 6(1) of the Government Saving Certificate Act, 1959 is materially and substantially the same as the provision of Section 45ZA(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and the decision in V.N. Khanchandani applies with full force to the facts of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">...................J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(AFTAB ALAM) ...................J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(R.M. LODHA) New Delhi, October 06, 2010.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">ABHISHEK 06012020</span></b></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-19978287180819687032020-01-27T18:09:00.003+05:302020-01-27T18:09:56.931+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">BOMBAY HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR V. JAYASHREE JAYANT </span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">31ST MARCH 2015<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Fact of the Case:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Salgaonkar (Suit No.503 of 2014) is an action for administration of the estate of one Jayant Shivram Salgaonkar. The Plaintiff's Notice of Motion No. 822 of 2014 seeks reliefs in respect of his estate described in the list at Exhibit "A" to the Plaint. Item 9 of that list speaks of investments in Mutual Funds, etc. These are detailed in Exhibit "D" to the Plaint. This is a list of various investments in Mutual Funds and it shows the name of the 'nominee' in respect of each such investment. Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 seem to be the nominees in respect of the bulk of these mutual fund investments. In their Affidavits in Reply to the Notice of Motion, Defendants Nos. 5 and 6, represented by Mr. Rajendra Pai, learned Counsel, have specifically urged that these investments do not form part of the Jayant Salgaonkar's estate. They each claim to be exclusively entitled in law to 'succeed to' these investments qua such nominees, and they invoke, inter alia, Regulation 29A of the SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996. Defendant No.6 makes a similar claim on the basis of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in respect of a fixed deposit receipt for Rs.50 lakhs with IDBI Bank.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Ghatalia, probate is sought to the will of one Urmila S. Ghatalia. The Petitioner is one of the deceased's sons. The other son has consented to the grant of probate. The action is opposed by the deceased's daughter. At present, the controversy is only whether or not the daughter is entitled to file and maintain a caveat in opposition to the probate petition or whether this caveat must be held to be defective and non-est. In the course of the hearing, a settlement was suggested and was very nearly reached. The only contentious issue related to some of the deceased's investments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Following question raised before the court -<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Whether nominations under sections 109A and 109B of Companies Act and Bye-law 9.11 of Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace law of succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether nomination only provide company or depository a legally valid quittance so that it does not remain forever answerable to a raft of succession litigation and an endless slew of claimants under succession law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether under sections 109A and 109B, company or depository gets a legally valid discharge, but nominee continues to hold in a fiduciary capacity and is answerable to all claimants under succession law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Whether thus, ruling in Harsha Nitin Kokate v. Saraswat Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2010] 101 SCL 145 (Bom.) was per incuriam and not a good law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Observation & Judgement of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There are additional problems too. The 'statutory testament' is not subject to the rigour of the Succession Act. It does require witnesses, but not the discipline mandated by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. A nomination, though said to be a 'testament', requires no probate or other proof 'in solemn form'. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not be in the presence of the nominator. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not act at the instance of the nominator. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not see the nominator execute the nomination.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No nomination can be assailed on the ground of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence; Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act is wholly defenestrated, as is Section 59. Yet it is said to be a will. There can be no codicil to a nomination. Yet it is said to be a will.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In short, a nomination, in the Kokate formulation, is some sort of 'super-will', one that partakes of none of the defining traits of a properly executed will and none of the tests of its validity, one that is never displaced by a later, properly made will that deals with the very same property. Mr. Pai asks that we should place ourselves in the 'armchair of the nominator'. That, as it happens, is the same furniture used by a testator, and it simply cannot be that the view from that seat depends on the nature of the document before the executant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no particular form for a will, but there are requirements attendant to its proper making. These do not apply to all nominations: even the requirement of witnesses is a matter of prudence rather than statute. If that be so, no nomination per se requires attestation, and if that be so, it is admissible in evidence under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 without the evidence of any witness (simply because a witness to a nomination is not, in any sense, an 'attesting witness'). But no will can be so read in evidence without such evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">From the fundamental definitions to the decisions cited, it is clear that a nomination only provides the company or the depository a quittance. The nominee continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the claimants under the succession law. Nominations under Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace the law of succession, nor do they open a third line of succession. This is the consistent view of the Supreme Court in Khanchandai, Shipra Sengupta and of our Court Gustad Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes, all decisions that preceded Kokate; and the submission made in paragraph 9 of Kokate was correctly placed and was in line with those decisions. Those decisions were all binding on the Kokate Court. They were neither noticed nor considered. The Kokate Court could not have taken a view contrary to those decisions. Kokate is, therefore, per incuriam.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This judgment does not dispose of the Notice of Motion in Salgaonkar or the application in Ghatalia. Those will be considered on their merits in view of the legal position enunciated above. Given that this judgment deals only with a question of law, there is no question of a stay of the judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Complete Judgement</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR V. JAYASHREE JAYANT </span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">31ST MARCH 2015<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">TESTAMENTARY & INTESTATE JURISDICTION<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 822 OF 2014<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Occupation </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Business, having his address at B-1, Vikas Apartment, N.M. Kale </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Marg, Agar Bazar, </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Business, having his address at </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">B-1, Vikas Apartment, N.M. Kale Marg, Agar Bazar, </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">1. JAYASHREE JAYANT SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">having her address at 604B, Laxmi Sadan, Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Marg, Dadar, Bombay - 400 014</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">2. JAYRAJ JAYANT SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant Occupation Business, having his address at 604B, Laxmi Sadan, Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Marg, Dadar, Bombay - 400 014</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">3. JAYENDRA JAYANT SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, Occupation Business, having his address at 2, Radha Mandir, Ground floor, 213, Sir Bhalchandra Road, Matunga, Bombay - 400 014</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">5. SHAKTI YEZDANI, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, Occupation Employed, having </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">her address at 604B, Laxmi Sadan, Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Marg, Dadar, Bombay - 400 014.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">6. LALITA LAXMI SALGAONKAR, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">of Bombay Indian Inhabitant,</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Occupation Employed, having her address at 604B, Laxmi Sadan, Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Marg, Dadar, Bombay - 400 014</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">7. SEEMA SALGAONKAR,</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">of Bombay Indian Inhabitant,</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Occupation Business, having her address at 2, Radha Mandir, Ground floor, 213, Sir Bhalchandra Road, Matunga, Bombay - 400014</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">8. SAMARTH SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant,</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Occupation Employed, having his address at 2, Radha Mandir,</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Ground floor, 213, Sir Bhalchandra Road, Matunga, Bombay - 400014</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">9. SIDDHI SALGAONKAR, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, Occupation Employed, having her address at 2, Radha Mandir, Ground floor, 213, Sir Bhalchandra</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 18px;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; text-align: center;">Road, Matunga, Bombay - 400 014</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">10. JAY GANESH NYAS TRUST<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">A trust registered under the Public Trusts</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Act, 1950 having its address at 604B, Laxmi Sadan, Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Marg,</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">FOR THE PLAINTIFF</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Mr. Snehal Shah, i/b Y. R. Shah.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">FOR DEFENDANTS NOS.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>5<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Mr. Rajendra V. Pai, a/w A. R. Pai, A. A.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">AND 6<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Dandekar, N. Thakkar, Prashant<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">::: Downloaded on - 02/04/2015 00:00:47 :::<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 457 OF 2014<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">URMILA S GHATALIA of Mumbai, Jain,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Inhabitant residing at the time of her death at IRIS, 6th Floor, Flat No. 21-22, G D<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">of Mumbai, Indian Inhabitant, residing at IRIS, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">6th Floor, Flat No. 21-22, Cuffe</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Parade, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Mumbai - 400 005</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">...</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Petitioner</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">SWATI SHATISHCHANDRA GHATALIA aged about 49 years, Indian<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Inhabitant of Mumbai, residing at Flat No. 21-22,6th floor,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IRIS, Cuffe Parade, Mumbai 400 005 Caveatrix<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">FOR THE PETITIONER<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Mr. Nanak Ghatalia, in person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">FOR THE CAVEATRIX<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Mr. Karl Tamboly, i/b Harish Pawar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>: G.S.Patel, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT RESERVED ON<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>: 12th December 2014<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>: 31st March 2015<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">JUDGMENT:</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">1. A common question of law arises in these two otherwise unrelated cases. In this judgment, I have addressed only that question of law, but not the respective applications on merits.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">2. The question first came up in Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar v Jayashree Jayant Salgaonkar ("Salgaonkar") when Mr. Snehal Shah, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff in that matter, urged that the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Harsha Nitin Kokate v The Saraswat Cooperative Bank Ltd & Ors. 1 was per incuriam and not good law. As a substantially similar issue arose in the second of these cases Nanak Ghatalia v Swati Ghatalia, I invited Mr. Ghatalia, the Petitioner appearing pro-se and Mr. Karl Tamboly, learned Counsel for the Caveatrix, to make their submissions on the question as well.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">3. I am not in this judgment deciding the merits of the applications in Salgaonkar or Ghatalia, but only considering whether Kokate was or was not per incuriam. The applications in both cases will then have to be heard on their merits. However, it is necessary to set out briefly how the question for determination arises.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">4. Salgaonkar (Suit No.503 of 2014) is an action for administration of the estate of one Jayant Shivram Salgaonkar. The Plaintiff's Notice of Motion No. 822 of 2014 seeks reliefs in respect of his estate described in the list at Exhibit "A" to the Plaint. Item 9 of that list speaks of investments in Mutual Funds, etc. These are detailed in Exhibit "D" to the Plaint. This is a list of various investments in Mutual Funds and it shows the name of the 'nominee' in respect of each such investment. Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 seem to be the nominees in respect of the bulk of these mutual fund investments. In their Affidavits in Reply to the Notice of Motion, Defendants Nos. 5 and 6, represented by Mr. Rajendra Pai, learned Counsel, have specifically urged that these investments do not form part of the Jayant Salgaonkar's estate. They each claim to be exclusively entitled in law to 'succeed to' these investments qua such nominees, and they invoke, inter alia, Regulation 29A of the SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996. Defendant No.6 makes a similar claim on the basis of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in respect of a fixed deposit receipt for Rs.50 lakhs with IDBI Bank.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">5. In Ghatalia, probate is sought to the will of one Urmila S. Ghatalia. The Petitioner is one of the deceased's sons. The other son has consented to the grant of probate. The action is opposed by the deceased's daughter. At present, the controversy is only whether or not the daughter is entitled to file and maintain a caveat in opposition to the probate petition or whether this caveat must be held to be defective and non-est. In the course of the hearing, a settlement was suggested and was very nearly reached. The only contentious issue related to some of the deceased's investments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">6 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC The Petitioner, Mr. Nanak S. Ghatalia, submitted that being a nominee in respect of those investments he alone was entitled to them and, notwithstanding anything in the will, these investments came to him exclusively on his mother's death. They did not form part of her distributable estate and were not required to be distributed in accordance with the will that he propounds.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">6. In both cases, the claims of exclusive rights to and ownership of the investments are founded on the judgment of the learned single Judge in Kokate. That decision was in a Notice of Motion in a Suit in which the plaintiff claimed an interest in certain shares as the heir and legal representative of one Nitin Kokate, the plaintiff's deceased husband. Nitin Kokate had, in his lifetime, made a nomination in respect of these shares in favour of his nephew, the 3rd defendant to the suit. The question placed before the Court was whether the plaintiff, Nitin Kokate's widow, could "show her legal right, title and interest in those shares". 2 There was no dispute about the correctness of the nomination or that Nitin Kokate made that nomination inter vivos after his marriage to the plaintiff. The Court then considered the provisions of Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956,3 and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act, 1996,4 and found that once a nomination is made, the securities in question:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Para 2 of the Maharashtra Law Journal report. All page and paragraph references to Kokate are to those in this report.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Equivalent to Section 72 of the Companies Act, 2013.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Incorrectly described in Kokate as Section 9 to the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">7 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of the shares.5 and, further, that:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"such nomination carries effect notwithstanding anything contained in a Testamentary Disposition or nominations made under any other law dealing with the securities. The last of the many nominations would be valid."6<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">7. In opposition to the 3rd defendant's claim, the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff was noted in paragraph 9 of Kokate thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"9. Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of the Plaintiff contends that the nomination only makes a nominee a trustee for the shares. He holds the shares in trust for the estate of the deceased, the deceased died intestate and hence the Plaintiff as the widow would be entitled to the shares to the exclusion of the nominee."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">This is precisely the formulation that Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly commend before me today.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">8. The plaintiff's counsel in Kokate also placed before the Court the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Sarbati Devi v Smt. Usha Devi,7 a decision under Section 39 of the Insurance Act. Similarly, attention was also invited to Section 30 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The Kokate Court held that these analogies were misplaced, and that the position under the Paragraph 6 Paragraph 6 (1984) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1984 SC 346 8 of Companies Act, 1956 was to the contrary. The Court considered various standard texts on the meaning of the word 'vest', 8 and the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants' Union v The Delhi Improvement Trust 9, Dr. M. Ismail Faruqi v Union of India,10 Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Hindustan Petroleum Corporation,11 and Bharat Coking Coal v Karam Chand Thapar & Bros.12 Then, in paragraphs 24 to 26 of Kokate, the Court concluded:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"24. In the light of these judgments Section 109A of the Companies Act is required to be interpreted with re-</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">gard to the vesting of the shares of the holder of the shares in the nominee upon his death. The act sets out that the nomination has to be made during the life time of the holder as per procedure prescribed by law. If that procedure is followed, the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares to the exclusion of all other persons. The nominee would be made be-</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">neficial owner thereof. Upon such nomination, there-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">fore, all the rights incidental to ownership would fol- low. This would include the right to transfer the shares, pledge the shares or hold the shares. The specific statutory provision making the nominee entitled to all the rights in the shares excluding all other persons would show expressly the legislative intent. Once all other persons are excluded and only the nominee be- comes entitled under the statutory provision to have all the rights in the shares none other can have it. Further Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act 1996 Paragraphs 14 through 23.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">AIR 1957 SC 344; Kokate, paragraph 18.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(1994) 6 SCC 360 : AIR 1995 SC 605; Kokate, paragraph 21.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(2001) 8 SCC 143; Kokate, paragraph 22.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(2003) 1 SCC 6 : 2002 (8) SCALE 388; Kokate, paragraph 23.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9 of 47 makes the nominee's position superior to even a testamentary disposition. The non-obstante Clause in Section 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the Testamentary Disposition itself. Hence, any other disposition or nomination under any other law stands subject to the nomination made under the Depositor- ies Act. Section 9.11.7 further shows that the last of the nominations would prevail. This shows the revoc-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">able nature of the nomination much like a Testament- ary Disposition. A nomination can be cancelled by the holder and another nomination can be made.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Such later nomination would be relied upon by the Depository Participant. That would be for conferring of all the rights in the shares to such last nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">25. A reading of Section 109A of the Companies Act and 9.11 of the Depositories Act makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the nomination is to vest the prop- erty in the shares which includes the ownership rights there under in the nominee upon nomination validly made as per the procedure prescribed,, as has been done in this case. These Sections are completely dif</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">ferent from Section 39 of the Insurance Act set out (supra) which require a nomination merely for the payment of the amount under the Life Insurance Policy without confirming any ownership rights in the nominee or under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act which allows the Society to transfer the shares of the member which would be valid against any demand made by any other person upon the Society. Hence these provisions are made merely to give a valid discharge to the Insurance Company or the Co-operative Society without vest- ing the ownership rights in the Insurance Policy or the membership rights in the Society upon such nominee. The express legislature intent under Section 10 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC 109A of the Companies Act and Section 9.11 of the De- positories Act is clear.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">26. Since the nomination is shown to be correctly made by her husband who was the holder of the Suit shares, the Plaintiff would have no right to get the shares of her deceased husband sold or to otherwise deal with the same."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(Emphasis supplied)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9. Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly submit that in arriving at this conclusion, although the Kokate Court did consider the Supreme Court decision in Sarbati Devi, its attention was not drawn to several other binding decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, all of which considered statutory provisions in pari materia with Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act, 1996. These decisions, they submit, make it clear that the emphasis is not on vesting, a term that is necessarily to be viewed in its context, but on whether a third line of succession, in addition to testamentary and intestate succession, was contemplated by the statutory provisions before the Kokate court. This, they submit, is not what the previous decisions of the Supreme Court and this High Court say; to the contrary, those decisions make it clear that the submission on behalf of Harsha Kokate were indeed accurate and were the only possible view in law, viz., that a nomination will only serve to discharge the responsibility or liability of the issuing depository vis-à-vis the nominee, but the nominee continues to be in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis all other claimants under either of the two statutorily recognized modes of succession. To hold otherwise, they submit, would be to put these corporate 11 of 47 statutes in direct and irreconcilable conflict with the Indian Succession Act, 1925. For, Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly say, not only would succession by intestacy be defeated by a corporate provision intended for the protection of the corporate, but, and perhaps more significantly, a testamentary disposition would be wholly defeated by a nomination, even if the will in question is actually made after the nomination and does contain a perfectly legitimate bequest of the very securities in respect of a nomination is made. In other words, a nomination not only becomes a testamentary disposition of sorts but stands on a higher pedestal, and, at the same time, is unguarded by any of the checks, balances and tests against which the validity of a will and its due execution are to be tested. This was not, they say, the intendment of the corporate statutes considered, and this construct of the law is directly contrary to decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court, each of which was binding on the Kokate Court. I will turn presently to the decisions cited in this regard, and to these arguments in greater detail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">10. Mr. Shah invites attention to the preamble to the Depositories Act, 1996. This is:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">An Act to provide for regulation of depositories in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">When Mr. Shah says, therefore, that this has nothing whatever to do with succession or disposition inter vivos, I believe he is correct. Plainly, the Depositories Act is concerned with the regulation of depositories, i.e., those entities providing depository services, and not in relation to the holders of the securities in such services, or the 12 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC manner in which those security-holders might choose to conduct their affairs or to leave the distribution of these securities either to be governed by actions and deeds inter vivos, testamentary succession or inheritance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">11. Section 2(1)(a) of the Depositories Act defines the expression 'beneficial owner' thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(a) "beneficial owner" means a person whose name is recorded as such with a depository;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">This, Mr. Shah says, is a definition wholly unrelated to any fiduciary responsibilities, and there is no other section that deals with nominations per se. That issue (nomination) is to be found only in Bye-Law 9.11 framed under the Depositories Act; and the purpose of this Bye-Law is made clear in 9.11.7. The relevant Bye-Laws (as also reproduced in Kokate) read:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11. TRANSMISSION OF SECURITIES IN THE CASE OF NOMINATION:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11.1. In respect of every account, the Beneficial Owner(s) ("Nominating Person(s)") may nominate any person ("Nominee") to whom his securities shall vest in the event of his death in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules from time to time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11.2. The securities held in such account shall automatically be transferred in the name of the Nominee, upon the death of the Nominating Person, or as the case may be, all the Nominating Persons subject to the other Bye Laws mentioned hereunder.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">13 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC 9.11.4. Beneficial Owner(s) may substitute or can- cel a nomination at any time. A valid nomination, substi</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">tution or cancellation of nomination shall be dated and duly registered with the Participant in accordance with the Business Rules prescribed therefore. The closure of the account by the Nominating Person(s) shall conclus- ively cancel the nomination.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11.5. A Nominee shall not be entitled to exercise any right conferred on Beneficial Owners under these Bye Laws, upon the death of the Nominating Person(s), unless the Nominee follows the procedure prescribed in the Business Rules for being registered as the Beneficial Owner of the securities of the Nominating Person(s) in the books of the Depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11.6. A nominee shall on the death of the Nomin</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">ating Person(s) be entitled to elect himself to be re- gistered as a Beneficial Owner by delivering a notice in writing to the Depository, along with the certified true copy of the death certificate issued by the competent authority as prescribed under the Business Rules. Sub-</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">ject to scrutiny of such election, the securities in the Ac- count shall be transmitted to the account of the Nomin- ee held with any depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9.11.7. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other disposition and/or nominations made by the Nom- inating Person(s) under any other law for the time being in force, for the purposes of dealing with the securit- ies lying to the credit of deceased Nominating Perm</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">son(s) in any manner, the Depository shall rely upon the last nomination validly made prior to the demise of the Nominating Person(s). The Depository shall not be li- able for any action taken in reliance upon and on the basis of nomination validly made by the Nominating Per- son(s).</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">(Emphasis supplied) Now while it is true that Bye-Law 9.11.7 contains a non-obstante clause, the reason for this is clear from the following phrase, viz., "for the purposes of dealing with the securities lying to the credit of the deceased Nominating Person(s) in any manner".</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">12. Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 was introduced in 1999 and this was done, Mr. Shah submits, for conformity with the Depositories Act which preceded it by three years. Sub-section (3) of the newly introduced section of the Companies Act, 1956 reads:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such shares in, or debentures of, the company, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to vest the shares in, or debentures of, the company, the nominee shall, on the death of the shareholder or holder of debentures of, the company or, as the case may be, on the death of the joint-holders become entitled to all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company or, as the case may be, all the joint-holders, in relation to such shares in, or debentures of the company to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">13. The purpose of the Companies Act is to consolidate the law relating to companies and certain other associations. It is not in any sense intended or directed to settled laws of succession or transfer 15 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC of property, but only the law relating to companies. Therefore, Mr. Shah submits, any provision of the Companies Act must be viewed in context, and there is nothing in this sub-section that can or should be viewed as an amendment sub-silentio of the testamentary and other dispositive laws, ones that concern themselves with the transfers (inter vivos or by inheritance or succession) of all property, including corporate securities. What Section 109A does is to ring- fence the liability of companies vis-à-vis the holders of securities. It does not absolve the nominees of those securities from their fiduciary responsibilities to the heirs or legatees of the original holder of the securities, the nominator.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">14. The decision of the Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v State of Orissa & Ors. 13 reiterates well- settled principles governing the interpretation of statutes. The Supreme Court held:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">9. In considering the rival submissions of the learned Counsel and in defining and construing the area and the content of the Act and its provisions, it is necessary to make certain general observations regarding the interpretation of statutes. A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal aids. The external aids are statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary (1987) 3 SCC 279 16 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted. Internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act. Having discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. It is again important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important. For instance, "the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning' (see Halsbury, 4th edn. Vol. 44 para 874).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">10. In Attorney General v. H.R.H. Prince Augustus 1957 (1) All ER 49, Viscount Simonds said, 17 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC My Lords, the contention of the Attorney-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">General was, in the first place met by the bald general proposition that, where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be cut down by the preamble, and a large part of the time which the hearing of this case occupied was spent in discussing authorities which were said to support that proposition. I wish, at the outset, to express my dissent from it, if it means that I cannot obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the meaning of the relevant enacting part. For words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use context in its widest sense which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">11. In Chertsey, V.D.C. v. Mixnam's Properties 1964 (2) All ER 627, Lord Reid said that the general effect of the authorities was properly in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">General words and phrases therefore, however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Though no reference was made to Maxwell this Court in Empress Mills v. Municipal Committee, Wardha [1958] 1 SCR 1102 , stated the same proposition:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">It is also a recognised principle of construction that general words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">12. In Maunsell v. Olins 1975 (1) All ER 16, Lord Wilberforce observed, ...I am not, myself, able to solve the problem by a simple resort to plain meaning. Most language, and particularly all languages used in rent legislation, is opaque: all general words are open to inspection, many general words demand inspection, to see whether they really bear their widest possible meaning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">13. But we think that when we rely upon rules of construction we must always bear in mind Lord Reid's admonition in Maunsell v. Olins (supra) to the following effect:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Then rules of construction are relied on. They are not rules in the ordinary sense of having some binding force. They are our servants not our masters. They are aids to constructions, presumptions or pointers. Not infrequently one 'rule' points in one direction, another in a different direction. In each case we must look at all relevant circumstances and, decide as a matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular 'rule'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">15. Mr. Shah submits that if a mere nomination was to effect a full-fledged transfer with all the incidents of ownership, it could not be dependent on the death of the nominator. If the nominator died holding securities, they necessarily fell into the deceased's estate and could not be abstracted from it. The position would be different in the case of a transfer inter vivos, for then the securities would no longer be the property of the nominator and, on his death, would form no part of his or her estate. The consequence of Kokate is that there is a transfer in praesenti, but to take effect only on death. That creates an inherent conflict: would it mean, for instance, that the nominator could not truck with those shares? Would the nomination, on account of the transfer eo instante, divest the nominator of ownership? If not, then the property in the form of securities would necessarily form part of the nominator's estate on his demise, and it cannot be otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">16. This is evident, Mr. Shah says, when one looks at the accepted definitions of 'nominee' rather than 'vesting'. That definition will tell us whether or not a nominee properly so called can ever acquire the full panoply of the incidents of ownership. In Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition, a nominee is defined thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Nominee (nom-i-nee), n. 1. A person who is proposed for an office, membership, award, or like title or status; an individual seeking nomination, election or appointment is a candidate. A candidate for an election becomes a nominee after being formally nominated. See CANDIDATE.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">2. A person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way. 3. A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">It is the third of these definitions that Mr. Shah commends as the correct meaning for our purposes. That definition, he says, makes it clear that the nominee holds title in a fiduciary capacity and none other.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Iyer's Judicial Dictionary includes this definition under the entry 'nomination':14 Nominee. It is clearly wide enough to include a transferee of shares who was paying for them from his own resources.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Should not be given the narrow meaning of a trustee for the company, but should be given its ordinary meaning of any person nominated by the company. [Motor & General Insurance Co Ltd v Gobin, 1987 LRC (Comm) 824 (PC)] This expression is not defined in the Companies Act. It apparently means a holder of shares, having no beneficial interest in the shares, the whole beneficial interest remaining in one or more other persons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">17. No nomination can ever result in a divesting, Mr. Shah submits. It is merely a matter of convenience for the company or the depository, not for the nominator and certainly it does not transfer ownership to the nominee. The reason for this is that the company or depository should not have to face a legal vacuum till the contesting rights are decided. Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors.15 is a decision of vital import to the present discussion because it not only considers the meaning of the word 'vest', but also the decision in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants' Union, which was cited before and considered by the Kokate Court. In paragraph 10 of Vatticherukuru, the Supreme Court considered the implications and meaning of the word 'vest' in the context of a local tenancy and land law and revenue records. It said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">10. The word 'vest' clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statute or rule. In Chamber's Mid-Century Dictionary at p. 1230 defined "vesting" in the legal sense 'to settle, secure, or put in fixed right of possession; to endow, to descend, devolve or to take effect, as a right'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">In Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1401, the word, 'vest', to give an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to accrue to, to be fixed, to take effect, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate, to give seisin to enfeoff. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Vol. 5 at p. 2938, the 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 word 'vested' was defined in several senses. At p. 2940 in item 12 it is stated thus 'as to the interest acquired by public bodies, created for a particular purpose, in works such as embankments which are 'vested' in them by statute, see Port of London Authority v. Canvey Island Commissioners [1932] 1 Ch. 446 in which it was held that the statutory vesting was to construct the sea wall against inundation or damages etc. and did not acquire fee simple. Item 4 at p. 2939, the word 'vest', in the absence of a context, is usually taken to mean vest in interest rather than vest in possession'. In item 8 to 'vest', "generally means to give the property in". Thus the word 'vest' bears variable colour taking its content from the context in which it came to be used. Take for instance, the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. By operation of Sections 16 & 17 thereof, the property so acquired shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Thereby, absolute right, title and interest is vested in the Government without any limitation divesting the pre- existing rights of its owner. Similarly, under Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, the estate of the insolvent vests in the receiver only for the purpose of its administration and to pay off the debts to the creditors. The receiver acquired no personal interest of his own in the property. The receiver appointed by the court takes possession of the properties in the suit on behalf of the court and administer the property on behalf of the ultimate successful party as an officer of the court and he has no personal interest in the property vested thereunder. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [1957] SCR 1 the question was whether the Delhi Improvement Trust was vested of the Nazul land belonging to the Government with absolute right, when the property was entrusted under the 23 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC scheme for construction of the markets etc. It was held by this Court that placing the property at the disposal of the trust did not signify that the Government had divested itself of its title to the property and transferred the same to the trust. The clauses in the agreement show that the Government had created the Trust as its agent not on permanent basis but as a convenient mode of having the scheme of improvement implemented by the Trust subject to the control of the Government.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">18. The Supreme Court decision in Smt. Sarbati Devi v Smt. Usha Devi16 was placed before the Kokate Court. This was a case under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The question, as set out in paragraph 1, was whether a nominee of life insurance policy under that Section, on the death intestate of the assured, would be entitled to 'the beneficial interest' in the amount received under the policy to the exclusion of all the heirs of the assured. The section under consideration contained no non-obstante clause akin to the ones in Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 or Bye-Law 9.11.7 under the Depositories Act, 1996. In Mr. Shah's submission, this makes no difference, for that non-obstante clause only serves to protect the company or the depository not divest an heir. In Sarbati Devi, the Supreme Court said that there was no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Insurance Act "operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in paragraph 16 of the decision in Uma Sehgal's case." The Supreme Court said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"5. ... It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in (1984) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1984 SC 346, supra.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills, which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(Emphasis supplied) Later, in paragraph 8, the Supreme Court said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"8. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's (case) supra. In this case of the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and that his rights would spring up only on the death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to examine the possibility of an existence of a conflict between the law of succession and the right of the nominee under Section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would prevail. We are of the view that the language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance placed by it on the effect of the amendment of Section 60(1) (kb) of the CPC, 1908 providing that all moneys payable under a policy of insurance on the life of the judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate with all 'plus and minus points'. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Section 39 of the Act. ..."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">19. Mr. Shah submits that this decision was on all fours with the case before the Kokate Court and was incorrectly distinguished.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">What the Kokate Court also did not consider was that Sarbati Devi was also considered by the Supreme Court itself in Shri Vishin N.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Khanchandani & Anr. v Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani & Anr.17 That case came up to the Supreme Court from a decision of this court in a First Appeal. It dealt with a nomination under the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the nominee specified in the National Savings Certificate, on the death of its holder, became entitled to the sum due under the certificate to the exclusion of all other persons, or whether the amount of the certificate was to be retained by him for the benefit of the deceased's legal heirs. Clearly, this was substantially the question in Sarbati Devi. The contention by the appellants in Khanchandani was precisely the same as is taken here by Mr. Pai and Mr. Ghatalia:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">4. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants- the nominees of the National Savings Certificates have filed this appeal contending that under Section 6 of the Government (2000) 6 SCC 724 26 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC Savings Certificates Act, 1959, after the death of the holder they had become entitled to the payment of such saving certificates in which they were nominees, to the exclusion of all other persons including the respondents and entitled to utilise the aforesaid amounts in the manner they like. It is contended that by their nomination, the holder of the National Savings Certificates, namely, Shri Lachmandas Naraindas Khanchandani has diverted the normal course of succession. According to them Section 6 provides another mode of succession, to the exclusion of testamentary and non-testamentary successions. Alternatively, it was urged that nomination itself amounted to testamentary succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">20. The statutory provision in question is set out in paragraph 6 of Khanchandani. Section 6(1) of the act in question also contained a non-obstante clause, thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">6. Nomination by holders of savings certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any disposition, testamentary or otherwise in respect of any savings certificate, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive payment of the sum for the time being due on the savings certificate on the death of the holder thereof and before the maturity of the certificate, or before the certificate having reached maturity has been discharged, the nominee shall, on the death of the holder of the savings certificate, become entitled to the savings certificate and to be paid the sum due thereon to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the 27 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(Emphasis supplied)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">21. Section 8 then said that payment made in accordance with the previous sections would discharge the insurer; and then followed Section 8(2), one that is without a comparable parallel in Section 109A and the Depositories Act, 1996:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">8. Payment to be a full discharge.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(1) Any payment made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Act to a minor or to his parent or guardian or to a nominee or to any other person shall be a full discharge from all further liability in respect of the sum so paid.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to preclude any executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased holder of a savings certificate from recovering from the person receiving the same under Section 7 the amount remaining in his hands after deducting the amount of all debts or other demands lawfully paid or discharged by him in due course of administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">(3) Any creditor or claimant against the estate of a holder of a savings certificate may recover his debt or claim out of the sum paid under this Act to any person and remaining in his hands unadministered in the same manner and to the same extent as if the latter had obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">22. Mr. Pai and Mr. Ghatalia submit that Khanchandani clearly has no application because the statutory provision there had a fail- safe in Section 8(2) that specifically saved the interests of heirs or legatees. There is no such provision in the Companies Act or the Depositories Act, they say, and the two legal schemas are distinct and different from the one under the Government Savings Certificate Act. I do not believe this to be an argument of substance. The savings provision in Section 8(2) was clarificatory and perhaps ex majore cautela. It does not take away the settled position in law, and this is clear from paragraph 9 of Khanchandani in which Sarbati Devi is considered and quoted at length. These are the same passages I have extracted above. If there was any doubt about this, it is put to rest by paragraphs 11 to 13 in Khanchandani:18<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">11. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the non-obstante clause in Section 6 excludes all other persons, including the legal heirs of the deceased holder, to claim any right over the sum paid on account of the National Savings Certificates, to the nominee. There is no doubt that by non-obstante clause the Legislature devices means which are usually applied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other statute. In other words such a clause is used to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">The phrase is equivalent to showing that the Act shall be no impediment to measure intended. To attract the applicability of the phrase, the whole of the Section, the scheme of the Act and the objects Paragraph numbers follow the SCC report.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">29 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC and reasons for which such an enactment is made has to be kept in mind.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">12. The submission made on behalf of the appellants has no substance in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons necessitating the passing of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 provides that if any payment is made in accordance with the provisions of the Act to a nominee, the same shall be a full discharge from all further liabilities in respect of the sum so paid. Section 7 of the Act provides that after the death of the holder of the savings certificates payment of the sum shall be made to the nominee, if any, and Sub- section (1) of Section 8 declares that such payment shall be a full discharge from all further liabilities in respect of the sum so paid. However, Sub-section (2) of Section 8 specifies that the payment made to the nominee under Sub-section (1) shall not preclude any executor or administrator or the legal representative of the deceased holder of a savings certificate from recovering from the person receiving the same under Section 7; the amount remaining in nominee's hand after deducting the amount of all debts or other demands lawfully paid or discharged by him in due course of administration. In other words though the nominee of the National Savings Certificates has a right to be paid the sum due on such savings certificates after the death of the holder, yet he retains the said amount for the benefit of the persons who are entitled to it under the law of succession applicable in the case, however, subject to the exception of deductions mentioned in the Sub- section. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act it is stated:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">13. In the light of what has been noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that though language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is different than the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same. The Act only makes the provisions regarding avoiding delay and expense in making the payment of the amount of the National Savings Certificates, to the nominee of holder, which has been considered to be beneficial both for the holder as also for the post office. Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. In other words, the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi's case holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">23. The Supreme Court in Khanchandani though it had before it a statute with a provision of express saving in Section 8(2), placed the entirety of the case on par with Sarbati Devi, a decision that considered Section 39 of the Insurance Act and did not have a provision parallel to Section 8(2) of the Government Savings Certificates Act. Consequently, the argument that a saving provision of that nature is essential and that, in its absence, there is an absolute devolvement to the exclusion of all heirs or legatees, on the nominee is an argument that was expressly raised and rejected by the Supreme Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">24. But that is not all. Both Sarbati Devi and Khanchandani were considered in Shipra Sengupta v Mridul Sengupta & Ors. 19 Here again a claim was made on the basis of a nomination, the nominee contending that he succeeded, by virtue of that nomination made inter vivos, to specific movable property to the exclusion of heirs. Sarbati Devi20 was considered as was Khanchandani.21 Then the Supreme Court held:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">17. The controversy involved in the instant case is no longer res integra. The nominee is entitled to receive the same, but the amount so received is to be distributed according to the law of succession. In terms of the factual foundation laid in this case, the deceased died on 8.11.1990 leaving behind his mother and widow as his only heirs and legal representatives entitled to succeed. Therefore, on the day when the right of succession opened, the appellant, his widow became entitled to one half of the amount of the general provident fund, the other half going to the mother and on her death, the other surviving son getting the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">19. In view of the clear legal position, it is made abundantly clear that the amount in any head can be received by the nominee, but the amount can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with law of succession governing them. In other words, nomination does not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee. In the instant case amounts so received are to be distributed according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The State Bank of India is directed to release half of the amount of general provident fund to the appellant now within two months from today along with interest.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">25. Now Shipra Sengupta is a decision of 20th August 2009; Kokate is of 20th April 2010, about eight months later. Shipra Sengupta contains an absolutely unambiguous statement of the law without any qualification on account of this or that statutory provision. This decision was preceded by just a few months by that of the Supreme Court in Challamma v Tilaga & Ors.22 on 31st July 2009, and this decision too reiterates and follows Sarbati Devi and Khanchandani. It reaffirms paragraph 4 of Sarbati Devi:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">14. In Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi [(1984) 1 SCC 424 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 59] this Court held: (SCC p. 427, para </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">4) "4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi [AIR 1962 All 355] on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip Singh [AIR 1978 Del 276] and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal [AIR 1982 Del 36] in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and (2009) 9 SCC 299 33 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him."</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">26. On 6th April 2010, another learned single Judge of this Court considered precisely the question of a nomination in relation to provident fund dues in Antonio Joao Fernandes v The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors.23 Mr. Justice N.A. Britto had before him a First Appeal from an order dismissing a suit in which the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to 50% of the provident fund dues as one of the two nominees of the deceased holder of the provident fund account, his cousin. The deceased's sister, the 3rd defendant to the suit, was the nominee of the remaining 50%. The learned single Judge expressly rejected the argument that the nomination would operate to the exclusion of the legal heir. Both Sarbati Devi and Khanchandani were cited and followed;24 and Mr. Justice Britto specifically held that the word 'vests' takes its colour from its context and has different connotations.25 In this regard, the learned single Judge relied on the decision of this Court in Nozer Gustad Commissariat v Central Bank of India & Ors. 26 (which, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants' Union), and to which Mr. Tamboly draws attention. Nozer Commissariat was also a decision in relation to an employee's provident fund, and in that decision, Mr. Justice D.R. Dhanuka categorically held that the decision in Sarbati Devi was not limited in 2010 (4) Bom. C. R. 208 : 2010 (3) All M.R. 599 Paras 13 and 15 of the equivalent Manupatra report, MANU/MH/0330/2010 Paragraph 15 of the equivalent Manupatra report, supra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">1993 Mh. L.J. 228 34 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC any way to claims under the Insurance Act but set a general principle in relation to nominees. Both Nozer Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes preceded Kokate (the latter by about two weeks). Neither was cited nor noticed in Kokate. Neither was distinguished.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">27. The Supreme Court's decision in Ram Chander Talwar & Anr. v Devender Kumar Talwar & Ors.27 was delivered on 6th October 2010 a few months after Kokate. Its relevance lies in the fact that it quite unequivocally reiterates the legal position in relation to a nominee and a nomination following Khanchandani; and Talwar does so in the context of Section 45ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, a provision that is in pari materia with Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">45ZA(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount to deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">28. Mr. Pai's submission that the expression 'right to receive' is materially different from 'the right to vest' is not one that commends itself. The Supreme Court in Talwar said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">5. Section 45ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Section 45ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Talwar came after Kokate, and it is not, of course, a reason to<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">29. hold that the latter decision is per incuriam. But Talwar is significant because it reiterates in demonstrably comparable circumstances a statement of law that was canvassed before the Kokate court and expressly rejected; and, further, traces this statement of law at least to Khanchandani, a decision that preceded Kokate by several months.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">30. The concept of a nomination has been extensively covered in the decision of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Leelawati Singh & Anr. v State of Delhi & Ors. 28 There again, a 1998 (75) DLT 694 36 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC question of nomination arose in a contested probate action. The learned single Judge not only followed Sarbati Devi but also set out an exhaustive survey of decisions of various courts on this aspect, saying inter alia that the legal effect of a nomination is no longer res integra. The learned single Judge quoted from an early decision in Aimai v Awabai Dhanjishaw Jamsetji & Ors. 29 That passage is a crystalline articulation of the law and is best reproduced in its entirety:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"To take the second point first, that is, let us assume that the amount at the credit of Master in the fund, or at any rate the right to recover that amount from the fund, formed part of the estate of Master during his life-time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Has he done anything to divest himself of his right thereto? All he did was to direct that in case of his death the sum should be paid to Aimai. This is in itself a mere mandate the validity of which expires with the death of the mandator. It is true the validity is extended by Statute beyond such death but such statutory extension does not by itself produce any change in the nature of the mandate. The question as to what the recipient is to do with the fund when she has obtained it is still for decision. The nomination paper is not a Will. In no case could a Parsi execute a Will in that form. But even in the case of those persons who can make a valid informal Will the nomination paper could not be considered as a Will and nothing more; if it were so considered the whole object of the nomination would be frustrated. The object of the nomination system is to designate some person to whom the Provident Fund may pay over the amount due to the subscriber, and obtain a valid quittance. If the nominee were AIR 1924 Sind 57 37 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC merely the legatee under the nomination paper considered as a Will then in so much as a Will can be revoked by a later Will even if not communicated to the fund or by some former instrument of revocation or in some cases by marriage of the testator the fund could never be certain whether the person nominated was the person entitled to receive payment, that is, if the nominee is to be regarded as legatee only. True it is that the fund is made safe in respect of the payment made to the nominee, but I am not now considering that, I am merely ascertaining what the legal effect on Master's rights to this fund was by his executing this nomination, paper, and it is certain that the nomination paper cannot operate as a Will."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">... I should hesitate, unless the words of the Statute and of the rules framed there under were explicit, to suppose that the perpetration of such unnatural injustice was rendered obligatory on a subscriber to a Provident Fund. Nor can I conceive why the Provident Fund should wish to introduce so strange a law of inheritance. I do not find in the Statutes anything which renders it obligatory for me to take this view. The object of Section 4, as amended by Act IV of 1903, is to render the fund incapable of attachment in the hands of the nominee for debts due by the subscriber. It is true that the Legislature uses the word "vest" but that word does not necessarily connote title. A person, in whom the property of another vests, has the same rights of dominion over the property as the owner would have had, no more and no less. But no one has the right to deal with his property so as to defeat the legal claims of others."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">38 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC The learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court found that no nominee gets any right or title by virtue of a nomination alone. This was also the view of the Lahore High Court in Hardial Devi Ditta v Janki Das & Anr.,30 which held that:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">"Nomination would not amount to a Will or a gift or trust in favour of the nominee. The nominee would only get the right to receive the amount and he holds the amount for the benefit of the heirs."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">This was also the view of the Madras High Court in D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v Indian Insurance & Banking Corporation, Salem & Anr.:31 "So far as nomination is concerned we do not see any appreciable difference between the English and American Laws on the one hand, and what obtains in our country. According to the English Law the payee or the nominee is nothing more than an agent to receive the money, which money remains as the property of the assured and at his disposal during his life time and on his death forms part of the estate. The result is that the payee or the nominee takes no beneficial interest in it."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">The views of the Kerala High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Delhi High Court all to the same effect were also considered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">31. Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly both relied on the 2009 decision of a learned single Judge in Ramdas Shivram Sattur v Rameshchandra AIR 1928 Lah 773 AIR 1957 Mad 115 39 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC alias Ramchandra Popatlal Shah & Ors.32 This was a decision under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The learned single Judge (A.P. Deshpande, J) held that the purpose of a nomination is to make certain the person to whom the society must look, and not to create an interest in the nominee to the exclusion of those in law entitled to the estate of a deceased member. This was also the view of another learned single Judge of this Court (R.D. Dhanuka, J) in Shashikiran Ashok Parekh v Rajesh Virendra Agarwal & Ors.33 Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly submit that although Kokate sets out Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act, 1960, it is set apart only on an interpretation of the word 'vest', one that is unsupported in law, and is also an interpretation that fades into insignificance when the other decisions squarely on the aspect of the legal effect of nominations under diverse statutes are taken into account. Further, if the purposive approach is to be taken, as it should be in the submission of Mr. Warerkar, who also supports Mr. Shah and Mr. Tamboly, then the preamble to the Indian Succession Act, 1925 should leave no room for doubt, for that is clearly an act to 'consolidate the Indian law relating to succession.' Till then there were very many 'large and important enactments' on the subject, making ascertainment difficult.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">32. Mr. Pai's response to all this is that there are only two modes of transfer of property: by operation of law and by act of parties. Transfer by law may be voluntary or involuntary. A transfer inter vivos is followed by an absolute vesting, and this is apparent from 2009 (3) Bom. C. R. 705 2012 (4) Mh. L. J. 370 40 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 130 which deals with transfers of actionable claims. Mr. Pai claims that the nomination is a 'statutory testament', something known, contemplated and approved by the Indian Succession Act. The purposes of a will and a nomination are identical, and both serve to disrupt a natural line of succession. Therefore, the same considerations must apply to both. Further, Section 58(2) of the Indian Succession Act specifically excludes from that Act other modes of succession, i.e., it recognizes that other modes of testamentary succession are possible, for it says that Part VI of the Indian Succession Act constitutes the law of India applicable to all cases of testamentary succession save as provided in sub-section (1) or by any other law for the time being in force. According to Mr. Pai, all the other decisions are subject to a rider and each has to be confined to the facts of its particular case, since none of them deal with the Companies Act, 1956 or the Depositories Act, 1996, two statutes that stand alone and apart. He invites attention to a comparative tabulation in this regard. According to Mr. Pai, the transfer in a nomination takes place absolutely on the death of the holder, and this is contemplated by Section 58(2) of the Indian Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">The statutory intention, he says, was to 'avoid disputes' between heirs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">33. Mr. Pai also cites the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Usha Majumdar v Smt. Smriti Basu,34 which held that a nominee in respect of a provident fund account is exclusively entitled to the amount in that account to the exclusion of the others. It is not possible to accept this submission. That decision AIR 1988 Cal 115 41 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC was considered by Mr. Justice Britto in Antonio Joao Fernandes, and expressly not accepted in view of Sarbati Devi and Khanchandani.35 Mr. Justice Britto's decision binds me; that of the Calcutta High Court, with respect, does not. To accept Mr. Pai's submission, I would have to hold that Antonio Joao Fernandes was incorrect and refer the matter to a larger Bench, or to hold that it was per incuriam.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">I can do neither.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">34. Similarly, I am unable to accept Mr. Pai's submission that the decision of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Dayagen P. Ltd v Rajendra Dorian Punj & Anr.36 should be followed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">There, the learned single Judge held that the submission that the nominee under Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 held merely in trust was negatived on account of the non-obstante clause. The learned single Judge held that legislative intent was to override the general law of succession and to carve out an exception in relation to nominations in respect of shares and debentures. But Dayagen too does not consider the Supreme Court decision in Khanchandani.37<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">35. I have also considered Mr. Ghatalia's remarkably fluent and concise written submissions. He makes the point that Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act must be read as a code in themselves and their statutory intent must be gleaned, in the first instance, from the plain meaning of the words. The words 'vest' and 'nominee' are to be seen, he submits, from that statute alone and no Paragraph 15 of the Manupatra report in Antonio Joao Fernandes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">[2009] 151 Com Cas 92 (Del) Dayagen preceded Shipra Sengupta by amount a month.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">42 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC other; and the non-obstante clause over-rides every other statutory provision, including the Succession Act. Mr. Ghatalia too cites Dayagen in this behalf.38 He joins Mr. Pai in submitting that the words of the statute must be seen without reference to outside considerations.39 There can be no quarrel with this well-settled proposition. But none of these are to be read to suggest that statutes must be read in a vacuum and that it is never permissible to look at others in pari materia, for that would mean that every new statute would have to be read and construed in a bubble of isolation. There is absolutely nothing in any portion of the Companies Act, 1956 or the Depositories Act, 1996 to support the view that Mr. Pai and Mr. Ghatalia commend.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">36. I must also note that the argument of a 'statutory testament' was raised before the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi and was expressly negatived there. To accept it now would be to confine Sarbati Devi to the narrow confines of Section 39 of the Insurance Act, a view that has since been rejected, most clearly in Khanchandani, Shipra Sengupta, Talwar, Nozer Gustad Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">37. The decision in Kokate does not consider the decisions of the Supreme Court in Khanchandani, Shipra Sengupta or Challamma, or I am not at this stage considering the remaining submissions made by Mr. Ghatalia, as these are on the merits of his case, one that I am not taking up presently.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">New Piecegoods Bazar Co Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay, AIR 1950 SC 165; Nathuprasad v Singhai Kapurchand, AIR 1976 MP 136; Ram Krishna Ram Nath v Janpad Sabha, AIR 1962 SC 1073; Harcharan Singh v Shivrani, (1981) 2 SCC 535.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">43 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC those of learned single Judges of this Court in Nozer Gustad Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes. Each one of these was binding on the Kokate court. The view taken in Kokate is contrary to, and does not consider any of these. It is, for that reason, per incuriam.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">38. The interpretation on Section 109A and Bye-Law 9.11 placed by the Kokate Court does not seem to me to be reconcilable with the explicit decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court. What was the 'mischief', if any, sought to be avoided by those two statutes? The succession law is unchanged. There are no further complications on account of testamentary or intestate succession. The nature of corporate instruments and securities has, however, undergone a massive change and so has the way corporations (including banks and depositories) conduct their business. The fundamental focus of Section 109A and Section 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act is not the law of succession, nor is it intended to trammel that in any way. The sole intention is, quite clearly, to afford the company or depository in question a legally valid quittance so that it does not remain forever answerable to a raft of succession litigations and an endless slew of claimants under succession law. It allows that liability to move from the company or the depository to the nominee. The company or depository gets a legally valid discharge; but the nominee continues to hold in a fiduciary capacity and is answerable to all claimants under succession law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">39. It cannot be otherwise. The Kokate view generates the very inconsistencies and conflicts that Sarbati Devi and, later, 44 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC Khanchandani, Shipra Sengupta and the decisions of this Court (Nozer Gustad Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes) were careful to avoid. Take for instance the example I referred to earlier, of a will being made after a nomination. In the ordinary law of succession, if the nomination is indeed a testamentary instrument, it would be displaced by a later will. Yet, in the formulation that Mr. Pai and Mr. Ghatalia commend, the nomination stands apart and is unaffected by any later will though they call the nomination a 'statutory' will. Further, testamentary dispositive capacities are not all identical. There are, for instance, restrictions in Mohammedan law on how much can be disposed by will. The so-called 'statutory' testament would oust this personal law entirely, even though there is nothing in either of the corporate statutes to indicate that this was ever the legislative intent. Moreover, nominations when viewed as Kokate would have it, create insoluble problems: no such 'statutory testament' can be displaced on the one ground that can always be invoked in a challenge to a will, viz., that it is 'unnatural' and gives to an outsider to the exclusion of heirs, or prefers one heir over all others.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">40. There are additional problems too. The 'statutory testament' is not subject to the rigour of the Succession Act. It does require witnesses, but not the discipline mandated by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. A nomination, though said to be a 'testament', requires no probate or other proof 'in solemn form'. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not be in the presence of the nominator. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not act at the instance of the nominator. Yet it is said to be a will. Witnesses need not see the nominator execute the nomination. Yet it is said to be a 45 of 47 TP-457-2014-S-503-2014-SALGAONKAR-GHATALIA-F.DOC will. No nomination can be assailed on the ground of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence; Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act is wholly defenestrated, as is Section 59. Yet it is said to be a will. There can be no codicil to a nomination. Yet it is said to be a will. In short, a nomination, in the Kokate formulation, is some sort of 'super-will', one that partakes of none of the defining traits of a properly executed will and none of the tests of its validity, one that is never displaced by a later, properly made will that deals with the very same property. Mr. Pai asks that we should place ourselves in the 'armchair of the nominator'. That, as it happens, is the same furniture used by a testator, and it simply cannot be that the view from that seat depends on the nature of the document before the executant. There is no particular form for a will, but there are requirements attendant to its proper making. These do not apply to all nominations: even the requirement of witnesses is a matter of prudence rather than statute. If that be so, no nomination per se requires attestation, and if that be so, it is admissible in evidence under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 without the evidence of any witness (simply because a witness to a nomination is not, in any sense, an 'attesting witness'). But no will can be so read in evidence without such evidence. From the fundamental definitions to the decisions cited, it is clear that a nomination only provides the company or the depository a quittance. The nominee continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the claimants under the succession law. Nominations under Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace the law of succession, nor do they open a third line of succession. This is the consistent view of the Supreme Court in Khanchandai, Shipra Sengupta and of our Court in Nozer 46 of 47.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 16pt;">Gustad Commissariat and Antonio Joao Fernandes, all decisions that preceded Kokate; and the submission made in paragraph 9 of Kokate was correctly placed and was in line with those decisions. Those decisions were all binding on the Kokate Court. They were neither noticed nor considered. The Kokate Court could not have taken a view contrary to those decisions. Kokate is, therefore, per incuriam.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">41. This judgment does not dispose of the Notice of Motion in Salgaonkar or the application in Ghatalia. Those will be considered on their merits in view of the legal position enunciated above. Given that this judgment deals only with a question of law, there is no question of a stay of the judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">42. List Notice of Motion 822 of 2014 in Suit No.503 of 2014 and Chamber Summons No.72 of 2014 in Testamentary Petition 457 of 2014 for final hearing on 16th April 2015 at 3:00 pm. These matters will now be heard separately and are not to be tagged together.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-2066296041653452802020-01-27T18:08:00.002+05:302020-01-27T18:08:28.706+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">SHAKTI YEZDANI V. JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR, Dated: 01.12.2016<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Introduction:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The issue which arises for consideration in this group of Appeals is whether the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited and Others is correct. In Harsha Nitin Kokate's case, in paragraphs 24 and 25, it was held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the light of these judgments section 109A of the Companies Act is required to be interpreted with regard to the vesting of the shares of the holder of the shares in the nominee upon his death. The act sets out that the nomination has to be made during the life time of the holder as per procedure prescribed by law. If that procedure is followed, the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares to the exclusion of all other persons. The nominee would be made beneficial owner thereof. Upon such nomination, therefore, all the rights incidental to ownership would follow.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This would include the right to transfer the shares, pledge the shares or hold the shares.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The specific statutory provision making the nominee entitled to all the rights in the shares excluding all other persons would show expressly the legislative intent. Once all other persons are excluded and only the nominee becomes entitled under the statutory provision to have all the rights in the shares none other can have it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Further section 9.11 of the Depositories Act 1996 makes the nominee's position superior to even a testamentary disposition. The non- obstante Clause in section 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the Testamentary Disposition itself. Hence, any other disposition or nomination under any other law stands subject to the nomination made under the Depositories Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Following question raised before the court -<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Whether nominee does not get absolute title to property subject matter of Nomination under section 109A, reason is by its very nature, when a shareholder or a deposit holder or an insurance policy holder or a member of a Co-operative Society makes a nomination during his life time, he does not transfer his interest in favour of the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether nomination does not override law in relation to testamentary or intestate succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether provisions regarding nomination are made with a view to ensure that estate or rights of deceased subject-matter of nomination are protected till legal representatives of deceased take appropriate steps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Whether vesting under section 109A does not create a third mode of succession. Whether object of provisions of Companies Act is not to either provide a mode of succession or to deal with succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Whether thus, a nominee of a holder of shares or securities appointed under section 109A read with Bye-laws under Depositories Act, 1996 is not entitled to beneficial ownership of shares or securities subject-matter of nomination to exclusion of all other persons who are entitled to inherit estate of holder as per law of succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Whether a bequest made in a Will executed in accordance with Indian Succession Act, 1925 in respect of shares or securities of deceased supersedes nomination made under provisions of section 109A and Bye-law No. 9.11 framed under Depositories Act, 1996.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Observation & Judgement of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As regards the Appeal No.311 of 2015, it arises out of a Testamentary Petition. The Appellant appearing in person is right in contending that the issue of the effect of nomination is irrelevant for deciding the Application for grant of probate inasmuch as it is well settled that a testamentary Court dealing with the issue of grant of probate or letters of administration has no jurisdiction to decide the issue as regards the title of the deceased testator to his assets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, the issue of effect of nomination could not have been gone into in the Appeal arising out of the Testamentary Petition filed by the Appellant in Appeal No.311 of 2015.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, we pass the following order:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) Appeal No.313 of 2015 is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) We make it clear that the impugned order stands confirmed as far as the Suit No.503 of 2014 is concerned;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) The impugned order stands quashed and set aside insofar as the Testamentary Petition No.457 of 2014 is concerned only on the ground that the issue of the sng 49 appeal-313n311.15 effect of nomination made by the testator cannot be gone into by the Testamentary Court in the probate proceedings. The Appeal No.311 of 2015 is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. The answer of all the question is given in affirmative.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">-------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">Complete Judgement<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">BOMBAY HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">SHAKTI YEZDANI V. JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR, Dated: 01.12.2016</span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Bench: A.S. Oka</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">APPEAL NO. 313 OF 2015</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">NOTICE OF MOTION NO.822 OF 2014</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">SUIT NO.503 OF 2014</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ALONG WITH </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">APPEAL NO.311 OF 2015</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO.457 OF 2014<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">APPEAL NO. 313 OF 2015<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shakti Yezdani and Another.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>..<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appellants</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Vs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar and Others.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">..</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Respondents</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shri Rajendra Pai along with Shri A.R. Pai i/b Ms. Bina R. Pai for the Appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shri Snehal Shah along with Shri Yatin R. Shah i/b Yatin R. Shah & Co<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">for Respondent No.1.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shri Santosh D. Raje along with Ms. Madhura Dalvi i/b Rajiv Jadhav for Respondent Nos.4, 6, 7 and 8.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">APPEAL NO.311 OF 2015</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Nanak S. Ghatalia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>..<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appellant<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Swati Shatishchandra Ghatalia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>..<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Respondent<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shri Nanak S. Ghatalia, the Appellant in person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Shri Rohan Cama i/b Kalpeshg Joshi Associates for the Respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">CORAM<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>: A.S. OKA & A.A. SAYED, JJ<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">DATE ON WHICH SUBMISSIONS WERE HEARD :<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>19TH JULY 2016<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED: 1ST DECEMBER 2016<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">JUDGMENT ( PER A.S. OKA, J )<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">THE CONTROVERSY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">1. The issue which arises for consideration in this group of Appeals is whether the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited and Others1 is correct. In Harsha Nitin Kokate's case, in paragraphs 24 and 25, it was held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"24. In the light of these judgments section 109A of the Companies Act is required to be interpreted with regard to the vesting of the shares of the holder of the shares in the nominee upon his death. The act sets out that the nomination has to be made during the life time of the holder as per procedure prescribed by law. If that procedure is followed, the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares to the exclusion of all other persons. The nominee would be made beneficial owner thereof. Upon such nomination, therefore, all the rights incidental to ownership would follow. This would include the right to transfer the shares, pledge the shares or hold the shares.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The specific statutory provision making the 1 2010(3)Mh.L.J 780 sng 3 appeal-313n311.15 nominee entitled to all the rights in the shares excluding all other persons would show expressly the legislative intent. Once all other persons are excluded and only the nominee becomes entitled under the statutory provision to have all the rights in the shares none other can have it. Further section 9.11 of the Depositories Act 1996 makes the nominee's position superior to even a testamentary disposition. The non- obstante Clause in section 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the Testamentary Disposition itself. Hence, any other disposition or nomination under any other law stands subject to the nomination made under the Depositories Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Section 9.11.7 further shows that the last of the nominations would prevail. This shows the revocable nature of the nomination much like a Testamentary Disposition. A nomination can be cancelled by the holder and another nomination can be made. Such later nomination would be relied upon by the Depository Participant. That would be for conferring of all the rights in the shares to such last nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">25. A reading of section 109A of the Companies Act and 9.11 of the Depositories Act makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the nomination is to vest the property in the shares which includes the ownership rights thereunder in the nominee upon nomination validly made as per the procedure prescribed, as has been done in this case. These sections are completely different from section 39 of the Insurance Act set out (supra) which require a nomination merely for the payment of the amount under the Life Insurance Policy without confirming any ownership rights in the nominee or under section 30 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act which allows the Society to transfer the shares of the member which would be valid against any demand made by any other person upon the Society. Hence these provisions are made merely to give a valid discharge to the Insurance Company or the Co-operative Society without vesting the ownership rights in the Insurance Policy or the membership rights in the Society sng 4 appeal-313n311.15 upon such nominee. The express legislature intent under section 109A of the Companies Act and section 9.11 of the Depositories Act is clear."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) By the impugned order dated 31 st March 2015, the learned Single Judge held that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited (for short "Kokate's case") is per incuriam.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">2. In short, the questions to be decided in these Appeals can be formulated as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(i) Whether a nominee of a holder of shares or securities appointed under Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 read with the Bye-laws under the Depositories Act, 1996 is entitled to the beneficial ownership of the shares or securities subject matter of nomination to the exclusion of all other persons who are entitled to inherit the estate of the holder as per the law of succession?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(ii) Whether a nominee of a holder of shares or securities on the basis of the nomination made under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with the Bye-laws under the Depositories Act, 1996 is entitled to all rights in respect of the shares or securities subject matter of nomination to the exclusion of all other persons or whether he continues to hold the securities in trust and in a capacity as a beneficiary for the legal representatives who are entitled to inherit securities or shares under the law of inheritance ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(iii) Whether a bequest made in a Will executed in accordance with the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in respect of shares or securities of the deceased sng 5 appeal-313n311.15 supersedes the nomination made under the provisions of Sections 109A and Bye-Law No.9.11 framed under the Depositories Act, 1996?.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">3. When these Appeals were placed before a Division Bench of this Court on 7th September 2015, the following order was passed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"2. It is urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants that the learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned order, has observed that the Judgment and Order delivered by another learned Single Judge, [Justice Smt. Roshan Dalvi in the matter of Harsha Nitin Kokate Vs. The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. In Notice of Motion No.2351 of 2008 in Suit No.1972 of 2008], is per incuriam. One of the submissions, which has been urged before us, is that the only option which was available before the learned Single Judge, if he disagree with the view taken by the another learned Single Judge, was to refer the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice so that the issue can be referred to a Larger Bench or Division Bench.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">3. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to place this matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice so that appropriate orders can be passed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">4. Office to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">On the basis of the order dated 7 th September 2015, these Appeals were placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. An Administrative Order was passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 25 th April 2016 assigning these Appeals before a Division Bench presided over by one of us (A.S.Oka, J). Accordingly, the Appeals were taken up for final disposal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">FACTS OF THE CASE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">4. It will be necessary to make a brief reference to the facts of the case which are necessary for deciding the issues involved in these Appeals. These two Appeals take an exception to the common judgment and order dated 31st March 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge. Appeal No.313 of 2015 has been preferred by the Original fifth and sixth Defendants in Suit No.503 of 2014. Appeal No.311 of 2015 has been preferred by the Petitioner in Testamentary Petition No.457 of 2014.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">5. Firstly, a reference to the facts of the case in Suit No.503 of 2014 will be necessary. The said suit has been filed for administration of the estate of late Jayant Shivram Salgaonkar and for other consequential reliefs. The Plaintiff therein and the first nine Defendants therein are the heirs and legal representatives of the late Jayant Shivram Salgaonkar (for short "late Jayant"), who died on 20 th August 2013. According to the case made out in the suit, late Jayant left behind several properties including the shares in M/s.Sumangal Press Private Limited as well as the shares and investments in various companies. The second and fourth Defendants in the suit filed a written statement for contesting the suit. In the said written statement, it is contended that late Jayant left behind his last Will and testament dated sng 7 appeal-313n311.15 27th June 2011 by which he has dealt with his shares in the suit properties and in particular the shares held by him in M/s.Sumangal Press Private Limited. It is claimed that the second and third Defendants have been appointed as the Executors under the last Will and testament who have filed an Application for grant of probate in respect of the said Will. It is stated that the said Application has been converted into a suit which is still pending. It is contended that by the said Will, a bequest has been made by late Jayant of his share in the properties listed at Item Nos.2, 3, 6 and 7 of the Exhibit-A to the Plaint in favour of a Public Trust which is the tenth Defendant in the suit. Item Nos.6 and 7 in Exhibit A are the shares held by late Jayant in Sumangal Press Pvt.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Ltd and M/s Sumangal Artech.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">6. The fifth and sixth Defendants filed their written statement in which they claimed that they were the nominees of late Jayant in respect of the investments made by him in Mutual Funds. By virtue of the nomination, they claimed that the securities in respect of which they were made nominees are exclusively vested in them. The fifth and sixth Defendants relied upon the Regulation 29A of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996 apart from Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act,1956 (for short "Companies Act"). The sixth Defendant claims to be a nominee in respect of a fixed deposit made by late Jayant with IDBI Bank. She claims to be an sng 8 appeal-313n311.15 absolute owner of the fixed deposit on the basis of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 (for short "the said Act of 1949"). That is how the issue of the effect of nomination arose in Suit No.503 of 2014.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">7. Testamentary Petition No.457 of 2014 is filed by the Appellant in Appeal No.313 of 2015. The Testamentary Petition was filed for grant of probate in respect of the alleged last Will and testament of one Mrs.Urmila Shatishchandra Ghatalia. The Petitioner/Appellant, one of the sons of the deceased testator, is claiming to be one of the Executors appointed under the said will. The Respondent in Appeal No.311 of 2015 filed a Caveat. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order has noted that the Respondent in the Appeal sought to file a Caveat. The learned Single Judge noted that the issue was whether or not the Respondent who is a daughter of the deceased testator is entitled to file and maintain a caveat. The learned Single Judge noted that a settlement was suggested which was nearly reached. The learned Single Judge has noted the only contentious issue related to some of the investments of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Appellant/Petitioner contended that he was a nominee in respect of those investments and in view of the nomination, notwithstanding anything stated in the Will, the said investments exclusively belonged to him on the demise of his mother, the deceased testator. According to the sng 9 appeal-313n311.15 learned Single Judge, the contention of the Appellant/Petitioner is that those investments do not form a part of distributable estate of the deceased testator. In Paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge noted that the claim of the said Appellant of the exclusive rights in respect the investments is founded on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Kokate's case. He has noted that in Kokate's case, the learned Single Judge considered the provisions of Section 109A of the Companies Act and the Bye-Law No.9.11 framed under the said Act of 1996.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">THE SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">8. The Appellant appearing in person in Appeal No.311 of 2015 made detailed submissions. Similarly, the learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in Appeal No.313 of 2015 made detailed submissions. The view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is that the decision of the learned Single Judge in Kokate's case is per incuriam and the nomination will not affect the validity of the testamentary disposition made by the owner of the securities/shares.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9. The Appellant appearing in person in Appeal No.311 of 2015 submitted that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the issue which has been decided under the impugned order sng 10 appeal-313n311.15 inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Testamentary Court dealing with an Application for grant of probate is very limited. He submitted that the jurisdiction is confined to decide the issue of proof of execution, genuineness and validity of the Will set up by the propounder. He urged that the Testamentary Court dealing with a Petition for Probate has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue of title of the deceased testator to the properties subject matter of the Will in respect of which a probate is sought. He submitted that assuming that he did not raise any objection before the learned Single Judge, the law is very well clear.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Even by consent, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court of Law which it did not possess. He submitted that the issue based on nomination did not arise in the Petition filed by him. The Appellant appearing in person pointed out that he has filed brief submissions on the issue of nomination in which he has specifically contended that the Caveator/Respondent in the Appeal has never raised a contention that the testamentary disposition will supersede the nomination. We must note here that the Appellant contended that till 10 th April 2015, he was not even aware of the impugned judgment and order. Without prejudice to his contention that the learned Single Judge while dealing with the Probate Petition had no jurisdiction to decide the issue, he also made submissions on merits. He invited the attention of the Court to various provisions of the Companies Act. Inviting our attention to Section 109A and Section 109B of the Companies Act, he urged that the sng 11 appeal-313n311.15 nomination in respect of the shares confers unlimited rights in respect of the shares on the nominee and there is nothing in the Companies Act to show that the shares are to be held in a fiduciary capacity by the nominee after the demise of the owner of the shares. He submitted that there is a vesting of shares in the nominee on the death of the owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Appellant appearing in person also made analysis of various decisions considered by the learned Single Judge and various decisions which are cited across the bar. We are not reproducing in detail the analysis made by the Appellant appearing in person of the said decisions as we have extensively dealt with the said decisions. He also submitted that the finding that the decision in Kokate's case is per incuriam is completely erroneous.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">10. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in support of Appeal No.313 of 2015 urged that apart from the fact that the learned Single Judge in Kokate's case had considered all the binding precedents and, therefore, the said decision cannot be said to be per incuriam, the provisions of Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act are completely different from the provisions in relation to the nomination under the Insurance Act, 1939, Banking Regulations Act, 1949, National Saving Certificates Act, 1959, Employees' Provident Fund and the Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. He submitted that the provisions regarding nomination under none of the said Acts are pari materia with sng 12 appeal-313n311.15 the provisions of the Companies Act. Another issue canvassed by him was that the issue decided by the learned Single Judge could have been considered only at the time of final hearing of the Notice of Motion. He pointed out the order dated 7th May 2014 passed in the said Notice of Motion by the learned Single Judge which directed that the Notice of Motion should be heard finally. He submitted that there was no occasion for deciding the said issue as a preliminary issue<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">11. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellants further submitted that if the learned Judge was of the view that Kokate's case was not correctly decided, the propriety required the learned Single Judge to make a request to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for making a reference to a Larger Bench. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the intention of the legislature while dealing with Section 109A and Section 109B of the Companies Act which were introduced by way of amendment by the Act of 1999. He submitted that the provisions make it clear that the same will override the provisions in relation to the law of intestate and testamentary succession as far as the shares are concerned. He submitted that none of the decisions which are relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment deal with any provisions which are similar to the relevant provisions of the Companies Act. He urged that Sections 109, 109A and 109B will have to be read with the other provisions of sng 13 appeal-313n311.15 the Companies Act. The learned counsel invited the attention of the Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sarbati Devi and Another v. Smt.Usha Devi2. He pointed out that learned Single Judge has followed the law laid down in the said decision. He has taken us through the decision in Kokate's case in support of his contention that the said decision gives a complete effect to the intention of the legislature of incorporating Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act. He urged that the provisions of Section 109B will have to be considered along with Section 109A and in particular Sub-section (3) of Section 109B of the Companies Act. By inviting our attention to the provisions of Sections 109, 109A and 109B of the Companies Act along with other provisions therein, he made an elaborate analysis of Sections 109A and 109B. He submitted that as the nominee has not been defined under the Companies Act, the meaning of the word will have to be understood in the context of Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act. He urged that a different meaning to the word "vests"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">could not have been given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. He submitted that the scheme of Sections 45-ZA of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 dealing with the nomination is completely different from the scheme of the Companies Act. He urged that the provisions of Companies Act dealing with the nomination provide for vesting of shares in nominee and the said provisions override the law of intestate and testamentary succession. On the contrary, the provisions 2 AIR 1984 SC 346 sng 14 appeal-313n311.15 regarding nomination in other Statutes specifically restrict the rights of a nominee. He extensively relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dayagen P. Ltd. V Rajendra Dorian Punj and Another3. He has taken us through the various decisions which are referred to and relied upon in Kokate's case as well as in the impugned judgment and order. He referred to the various other decisions to which we will make a reference in the subsequent part of the judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">He also invited our attention to the relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. He submitted that the provisions regarding testamentary succession under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 do not apply when the provisions of the testamentary succession as provided in any other law for the time being in force are applicable. He urged that the learned Single Judge has completely overlooked the fact that the provisions of Section 109A and in particular Sub-Section 3 thereof incorporate a non-obstante clause which specifically provides that it will override the provisions of any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of shares or debentures of the Company. It specifically provides for vesting of shares or debentures in a Company in the nominee on the death of the shareholder or holder of debentures, as the case may be. He would, therefore, urge that the impugned order is completely erroneous. He also invited our attention to the Bye-Law No.9.11 framed under the Depositories Act, 1996.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">12. The learned counsel appearing for the original Plaintiff in Suit No.503 of 2015 supported the impugned judgment. He relied upon several decisions while referring to the language used by Section 109A and Section 109B of the Companies Act. He pointed out that the nomination would be always subject to the testamentary disposition by holder of shares or debentures. Even the learned counsel for the contesting Respondent in the other Appeal made submissions.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">THE ISSUE OF PER INCURIAM<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">13. We have given careful consideration to the submissions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Though the submissions have been made on the issue whether the decision in Kokate's case is per incuriam, the said issue need not be gone into inasmuch as a Division Bench can always examine the decisions of the learned Single Judges and record a finding as to which view is correct. If the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is otherwise correct in law, it is not necessary for us to deal with the issue whether the decision in Kokate's case is per incuriam. Similarly, when we find that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is erroneous, the impugned order will have to be set aside on merits and while doing so, it will not be necessary to go into the question whether the decision in Kokate's case is per incuriam as held sng 16 appeal-313n311.15 by the learned Single Judge. Moreover, we find that before the learned Single Judge as well as this Bench, submissions have been made on merits of the issue. The questions framed in Paragraph No.2 above will squarely arise in the suit subject matter of Appeal No.313 of 2015.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, we are examining the impugned order on its own merits in the light of the submissions made across the bar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WHETHER THE ISSUES WILL ARISE IN TESTAMENTARY PETITION<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">14. The Appellant appearing in person in support of the Appeal No.311 of 2015 has mainly contended that the issue decided by the learned Single Judge did not arise in this Testamentary Petition. The Appellant in person is right in the sense that the issue of title of the testator to the property subject matter of the will cannot be decided in the proceedings of probate. That is the well settled law( see the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Kanwarjit Singh Dhillon v. Hardyal Singh Dhillon4). Hence, the contention of the Appellant appearing in person that the issue could not have been decided in Testamentary Petition appears to be correct. The issues will certainly arises in Suit No.503 of 2014 in view of the stand taken in the written statement of the concerned Defendants. Therefore, in the Appeal arising out of the said suit, the issue will have to be decided in any case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">15. In these Appeals, we are concerned with the two provisions of the Companies Act which are Sections 109A and 109B which read thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"109A. NOMINATION OF SHARES.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Every holder of shares in, or holder of debentures of, a company may, at any time, nominate, in the prescribed manner, a person to whom his shares in, or debentures of, the company shall vest in the event of his death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Where the shares in, or debentures of, a company are held by more than one person jointly, the joint holders may together nominate, in the prescribed manner, a person to whom all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company shall vest in the event of death of all the joint holders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such shares in, or debentures of, the company, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to vest the shares in, or debentures of, the company, the nominee shall, on the death of the shareholder or holder of debentures of, the company or, as the case may be, on the death of the joint holders becomes entitled to all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company or, as the case may be, all the joint holders, in relation to such shares in, or debentures of, the company to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(4) Where the nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the holder of the shares, or holder of debentures, to make the nomination to appoint, in the prescribed manner, any person to become entitled to shares in, or sng 18 appeal-313n311.15 debentures of, the company, in the event of his death, during the minority.] 109B. TRANSMISSION OF SHARES.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Any person who becomes a nominee by virtue of the provisions of section 109A, upon the production of such evidence as may be required by the Board and subject as hereinafter provided, elect, either -<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) to be registered himself as holder of the share or debenture, as the case may be ; or<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b) to make such transfer of the share or debenture, as the case may be, as the deceased shareholder or debenture holder, as the case may be, could have made.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) If the person being a nominee, so becoming entitled, elects to be registered as holder of the share or debenture, himself, as the case may be, he shall deliver or send to the company a notice in writing signed by him stating that he so elects and such notice shall be accompanied with the death certificate of the deceased shareholder or debenture holder, as the case may be.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) All the limitations, restrictions and provisions of this Act relating to the right to transfer and the registration of transfers of shares or debentures shall be applicable to any such notice or transfer as aforesaid as if the death of the member had not occurred and the notice or transfer were a transfer signed by that shareholder or debenture holder, as the case may be.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(4) A person, being a nominee, becoming entitled to a share or debenture by reason of the death of the holder shall be entitled to the same dividends and other advantages to which he would be entitled if he were the registered holder of the share or debenture except that he shall not, before being registered a member in respect of his share or debenture, be entitled in respect of it to exercise any right conferred by membership in relation to meetings of the company:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">sng 19 appeal-313n311.15 Provided that the Board may, at any time, give notice requiring any such person to elect either to be registered himself or to transfer the share or debenture, and if the notice is not complied with within ninety days, the Board may thereafter withhold payment of all dividends, bonuses or other moneys payable in respect of the share or debenture, until the requirements of the notice have been complied with.]"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">16. Apart from the provisions of the Companies Act, we are also concerned with the Bye-Law No.9.11 framed in exercise of the powers under the Depositories Act, 1996 which reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"9.11. TRANSMISSION OF SECURITIES IN THE CASE OF NOMINATION:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.1. In respect of every account, the Beneficial Owner(s) ("Nominating Person(s)") may nominate any person ("Nominee") to whom his securities shall vest in the event of his death in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules from time to time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.2. The securities held in such account shall automatically be transferred in the name of the Nominee, upon the death of the Nominating Person, or as the case may be, all the Nominating Persons subject to the other Bye Laws mentioned hereunder.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.3 ...<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.4. Beneficial Owner(s) may substitute or cancel a nomination at any time. A valid nomination, substitution or cancellation of nomination shall be dated and duly registered with the Participant in accordance with the Business Rules prescribed therefore. The closure of the account by the Nominating Person(s) shall conclusively cancel the nomination.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">sng 20 appeal-313n311.15 9.11.5. A Nominee shall not be entitled to exercise any right conferred on Beneficial Owners under these Bye Laws, upon the death of the Nominating Person(s), unless the Nominee follows the procedure prescribed in the Business Rules for being registered as the Beneficial Owner of the securities of the Nominating Person(s) in the books of the Depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.6. A nominee shall on the death of the Nominating Person(s) be entitled to elect himself to be registered as a Beneficial Owner by delivering a notice in writing to the Depository, along with the certified true copy of the death certificate issued by the competent authority as prescribed under the Business Rules. Subject to scrutiny of such election, the securities in the Account shall be transmitted to the account of the Nominee held with any depository.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9.11.7. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other disposition and/or nominations made by the Nominating Person(s) under any other law for the time being in force, for the purposes of dealing with the securities lying to the credit of deceased Nominating Person(s) in any manner, the Depository shall rely upon the last nomination validly made prior to the demise of the Nominating Person(s). The Depository shall not be liable for any action taken in reliance upon and on the basis of nomination validly made by the Nominating Person(s)."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS KOKATE'S CASE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">17. Firstly, we propose to deal with the decision of the learned Single Judge in Kokate's case. The said decision is rendered in a Notice of Motion arising out of a suit. The Plaintiff therein was the widow of one Nitin Kokate, who died on 5th July 2007. Her deceased husband held certain shares in D-mat Account with the Depository Participant Cell of the first Defendant in the suit. The husband of the Plaintiff had sng 21 appeal-313n311.15 made a nomination in favour of the third Defendant. The third Defendant was the nephew of the deceased husband of the Plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Plaintiff claimed a title in the said shares after the demise of her husband as the sole heir and legal representative under the law of succession. The third Defendant claimed ownership of the shares on the basis of the nomination made by the deceased husband of the Plaintiff. The learned Single Judge considered the provisions of Section 109A of the Companies Act and the Bye-Law No.9.11 framed under the Depositories Act, 1996. Section 109A and the Bye-Law No.9.11 are already quoted above. The learned Single Judge considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarbati Devi dealing with the nomination under Section 39 of the Insurance Act. The learned Single Judge also dealt with the nomination made in accordance with Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The learned Single Judge in Kokate's case observed that in case of the nominees under the aforesaid two Enactments, the nominee becomes merely a trustee of the estate of the deceased. It was held that Section 109A of the Companies Act stands on a separate footing. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge considered the meaning of the word "vests" and ultimately in Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the said decision, she held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"24. In the light of these judgments Section 109A of the Companies Act is required to be interpreted with regard to the vesting of the shares of the holder of the shares in the sng 22 appeal-313n311.15 nominee upon his death. The act sets out that the nomination has to be made during the life time of the holder as per procedure prescribed by law. If that procedure is followed, the nominee would become entitled to all the rights in the shares to the exclusion of all other persons. The nominee would be made beneficial owner thereof. Upon such nomination, therefore, all the rights incidental to ownership would follow. This would include the right to transfer the shares, pledge the shares or hold the shares. The specific statutory provision making the nominee entitled to all the rights in the shares excluding all other persons would show expressly the legislative intent. Once all other persons are excluded and only the nominee becomes entitled under the statutory provision to have all the rights in the shares none other can have it. Further Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act 1996 makes the nominee's position superior to even a testamentary disposition. The non-obstante Clause in Section 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the Testamentary Disposition itself. Hence, any other disposition or nomination under any other law stands subject to the nomination made under the Depositories Act. Section 9.11.7 further shows that the last of the nominations would prevail. This shows the revocable nature of the nomination much like a Testamentary Disposition. A nomination can be cancelled by the holder and another nomination can be made. Such later nomination would be relied upon by the Depository Participant. That would be for conferring of all the rights in the shares to such last nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">25. A reading of Section 109A of the Companies Act and 9.11 of the Depositories Act makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the nomination is to vest the property in the shares which includes the ownership rights thereunder in the nominee upon nomination validly made as per the procedure prescribed,, as has been done in this case. These Sections sng 23 appeal-313n311.15 are completely different from Section 39 of the Insurance Act set out (supra) which require a nomination merely for the payment of the amount under the Life Insurance Policy without confirming any ownership rights in the nominee or under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act which allows the Society to transfer the shares of the member which would be valid against any demand made by any other person upon the Society. Hence these provisions are made merely to give a valid discharge to the Insurance Company or the Cooperative Society without vesting the ownership rights in the Insurance Policy or the membership rights in the Society upon such nominee. The express legislature intent under Section 109A of the Companies Act and Section 9.11 of the Depositories Act is clear."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">18. We must make a reference to the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court dealing with the issue of nomination under the different enactments. A recent decision of the Apex Court is in the case of Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Co-op. Societies and Others 5. The Apex Court in the said decision considered the provisions of nomination under Sections 69 and 70 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (for short "the West Bengal Act of 1983"). The Apex Court also considered its own decision in the case of Sarbati Devi which dealt with the nomination under the Life Insurance Act, 1938. After considering Section 79 of the West Bengal Act of 1983, the Apex Court 5 (2016) 6 SCC 440 sng 24 appeal-313n311.15 came to the conclusion that where a member of a Co-operative Society nominates a person in consonance with the provisions of the Rules framed under the West Bengal Act of 1983, the Co-operative Society is mandated to transfer all the shares or interest of such member in the name of the nominee. This view was taken by the Apex Court in the light of the express provisions of Section 80 of the said Act of 1983 read with Rule 127 of the Rules of 1987 framed under the West Bengal Act of 1983. Sections 79 and 80 of the said Act of 1983 appear to be different from the provisions relating to the nomination in the Maharashtra Co-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">operative Societies Act, 1960. In Paragraphs 19 to 23 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Indrani Wahi, the Apex Court concluded as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"19. In the same manner as is postulated under Section 79 of the 1983 Act, Rule 127 of the 1987 Rules provides, that if a nomination has been made by a member under Section 79, the share or interest or the value of such share or interest standing in the name of the deceased member, would be transferred to the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It is however, necessary to notice that Rule 127 postulates nomination only in favour of a person "belonging to his family". It is not necessary for us to deal with the issue whether the appellant Indrani Wahi, being a married daughter of the original member Biswa Ranjan Sengupta, could be treated as a member of the family, of the deceased member (Biswa Ranjan Sengupta), because the learned Single Judge, as also, the Division Bench of the High Court concluded, that the appellant Indrani Wahi was a member of the family, of the original member Biswa Ranjan Sengupta. This conclusion has sng 25 appeal-313n311.15 not been assailed by the respondents, before this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">20. Rule 128 of the 1987 Rules also leads to the same inference. Inasmuch as Rule 128 aforementioned provides, that only in the absence of a nominee, the transfer of the share or interest of the erstwhile member, would be made on the basis of a claim supported by an order of probate, a letter of administration or a succession certificate (issued by a court of competent jurisdiction).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">21. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, there is no doubt in our mind, ig that even Rules 127 and 128 of the 1987 Rules, lead to the inference, that in case of a valid nomination, under Section 79 of the 1983 Act, the cooperative society is liable to transfer the share or interest of a member in the name of the nominee. We hold accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">22. Having recorded the above conclusion, it is imperative for us to deal with the conclusion recorded in para 6 (already extracted above at p. 448f-h and p. 449a-b) of the judgment of this Court in Usha Ranjan Bhattacharjee case [Usha Ranjan Bhattacharjee v. Abinash Chandra Chakraborty, (1997) 10 SCC 344] . In this behalf, it is necessary to clarify that transfer of share or interest, based on a nomination under Section 79 in favour of the nominee, is with reference to the cooperative society concerned, and is binding on the said society. The cooperative society has no option whatsoever, except to transfer the membership in the name of the nominee, in consonance with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1983 Act (read with Rules 127 and 128 of the 1987 Rules). That, would have no relevance to the issue of title between the inheritors or successors to the property of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">23. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, we therefore hereby direct the Cooperative Society to transfer the share or interest of the Society in favour of the appellant Indrani Wahi. It shall however, be open to the other members of the family (presently only the son of Biswa Ranjan Sengupta, Dhruba Jyoti Sengupta; we are informed that his mother Parul Sengupta has died), to pursue his case of succession or inheritance, if he is so advised, in consonance with law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) After issuing the directions to the Co-operative Society to transfer the shares of the deceased member in the name of the Appellant who was a nominee, the Apex Court specifically observed that it will be open for other members of the family of the deceased member to pursue their case of succession or inheritance in consonance with law. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Apex Court was that a Co-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">operative Society is bound by the nomination made by the member. In case of such nomination, the Society has no option except to transfer the shares in the name of the nominee after the death of the member.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">However, those who are claiming inheritance will be entitled to pursue their remedies and claim title in the shares on the basis of inheritance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Apex Court was not that the nomination binds the legal representatives of the deceased shareholder or a member of the Society or that it overrides the law of succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">19. The scope of the nomination governed by Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 read with the Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 was considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ramdas Shivram Sattur vs Rameshchandra Popatlal Shah 6. After quoting both the provisions, the learned Judge referred to another decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Gopal Vishnu Ghatnekar v.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Madhukar Vishnu Ghatnekar7. The said decision was approved by a Division Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge quoted the decision of the Division Bench in Paragraph 9. Ultimately, in Paragraph 10, the learned Single Judge concluded that by a nomination under Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, there is no disposition of the properties by the member of the Society and, therefore, the nominee on the demise of the member does not become the owner of the properties in question held by virtue of the membership of the Society.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">20. We may note here that Section 80 of the West Bengal Act of 1983 specifically provides that on the death of a member of a Cooperative Society, the share or interest of the member in the Cooperative Society shall stand transferred to the person nominated 6 2009(3)Bom C R 705 7 AIR 1982 Bom 482 sng 28 appeal-313n311.15 under Section 79. Sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">operative Societies Act, 1960 specifically provides that all transfers duly made by the Society under the said provision to the nominee shall be valid and effectual against any demand made upon the Society by any other person. Notwithstanding the provision of Section 80 of the West Bengal Act of 1983 which mandates that on the death of a member of a Cooperative Society, his share or interest shall be transferred to nominee, the Apex Court did not hold that nomination supersedes the succession or inheritance in accordance with law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">21. In the case of Sarbati Devi, the Apex Court considered the effect of nomination under Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act, 1938.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Paragraph 3 of the said decision sets out the question which required consideration. In Paragraph 5, the Apex Court analyzed Section 39. In Paragraph 8, the Apex Court observed thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"We are of the view that the language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under the law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Ultimately, in Paragraph 12, the Apex Court held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">sng 29 appeal-313n311.15 The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case [AIR 1978 Del 276] and in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">22. In the case of Nozer Gustad Commissariat v. Central Bank of India and Others 8, the learned Single Judge of this Court considered the effect of nomination under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. In Paragraph 8, the learned Single Judge quoted the relevant provisions of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Provisions Act, 1952. Section 10 of the said Act reads thus:</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"10.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Protection against attachment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Amount standing to the credit of any member in Fund or of any exempted employee in a provident fund shall not in any way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any court in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the member or the exempted employee, and neither the official assignee appointed under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) nor any receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), shall be entitled to have any claim on, any such amount.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Any amount standing to the credit of a member in the fund or of an exempted employee in a provident fund at the time of his death and payable to his nominee under the Scheme or the rules of the provident fund shall, subject to any deduction authorised by the said Scheme or rules, vest in the nominee and shall be free from any debt or other liability incurred by the deceased or the nominee before the death of the member or of exempted employee and shall also not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) The provisions of sub-section 1 and sub-section 2 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the pension or any other amount, payable under the Pension Scheme and also in relation to any amount payable under the Insurance Scheme as they apply in relation to any amount payable out of the Fund."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) Thereafter, the learned Single Judge proceeded to discuss the meaning of the word "vest" used in Sub-section (2) of Section 10.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Apart from referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarbati Devi, the learned Single Judge considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">sng 31 appeal-313n311.15 The Delhi Improvement Trust9, wherein the Apex Court discussed various meanings of the word "vests". In Paragraph 16, the learned Single Judge held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"16. There are two main points of distinction, which have to be kept in mind while considering the submission concerning literal interpretation of section 10(2) of the 1952 Act as appears to have been done by the High Court of Calcutta. The question to be asked is why the word "absolutely" hitherto before existing in section 5 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1925 was deliberately omitted by the Amending Act XI of 1946. Was it the intention of the Legislature that even after omission of the said word from the said provision, the nominee must be held to have an absolute right to the provident fund amount lying to the credit of the deceased employee. Even prior to 1946, some of the High Courts had interpreted the provision to mean that the nominee of provident fund had no title to the amount belonging to the deceased subscriber. The object of Amending Act, 1946 by directing omission of word absolutely from section 5 of the Act of 1925 was to make it clear beyond doubt that the nominee would have no title to the amount. Section 10(2) of Act of 1952 does not use the word "absolutely". It appears to me that the Supreme Court judgment highlighting various meanings of the word "vest" in the case of The Fruit and Vegetable Merchants' Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 and holding that the word 'vest' in the context could mean mere possession for specific purpose without any title was not cited before the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta. If the various English and Indian cases noticed by Hon'ble Justice Sinha of the Supreme Court in the abovereferred judgment are to be considered and applied having regard to the context and object of the Act, it would follow that the use of the word "vest"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">in section 10(2) of the Act merely means that the nominee is merely entitled to collect the amount for benefit of heirs of the deceased coupled with 9 AIR 1957 SC 344 sng 32 appeal-313n311.15 exemption thereof from attachment and subject to category of heirs being restricted as specified in Provident Funds Scheme. I therefore, hold that the provident fund amount forms belonging to the estate of the deceased and the petitioner is solely entitled thereto. Having regard to the facts of this case, the respondent No. 4 is liable to be restrained from collecting the said amount from the former employer of the deceased. It is the duty of this Court to pass appropriate orders so as to safeguard the interest of petitioner minor and pass order of injunction against respondent No. 4 having regard to the above. I am supported in the view which I have taken on interpretation of section 10(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 and also by judgments of High Court of Delhi in the case of Smt. Om Wativ. Delhi Transport Corporation, 1988 Labour and Industrial Cases 500 and also the recent judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Lalitaben Bhanabhai d/o Bhanabhai Malabhai v. Laliben Bhanabhai w/o Bhanabhai Malabhai, 1992 I Current Labour Reports<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">164."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">23. In the case of Vishin N. Khanchandani and Another v.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani and Another 10, the Apex Court considered the effect of nomination under the Government Savings Certificate Act, 1959 and in particular Sections 6 to 8 thereof. The said Sections read thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"6. Nomination by holders of savings certificates.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any disposition, testamentary or otherwise in respect of any savings certificate, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner 10 (2000)6 SCC 724 sng 33 appeal-313n311.15 purports to confer on any person the right to receive payment of the sum for the time being due on the savings certificate on the death of the holder thereof and before the maturity of the certificate, or before the certificate having reached maturity has been discharged, the nominee shall, on the death of the holder of the savings certificate, become entitled to the savings certificate and to be paid the sum due thereon to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Any nomination referred to in sub-section (1) shall become void if the nominee predeceases, or where there are two or more nominees all the nominees predecease, the holder of the savings certificate making the nomination.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) Where the nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the holder of the savings certificate making the nomination to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the sum due thereon in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(4) A transfer of a savings certificate made in the prescribed manner shall automatically cancel a nomination previously made:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Provided that where a savings certificate is held by or on behalf of any person as a pledgee or by way of security for any purpose, such holding shall not have the effect of cancelling a nomination but the right of the nominee shall be subject to the right of the person so holding it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">7. Payment on death of holder.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) If the holder of a savings certificate dies and there is in force at the time of his death a nomination in favour of any person, payment of the sum due thereon shall be made to the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Where the nominee is a minor, payment of the sum due thereon shall be made--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) in any case where a person has been appointed to receive it under sub-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">sng 34 appeal-313n311.15 section (3) of Section 6, to that person, and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b) where there is no such person, to any guardian of the property of the minor appointed by a competent court, or where no such guardian has been so appointed, to either parent of the minor, or where neither parent is alive, to any other guardian of the minor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) Where the sum due on a savings certificate is payable to two or more nominees, and either or any of them dies, the sum shall be paid to the surviving nominee or nominees.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(4) If a person dies and is at the time of his death the holder of a savings certificate and there is no nomination in force at the time of his death and probate of his will or letters of administration of his estate or a succession certificate granted under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, is not within three months of the death of the holder produced to the prescribed authority, then, if the sum due on the savings certificate does not exceed such limit as may be prescribed, the prescribed authority may pay the same to any person appearing to it to be entitled to receive the sum or to administer the estate of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(5) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to require any person to receive payment of the sum due on a savings certificate before it has reached maturity or otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the savings certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">8. Payment to be a full discharge.--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Any payment made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Act to a minor or to his parent or guardian or to a nominee or to any other person shall be a full discharge from all further liability in respect of the sum so paid. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to preclude any executor or administrator or other sng 35 appeal-313n311.15 representative of a deceased holder of a savings certificate from recovering from the person receiving the same under Section 7 the amount remaining in his hands after deducting the amount of all debts or other demands lawfully paid or discharged by him in due course of administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) Any creditor or claimant against the estate of a holder of a savings certificate may recover his debt or claim out of the sum paid under this Act to any person and remaining in his hands unadministered in the same manner and to the same extent as if the latter had obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision, the Apex Court observed thus-:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"7. Mr Sanjay K. Kaul, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants submitted that Section 6 of the Act very unambiguously provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any disposition, testamentary or otherwise, in respect of any savings certificate where a nomination is made, the nominee shall, on the death of the holder of the savings certificate, become entitled to the savings certificate and to be paid the sum due thereon to the exclusion of all other persons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Referring to sub-section (3) of Section 6, the learned counsel submitted that in case where the nominee is a minor, the holder of the savings certificate has a right to make the nomination to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the sum due thereon in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. It is contended that if the intention was not to entitle the nominee to be paid and to retain the sum due on such National Savings Certificates, there was no necessity of making a provision as has been incorporated in sub-section (3) of Section 6. Section 7 was also relied upon to urge that after the death of the holder, the nominee becomes entitled to the payment of the sum due without there being any further sng 36 appeal-313n311.15 obligation upon him. In support of such an argument further reliance was placed upon sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7. He also tried to distinguish the verdict of this Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi [(1984) 1 SCC 424 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 59] by pointing out the difference of the language and phraseology in Section 6 of the Act and Section 39 of the Insurance Act. According to him the words, "on the death of the holder of the savings certificate, become entitled to the savings certificate and to be paid the sum due thereon to the exclusion of all other persons", appearing in Section 6 of the Act have not been incorporated in Section 39 of the Insurance Act suggesting that the legislature had intended to make the nominee absolute owner of the value of the certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">8. The law in force in England on the position of a nominee who has been treated to be a third party in relation to a claim regarding insurance policy, is summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England(4th Edn.), Vol. 25, para 579 as under:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"579. Position of third party.--The policy money payable on the death of the assured may be expressed to be payable to a third party and the third party is then prima facie merely the agent for the time being of the legal owner and has his authority to receive the policy money and to give a good discharge; but he generally has no right to sue the insurers in his own name. The question has been raised whether the third party's authority to receive the policy money is terminated by the death of the assured; it seems, however, that unless and until they are otherwise directed by the assured's personal representatives the insurers may pay the money to the third party and get a good discharge from him."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) In paragraph 13, the Apex Court proceeded to observe thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"13. In the light of what has been noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that though the language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is sng 37 appeal-313n311.15 different from the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same. The Act only makes the provisions regarding avoiding delay and expense in making the payment of the amount of the National Savings Certificates, to the nominee of the holder, which has been considered to be beneficial both for the holder as also for the post office. Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. In other words, the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi case [(1984) 1 SCC 424 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 59] holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those in whose favour the law creates a beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">24. In the case of Antonio Joao Fernandes v. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Others11, the learned Single Judge of this Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and in particular the meaning of the expression "vests" used in the said provisions. The learned Single Judge followed the view taken in the case of Nozer Gustad Commissariat.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">25. Now we come to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chander Talwar and Others v. Devender Kumar Talwar and 11 2010(3) All MR 599 sng 38 appeal-313n311.15 Others12. The issue before the Apex Court was whether a nominee in the bank account held by the deceased can claim full rights over the money lying in the account to the exclusion of the legal heirs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the said decision read thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"4. Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA, reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"45-ZA. * * * (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount of deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">5. Section 45-ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Section 45-ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased 12 (2010)10 SCC 671 sng 39 appeal-313n311.15 depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">6. We find that the High Court has rightly rejected the appellant's claim relying upon the decision of this Court in Vishin N. Khanchandani v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani [(2000) 6 SCC 724] . The provision under Section 6(1) of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 is materially and substantially the same as the provision of Section 45-ZA(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and the decision in Vishin N. Khanchandani [(2000) 6 SCC 724] applies with full force to the facts of this case."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ig (emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">26. Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 starts with a non-obstante clause which seeks to override any other law for the time being in force or any disposition whether testamentary or otherwise in respect of such deposit, where a nomination has been made in the prescribed manner. Though the word "vest" is not used in Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA, it provides that a nominee on the death of the sole depositor or as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors becomes entitled to all rights as the sole depositor in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons. The Apex Court held that the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is no way concerned with the question of succession and, therefore, all the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA would form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and would be governed by the law of succession by which the depositor sng 40 appeal-313n311.15 was governed. Though Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA seeks to override any other law for the time being in force or any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, the Apex Court held that the nominee does not become the owner of the money lying in the account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">27. Coming back to the decision in the case of Vishin N. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Khanchandani and Another, as stated earlier, the Apex Court interpreted Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We have already quoted Section 6 of the said Act. As pointed out earlier, even Sub-section (1) of Section 6 starts with a similar non-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">obstante clause. The submission of the Appellant before the Apex Court which is noted in Paragraph 6 based on the non-obstante clause, was that Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 was intended to make the nominee the absolute owner of the value of the saving certificates. In Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said decision, the Apex Court noted the difference between Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act, 1938 and Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 and noted that Section 6 starts with a non-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">obstante clause as distinguished from Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act. Ultimately, in Paragraph 13, the Apex Court observed that though the phraseology used in Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act, 1938 is different from the phraseology used in Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959, the effect of both the provisions is the sng 41 appeal-313n311.15 same and that is how in Paragraph 13 in the case of Vishin N.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Khanchandani and Another, the Apex Court held thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"13. In the light of what has been noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that though the language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is different from the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same. The Act only makes the provisions regarding avoiding delay and expense in making the payment of the amount of the National Savings Certificates, to the nominee of the holder, which has been considered to be beneficial both for the holder as also for the post office. Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. In other words, the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi case [(1984) 1 SCC 424 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 59] holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those in whose favour the law creates a beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">28. Now, we may make a reference to Sections 109A and 109B of the Companies Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 109A quoted earlier is on par with Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 and Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. There is no material difference between Sub-section (3) of Section 109A of the Companies Act and Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 as sng 42 appeal-313n311.15 well as Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which have been interpreted by the Apex Court as aforesaid. The said provisions start with non-obstante clause and seek to provide that nomination will override the disposition whether testamentary or otherwise. The said provisions seek to exclude all other persons except the nominee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">29. Section 109B of the Companies Act does not advance the case of the Appellants any further. Section 109B does not suggest that on nomination being made by a deceased shareholder of a Company, his nominee becomes the owner of the shares to the exclusion of all other legal heirs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">30. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gajanan and Others v.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Seth Brindaban13 and in particular Paragraph 15 thereof which reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"15. There is also another aspect which may legitimately be kept in view. People in arranging their affairs are entitled to rely on a decision of the highest court which appears to have prevailed for considerable length of time and it would require some exceptional reason to justify its reversal when such reversal is likely to create serious embarrassment for those who had acted on the faith of what seemed to be the settled law. Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretations than one, and one view 13 1970(2) SCC 360 sng 43 appeal-313n311.15 accepted by the highest court has stood for a long period during which many transactions such as dealings in property and making of contracts have taken place on the faith of that interpretation the court would ordinarily be reluctant to put upon it a different interpretation which would materially affect those transactions."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">31. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in Appeal No.313 of 2015 relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Ashwani Kumar and Others14. Paragraph 22 of the said decision relied upon reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"22. We make it clear that to maintain certainty in the judicial decision, we have to restrain from interfering with the decision of the High Court which has stood for a long period on the principle of stare decisis. However, the said principle will be applicable where the meaning of the Statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretation than one. In the instant case, the provision of the Act/Statute is very clear and, therefore, principle of stare decisis is of no help to the Respondents."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">32. In the present case, we find that the provisions of Section 109A and in particular Sub-section (3) thereof are not materially different from the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959. Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is also similar to Sub-section (2) of Section 109B. The same is the case with Bye-law 9.11 of the Depositories Act,1996. Even assuming that the format of the nomination requires attestation as required by a will under the Indian 14 2015(12) Scale 619 sng 44 appeal-313n311.15 Succession Act,1925, the nomination does not become a testamentary disposition. Therefore, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Ashwani Kumar and Others is of no help to the Appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">33. Reliance is placed on Sub-Section (2) of Section 58 of the Indian Succession Act,1925 which reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"58. General application of Part.--(1) The ig provisions of this Part shall not apply to testamentary succession to the property of any Muhammadan nor, save as provided by Section 57, to testamentary succession to the property of any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina; nor shall they apply to any will made before the first day of January, 1866.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Save as provided in sub-section (1) or by any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Part shall constitute the law of [India] applicable to all cases of testamentary succession."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Sections 109A was not on the Statute Book when the Indian Succession Act,1925 came into force. We do not see how the said provision will help the Appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">34. The provisions relating to nominations under the various Enactments have been consistently interpreted by the Apex Court by holding that the nominee does not get absolute title to the property subject matter of the nomination. The reason is by its very nature, sng 45 appeal-313n311.15 when a share holder or a deposit holder or an insurance policy holder or a member of a Co-operative Society makes a nomination during his life time, he does not transfer his interest in favour of the nominee. It is always held that the nomination does not override the law in relation to testamentary or intestate succession. The provisions regarding nomination are made with a view to ensure that the estate or the rights of the deceased subject matter of the nomination are protected till the legal representatives of the deceased take appropriate steps. None of the provisions of the aforesaid Statutes providing for nominations deal with the succession, testamentary or non-testamentary. As observed by the Apex Court, the legislative intention is not to provide a third kind of succession. In Sarbati Devi, the Apex Court held in paragraph 5 which reads thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">" ......But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy- </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in para 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would sng 46 appeal-313n311.15 become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered."</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(emphasis added) The object of the provisions of the Companies Act is not to either provide a mode of succession or to deal with succession. The object of the Section 109A is to ensure that the deceased shareholder is represented by some one as the value of the shares is subject to market forces. Various advantages keep on accruing to shareholders. For example, allotment of Bonus shares. There are general meetings held of the Companies in which a shareholder is required to be represented.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The provision is enacted to ensure that the commerce does not suffer due to delay on the part of the legal heirs in establishing their rights of succession and claiming the shares of a Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">35. Considering the consistent view taken by the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions relating to nominations under various Statutes (including the view in the recent decision in the case of Indrani Wahi), there is no reason to make a departure from the sng 47 appeal-313n311.15 consistent view. The provisions of the Companies Act including Sections 109A and 109B, in the light of the object of the said Enactment, do not warrant any such departure. The so called vesting under Section 109A does not create a third mode of succession. It is not intended to create a third mode of succession. The Companies Act has nothing to do with the law of succession. We have gone through every decision and material relied upon by the Appellants to which we have not made a specific reference in this Judgment. We hold that there was no reason to take a view which is contrary to the view taken in the long line of the decisions of the Apex Court on interpretation of provisions regarding nominations. Hence, the view taken in Kokate's case is not correct. We answer the first question in the negative and the third question in the affirmative. The second question is answered accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">36. Some argument was canvassed in Appeal No.313 of 2015 that the learned Single Judge has decided the question at the time of hearing of the Notice of Motion which was not a question of jurisdiction. From the impugned order, it appears that the Appellants in Appeal No.313 of 2015 were fully aware as to the controversy before the learned Single Judge and in fact, the submissions have been made on merits of the issue. Hence, the said contention cannot be accepted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">37. As regards the Appeal No.311 of 2015, it arises out of a Testamentary Petition. The Appellant appearing in person is right in contending that the issue of the effect of nomination is irrelevant for deciding the Application for grant of probate inasmuch as it is well settled that a testamentary Court dealing with the issue of grant of probate or letters of administration has no jurisdiction to decide the issue as regards the title of the deceased testator to his assets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, the issue of effect of nomination could not have been gone into in the Appeal arising out of the Testamentary Petition filed by the Appellant in Appeal No.311 of 2015.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">38. Hence, we pass the following order:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) Appeal No.313 of 2015 is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b) We make it clear that the impugned order stands confirmed as far as the Suit No.503 of 2014 is concerned;</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(c) The impugned order stands quashed and set aside insofar as the Testamentary Petition No.457 of 2014 is concerned only on the ground that the issue of the sng 49 appeal-313n311.15 effect of nomination made by the testator cannot be gone into by the Testamentary Court in the probate proceedings. The Appeal No.311 of 2015 is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(d) Pending Notices of Motion, if any, in both the Appeals do not survive and the same are disposed of.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">( A.A.SAYED, J )</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">( A.S. OKA, J )</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">39. After the judgment is pronounced, the learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in Appeal No.313 of 2015 prays for continuation of the ad-interim or interim order which is operative in the Appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">40. Considering the nature of controversy, we extend the ad- </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">interim or interim order which is operative till today by a period of 10 weeks from today.</span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">ABHISHEK 06012020<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-40294408312847217632020-01-27T18:06:00.000+05:302020-01-27T18:06:25.609+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">PATNA HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">RENUKA BALA CHATTERJI VS ASWINI KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS. ON 27 JUNE, 1961<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7A4dEqsEs5rse5cC4YNrieKoDzJ73aDJTQu7D7DKjAQdOvh9gpbOI6xFgMQGgVsADNEifJ98yUxDo9tR7dlCbaF4hY_K9D6sWpZkMDESYpjhFfn8T58i9B8fxj8ltCJ_DqHfCVJK0Aw0/s1600/Patana-High-court.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="630" data-original-width="1095" height="368" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7A4dEqsEs5rse5cC4YNrieKoDzJ73aDJTQu7D7DKjAQdOvh9gpbOI6xFgMQGgVsADNEifJ98yUxDo9tR7dlCbaF4hY_K9D6sWpZkMDESYpjhFfn8T58i9B8fxj8ltCJ_DqHfCVJK0Aw0/s640/Patana-High-court.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The facts leading to the present appeal by defendant No. 1 may be stated in brief as follows: One Srimati Manorama Mazumdar, widow of Girish Chandra Mazumdar, the d on the 25th of April, 1936 leaving three daughters, Srimati Nirmala, Srimati Urmila and Srimati Amala. She had two other daughters, Srimati Framila and Srimati Simla who had predeceased her. Of the three surviving daughters. Srimati Amala the d on the 19th July, 1936 and Srimati Nirmala in 1939. Srimati Urmila is defendant No. 2 in the present suit and her son is defendant No. 3. Defendants 4 and 5 are sons of Nirmala and Bimala, respectively.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Plaintiffs 1 to 5 are sons of Framila deceased. An item of house property consisting of half of the suit house was acquired by Manorama Mazumdar by way of gift from a relation, and she was the absolute owner thereof. Similarly, another item of property, which was the adjoining half of the house already acquired by Manorama, was purchased by Amala out of her earnings, and she constructed a house on that land herself. She was the absolute owner thereof.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">On the death of Manorama Mazumdar in April, 1936, Srimati Amala inherited her property as a Stridhan heir. She thus came in possession of both the halves of the suit house, one which had belonged to Manorama and the other belonging to herself. Within three months of the death of the mother. Amala the died in July 1936. Srimati Ninnala and Srimati Urmila, the two other surviving daughters of Manorama inherited Manoratna's property. They also inherited Amala's portion of the house as Her Stridhan heirs. While both the sisters were thus in possession of the suit house, Nirmala died in 1939, in which case Urmila, the present defendant No. 2, succeeded to the suit house and came in possession exclusively.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We have to look to the heirs in Class I given In the Schedule of the Act as that is applicable for the heirs of a male Hindu, and in that class persons available for the purpose of the present case will be the sons of the predeceased daughters of Girish Chandra; that is to say, Girish Chandra will be deemed to have the d on 19-7-1956, when Amala the and his predeceased daughters in that case Will be Bimala and Pramila who were dead before 1936. Their sons are the plaintiffs and defendant No. 5. Thus the plaintiffs are covered by Section 1 5 as heirs both of Amala and Manorama in regard to their absolute properties now in the hands of the limited owner, defendant No. 2. The appellant's objection against the maintainability of the present suit by the plaintiffs cannot thus prevail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The result, therefore, is that none of the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant succeeds. The appeal is therefore, dismissed but, in view of the circumstances of the case and the legal points involved in it, there will be no order for costs in this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Complete Judgement</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">PATNA HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">RENUKA BALA CHATTERJI VS ASWINI KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS. ON 27 JUNE, 1961</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: AIR 1961 Pat 498<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: Mahapatra<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: K Ahmad, H Mahapatra<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT Mahapatra, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. The facts leading to the present appeal by defendant No. 1 may be stated in brief as follows: One Srimati Manorama Mazumdar, widow of Girish Chandra Mazumdar, the d on the 25th of April, 1936 leaving three daughters, Srimati Nirmala, Srimati Urmila and Srimati Amala. She had two other daughters, Srimati Framila and Srimati Simla who had predeceased her. Of the three surviving daughters. Srimati Amala the d on the 19th July, 1936 and Srimati Nirmala in 1939. Srimati Urmila is defendant No. 2 in the present suit and her son is defendant No. 3. Defendants 4 and 5 are sons of Nirmala and Bimala, respectively. Plaintiffs 1 to 5 are sons of Framila deceased. An item of house property consisting of half of the suit house was acquired by Manorama Mazumdar by way of gift from a relation, and she was the absolute owner thereof. Similarly, another item of property, which was the adjoining half of the house already acquired by Manorama, was purchased by Amala out of her earnings, and she constructed a house on that land herself. She was the absolute owner thereof.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. On the death of Manorama Mazumdar in April, 1936, Srimati Amala inherited her property as a Stridhan heir. She thus came in possession of both the halves of the suit house, one which had belonged to Manorama and the other belonging to herself. Within three months of the death of the mother. Amala the died in July 1936. Srimati Ninnala and Srimati Urmila, the two other surviving daughters of Manorama inherited Manoratna's property. They also inherited Amala's portion of the house as Her Stridhan heirs. While both the sisters were thus in possession of the suit house, Nirmala died in 1939, in which case Urmila, the present defendant No. 2, succeeded to the suit house and came in possession exclusively. She had no doubt a limited interest in the suit property as a limited owner. On the 23rd of November, 1942, however, she executed and registered a deed of sale in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the whole house which stands on holding No. 292 of the Giridih Municipality, for Rs. 600/- only. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs, claiming as reversioners, to challenge that alienation, on the ground that it was without legal necessity. They asserted that they along with defendants 3 to 5 were the next reversioners to the estates of Manorama and Amala.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The trial court decreed the suit and granted a declaration that the impugned transfer was without legal necessity and was not binding against the plaintiffs. It, however, held that as Srimati Urmila, defendant No. 2, was still alive, the transfer would enure till heri death, and the purchaser, defendant No. 1, would be entitled to remain in possession till that time. Against this the present appeal was preferred by defendant No. 1 in this court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. When it came for hearing the following contentions were raised on behalf of the appellant: (1) Manorama Mazumdar and Amala Mazumdar were Brahmos and were to be governed by the Indian Succession Act and not by Dayabhag School, for purpose of succession to their estates. (2) Under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs had no locus standi as reversioners to challenge the alienation as Srimati Urmila, defendant No. 2, became an absolute owner after that Act came into force, and her transferee, defendant No. 1 would be deemed to have taken such absolute title by his purchase. (3) Even if Srimati Urmila did not acquire absolute title and was a limited owner, on her death the heirs, who would succeed to the estates of Manorama and Amala, would be the heirs according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In that case the plaintiffs would not be such heirs (reversionary heirs).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that both Manorama Mazumdar and Amala Mazumdar belonged to the Dayabhag School of Hindu law and Manorama and her daughters were married according to the Hindu form and not under the Special Marriage Act, though they were Brahmos. It was further held that Srimati Urmila, (defendant No. 2) was a limited owner in respect of the property in dispute, and the benefits of absolute ownership as provided under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, were not available to her as she had effected a transfer in favour of defendant No. 1, much before that Act came into force. That transfer was also found to have been without any legal necessity. In all these findings there was a complete agreement with the trial court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. In elaboration of the argument that on the death of the limited owner, (defendant No. 2), the next heirs of Manorama and Amala would have to be determined according to the Hindu Succession Act, it was pointed out that the only sons of those daughters of Manorama who had predeceased their father, Girish Chandra Mazumdar, would be entitled to the suit properties. There was nothing on record then to show when exactly Srimati Bimala and Srimati Pramila had the d. Their father, Girisn Chandra Mazumdar, was dead in 1913. It was known that Srimati Nirmala had the d in 1939, but as it was necessary to know the year of death of Bimala and Pramila, with a view to finding out it the plaintiffs would come within the category of sons of predeceased daughter, the case was remanded to the trial court, by the judgment of this court dated the 4th December, 1958.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It has now been found by the learned Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, that Girish Chandra Mazumdar, husband of Manorama Mazumdar and father of Bimala and Pramila the d in 1913; before that Bimala was dead. Pramila, however, the d before Mauorama's death but after 1913. Thus the only daughter, who can be said to have actually predeceased Girish Chandra Mazumdar, was Bimala whose son is defendant No. 5. The appeal came tor further hearing after that finding was transmitted to this court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Certain facts and position of law are beyond dispute. Manorama and Amala were absolute owners in respect of the properties they owned before their death. On Manorama's death Srimati Amala, being the only maiden daughter, was entitled to inherit as a limited owner, the estate of Manorama Mazumdar and she did so. On her death, that is Amala's, the next Stridhan heirs of Manorama were the two surviving . daughters Nirmala and Urmila, and as limited owners both of them Were entitled to and came in possession of Manorama's property. On Nirmala's death, Urmila, defendant No. 2, became entitled to and retained possession of that property. So far as Amala's property was concerned, on her death in July 1936, her property, being the Stridhan property of a maiden, was to pass in absence of any uterine brother, mother or father, to her father's heir in order of propinquity, that is to say, in the present case, to the daughters of Girish Chandra Mazumdar according to the rule of Succession under the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law. They Were no other than Nirmala and Urmila. On Nirmala's death, the other surviving (Urmila, defendant No. 2) was the only Stridhan heir of Amala's property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, in the hands of defendant No. 2, both the properties of Manorama and Amala remained since 1939 and her rights were no better than that of a limited owner. While it was so, the impugned transfer was made on the 23rd of November, 1942 by her in favour of defendant No. 1. The next reversionary heirs of Amala in respect of her maiden Stridhan property would be, according to the Hindu law, the sons of the daughters of her father, who in this case are the plaintiffs and defendants 3, 4 and 5. Manorama's property belonged to the category of Ayautaka Stridhan as it came to her as a gift from a relation. The heirs to that property would be in the following order: (1) sons and maiden daughters, (2) married daughters, (3) sons' sons. (4) daughters' sons and so on. Amala came in the first group and after her, the defendant No. 2 in the second group and after her, will come the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 as belonging to the fourth group. Thus, according to the rules of succession to the Stridhan properties as prevalent in the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law, the plain- </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">tiffs and defendants 3, 4 and 5 are undisputedly the next reversioners in regard to the Stridhan properties left by Manorama and Amala.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. The point that was stressed on behalf of the appellant was that though Urmila, (defendant No. 2), could not acquire the benefits of an absolute owner under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, as she had already made an absolute transfer in favour of defendant No. 1 prior to the coming of the Act, yet, on her death, those who will succeed to the suit property will be governed by Section 15 of the Act. In other words, the argument is, whether Urmila (defendant No. 2) is or is not an absolute owner will be immaterial. Section 15 provides for a devolution of the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. The defendant No, 2 is still alive and her death will come after the Act came into force, and during its continuance, the property in her hands will be on her death, that of a female Hindu dying intestate, and, therefore, it shall devolve upon the class of persons set out in section 15 read with Section 16. A "female Hindu" mentioned in Section 15-according to the contention, will include a female Hindu limited owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no doubt that the Act is applicable to all deaths occurring after the commencement of the Act of all female Hindus having properties as full owners. The question in controversy is whether it would also be applicable to a female Hindu having property as limited owner. Learned counsel's reasons' are that there is nothing in Section 15 to indicate that any particular kind of property in possession of a female Hindu was to be excluded from the operation of the Act, and, therefore, all kinds of properties that are held by a female Hindu must be subject to the rule of devolution prescribed in the Act. He referred to Sections 6 and 7 to show that the Parliament, wherever they wanted to do so, specifically provided for the exclusion of particular types of properties or persons from the operation of the Act. If they wanted to keep out the female Hindu limited owners and their properties out of the ambit of the Act, they would have either in Section 15 or elsewhere prescribed that.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This contention has some seeming force though devoid of real substance. Sections 6 and 7 deal with some kind of interest in the property, in one case, of Mitakshara coparcenary, and in the other, of some other different kinds. Section 8 or 15 deals with the property actually held by a male or female Hindu. Section 8, which lays down the general rule of succession in the case of a male Hindu, does not contain any words to indicate that the general rules were subject to the exceptions provided under Sections 6 and 7. The reason is obvious. That section deals with the property of a male Hindu which is treated as different from an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary or the like; otherwise Sections 6 and 7 on one hand, and Section 8 on the other, will present some conflict,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. The appellant's contention cannot prevail also for another reason. "A female Hindu dying intestate" in Section 15 cannot but indicate that that section deals with the property of a female Hindu which is capable of being disposed of by will or other testamentary disposition but not disposed of that way and held by a female Hindu at the time of her death. The property held by a female Hindu as a limited owner is certainly not capable of a testamentary disposition and she cannot be treated to have died intestate in that respect, unless limited ownership matures to absolute ownership within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. Section 15, coming in the wake of Section 14, makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature first provided for converting all properties possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, into that of full ownership. That section intended to wipe out all the limited ownership of female Hindus. The words: ".....shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner" are clear proof of that. Different kinds of properties acquired by and in possession of a female Hindu have been mentioned in the explanation given in that section, and the properties acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil court or under an award have been left outside the scope of that section under Sub-clause (2), which indicates that limited ownership if any of a female' Hindu was left to be intact in respect of such properties. Once one kind of limited ownership was left surviving, under Section 14, the following section (Section 15) could not have been intended to include the same for purposes of succession. If it were so, then there was no meaning in retaining the limited ownership. As long as a limited owner is alive, and as far as she herself is concerned, there is no difference between the properties of absolute and limited ownership.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The position becomes different only on the death of the limited owner, as the heirs to succeed to the property thereof will vary; in case of limited ownership, the next heirs of the last full owner will come, but in case of an absolute ownership, the heirs of the dying female Hindu will inherit the property. Reading Sections 14 and 15 together leaves no doubt that Section 15, where the general rules of succession, to properties of a female Hindu dying intestate are provided, cannot apply to properties of limited ownership. "The restricted estate" of a female Hindu saved by Section 14 is not invaded upon under Section 15 of the Act. It is true, that in the present case, the limited ownership of defendant No 2 about the suit property does not come within the categories of Sub-clause (2) of Section 14, but that is immaterial. It is not and cannot be contended that Section 15 excludes only one kind of limited ownership properties and governs other kinds. There is nothing in that section to justify such a contention; all kinds of limited ownership are either included in or excluded from that Section. By a comparison of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 with that of Section 15, I have tried to show that the latter section cannot govern at least that kind of "restricted estate" of a female Hindu described in the former section. That leads to the conclusion that no kind of limited ownership whatsoever can be brought under application of Section 15.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. It was contended that the preamble of the Act states that it is an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus which can only mean that all kinds of intestate successions are included within the purview of the Act. A word of general import like "codify" in the preamble cannot be taken to necessarily include all possible situations that may arise on the death of a Hindu in regard to the succession to the properties held by him or her. Preamble, at the most, may indicate in a general way the content and colour of an enactment but it cannot override in order to enlarge or restrict the enacting provision in the Act. The language of the enactment portion will determine the meaning of the provision, particularly if that language is in no way ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Learned counsel referred, in support of his contention, to a case reported in ILR 23 Cal 563, (PC), Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi. There, the matter in dispute was the interpretation of a clause in a will left by a Hindu father who had stated that his three sons shall be entitled to enjoy all the moveable and immoveable properties left by him equally; but anyone of the sons dying sonless, the surviving sons shall be entitled to all the properties equally. On the death of the testator all the three sons were alive and the properties devolved on them, but sometime after, the eldest one the d leaving no son.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">A dispute arose as to whether the two surviving sons of the testator Would take the properties to the exclusion of the widow of the eldest son in respect of the share that he possessed after the testator's death. The trial court held in that case that the entire property was to go to the two surviving sons. In appeal, the High Court reversed that decision. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee agreed with the view of the High Court, and while doing so, they referred to the dictum laid down by Lord Herschell in the Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros., 1891 AC 107. It was in the following terms:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"I think, the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the Statute and 'to ask what is its natural meaning uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law and not to start with enquiring how the law previously stood, and then assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view. If a Statute intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the law is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 111 of the Succession Act, 1865, came for interpretation in that case with a view to finding out if under that provision the legacy bequeathed by the father was subject to the happening of the uncertain event, mentioned in the will, after the death of the testator. On a reading of the section itself, it was found that the Legislature had made it clear that unless the uncertain event mentioned in the will, namely, the death of any son leaving no male issue happened before the testator's death the legacy dependent upon that will not fructify. The bequeathed fund will be payable or distributable as the conditions may be at the time of the testator's death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It does not appear from this decision that words of general import used in the preamble will control or expand the meaning of the enacting- provisions. On the other hand, what was insisted upon in that case was that the language of the statute is to be examined in the first instance and its natural meaning uninfluenced by any other considerations will govern its application. Learned counsel, therefore, cannot derive any help from this case to support his contention.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. He also referred to the case of Anna-goucta Nathgouda v. Court of Wards, Satara, AIR 1952 SC 60. There the question arose whether the provisions of Act 2 of 1929, the Hindu law or Inheritance Amendment Act, could be invoked to determine the heirs of a Hindu female in respect of her Stridhan property. The preamble stated the object of that Act to be to alter the order, in which heirs of a Hindu male dying intestate were entitled to succeed to his estate. On a consideration of Section 1 Sub-clause (2) of that Act which specifically laid clown that the Act applied only to persons who, prior to the passing of this Act, would have been subject to the law of Mitakshara in respect of the provisions thereunder enacted, and it applied to such persons in respect only of the property of males not held in coparcenary and not disposed of by will. Their Lordships held that the scope of that Act was limited and it governed succession only to the separate property of a male Hindu who the d intestate. It did not alter the law as regards devolution of any other kind of property owned by a Hindu male and did not purport to regulate succession to the property of a Hindu female at all.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In that case the preamble was more general than Section 1 inasmuch as it did not exclude the coparcenary property as was done in Section 1 of that Act. With reference to the enacting provision under Section. 1, the otherwise general import as revealed by the preamble was curtailed by that decision. In my view, therefore, there is no justification for contention of the appellant that in the instant case the preamble containing the word "codify" will any way expand the application of Section 15 of the Act to things other than property with absolute ownership. Thus the heirs of Srimati Urmila (defendant No. 2) have no locus standi to succeed to the suit properties on her death, as the next heirs of Manorama and Amala.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. This takes us to the next argument of learned counsel, who urged that Section 1 5 of the Act again has to be looked into to discover such heirs. In the first place, his contention is that Manorama's heirs, after Urmila, will be, according to Section 15 Sub- clause (b), the heirs of her husband Girish Chandra. They will be in pursuance of the provisions under Section 8, which in the present case will mean sons of a predeceased daughter. On the findings of the trial court after remand, defendant No. 5 alone will be such a person. There is more than one fallacy in this contention. If Section 1 5 is held as applicable to trace the heirs of Manorama in the present case, Sub-clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of that section will be attracted. It provides that firstly the property shall devolve on the sons and daughters (including the children Of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">After Urmila's death, the only persons that are available under this provision will be the children of the predeceased daughters of Manorama; they would be the plaintiffs and defendant No. 5 because their mothers Prarqila and Bimala predeceased Manorama. As for Amala's property, it was contended that according to Section 1 5, her heirs in the present case will come under Section 1 5 Sub-section (1) Sub-clause (d), that is, the heirs of Amala's father Girish Chandra. Section 16, Rule 3 provides that the devolution of the property of the intestate (in this case Amala) on the heirs referred to in Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 1 5 shall be in the same order and according to the same rules as will apply if the property had been the father's (in the present case Girish Chandra Mazumdar), and such person had the d intestate in respect (thereof immediately after the intestate's (Amala's) death. This would mean that Girish Chandra will be deemed to have the d immediately after Amala's death in 1936 and his heirs would be those persons with reference to that time of death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We have to look to the heirs in Class I given In the Schedule of the Act as that is applicable for the heirs of a male Hindu, and in that class persons available for the purpose of the present case will be the sons of the predeceased daughters of Girish Chandra; that is to say, Girish Chandra will be deemed to have the d on 19-7-1956, when Amala the and his predeceased daughters in that case Will be Bimala and Pramila who were dead before 1936. Their sons are the plaintiffs and defendant No. 5. Thus the plaintiffs are covered by Section 1 5 as heirs both of Amala and Manorama in regard to their absolute properties now in the hands of the limited owner, defendant No. 2. The appellant's objection against the maintainability of the present suit by the plaintiffs cannot thus prevail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. But the real objection against the appellant's contention is that section Section 1 5 has no application to the present case. Both Sections 8 and 15 are provided to govern the succession in the case of male and female Hindus, who the intestate subsequent to the commencement of the Act. The language employed therein shows that clearly. In particular, the words "shall devolve" plainly indicate that those two sections are prospective in their operation. They would apply to the death of a Hindu intestate and consequent devolution of his or her property will take place after the commencement of the Act. Previous to the Hindu Succession Act, the Stridhan property varied according as the woman possessing the same was married or not, and also according to the form of her marriage. It varied also according to the source from which he Stridhan property came to the hands of the woman. The modes of devolution of that property, on the death of the Stridhan owner, were different according to the different schools of Hindu law. This- diversity has been abolished by Section 15 of the Act, which lays down a definite and uniform rule of succession to the property of a female Hindu, irrespective of her marriage, source of the property and the particular school of Hindu law by which she is governed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is well known that there is no vacuum in succession to a property. Properties of female Hindus must have devolved upon one class or other heirs on their death, that occurred previous to 1956, according to the Hindu Law then prevailing. It cannot be suggested that those devolutions would undergo an alteration on the new Hindu Succession Act coming into force. Property already vested cannot be divested by introduction of a new enactment. No doubt, a Legislature is competent to give retrospective effect to an enactment, but that must be by the language used in that (sic). Every Act is prima facie prospective in its operation, and unless the language used by the Legislature is clear and unequivocal, retrospective operation cannot be inferred. This proposition was clearly laid down in the case of Gardner v. Lucas, (1878) 3 AC 582. Lindlay L. J, expressed the same view in Lauri v. Renad, (1892) 3 Ch. 402: 61 LJ Ch. 580. There is nothing in Section 1 5 to indicate that a retrospective application of that provision was intended by the Legislature. On the other hand, the words "shall devolve" point to the application of the provision to deaths that may occur after the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. The argument of learned Counsel is that on the death of Urmila (defendant No. 2) the succession will open and Manorama and Amala would be deemed to have the d then, in which case their heirs will have to be found out to take the succession according to the law then prevailing. Both those ladies, Manorama and Amala, would be taken to have the intestate at that point of time, and, as such, Section 15 of the Act will come into place. In other words, a fictional death will be supposed to attract the new rule of succession. This contention is not at all warranted by the language of the section. Wherever a legal fiction was sought to be introduced to work out the succession the Legislature provided for that in clear terms in this Act. Rule 3 under Section 1 6 is an instance of that. There is no justification to import such a deeming clause to S, 15 in absence of any provision for the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. The next contention is that without importing any fictional death of the last full owner to a later time as when the limited owner the s, the next heirs of the last full owner will have to be found out with reference to the law of succession as would hold ground at the time when the succession, opens on the death of the limited owner. There is no dispute that a limited owner succeeds to the estate of the last full owner as an heir. The only limitation in her case is that she does not take it absolutely so as to pass it on her death, to her own heirs. But for this restriction, he is an owner and an heir to the deceased. Succession always opens on the death of the possessor of an estate or property. In the case of death of a limited owner, succession no doubt opens in respect of the property held by her, and in that case, not the heirs of the limited owner but the next heirs of the last full owner would take the property. The position is. the same whether the last full owner was a male or a female Hindu.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The very idea, that the "next" heir of a last full owner living at the time of death of the limited owner will have the preferential right to succeed to the estate, indicates that one of the heirs of the last full owner had already taken the inheritance, and that heir was no other than the limited owner. The line of heirs of the last full owner is, therefore, to be one in which the limited owner was an heir in priority, and this cannot but be with reference to the time when the limited owner heir succeeded, that is, the time of death of the last full owner. In that view, the line of succession under the prevalent law in 1936 when Manorama and Amala the d will be relevant for tracing the "next" heir to succeed to their estates on the death of Urmila (defendant No. 2).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. Learned counsel suggested that Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has altered the old Hindu Law of succession of female Hindus, and that would be applicable to the present case when the succession opens after 1956, although the death of the last full owners (Manorama and Amala) took place long before the Act. He referred to the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, which was enacted to alter the order in which certain heirs of a Hindu male dying intestate were entitled to succeed to his estate. Under that Act, three female heirs of a male Hindu were placed higher in the rank in the order of succession than a particular male heir. The order of succession under the old Hindu Law was not replaced except the above change in ranking. That change was, no doubt, held applicable to a case where the heirs of a last full male owner were to succeed after the death of a limited owner which occurred after 1929, that is, after the Amendment Act came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Learned counsel referred to the case of Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali, AIR 1946 PC 173. There a Hindu male had the d intestate in 1922 and was succeeded by his widow who the d in July 1936. On her death, as she was a limited owner, having a widow's estate, the succession to the estate opened out. As the opening of succession was after the Hindu Inheritance (Amendment) Act had come into force, it was (held that the nearest reversionens . would be according to the change in ranking introduced by the amending Act. The principle decided in that case comes to this. When the inheritance of a full owner's estate opens to the reversioners on the death of a limited owner, the nearest heir among those reversionerg would be according to the order of succession prevailing at the time of I he death of the limited owner. The view that was taken by the Judicial Committee in Moni Ram Kolita v. Kery Kolitany, 7 Ind App 115 (PC) to the effect that the succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate, and upon this termination, tile property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived up to and the d at the moment of her death was reiterated in that decision. A great deal of stress was laid by learned counsel upon that view, and on that basis, he urged that, in the present case, the property will descend to those who would have been heirs of Manorama and Amala if they (Manorama and Amala) had lived up to and the d when Urmila (defendant No. 2) dies. Apparently, there is some force in this contention, but when properly analysed, it would reveal the inherent fallacy in it. The contention assumes, and in my view, wrongly so, that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, are enactments of the same nature and introduced alteration of the same kind in the matter of succeseion among the Hindus.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. Before the 1929 Amendment Act, the law of succession in Mitakshara School of Hindu Law was that the heirs were divided into three classes: Sapindas, Samanodakas and Baridhus, and the first class was to succeed before the second, and the second before the third. The order of succession in each one of those three classes was also enumerated. By the amending Act, four persons (son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister and sisters son) were introduced, for the first time to the class of Sapindas, and their ranks, in the order of succession belonging to that class, were also specified. The amending Act did not indicate at all, as obviously it was not called for, on which kind of deaths, the changed order of succession will apply. That was already in, the old Hindu law of Succession which, in other words, was that in all cases where and when inheritance to a Hindu male would arise, the heirs would be determined in order of priority out of the three classes noted above. That is why, when the inheritance to the estate of a deceased male Hindu arose, not at the time of his death, but after the/termination of a widow's estate later on, the Judicial Committee upheld the application of the changed order under the amending Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">An argument was advanced before their Lordships that the words "dying intestate" in the preamble of the amending Act indicated a future tense about the application of the Act, and, as such, the Act would govern only that class of succession which would open on the death of a male full owner that would occur subsequent to the commencement of the amending Act. That was rejected with an observation that "dying intestate" described the status of the deceased meaning there-by "in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male". The preamble as a whole read as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Whereas it is expedient to alter the order in which certain heirs of a Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his estate: It is hereby enacted as follows":<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">That was taken not to indicate any future tense or application. Their Lordships, however, clearly held in that case that, that interpretation of the preamble was not to give a retrospective effect to the provisions of the Act, and the material point of time, for the application of that Act, was the date when the succession opened, namely, the death of the widow, and not the death of the full owner. I should point out here that the effect of the use of the words "shall be entitled to rank" in the S. 2 of that Act do not appear to have come for consideration of their Lordships.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">However, what emerges from that decision is that, in their Lordships view the provisions of the amending Act, are applicable with reference to the time when succession opens after that Act came into force. That may be when the limited owner the s or when the full owner the s as the case may be. In either case the incident must be subsequent to the Act. Succession opening prior to the Act, on the death of the full owner, remained out of the operation of that Act as it was not retrospective. In the case reported in AIR 1952 SC 60, the amending Act was also held inapplicable in regard to inheritance to a female Hindu's Stridhan property. Thus it is clear that the general and fundamental principles underlying the Mitakshara Law of succession were not affected by the amending Act of 1929.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is entirely of a different character. It replaces the general rules of succession of the Hindus dying intestate in respect of all matters, of which provision has been made ia the Act. Those matters, of which there is no provision in the Act, are still to be governed by the old Hindu law. Section 4 makes that clear. Either of the Sections 8 and 15 provides an order in which there shall be devolution of property of a Hindu dying intestate. Chapter I of the Act deals with preliminary matters, such as, the application of the Act and definitions. Chapter II deals with intestate succession and it contains Sections 5 to 29. Chapter III provides for testamentary succession and Chapter IV gives the schedule of different class.es of heirs. In Section 8, the main part reads as follows: "Property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter". The words "shall devolve" unmistakably point out application of the Act to incidence of devolution of property that will be caused after the coming into effect of the Act, and that devolution will be on account of the death of the male Hindu in respect of his property (including the undivided interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary), Keeping in view the interpretation given by the Judicial Committee to the words "dying intestate", the section, re-read in that light, may be put like this: The property of a male Hindu "in the case of his intestacy" shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter. The devolution oi property, spoken of in that section, refers to the first devolution on account of actual death; and to such devolution that would occur after the commencement of the Act. The other kind of devolution of property of a male Hindu, which happens on succession being again opened on the death of a limited owner, who inherited the property immediately on the actual death of the limited owner, is not envisaged by the section. The circumstances and incidence, relating to the existence of limited owners or restricted estates, have been kept out of the ambit of the Act. In that connection I have already referred to Sub-clause (2) of Section 1 4. Reading the Sections 8, 14, 15 and 16 together, I am left with the conclusion that succession of property oi a male or female Hindu on his or her actual death has been reoriented by this Act. Other kinds of succession about such property relating to the intervention by a limited owner are left to be governed by the Old Hindu Law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It may be suggested that two different orders of succession to the estate of a full owner will ap-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">pear rather unreasonable and the Legislature might not have intended that. This suggestion may becompletely answered by pointing to the survival ot restricted estates under Section 1 4, Sub-clause (2), although the mandatory provision of Sub-clause (1) of Section 1 4 is to confer absolute ownership on the female limited owners in respect of properties possessed by them. Even properties owned and possessed by a female Hindu before the Act, in which she could have acquired full ownership, have been held out of the application of Section 1 4, for the reason that they were transferred by such female Hindus in favour of others before the Act came into force. Those properties are to be treated as of a limited owner and are to be governed, for the purpose of succession to them, not by the present Act, but by the old Hindu Law. These two orders or succession for the properties in the hands of aj female Hindu, according as she is a full or limited1 owner, are not ruled out by the enacting provisions of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Similarly, the interpretation of Section 8, about its application to only devolution on the actual death of a male Hindu, resulting in two orders of succession, according as the succession opens on the deatn of the full owner or a limited owner, will not be, in any way, inconsistent with the scheme of the Act, so as to rule out that construction. Any other Interpretation, such as, making Section 8 applicable to all cases of opening of succession (either on the death of the full owner or limited owner) would bring a strain on the language of the section, and would nullify the plain import and meaning of the word "shall devolve". If the death of a full owner occurs after the 17th June, 1956, there is no doubt that the inheritance will be governed by the Act, and there will be no room for intervention by any limited heir. The difference in succession arises only in cases where the death occurred prior, to the 17th June, 1956, and the first devolution of the estate took place at that time according to the old Hindu Law. If that devolved upon a limited owner, on whose death, the property would devolve once again on the next heir of that full owner according to the old Hindu Law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I would refer here to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581, There, the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that a deed of gift of the year 1949 executed by defendant No. 2, widow of one Rambarat Singh, in favour of defendant No. 1 was not valid beyond the lifetime of the widow and was not binding on the plaintiffs who were the next reversioners to the estate of Rambarat Singh. Defendant No. 1, the donee, was the sister's son of Rambarat. The plaintiffs were the sons of the separated brother of the father of Rambarat. (I have found that from the trial court judgment). The suit was contested by the donee, defendant No, 1, on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the next reversioners, but he (defendant No. 1) himself was so, being the sister's son of the last full owner. The trial Court dismissed the suit on holding that defendant No, 1 was the preferential reversionary heir, and the suit was not maintainable by the plaintiffs. In appeal by the plaintiffs, the respondent (the defendants including the donee)1: contended that after the passing of the Hindu Suc-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">cession Act, 1956, and in view of the provisions of Section 14 of that Act, the limited, estate of the Hindu widow had become absolute even in the hands of<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">-the alienee, and so the plaintiff could not get a declaration that the deed of gift by the widow executed in 1949 was not valid beyond her lifetime.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">When the matter came before the Full Bench that contention was overruled, for the reason that Section 14 had no application to a case where a Hindu widow (a limited owner) had made a complete transfer of the property. It was held that in such a case a suit by a reversioner, for a declaration that a certain transfer made by the widow before 'the Act came into force was invalid and not binding upon the reversioner, was maintainable. The question that was reframed for the consideration of the Full Bench is very significant and reads as follows;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Whether the right of an heir of the last male holder to repudiate an absolute alienation of property by way of sale or gift made by a female Hindu without legal necessity before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (Act XXX of 1956) and his claim of possession thereof from the transferee on the death of the female Hindu or on the extinction of the woman's estate otherwise, has been adversely affected and taken away by Section 14 of Act XXX of 1956?"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The heirs of the last male holder, who brought that suit, were the heirs according to the old Hindu Law and not according to the Hindu Succession Act. The death of the last full owner had occurred before 1956 and the limited owner, his widow, was still alive when the suit was instituted, and the succession to the estate of the last full owner was to open on her death, that is, after 1956. In that context their Lordships of the Full Bench held that the right of the plaintiffs in that case to repudiate the alienation of the property by the widow for no legal necessity was not affected by the Act, and the claim for possession of the plaintiffs from the transferee, after the death of the widow or on the extinction of the widow's estate otherwise, was also not affected or taken away by Section 1 4.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">From this it is clear that their Lordships held not only that Section 1 4 did not confer any absolute right on a female Hindu in regard to the property which was in her hands but had been transferred before the Act came into force, but also that the heirs of the full owner who would succeed to the estate, on the death of the widow, would be those according to the class of heirs prescribed under the old Hindu Law; otherwise the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiffs, who were heirs of that kind, and not heirs in any class specified in the Schedule of 1956 Act, would not have been upheld, in spite of the fact that new line of succession had come into force by the new Act by that time. My Lord, the Chief Justice, in delivering the Judgment in that case, at one place observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is also established that such an alienation by the widow can be avoided only at the instance of a co-widow, or at the instance of reversioners, or at the instance of those who are entitled to the property by escheat. Such an alienation will be legally valid as against third parties, and the transac-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">tion cannot be challenged by such third parties on the ground of legal necessity.....<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In other words, the transaction by a Hindu widow which is unsupported by legal necessity is not valid but is voidable at the instance of a certain class of persons, namely, those who are entitled to the property by survivorship, or in inheritance, or escheat".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus the persons who could challenge the. alienation and who were entitled to succeed to the estate on the death of the limited owner were held, to be according to the old law. In other words, succession that opened on the death of a limited owner to the estate of the last full owner who the d before 1956 was left to be governed by the old law of succession, in spite of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This lends great support to the view I have taken about the application of the provisions under Section 8 There is nothing like reversioners under the new Act. The same consideration and meaning is applicable to Section 15 which is in the same terms as Section 8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. Learned counsel referred to another case: Lateshwar Jha v. Mt. Uma Ojhain^ AIR 1958 Pat 502. The facts there were as follows: One male Hindu had two sons Ramdhari and Bachan. The plaintiff was the grandson of Ramdhari. Defendants 1 to 3 were three sons out of 5. who survived their father Bachan. Defendants 8 and 9 were .the widows of the two deceased sons of Bachan. The Other defendants were sons of defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff, that is, the grandson of Ramdhari claimed partition of the family properties from the defendants, some of whom compromised with the plaintiff during the suit, but defendants 8 and 9, the widows of Bachan's two sons, contested the suit. Each of them claimed one-tenth share in the properties by virtue of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and their defence was that their husband had the d in a state of separation from defendants 1 to 3 after the 1937 Act came into force, and, therefore, they were entitled to the respective shales of their husbands in separation of the other defendants, This defence was rejected by the trial court which held that there had been no separation in the family before the suit, and that the death of the husbands took place after the 1937 Act came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On this finding the plaintiffs suit was decreed. An appeal was brought to this Court before a single Judge. During its pendency here defendant No. 9, one of the widows, compromised with the plaintiff; so the only contest in appeal was between the plaintiff and defendant No. 8, the other widow. The learned Judge, who heard the appeal, agreed with the finding of the trial court about the death of the husband of defendant No. 8 being in 1938 after the passing of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, and, as such, the widow was entitled to a share representing her husband's share in the property under partition. Then the question arose whether that interest of 'the widow would be taken to have matured to absolute rights within the meaning of Section 14 Clause (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, and his Lordship held that it would. His Lordship considered the contention that was raised on behalf of the plaintiff to the effect that Section 1 4(1) was to come into play only when a Hindu female acquired the interest on the death of her husband after the commencement of the 1956 Act. That contention was overruled for the main reason that Section 1 4(1) was retrospective in the sense that it affected properties whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act by a female Hindu. That completely disposed of that appeal. But, however, the court thereafter proceeded to consider an alternative argument, which had been advanced on behalf of the widow respondent. It was contended that, even if it was assumed that the husband of the widow had the d before 1937, that is, before the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act came into force, even then, the widow would be entitled to a share representing her husband's share, as an absolute owner, in view of the Hindu Succession Act, as the estate of her husband, who the d intestate, would devolve upon his widow, who was the only heir available according to Section 8(a)read with Class I of the Schedule of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Against this argument, the other side contend ed that Section 8 was prospective and the rules of suc cession provided thereunder are applicable to the case of properties of male Hindus who the d after the Act and not before. As it appears from the judgment, the only ground advanced in support of that contention was with reference to the words "dying intestate" in that section. Neither the words "shall devolve" nor the Full Bench decision of this Court (AIR 1958 Pat 581) were referred to or con sidered. His Lordship, on a comparison of Section 6 with Section 8 and on account of the omission of the words "after the commencement of this Act" which occur in Section 6, from Section 8, and in view of the inter pretation of the words "dying intestate" given by the Judicial Committee in the case reported in AIR 1946 PC 173, held that Section 8 was applicable to all cases where a male Hindu the s intestate irres pective of the time of his death. With great res pect, I must confess that I am unable to agree with the proposition that has been laid so broadly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Neither the decision of the Judicial Committee nor the Single Judge decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hiralal Roy v. Kumud Behari Roy, (S) AIR 1957 Calcutta 571 to which, his Lordship also referred, go to that extent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As I have pointed out earlier, what the Judicial Committee laid down with reference to the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, was that the provisions of that Act were applicable when a succession opened after that Act came into force. In the case in AIR 1958 Pat 502 which was for partition, the succession to the widow had opened on the death of her husband and that was long before 1956. Under Section 3 Sub-clause (2) of the Hindu Women's Bight to Property Act, 1937, the widow could get the same interest as her husband had, at the time of his death, in a Hindu Joint family property, provided his death occurred after that Act came into effect. That Act was repealed by the Hindu Succession Act in 1956. Thus the position, as it was till the 1956 Act came to the field, was that the widow could not have any share or interest in the joint family property, or the right to seek a partition, if her husband had the d before 1937, and in the case of a death of that kind, the interest of the husband in the joint family property must have vested in the survivors according to the Mitakshara law of succession. Property once vested like that could never be divested and brought to the widow under a subsequent Act like that of 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whatever room there may be for an argument in support of the application of Section 8 of the Act to a case of succession opening on, the death of a limited owner subsequent to the Act, there can be no room whatsoever for a contention that this section would have a retrospective application, to divest others in1 whom the property already vested as full owners,: according to the undisputed rule of succession prevailing at the time of such devolution. I am, therefore, constrained to say, with great respect, that it is not possible for me to agree With the view of his Lordship which was stated in very broad terms to the effect that section 8 is retrospective and would apply to all cases of instestacy of a Hindu male without having any reference to the time of death of such a male Hindu, and the property of such a deceased male Hindu would devolve on his heirs mentioned in the Schedule of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. We have very carefully and with the assistance of learned counsel for both the sides in this appeal, considered the decision of the Judicial Committee, (AIR 1946 PC 173) and the Full Bench decision of this Court (AIR 1958 Pat 581) and the scheme of the Act (Hindu Succession Act, 1956), and have come to the conclusion that Sections 8 and 15 of the Act are not retrospective and they do not govern the devolution of property of a male or female Hindu on his or her death that occurred prior to the 17th June, 1956, when the Act came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The principle laid down in AIR 1946 PC 173 is not applicable to Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The provisions under sections 8 and 15 are prospective and will apply to cases of first devolution on the death of a male or female Hindu that occurs after the Act came into effect. In the present case, Section 15 will have no application, as both Manorama and Amala had the d long before the Act and their property had already devolved upon their heirs, though limited owners. When succession opens on the death of the limited owner, old Hindu Law principles will operate. On the death Of Urmila (defendant No. 2), heirs of Manorama and Amala according to the old law will inherit the properties. Plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 are such heirs. They have, however, no vested interest in the estate now. Their right is contingent which may accrue to all or any of them that may be alive at the death of the defendant No. 2 Urmila.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. Another case was also referred to by the appellant: Smt. Banso v. Charan Singh, AIR 1961 Punj 45. There a male Hindu the d leaving a widow and daughters. The widow made a gift prior to 1956 Act in favour of her married daughters. The suit was instituted by collaterals for a declaration that the gift was inoperative. The Hindu Succession Act came into force during the pendency of the suit. It was held that the widow held a life's estate and the succession, to the estate of the last male holder would open, on the death of the widow (irrespective of the validity or otherwise of the gift) in favour of the daughters. They (the daughters) were the next heirs of the last male holder in view of the order of succession in the 1956 Act. In other words, that case decided that application of Section 8 of the 1956 Act was dependent upon when the succession opened on the death of the limited owner after the Act had come into force and not upon the time of death of the last male holder which preceded the Act. I have already given reasons why this view does not appear to us to be correct.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. The result, therefore, is that none of the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant succeeds. The appeal is therefore, dismissed but, in view of the circumstances of the case and the legal points involved in it, there will be no order for costs in this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. I agree.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-39595779040283054662020-01-27T18:01:00.000+05:302020-01-27T18:01:10.116+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">KERALA HIGH COURT</span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">CHELLAMMA KAMALAMMA AND ORS. VS NARAYANA PILLAI PRABHAKARAN NAIR ON 17 DECEMBER, 1992<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Summarised Judgement(Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Question of Law:</span></b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The question referred to this larger Bench is one of great importance in respect of the rights of inheritance to females governed by the Marumakkathayam law in Kerala. The question is whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with succession to females continues to be in force and operative notwithstanding the commencement of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975'). A learned single Judge of this Court in Madhavi Amma v. Kalliani Amma, (1988) 2 Ker LT 964 and a Division Bench of this Court in Bhaskaran v. Kalliani, (1990) 2 Ker LT 749, have taken the view that the above-said Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 continues to be in force notwithstanding the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. It is the correctness of the said decisions that falls for consideration before us.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The basic facts are not in dispute and are as follows: The property in question belongs to one Lakshmikutty Amma, who belonged to a Nair family and who died on 18-2-1982 leaving behind her, her husband (plaintiff) and her mother, one Chellamma. The dispute is in regard to the succession to the property held by Lakshmikutty Amma on the date of her death on 18-2-19.82. Her husband is claiming as legal heir under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on the basis that the effect of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 was to make Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 inoperative.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The contest on the other side is raised by defendants 1 to 8 who are the legal heirs of Lakshmikutty Amma's mother, Chellamma, the said Chellamma having died on 8-9-1982 subsequent to Lakshmikutty Amma's death. Defendants 1 to 8 claim that their mother, Chellamma became the legal heir to the property of her daughter by virtue of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They contend that Section 17 continues to be operative even after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. There is no dispute that the plaintiff married Lakshmikutty Amma in April, 1973 and the defendants 1 to 8 are the brothers and sisters of Lakshmikutty Amma and children of Chellamma. 9th defendant is the paternal uncle of late Lakshmikutty Amma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The suit was filed for a declaration of title by the plaintiff over plaint A Schedule properties except in regard to the building in item 4 of plaint A Schedule and plaint B Schedule amounts deposited in Bank by Lakshmikutty Amma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In the view that I have taken in regard to succession of Lakshmikutty Amma it is Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act that is applicable and not Section 17. If that be so, the plaintiff who is her husband alone will be her heir as admittedly she died issueless. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for with the decree of the trial court and accordingly. I dismiss the appeal, but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt;">Complete Judgement</span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">KERALA HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 18pt;">CHELLAMMA KAMALAMMA AND ORS. VS NARAYANA PILLAI PRABHAKARAN NAIR ON 17 DECEMBER, 1992<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: AIR 1993 Ker 146<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: J Rao<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: M J Rao, K Nayar, T Ramakrishnan, P Krishnamoorthy, K B Marar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT Jagannadha Rao, C.J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. The question referred to this larger Bench is one of great importance in respect of the rights of inheritance to females governed by the Marumakkathayam law in Kerala. The question is whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with succession to females continues to be in force and operative notwithstanding the commencement of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975'). A learned single Judge of this Court in Madhavi Amma v. Kalliani Amma, (1988) 2 Ker LT 964 and a Division Bench of this Court in Bhaskaran v. Kalliani, (1990) 2 Ker LT 749, have taken the view that the above-said Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 continues to be in force notwithstanding the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. It is the correctness of the said decisions that falls for consideration before us.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. The basic facts are not in dispute and are as follows: The property in question belongs to one Lakshmikutty Amma, who belonged to a Nair family and who died on 18-2-1982 leaving behind her, her husband (plaintiff) and her mother, one Chellamma. The dispute is in regard to the succession to the property held by Lakshmikutty Amma on the date of her death on 18-2-19.82. Her husband is claiming as legal heir under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on the basis that the effect of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 was to make Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 inoperative. The contest on the other side is raised by defendants 1 to 8 who are the legal heirs of Lakshmikutty Amma's mother, Chellamma, the said Chellamma having died on 8-9-1982 subsequent to Lakshmikutty Amma's death. Defendants 1 to 8 claim that their mother, Chellamma became the legal heir to the property of her daughter by virtue of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They contend that Section 17 continues to be operative even after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. There is no dispute that the plaintiff married Lakshmikutty Amma in April, 1973 and the defendants 1 to 8 are the brothers and sisters of Lakshmikutty Amma and children of Chellamma. 9th defendant is the paternal uncle of late Lakshmikutty Amma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The suit was filed for a declaration of title by the plaintiff over plaint A Schedule properties except in regard to the building in item 4 of plaint A Schedule and plaint B Schedule amounts deposited in Bank by Lakshmikutty Amma. Admittedly, items 1, 2, 3 and 5 of plaint A Schedule belong to said Lakshmikutty Amma while plaint B Schedule were deposits in her name. Item 4 in the plaint A Schedule is a building in item 3 alleged to have been put up by defendants subsequent to the death of Lakshmikutty Amma while item 2 is a building in item 1 of plaint A Schedule. According to the plaintiff, items 1, 3 and 5 were acquired by deceased Lakshmikutty Amma with the funds supplied by him and the amounts mentioned in plaint B Schedule are deposited by him in the State Bank of India, Changanacherry branch in the name of the deceased and that on her death, defendants 1 to 8 have trespassed into the plaint A Schedule properties. It may be noted that Chellamma had filed OP 71 of 1982 before the Sub Court, Kottayam for grant of a succession certificate in respect of plaint B Schedule amounts. The plaintiff got himself impleaded therein and opposed the said application and the said O.P. was dismissed. Chellamma having subsequently died, defendants 1 to 8 got themselves impleaded as additional petitioners in the said application. While the O.P. was pending, the present suit had been filed by the plaintiff and it was because of the filing of the present suit that the O.P. was dismissed declaring that the said dismissal will be subject to the result of the suit. Though an appeal was filed before the Sub Court against the judgment in the O.P., that was also dismissed reserving the rights of the parties to be governed by the judgment in the suit. As already stated, the plaintiff relied on Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 while the defendants relied upon Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Defendants have filed a joint written statement contending that the plaint A Schedule items were the self-acquisition of late Lakshmikutty Amma and that plaintiff has not given any money for the acquisition of these properties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. The trial Court held that plaint A Schedule items 1, 2, 3 and 5 and the deposits shown in plaint B Schedule were the separate properties of Lakshmikutty Amma and that item 4 of plaint A Schedule was unauthorisedly put up in item 3 by the defendants after the death of Lakshmikutty Amma. The trial Court also held that Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applied and that Section 17 was no longer applicable after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 and that, therefore, Chellamma could not have claimed any right to the property on the death of her daughter Lakshmikutty Amma and that it was the plaintiff who could claim the property. It was, therefore, held that the plaintiff had title to plaint A Schedule items 1, 2, 3 and 5 and in regard to plaint B Schedule amounts as the legal heir of his wife Lakshmikutty Amma and a decree for possession was granted for plaint A and B Schedules. Defendants were directed to remove item 4 of plaint A Schedule within two months from the date of judgment and on failure the plaintiff was allowed to have it removed through the Execution Court at the expenses of the fourth defendant. It is against this judgment that the defendants have preferred this appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. In this appeal, it is not in dispute that plaint A Schedule properties (except item 4) belong to Lakshmikutty Amma. It is on that basis that we have to consider whether Section 15 would help the plaintiff-respondent or whether Section 17 would help the defendants-appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Elaborate arguments have been addressed for the appellants by learned Counsel, Sri M. Krishnan Nair and by counsel for the respondents, Sri C. K. Sivasankara Panicker. As the matter is of considerable importance affecting all those who had been governed by the Marumakkathayam law, we requested other senior members of the Bar to address us if they so desired. Pursuant to our request, Sri Jagadeeshchandran Nair, Sri T. P. Kelu Nambiar and Sri S. Venkatasubramanya Iyer submitted elaborate arguments before us supporting the contention of the appellants that Section 17 continues to operate even after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. We are thankful to them as also to counsel who appeared in the case for the very valuable assistance given to us.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. It will be noticed that the Marumakkathayam system of law was applicable in the South-Western coast of India, in areas which have now become part of the State of Kerala and in some parts which are now within the State of Karnataka and the State of Tamil Nadu. What we decide in this case is meant to apply within the State of Kerala inasmuch as the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 extends its operation only within the State of Kerala. We shall now set out the contentions of learned Counsel on both sides.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. It is the contention for the appellants-defendants that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which relates to the succession to a female dying after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law had the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 not been passed, continues to be governed by Section 17 and that the abolition of right by birth, right of survival ship, pious obligation etc. and the abolition of the Travancore Nair Act etc. by the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 has no bearing on Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. It is also agreed that the principle of Incorporation or Reference is not attracted to Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. That Section merely referes to the persons who are governed by the Marumakkathayam law on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and once that group is identified, they will be governed by Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 cannot indirectly make Section 17 inoperative. Their contention further is that the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the reports of the State Law Commission which preceded the enactment indicate clearly that the State Legislature while passing the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 did not intend to disturb the continued operation of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. On the other hand, it is contended by learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act must be treated as an express amendment to the Travancore Nair Act and other State enactments dealing with succession and on the repeal of the Travancore Nair Act by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, Section 17 gets expressly repealed even otherwise it gets impliedly repealed on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Alternatively, the principle of Incorporation or Reference applies to Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act and that the Marumakkathayam law mentioned in Section 17 must be treated as changing from time to time depending upon whatever changes were brought in the said law by the State Legislature and that once the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 was passed, the said Marumakkathayam law came to be totally abolished both under Section 7(1) and Section 7(2) of the said Act, and therefore, Section became inoperative. It is also contended that the Hindu Succession Act and (for example) the Travancore Nair Act (insofar as it relates to succession) are in pari materia or are supplements to each other and, therefore, the effect of the repeal of the Travancore Nair Act (and other laws) has to be carried into Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. Once that is done, Section 17 becomes inoperative inasmuch as there is no person, after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, governed by the Marumakkathayam law. That would make Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act inoperative.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. On the basis of the above contentions, the following points arise for consideration :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) What are the changes, relevant to the present case, made in the Marumakkathayam law from time to time by the Parliament or by the Kerala State Legislature?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Whether the Kerala State Legislature, when it made a legislation under Entry 5 of List III to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India by passing the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, intended to trench upon Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which was a law passed by the Parliament under the same Entry in relation to testamentary and intestate matters?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 incorporates an amendment into the Travancore Nair Act and other Statutes and whether subsequent to the repeal of the Travancore Nair Act and other State laws by the State Legislature and by virtue of Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act stands repealed by virtue of the operation of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) Whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 becomes inoperative after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 and if so, to what categories of persons it applies and to what categories of persons it does not apply?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(5) What is the position of those persons who were born on or after 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. Point No. 1 :-- Under this point, we shall make a brief survey of the changes made in the Marumakkathayam system of inheritance and with particular reference to the facts of this case. We shall, however, extract the relevant statutory provisions while dealing with Point No. 2.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12A. It has to be noticed that the Marumakkathayam system of inheritance means the system of inheritance by descent from a common ancestress. It is called a matrilineal system of inheritance and is somewhat different from the patrilineal system of inheritance in the various branches of Hindu law. Various principles of succession were being applied both when a male died or a female died, in the South-Western parts of this country and these principles of succession were generally treated as Marumakkathayam system of inheritance. Before the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 was passed, several legislations had been made by the Provincial Legislatures both in the former State of Travancore and Cochin and former State of Madras to amend the pristline Marumakkathayam law not only in regard to succession but also in regard to marriage, divorce, joint family management etc. The said Statutes were, therefore, governing the law relating to testamentary and intestate succession among Nairs, Ezhavas and other communities. The Nairs were governed by the Travancore Nair Act, II of 1100 while the Ezhavas were governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act, III of 1100 and so on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. In 1955 and 1956 Parliament came forward with four important Statutes governing Hindus, namely, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. These Acts were passed after considerable debate over several years. So far as the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was concerned, it contained certain provisions amending or modifying the existing law relating to testamentary and intestate successions which were till then governed by the Travancore Nair Act or the Travancore Ezhava Act etc. For the aforesaid purposes, the Hindu Succession Act introduced a definition of 'Marumakkathayam law' in Section 3(h) and modified the law of succession in certain respects in Sections 7, 17 and 30 of the said Act. While Section 7 related to the devolution in respect of the undivided interest of a person in the property of a tarwad, tavazhee, kutumba, kavaru or illom, Section 17 made a separate provision in relation to succession to property of males or females who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if the Hindu Succession Act had not been passed. So far as succession to females, with which we are concerned, Section 17 stated that provisions of Section 15 relating to succession to a female will have to be applied in the manner mentioned in Section 17(ii). Section 30 of the Act contains an Explanation permitting interest of a member of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru to be capable of being disposed of by male or female in accordance with the provisions of Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. Taking the example of the present case, it will be noticed that if Lakshmikutty Amma, on her death, was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, her mother would be her legal heir under Section 17(ii)(a) inasmuch as under that clause, the legal heirs of the properties of the females are only the sons and daughters and the mother. In the present case, since Lakshmikutty Amma did not have sons or daughters, the property would go under Section 17(ii)(a) to her mother, Chellamma. Succession to a female on her death under the Travancore Nair Act in a case where the deceased had no male or female children, would have been governed by Section 18 of the Travancore Nair Act. That Section stated that on the death of a Nair female leaving no lineal descendants surviving her, the whole of the self-acquired and separate property left undisposed of by her at her death shall devolve on her mother's tavazhee. Section 2(3) of the Travancore Nair Act had defined "Thavazhee of a female" as "a group of persons consisting of that female and her issue how-low-so-ever in the female line, or such of that group as are alive". In other words, before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a Nair female died without leaving any male or female lineal descendants surviving her, her property would have gone to her mother and the mother's issues how-low-so-ever in the female line, or such of that group as are alive. This succession was altered under Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act to the extent that instead of the property devolving on the mother's thavazhee, it would devolve on the mother alone.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. We can notice that the other sub Sections of Section 17 brought about similar changes in the law of succession mentioned in the Travancore Nair Act and other laws in relation to succession to males or females who died after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and who were, before the said Act, governed by the Marumakkathayam law of succession as specified in the Travancore Nair Act. The question before us is whether upon the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act stood either repealed expressly or on account of repugnancy or on account of its becoming inoperative. We think that the aforesaid discussion of the general changes made in the Marumakkathayam system of inheritance will be sufficient to understand our discussion under Points 2 to 5. Point No. 1 is decided accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. Point No. 2:-- As stated earlier, Lakshmikutty Amma, in the present case, belong to a Nair family. The dispute is in relation to succession to her property on her death on 18-2-1982. The question depends upon whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act applies or whether the said Section has become repugnant on the passing of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family system (Abolition) Act, 1975, in view of Article. 254(2) of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of deciding that question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Travancore Nair Act (Regulation II of 1100), the relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the relevant provisions of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. As stated in Point No, 1, at one point of time, the succession was governed by pristine Marumakkathayam law. Subsequently, the succession came to be governed by the Travancore Nair Act (Regulation II of 1100). That Act dealt with the following subjects : marriage and its dissolution (Chapter II), maintenance and guardianship (Chapter III), intestate succession (Chapter IV), testamentary succession (Chapter V), the tarwad and its management (Chapter VI), partition of tarwad property (Chapter VII) and impartible tarwads (Chapter VIII). Chapter I dealt with definitions. Section 1(2) stated that the Travancore Nair Act would apply to all Nairs domiciled in Travancore, and to such Nairs not so domiciled and non-Nairs, whether so domiciled or not, as have, or shall have, marital relation with Nairs domiciled in Travancore. Section 2(2) defines 'marumakkathayam' as the system of inheritance in which descent is traced in the female line. Chapter IV which dealt with intestate succession contained Sections 11 to 22. Intestate succession on the death of a Nair male was governed by Sections 11 to 16. Intestate succession on the death of a female member of a Nair family was governed by Sections 17 to 20. Sections 21 to 23 dealt with certain other connected matters relating to succession. Testamentary succession in Chapter V was governed by a single Section , that is Section 24. There was a saving provision in Section 44 in Chapter IX dealing with supplemental provisions, which reads as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"44. Nothing in this Regulation shall --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) affect the existing rules of marumakkathayam law, custom or usage except to the extent hereinbefore expressly provided for; or ....."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">From the provisions of the above Travancore Nair Act, it is clear that the said Act made provisions in regard to marriage and its dissolution, maintenance and guardianship, intestate succession, testamentary succession, tarwad and its management, partition of tarwad property and impartible tarwads. It also provided in Section 44 that the rule of Marumakkathayam law, custom, usage, except to the extent hereinbefore expressly provided for, would be saved.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. After the commencement of the Constitution of India, provisions were made in the Concurrent List (List III) permitting Parliament or the State Legislature to make various laws in regard to intestate succession and also certain other matters. It is necessary to refer to Entry 5 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India, which reads as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; Wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">So far as "Wills, intestacy and succession" are concerned, Parliament passed the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The said Act came into force with effect from 18-6-1956. Section 2 of the said Act stated that the said Act would apply to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj, and to any person who is a Buddhist, Jains or Sikh by religion, and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it was proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Section 3(h) defines 'Marumakkathayam law' as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"3(h): "Marumakkathayam law" means the system of law applicable to persons --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) who if this Act had not been passed, would have been governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933); the Travancore Nair Act (II of 1100 K); the Tranvancore Ezhava Act (III of 1100 K); the Travancore Nanjined Vellala Act (VI of 1101 K); the Travancore Kshatriya Act (VII of 1108 K ); the Travancore Krishnanaka Marumakkathayee Act (VII of 1115 K); the Cochin Marumaskkatham Act (XXXIII of 1113 K); or the Cochin Nair Act (XXIX of 1113 K) with respect to the matters for which provision is made in this Act, or<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) who belong to any community, the members of which are largely domiciled in the State of Travancore-Cochin or Madras, as it existed immediately before the 1st November, 1956 and who, if this Act had not been passed, would have been governed with respect to the matters for which provision is made in this Act by any system of inheritance in which descent is traced through the female line; but does not include the aliyasanthana law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act has an overriding effect of the said Act and reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"4. Overriding effect of Act: (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 7 deals with devolution of interest in the property of a tarwed, tavazhi, kavaru or illom. It is necessary to extract Section 7(1) which reads as follows ;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"7. Devolution of interest in the property of a tarwed, tavazhi, kutumba, kavaru or illom:--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) When a Hindu, to whom the marumakkathayam or nambudiri law would have applied if this act had not been passed, dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his or her death an interest in the property of a tarwad, tawazhi or illom, as the case may be, his or her interest in the property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not according to the marumakkatayam or nambudiri law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Secrtion 15 of the Hindu Succession Act deals with general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus, and it reads as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16 --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">....."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 17 with which we are concerned now reads as follows.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"17. Special provisions respecting persons governed by marumakkathayam and aliyasantana laws. -- The provisions of Sections 8, 10, 15 and 23 shall have effect in relation to persons who would have been governed by the marumakkathayam law or aliyasantana law if this Act had not been passed as if --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(i) for Sub-clauses (c) and (d) of Section 8, the following had been substituted, namely:--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">'(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of the two classes then upon his relatives, whether agnates or cognates'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(ii) for Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub- Section (i) of Section 15, the following had been substituted, namely:--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son of daughter and the mother;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) thirdly, upon the heirs of the mother;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iii) Clause (a) of Sub- Section (2) of Section 15 had been omitted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iv) Section 23 had been omitted."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">So far as testamentary succession is concerned, the same is governed by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, which reads as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"30. Testamentary succession. -- Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Explanation. -- The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara Coparcenary property or the interest of a member of a tarwad, tawazhi, Illom, Kutumba or kavaru in the property of the tarwad, tawazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru shall notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this Section ."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore Parliament passed the Hindu Succession Act under the heading 'wills, intestacy, and succession' in Entry 5 of List III to the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India, It made the above provisions so far as the marumakathayam law was concerned. In view of Article 254 (i) of the Constitution of India to the extent of provisions made in the Hindu Succession Act in relation to wills, intestacy and succession, the same shall necessarily override to that extent the corresponding provisions in relation to the said subject matter as contained in the Travancore Nair Act, etc. This is clear from Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Article 254 (1) reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Article 254:-- Inconsistency between laws made by parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States -- (1) If any provision of a law made by Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or as the case may be, the existing law shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It will be noticed that the provisions relating to testamentary and intestate succession as contained in chapters IV and V of the Travancore Nair Act, in so far as they are repugnant to any provisions made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be void, to the extent of repugnancy. In fact, there is no dispute insofar as this aspect of the matter is concerned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. The dispute arises in relation to the position after the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 which came into force with effect from 1-12-1976.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The preamble of the said Act says that it is an Act to abolish the joint family system among Hindus in the State of Kerala. Section 1(2) extends the Act of the whole State of Kerala. Section 2 defines joint Hindu family as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"'joint Hindu family' means any Hindu family with community of property and includes --<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) a tarwad or thawazhi governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, the Travancore Nayar Act, of 1100, the Travan-core Ezhava Act, 111 of 1100, the Nanjinad Vellala Act of 1101, the Travancore Kshatriya Act of 1108, the Travancore Krishnavaka Marumakkathayaee Act, VII of 1115, the Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 1113, or the Cochin Marumakkathayam Act, XXXIII of 1113;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) a kutumba or kavaru governed by the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) an illom governed by the Kerala Nambudiri Act 1958; and (4) an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 3 abolishes the right by birth in the joint family, while Section 4 replaces tenancy in common in respect of joint tenancy rights of the members of the undivided Hindu family with effect from the day of commencement of the Act. In other words, those who were holding property as undivided Hindu family as defined in Section 2(1) of the said Act, immediately on the passing of the Act become tenants in common, as if partition had taken place. Section 5 abrogated the rule of pious obligation Hindu son, and Section 6 dealt with the liability of members of joint Hindu family of debts contracted before the Act and stated that the said liability was not affected. Section 7 is a repeal provision and is important. It reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"7. Repeal:-- (1). Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) The Acts mentioned in the Schedule, in so far as they apply to the whole or any part of the State of Kerala are hereby repealed."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We are of the view that the Kerala Legislature, when it passed the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 did not intend to occupy the field relating to "Wills, intestacy and succession" in Entry 5 of List III of the Constitution of India. Unless the State Legislature enters upon the said filed relating to "Wills, Intestacy and Succession", it cannot be said that the State Legislature intended to create any repugnancy between the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. This is clear not only from the body of the provisions in the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 but is also made clear from the . Statement of Objects and Reasons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is stated as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Parliament has enacted the following Acts for the whole of India:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(i) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; (ii) The Hindu Succession Act, 1956;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iii) The Hindu Minority ' Guardianship Act, 1956; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iv) The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As regards matters for which provision has been made in the above Acts, the provisions therein prevail over those in the State enactments. The only topic that has not been dealt with in the above Acts is "Tarward and its management and partition"."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Statement of Objects and Reasons also refers to two reports of the Kerala Law Commission. The first report of 1966 related to the changes proposed to be made in the Personal Laws of Hindu Marumakkathayees of Kerala while the second report of 1972 related to the changes proposed to be made in the Kerala Namboodiri Act and in the Mitakshara law. In paragraph 40 of the first report, it is stated as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"40. Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, contains special provisions regarding succession among all those governed by Marumakkathayam and Aliyasanthana laws. Since the provision is applicable alike to all the Marumakkathayis and Aliyasanthanis there is no need to suggest any change to this provision now."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is, therefore, clear that the Kerala State Legislature, when it passed the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 under Entry 5 of List III of the Constitution of India, did not intend to trench upon Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, there is neither any repugnancy nor implied repeal of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act by reason of the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Point No. 2 is found accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. Point No. 3:-- A contention was raised by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was in the nature of an amendment to the Travancore Nair Act and other State Statutes and that the subsequent repeal of the State laws by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 resulted in the express repeal of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. It was pointed out that the latter Act had received the assent of the President of India and, therefore, Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India was attracted and the State legislation could repeal Section 17 of the Central legislation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is true that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act creates certain changes in the Travancore Nair Act in relation to intestate succession. That is because of the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. But that does not mean that the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act become engrafted into the Travancore Nair Act or other Kerala State Statutes so as to suffer a repeal by virtue of Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. We accordingly hold that there is no express repeal of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act by the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Point No. 3 is decided accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">23. Point No. 4:-- This is the central question. We have already held under Point No. 2 that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has not become repugnant to the provisions of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 because the State Legislature, while passing the latter Act, did not intend to trench upon the former. We have also held under Point No. 3 that there is no express repeal of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act on account of the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. The only other question would, therefore, be whether on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has become inoperative or otiose. The submission on behalf of the respondent, in this connection, is that for Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is to operate, the continued existence of the Marumakkathayam law is necessary so as to identify the females who would have been governed by that law before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act. It is contended that once Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, the Travancore Nair Act and other analogous State laws are repealed and when under Section 7(1), the residuary customary laws are repealed, there is no Marumakkathayam law in existence so that it can be said that the female who died after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 was governed by Marumakkathayam law. Reliance in this connection is made for the respondent on the principles relating to Incorporation and Reference of one Statute into another. Strong reliance is placed in this connection on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi (AIR 1963 SC 553, para 12) and Bajya v. Gopika Bai, AIR 1978 SC 793. Reference is also made by the respondent to the Exceptions referred to in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835. It is stated that the two earlier decisions are directly in point and that so far as the third case is concerned, the Exceptions mentioned in paragraph 16 of that judgment would apply inasmuch as Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is either supplemental to the provisions of the Travancore Nair Act and the other analogous laws in relation to intestate succession; or the two Statutes, namely, the Hindu Succession Act and the Travancore Nair Act and other analogous laws are at least in pari materia. The subsequent changes made to the Marumakkathayam law including its entire repeal by Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 should be read into Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act and if so read, there could be no female, after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 who could be said to be governed on the date of her death by the Marumakkathayam law. It is also argued for the respondent that once the Marumakkathayam law has been repealed, a person who is born after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 will never be considered as being governed by the Marumakkathayam law any more. If that be so, persons who were governed by that law and who were alive on the passing of the Hindu Succession Act but who died on a date subsequent to the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 would also be in the same position. What matters in cases relating to succession is the date of death. On the date of death if a particular system of marumakkathayam law was not in existence, the person could not be said to be governed by that law. That is the contention.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">24. On the other hand, it is submitted by the appellants that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act identifies a group of persons, as on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act who were governed by a particular marumakkathayam law and that once the said group of persons is fixed, Section 17 will continue to operate even assuming that the entire marumakkathayam law is repealed on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. It is, therefore, argued that the principle of Incorporation or Reference as mentioned in the above said three decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be applied. It is pointed out that this is not a case where Section 17 states that a particular marumakkathayam law will govern the succession. On the other hand, Section 17 has itself fixed the method of devolution. When Section 17 refers to persons who would have been governed by marumakkathayam law on the date of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Section , it is argued, is only referring to a group of persons governed by that law on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">25. It will be noticed that when Parliament passed the Hindu Succession Act, it made certain inroads into the law of succession governing Hindus belonging to various schools of law. So far as females are concerned, it made certain provisions in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. While doing so, the Parliament thought it fit to make a special provision for females who up to the date of passing of the Hindu Succession Act were governed by the marumakkathayam law, and this was done as per Section 17. The provisions of Section 17 would reveal that the law of succession as contained in the Kerala Statutes, such as those contained in Chapter IV of the Travacore Nair Act were altered. While the matrilineal system of succession is the main basis for the marumakkathayam system under the Travancore Nair Act or under other corresponding laws, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act cut down the rigour of that system of female line of succession, at the same time maintaining a limited part of the said system. For example in the case before us where the deceased female died without any children, but leaving her husband and her mother at the time of her death, her property would have gone under Section 18 of the Travancore Nair Act to the mother's tavazhi which includes the mother and the mother's issue how-low-so-ever in the female line or such of that group as are alive, while under Section I7(ii)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of the female would go to the mother of the deceased. Parliament, therefore, intended that that group of persons who would have been governed by the marumakkathayam law as on the date of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 should be governed by Section 17. Those persons could be identified by virtue of the provisions of Section 3(h) of the Hindu Succession Act, which defined the marumakkathayam law as the system of law applicable to persons who, if the Hindu Succession Act had not been passed would have been governed by the Travancore Nair Act, etc., with respect to the matters for which provisions were made in the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26. For the purpose of understanding the scope of the words "persons who would have been governed by the marumakkathayam law if the Act had not been passed" occurring in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, we have to find out whether on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, the marumakkathayam law -- both statutory and customary -- came to be totally repealed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27. The question then is what is the effect of Section 7(1) and Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act. The discussion can be split into three parts :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(A) Effect of Section 7(1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(B) Effect of repugnancy under Article 254(1) when Section 17 was enacted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(C) Effect of Section 7(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(A). So far as Section 7(1) is concerned, the words "Hindu Law" are used. In our view, the words "Hindu Law" are used in the same sense as they are used in Section 4(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. In fact Section 7(1) of the Joint Family Abolition Act and Section 4(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are identical in words. The marumakkathayam law was contained in the Travancore Nair Act and other analogous statutes made by the Kerala Legislature, and there were provisions in the said statutes such as Section 44 of the Travancore Nair Act which saved the pristine Marumakkathayam law to the extent to which provisions were not made in the Travancore' Nair Act. By virtue of Section 7(1) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, there was a repeal of the residuary and customary principles of marumakkathayam law, if any, saved under Section 44 of the Travancore Nair Act. No doubt, Section 7(1) states that the repeal is to the extent provision is made in the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(B) So far as Chapter relating to intestate succession in the Travancore Nair Act and analogous Acts is concerned, to the extent provisions were made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the said Sections became repugnant and void by virtue of the joint operation of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 4(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(C) Coming to the remaining statutory provisions of the Travancore Nair Act and analogous laws, they stood repealed by virtue of Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27A. In other words, by the combined effect of Article 254(1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, the statutory laws mentioned in the Schedule to the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 stood repealed. So far as the pristine law which was not covered by those Acts is concerned, it stood repealed by Section 7(1) to the Extent provision is made in the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Of course, once all this is gone, almost nothing is left under the pristine marumakkathayam law, or the customary and statutory on 1-12-1976. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondent is right to this extent, namely, that the entire marumakkathayam law stood repealed after passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27B. A contention was raised that the word "Hindu Law" used in Section 7(1) is referrable to Hindu law other than the marumakkathayam and other laws and is meant to refer only to the Mitakshara law. We cannot accept this contention. We may here point out that the words 'Hindu law' in Section 7(1) have to be understood in a broad sense, having regard to Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which dealt with the applicability of that Act to any person who is a Hindu by religion, etc. This has been pointed out by Gajendragadkar C.J. in Yagnapurushodasji v. Muldas, AIR 1966 SC 1119 at p. 1131 (paragraphs 40 to 42). It was there stated after referring to that four Acts passed under this Hindu Law in 1955 and 1956 that in those Acts the word 'Hindu' was used in a 'broad' and comprehensive sense'. The marumakkathayam law was considered by Sundara Iyer J. in Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran, AIR 1916 Mad 751 (FB) as a school of Hindu law. No doubt, Subba Rao J., as he then was, in Kochunni v. State of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, at 1099, paragraph 43, made an observation that the above statement has not been accepted by others. The learned Judge did not, however, categorically say that the observations of Sundara Iyer, J. were wrong. In any event, having regard to the broad and comprehensive meaning of the word 'Hindu' in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as pointed out by Gajendragadkar, C. J. in the case already referred to, it must be held that the Marumakkathayam law is a school of Hindu law. In fact, Section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act itself states as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"any Hindu to whom the marumakkathayam or nambudiri law would have applied."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Further, the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 also states in its preamble that it is an Act to abolish the joint family system among Hindus in the State of Kerala. We therefore hold that the words 'Hindu law' in Section 7(1) are used in a broad and comprehensive sense, so as to attract the residuary marumakkathayam law referable to Section 44 of the Travancore Nair Act and other similar provisions of the Kerala Statutes and the said residuary Marumakkathayam law stood repealed by Section 7(1) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. So far as the statutory provisions relating to marumakkathayam law are concerned, such as the Travancore Nair Act, etc. they were repealed by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Therefore, the entire Marumakkathayam law stood repealed after the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 and no part of it can be said to be in existence thereafter. On this, we accept the contention for the respondent-plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">28. Once we, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Marumakkathayam law stood totally abolished on the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 the question arises as to the meaning of the word in Section 17 "persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law, if this Act had not been passed". In order to be clear, we shall divide the persons who were governed by the Marumakkathayam law into five groups :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(i) those who were governed by the Marumakkathayam law and were living as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and died before 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(ii) those who were so governed by the Marumakkathayam law and living as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died on or after 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iii) those who were governed by the Marumakkathayam law, i.e., Travancore Nair Act etc. and were born on or after 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died before 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iv) those who were governed by the Marumakkathayam law, i.e., Trvancore Nair Act etc. and were born on or after 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force but before 1-12-1976 and who died after 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force, and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(v) those who were born into families which were once governed by Marumakkathayam law but were born on or after 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force and who died later.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Though we are concerned with a case falling under category (ii), as the discussion of the legal principles is an integrated one, it has become necessary to deal with these five categories.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">29. So far as category (i) and category (iii) are concerned, there is no dispute that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act applies. The dispute is only in relation to category (ii), category (iv) and category (v).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30. We shall deal with category (ii) and category (iv) in the ensuing discussion. So far as category (v) is concerned, we shall deal with it under Point No. 5.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">31. We shall, therefore, take category (ii), i.e. persons who were governed by the Marumakkathayam system of law as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died on or after 1-12-1976 when the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force; and category (iv), i.e., persons who were governed by the Marumakkathayam law, i.e., Travancore Nair Act etc. and were born on or after 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force (but before 1-12-1976) and who died after 1-12-1976. The thing that is common to these two categories is that 'the persons died after 1-12-1976'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">32. In our view, the words "persons would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if this Act had not been passed" are sufficient to identify the category (ii), the group of persons who were living on 18-6-1956 and were governed by the Travancore Nair Act and other Kerala laws and who died on or after 1-12-1976. It is also not difficult to identify the group (iv), the group of persons who were born on or after 18-6-1956, who were governed by the Travancore Nair Act and other Kerala laws, but before 1-12-1976 and died after 30-11-1976. All these persons are, in our view, identifiable for purposes of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and once they are so identified, the changes in the Marumakkathayam law, whether by way of amendment or repeal, cannot affect such identification. The continuance of the Travancore Nair Act and other Kerala laws has no bearing on their status as "persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if this Act had not been passed."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">33. It is true that in matters relating to succession, the date of death of the persons is the criterion and it is the law of succession as on that date that will apply. But this principle is not offended for Section 17 does not say that the Marumakkathayam law will apply for succession of males and females. On the other hand, Section 17 fixed up the devolution, i.e., the legal heirs of persons who "would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law as if this Act had not been passed". Now, the persons who were so governed either on 18-6-1956 and who were so governed till 30-11-1976 are an identifiable group and their succession is fixed according to the mode prescribed in Section 17. Such persons once identified need not, in our view, continue to be governed by the Marumakkathayam law on their death. As already stated, Marumakkathayam law is referred to in Section 17 not to govern succession but merely to identify a group of persons, who would be governed by the devolution fixed in Section 17. Hence the general principle that the law applicable as on the date of death is relevant is not applicable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">34. It is, however, argued for the respondents that the principle of Incorporation or Reference applies to the facts of the case. Reliance was placed on the three decisions of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553, in Bajya v. Gopikabai, AIR 1978 SC 793 and in State of M.P. v. M. V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835 to say that Section 17 does not apply once the Marumakkathayam law is repealed. It is argued that these decisions would lead to the inference that the Marumakkathayam law referred to in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would suffer a repeal on account of Section 7 of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 and would cease to apply in relation to persons who died after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. We shall, therefore, deal with these three decisions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">35. Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 was concerned with the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913. That Act in Section 14 gave certain rights of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land sold by a member of an 'agricultural tribe'. Agricultural tribe referred to in Section 14 was defined in Section 3(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"member of an agricultural tribe and group of agricultural tribes shall have the meanings assigned to them respectively under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The latter Act of 1900 was repealed by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order, 1951. The Supreme Court held that Section 14 became inoperative after the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900. It was further held that with the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 the restriction imposed by Section 14 as regards the availability of the right of pre-emption to particular agricultural tribes would disappear. In other words, the effect of the removal of the limitation of Section 14 would only be that the pending words of Section 15 cease to operate. In such circumstances, Section 14 would lose all significance because the post-Constitution law does not recognise membership of tribes as conferring any special rights and consequently the elimination of Section 14 would leave Section 15 without the limitation originally imposed upon it. In our view, the said decision has no application to the facts of the case before us. Their Lordships held that being a member of an 'Agricultural tribe' was a necessary condition for a right of pre-emption on the date of the actual sale. It was nut a case where the members of the agricultural tribe were to be identified as on an earlier date. We, therefore, hold that the said decision of the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable on facts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">36. The case in Bajya v. Gopikabai, AIR 1978 SC 793 may appear at the first blush to support the case of the respondents. But a closer examination would, in our opinion, show that the said decision is also clearly distinguishable. In that case succession to certain rights of tenure holders was covered by Section 151 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954 which came into force on 5-2-1955. The Section read as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Subject to his personal law, the interest of a tenure-holder shall on his death pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest, as the case may be."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Subsequent to the said Code of 1954, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. The appellant claimed that even though the widow, Surji died on 6-11-1956, subsequent to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her husband's reversioners --(her husband having died in 1936) were entitled to succeed to the property. This was on the basis that the succession would be governed by personal law applicable as on 5-2-1955 when the M.P. Land Revenue Code came into force. On the other hand, it was contended for the respondents who were the sister's daughters of the last male member that if the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act applied, the widow of the last male member Surji had become the absolute owner of the property, and on her death in 1956, the legal heirs of the estate had to be identified on the basis of Section 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property heaving been inherited by the husband of the widow. Thereafter, Section 16, Rule 3 would apply and the devolution would be not to the reversioners but to the husband's heirs under the Hindu Succession Act who would have been entitled to the husband's property, if the husband had died intestate immediately after the death of Surji. In other words, the appellant contended that the law of succession which was in force on 5-2-1955 became incorporated into the M.P. Land Revenue Code in Section 151. The Supreme Court affirmed the view of the High Court and held that the law that would be applicable was personal law as stated in Section 151 and that that would be the law as on the date of death of the widow Surji, namely, 6-11-1956, and not the law as on the date when the M.P. Land Revenue Code came into force. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court made reference to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, paragraph 370 at page 848 as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"A well established exception to, or qualification of, the general rule exists where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof; in such case the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied with all the changes made from time to time at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was pointed out by their Lordships that in view of the words 'personal law' used in Section 151 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, the personal law as obtaining from time to time would be the law applicable and viewed in that light the personal law would be the law applicable to Surjit as on the date of her death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">37. In our opinion, the above said decision is clearly distinguishable. In Section 151 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, the statute did not specifically fix a particular mode of devolution. On the other hand, it said that the devolution would be as per the personal law applicable to the parties. In such a case there could be no doubt that the personal law as on the date of death of a particular person would be the law applicable so far as the succession was concerned. It would not be the personal law on the date when Section 151 itself was created, under the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954. In the present case, Section 17 does not allow the mode of succession to be decided with reference to any personal law. The Section itself fixes the mode of devolution in the case of males and females. In fact, Section 17 mentions the persons on whom the property would devolve. The mode of devolution is not left indefinite to be governed by a personal law which would be changing from time to time. The limited scope of applicability of the personal law in Section 17 is in relation to fixing of the group of people who would be governed by Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. If, therefore, the mode of devolution is not referable to any personal law, which would change from time to time, and what all was done under Section 17 with reference to a personal law was to fix a group of persons, then the persons so identified would, in our view, be governed by Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, even if they died after the total repeal of the Marumakkathayam law. In our view, therefore, the above decision is clearly distinguishable. We are also not satisfied that there is a legislation by Incorporation or Reference involved in this case. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court observed (AIR 1978 SC 793, para 27) :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">".....Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories : First, where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second, where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of the latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also, made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">38. We then come to the decision in State of M.P. v. M. V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835. In that case an employee of the Heavy Electricals India Limited was sought to be proceeded against under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The question arose whether the definition of 'public servant' in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which was engrafted into the Prevention of Corruption Act would take in the subsequent amendments to the definition of 'public servant' in the Indian Penal Code by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964. These two amendment Acts had only amended the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court dealt elaborately with the principle of incorporation by reference and adverted to the leading cases in Clarke v. Brad Laugh (1881) 8 QBD 63, Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149 and other cases. Their Lordships pointed out that in the case of incorporation of a particular provision in a latter Act with reference to an earlier Act, the incorporated provision becomes an independent provision of the latter Act and is not affected by any changes in the earlier Act. However, there are four exceptions to such a rule. Adverting to the exceptions, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 16 as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act when the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment In the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) Where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) Where the two Acts are in pari materia;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) Where the amendment in the previous Act if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(d) Where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Supreme Court while holding that the definition of 'public servant' in the Indian Penal Code became incorporated into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, proceeded to consider whether, notwithstanding the said incorporation, the subsequent amendment to the definition of 'public servant' in Indian Penal Code should be applied to the definition of 'public servant' in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. A contention was raised before their Lordships that inasmuch as the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code were pari materia, therefore, amendments to the Indian Penal Code would automatically apply to the definition of 'public servant' in the Prevention of Corruption Act. This contention was rejected on the basis that the two statutes were not in pari materia. It was then contended that the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act were supplemental to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, and on that basis the amendment to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code would affect the definition of 'public servant' in the Prevention of Corruption Act. This contention was accepted and the case was treated as one falling within the first of the above exceptions, namely, where the subsequent Act (Prevention of Corruption Act) and the previous Act (Indian Penal Code) were supplemental to each other.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">39. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that in the case before us the principle of incorporation applies and therefore it is necessary to test whether the exceptions laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said decision would apply to the facts of the case. It is pointed out that the Travancore Nair Act and the Marumakkathayam law was the previous law, and the subsequent legislation was the Hindu Succession Act. Once the Travancore Nair Act is repealed by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, it is contended that Section 17 will cease to apply any longer as there is no person who can be said to be governed by the Marumakkathayam law as defined in Section 3(h) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is pointed out that the Travancore Nair Act in so far as succession is concerned and the Hindu Succession Act are either in pari materia to each other or supplemental to each other.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">40. In our view, the question as to whether the case will fall within the exceptions to the rule of incorporation will depend upon whether the principle of incorporation itself is applicable to the facts of the case. If the principle of incorporation is in itself not applicable the facts of the case, then, in our view, there is no question of the present case falling within any of the exceptions mentioned in the decision in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan (AIR 1975 SC 1835) (supra).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">41. In our view, the principle of Incorporation is not at all applicable to the facts of the case. Here, we are not, as stated earlier, concerned with a situation where the very mode of devolution is on the basis of the personal law of Marumakkathayam. If Section 17 stated that the mode of devolution would be according to the Marumakkathayam law, then it could be treated that the mode of succession was governed by the incorporated law. Then the question could arise whether the exceptions to the general principles of incorporation were attracted. In the present case, Section 17 does not lay down any principle of devolution generally applicable. On the other hand, the Section itself fixes the mode of devolution in a particular manner. The Section only deals with the question of identification of a group of persons, who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law as mentioned in Section 3(h) of the Hindu Succession Act. In our view, therefore, the principle of Incorporation itself does not apply to the facts of the case and, therefore, there is no question of considering whether any exception in relation to the said principle applies to the facts of this case. Therefore, State of M.P. v. Narasimhan (AIR 1975 SC 1835) (supra) is clearly not attracted to the facts of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">42. A contention was raised for the respondent that on the basis of the words "if this Act had not been passed" in Section 3(h) of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a legal fiction has been created and that fiction has to be carried to the logical limits irrespective of the consequences. It is contended that if such a fiction comes into play and the Hindu Succession Act is to be deemed as not passed for the purpose of identifying the group of persons, mentioned in Section 17, Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act also goes out of the picture and consequently the Chapter relating to intestate succession in the Travancore Nair Act and other Statutes would have to be treated as in existence (notwithstanding their having been otherwise repugnant to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act), and that Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 has to be applied. It is then stated that the Chapter relating to intestate succession in the Travancore Nair Act also would then stand repealed expressly by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 and there would be no person who could be governed by the Travancore Nair Act or similar Acts for the purpose of being governed thereby. It is said that that would result in no person being governed by the Marumakkathayam law after Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 applied.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">43. In our opinion, this contention cannot be accepted. It is well settled that even in cases where a fiction is created, the Court must bear in mind the purpose of which the fiction is created. We need not quote any authority for this proposition, (per James L. J. in Ex parte Walton, In re Levy (1881) 17 Ch D 746 at 756) (S. R. Das, J. in State of T. C. v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, AIR 1953 SC 333; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 at p. 680). In fact, in M. K. Baiakrishna Menon v. Asst. Controller of Estate Duty, AIR 1971 SC 2392 at p. 2395), it was held by the Supreme Court that the fiction created in Section 7(3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the words "as if the sthanam property had been divided per capita immediately before the death of sthanamdar among himself and all the members of the family," was introduced for the purpose of determining the shares of the members of the family and heirs of the sthanamdar on his death but not for creating a division during the lifetime of the sthanamdar. It was held that the opening words of the Section made it clear that during his lifetime, he holds the entire sthanam and there is no factual division while he was living and that on the death of the sthanamdar, the entire sthanam property devolved on the members and heirs, and, therefore, the entire property was held liable to payment of estate duty and for that purpose, the fiction in Section 7(3) did not apply.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">44. The fiction here in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is, in our view, limited to ascertaining the group of persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law, had the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 not been passed. Obviously, there would be people governed by the Marumakkathayam law till 1-12-1976, when that law statutory and customary was repealed. The fiction stops there and does not extend to create a vacuum. The argument that the fiction extends for all purposes, that if the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was to be forgotten altogether including Section 4 thereof and then the Intestate Succession Chapter in (say) the Travancore Nair Act comes back into it and then gets repealed by Section 7(2) on 1-12-1976 and then there would be no Marumakkathayam law and no person governed by it, would lead us nowhere. If Section 17 becomes inoperative by such a wider fiction and the Chapter relating to intestate succession in (say) the Travancore Nair Act etc. also stand repealed by Section 7(2) of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, then we would be left with a situation where there is no law of succession, because one ( Section 17) is treated as inoperative and the other (the succession law in Travancore Nair Act) has got repealed. That is why we say, the fiction should not be used in a wider manner but should be confined within its purpose, namely, to identify the group of persons, as stated above. We would, therefore, confine the fiction within the limits of its above said purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">45. In the result, as Lakshmikutty Amma was in existence as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act came into force and she belonged to an identified group of persons who were governed by the Marumakkthayam law as on 18-6-1956, the devolution upon her death will be governed by Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act and the abolition of Marumakkathayam system by the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 does not have any bearing on the applicability of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">46. It is then argued for the respondent that when Section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has become inoperative on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, in like manner. Section 17 must also be deemed to have become inoperative. We are unable to agree. The two Sections stand on a different footing. So far as Section 7 is concerned, it deals with succession to an undivided interest in a tarward, tavazhee, kutumba, kavaru or illom. It may be that on account of the abolition of right by birth in Section 3 and the immediate conversion of joint tenancy into tenants-in-common by Section 4, there is no undivided interest in the tarward, tavazhee, kutumba, kavaru or illom, so far as the Marumakkathayam law in Kerala State is concerned. That is because there is no longer any undivided interest in property in regard to which the law of succession stated in Section 7 can apply. In other words, the type of property to which it can apply is no longer there. But, that analogy, in our view, cannot apply to Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. Once the group of persons who would be governed by the Marumakkathayam law and who were living on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force had been identified as on 18-6-1956, the fact that on the date of their death subsequent to the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, the said Marumakkathayam law was not in force would not matter. A situation of a particular type of interest not existing as in the case of Section 7, does not arise here. We have, in fact, already given elaborate reasons as to why Section 17 continued to be in force in respect of persons in spite of the repeal of the Marumakkathayam law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">47. We, therefore, hold that on the passing of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not become inoperative in respect of the group (ii), that is the group of persons who were living on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died on or after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. It also does not become inoperative in respect of the: group (iv) that is the group of persons who were born on or 18-6-1956 but before 1-12-1976 and who died on or after the commencement of the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975. Point No. 4 is held accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">48. Point No. 5:-- It may be asked whether it is necessary to consider the cases of persons born on or after 1-12-1976, on which day the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force and who died later. We may state that this issue has necessarily fallen for decision for the following reason. As stated earlier, the entire discussion is based on a logic and a reason and is an integrated one. For the purpose of deciding the meaning of the words "persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law as if this Act has not been passed", we have to lay down who are within these words and who are outside of it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">49. So far as this category of persons who were born on or after 1-12-1976 and who died later, there was no right by birth, survivorship or practically any vestige of the Marumakkathayam law, at their birth or death. Therefore, in our view, in the case of these persons, male or female, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot apply. The principles applicable to other Hindus as stated in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would then apply.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">50. We may finally summarise as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(I) Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will govern the law of succession on the death of males or females who were governed by the Marumakkathayam system if such persons were--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(i) living as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and they died before 1-12-1976 when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(ii) living as on 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died on or after 1-12-1976 when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iii)born on or after 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and who died before 1-12-1976 when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force, and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iv) born on or after 18-6-1956 when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force but before 1-12-1976 and who died on or after 1-12-1976 when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will not, however, govern the law of succession of males or females if such persons were born on or after 1-12-1976 and died thereafter. Succession to them would be governed by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 other than the provisions applicable to those governed by the Marumakkathayam system.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) We approve the decision of the learned single Judge in Madhavi Amma v. Kalliani Amma, (1988) 2 Ker LT 964 and of the Division Bench in Bhaskaran v. Kalliani (1990) 2 Ker LT 749. We overrule the observations to the contrary in Saraswathy Amma v. Radhamma, (1990) 2 Ker LT 183 : (AIR 1991 Kerala 86).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">51. The case before us comes under principle 1(ii) referred to above and, therefore, succession to Lakshmikutty Amma will be as provided in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. As she had no children, male or female, Section 17(ii)(a) applies and Chellamma, her mother succeeded to her properties and not her husband. Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not apply. On the death of Chellamma, the properties devolve on defendants 1 to 8.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">52. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Krishnamoorthy, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">53. In spite of the persuaive arguments by counsel for the appellants and other counsel who advanced arguments in the case and even after seeing the judgment prepared by My Lord the Chief Justice, I do not feel myself persuaded to agree with the decree passed by My Lord the Chief Justice in the case. Facts of the case and contentions raised by parties are set out in his judgment and it is not necessary to repeat the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">54. In the light of the contentions raised, the following points arise for consideration :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) Whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is repealed by the provisions contained in the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Whether the continued existence of the system of Marumakkathayam Law a necessary precondition for the operation of Section 17.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act applied to persons who were governed by the respective enactments, irrespective of the fact whether they are governed by Marumakkathayam law or not on the date when succession opens.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) Whether the Marumakkathayam System of law survives after the coming into force of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(5) Whether Section 17 is operative after 1-12-1976 in the light of the findings on points 1 to 4.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">55. Point No. 1 : In regard to intestate succession among marumakkathayees before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act they were governed by the respective State enactments, and Nairs of Travancore, with whom we are concerned in this case, were governed by the Travancore Nair Act. Section 4(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act provides that the provisions contained in the Act will have overriding effect over any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act. Clause (b) provides that any other law in force immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provision contained in the Hindu Succession Act. From the above Section it is clear that the provisions contained in the Travancore Nair Act in regard to intestate succession were given a go-by and were superseded by the provisions contained in the Hindu Succession Act. So far as marumakkathayees are concerned, a special provision was enacted in the Hindu Succession Act, namely Section 17 which provides for intestate succession of both male and female marumakkathayees. It is thus a case of repeal of the Travancore Nair Act in so far as it related to intestate succession and re-enactment of the law. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to agree with the contention of counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that Hindu Succession Act is only an amending Act of the Travancore Nair Act or the other State enactments in regard to the law of intestate succession, but an independent enactment providing for intestate succession among the Hindus including marumakkathayees. The repeal of the Travancore Nair Act or other State enactments by Section 7 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act will not by itself affect the operation of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. Moreover, the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act is not intended to touch the topic of succession and in that view of the matter also it has to be held that Section 17 cannot be said to be repealed by the provisions contained in the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act. I accordingly hold that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is not repealed by the provisions contained in the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act. But the question whether Section 17 has become inoperative by virtue of the aforesaid Act is a different question which will be considered in the subsequent part of this judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">56. Points 2 and 3 : These two points can be considered together. The question to be considered is as to whether Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act can have any operation after the coming into force of the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975. A large population of Kerala belonging to certain communities were following a system of law called 'Marumakkathayam law the characteristic feature of which is that the descent is traced in the female line unlike the ordinary Hindu Mitakshara law. That system of law-was a body of customs and usages which received judicial recognition. The joint family is called a tarwad. The customary Marumakkathayam law has been materially altered by Statutes in Malabar (which was part of Madras State before 1-11-1956), in Travancore and in Cochin the three component parts of the present Kerala State. Most of the enactments contain provisions regarding marriage and its dissolution, maintenance and guardianship, intestate succession, testamentary succession and tarwad and its management and partition. In pursuance to the directive principles contained in Article 44 of the Constitution of India, Parliament passed the following four enactments applicable for the whole of India :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These Acts apply to all Hindus including the Marumakkathayees of Kerala and the Central Acts have overriding effect over the State enactments as regards the matters provided for by the Central Acts ( Section 4 of the Acts mentioned as items 1, 2 and 4 and Section 5 of item 3). In this case we are concerned with Hindu Succession Act alone and so it is necessary to consider the provisions therein with special reference to marumakkathayees and to the extent it is necessary for this case. The Act is a codifying Act dealing with in testate succession among Hindus throughout India. Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act is to the following effect:--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"4. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act provides for devolution of interest in coparcenary property. General rules of succession in the case of males are provided for in Section 8. Sections 9 and 10 provide for the order of succession among heirs in the Schedule and the distribution of property among heirs in class I of the Schedule. Section 15 of the Act contains the general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus and it reads :--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"15. (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16,--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son, or daughter) and the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub- Section (1),--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in Sub- Section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub Section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 16 of the Act provides for the order of succession and manner of distribution among heirs of a female Hindu.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">57. In the matter of devolution of the interest of a Hindu to whom the Marumakkathayara law would have applied if the Hindu Succession Act is not passed in the property of a tarwad, and in regard to succession of persons (both male and female) who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if the Hindu Succession Act had not been passed, special provision is made in the Act the former in Section 7(1) and the latter in Section 17. Those Sections read as follows :--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"17. The provisions of Sections 8, 10, 15 and 23 shall have effect in relation to persons who would have been governed by the marumakkattayam law or aliyasantana law if this Act had not been passed as if--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(i) for Sub-clauses (c) and (d) of Section 8, the following had been substituted, namely:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon his relatives, whether agnates or cognates";<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(ii) for Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 15, the following had been substituted, namely:--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the mother;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) secondly, upon the father and the husband;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) thirdly, upon the heirs of the mother;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the husband";<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iii) Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 had been omitted;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(iv) Section 23 had been omitted."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">58. In order to understand the applicability and scope of these two Sections, it is also necessary to note the definition of "Marumakkattayam law" contained in Section 3(i)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act to the following effect:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"3(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(h) "marumakkattayam law" means the system of law applicable to persons -<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) who, if this Act had not been passed, would have been governed by the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932; the Travancore Nayar Act; the Travancore Ezhava Act; the Travancore Nanjinad Vellala Act; the Travancore Kshatriya Act; the Travancore Krishnanvaka Marumakkathayee Act; the Cochin Marumakkathayam Act; or the Cochin Nayar Act with respect to the matters for which provision is made in this Act; or<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) who belong to any community, the members of which are largely domiciled in the State of Travancore-Cochin or Madras as it existed immediately before the 1st November, 1956, and who, if this Act had not been passed, would have been governed with respect to the matters for which provision is made in this Act by any system of inheritance in which descent is traced through the female line </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">but does not include the aliyasantana law;"</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(In this judgment the enactments mentioned in the above Section will hereinafter be referred to as State enactments).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">59. Thus from the above provisions it is clear that intestate succession of Hindus is governed by Sections 8 and 15 of the Act. Section 17 is a special provision In regard to succession among marumakkathayees and in effect it operates as aproviso to Sections 8, 10 and 15.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">60. In 1976 the Kerala Legislature enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976). The Act received the assent of the President and came into force on 1-12-1976. The Act abolished the entire joint family system among Hindus governed by Mitakshara law as also marumakkathayees governed by the various State enactments. (See definition of 'joint Hindu family' in Section 2). By Section 3 right by birth which is inherent in every member of a joint family under Hindu law and every member of tarwad following Marumakkathayam law was abolished and by Section 4 joint tenancy was abolished and instead the members of a coparcenary or tarwad holding joint family property on the date of coming into force of the Act were made tenants-in-common from that day holding his or her share separate as full owner. Section 5 has done away with the rule of pious obligation of a Hindu son, with certain exceptions and Section 6 saved the liability of members of joint family for the debts binding on it. Section 7 is the repealing Section which has a bearing on the case and it is advantageous to reproduce the same :--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"7. Repeal.-- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this act, any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) The Acts mentioned in the Schedule, in so far as they apply to the whole or any part of the State of Kerala, are hereby repealed."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(The Schedule includes all the State enactments mentioned in Section 3(h) of the Hindu Succession Act.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">61. The question to be considered is as to whether for the application of the special provision contained in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act it is necessary that the intestate should be a person governed by the 'Marumakkathayam law' on the date of his or her death or is it sufficient if he or she was a marumakkathayee as on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956. 'Marumakathayam law' is defined in Section 3(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act as a system of law applicable to persons who, if the Hindu Succession Act had not been passed, would have been governed by the respective State enactments with respect to matters provided in the Act. So also, the special provision contained in Section 17 applies to persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if the Hindu Succession Act had not been passed. So it is clear that for finding out the persons referred to in Section 3(1)(h) as also in Section 17 it has to be assumed that Hindu Succession Act had not been passed. So we have to proceed on the basis that Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act is also not in force and in that view the words 'with respect to the matters for which provision is made in this Act' occurring in Section 3(1)(h) has not much significance in the context. In order to identify the persons who would have been governed by Marumakkathayam law, the provisions of the State enactments have to be looked into and the above law is defined as the system of law applicable to such persons. After identifying such persons when we come to Section 17, it can be seen that the said provision apply to persons who would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law if the Hindu Succession Act is not passed. Section 17 of the Act is applicable to a particular set of persons following a particular system of law, namely 'Marumakkathayam law' or 'Aliasantana law'. The words 'would have been governed by the Marumakkathayam law' are used because for identifying the persons we have to assume that the Hindu Succession Act is not passed and not that it is sufficient that such persons were governed by Marumakkathayam law at any anterior time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">62. In this connection it is apposite to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in Bajya v. Gopikabai, AIR 1978 SC 793 in regard to legislation by referential incorporation :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"27. Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories First, where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second, where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also, made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. This principle of construction of a reference statute has been neatly summed up by Sutherland, thus :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"A statute which refers to the law of a subject generaly adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted." (Vide, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Article 520.8, p. 5208).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Corpus Juris Secundum also enunciates the same principle in these terms :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">".... Where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof......the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied, with all the changes made from time to time, at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">63. In Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act the reference is to a general law on the subject viz. 'Marumakkathayam law' and not to any particular statute. Any changes made in that general law from time to time have to be taken note of and the law as it stands on the date when it is sought to be applied has to be adopted. It is elementary and fundamental that a provision like Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act regarding succession shall have application only on the death of a person and not before. If that be so, the changes made in the Marumakkathayam law by any other statute till the date of death of a person have to be taken note of and Section 17 applied accordingly. Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act applies to persons governed by Marumakkathayam law and if on the date of death of a person that law is completely abrogated, Section 17 can have no application, for he or she is not a person governed by Marumakkathayam law on the date of his or her death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">64. In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 the question arose as to the effect of the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 on Section 14 and the definition of agricultural tribe in Section 3(4) of the Punjab Preemption Act 1 of 1913 which was as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"member of an agricultural tribe and group of agricultural tribes shall have the meanings assigned to them respectively under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 14 of the Pre-emption Act is to the following effect:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"14. No person other than a person who was at the date of sale a member of an agricultural tribe in the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor shall have a right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land sold by a member of an agricultural tribe."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was held (AIR 1963 SC 553, para 12):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"With the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 it is manifest that Section 14 would lose all significance, but this does not help, in any manner, the contentions urged by learned counsel for the appellant. It would be seen that Section 14 is restrictive, in that in the case of the alienations by persons referred to in that section the right of pre-emption is conferred upon a limited group. With the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 the restriction imposed by Section 14 as regards the availability of the right of pre-emption to particular agricultural tribes would disappear."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the light of the above decision, when the State enactments mentioned in Section 3(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act are repealed in 1976 by the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, the Section loses all its significance and it is not possible to identify the persons to whom the Marumak-kahayam law would have been applied. Moreover, the State enactments and the Hindu Sucession Act are supplemental to each other and are in pari materia and the repeal of the former will affect the latter (See State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">65. The learned Chief Justice has taken the view that if Marumakkathayam law has ceased to be in force from 1-12-1976, Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act can have no application to persons who were born after that date, for they were never governed by Marumakkathayam Act. I am in complete agreement with that view. If it cannot apply to such persons, I am unable to find any reason how it can apply to a person who died after 1-12-1976, though born before that date, for the applicability of Section 17 could arise only on death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">66. In Madhavi Amma v. Kalliani Amma, (1988) 2 Ker LT 964 a learned single Judge of this Court considering the very same question held as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Reference to Marumakkathayam and Aliyasantana laws in Section 17 therefore is only to clarify the position that these special provisions are applicable only to persons, who at the time of the coming into force of the Succession Act, were governed by the Maru-makkahayam law or Aliyasantana law as the case may be."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Bhaskaran v. Kalliani, (1990) 2 Ker LT 749, a Division Bench of this Court (in which the judgment was delivered by one of us, Ramakrishnan, J.) said at page 754 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The reference to 'Marumakkathayam law or Aliyasantana Law' in Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is only to clarify the position that the special provisions contained therein are applicable only to persons who at the time of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act were governed by the Marumakkathayam Law or Aliyasantana Law as the case may be."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">67. With greatest respect, I find myself unable to subscribe to the above view. Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act applies to persons who would have been governed by 'Marumakkathayam law' if that Act had not been passed. I have already held that the words 'who would have been governed by Marumakkathayam law' are used in the context that in order to identify the "persons" it has to be presumed that the Hindu Succession Act is not passed. It does not mean that it is enough that they were governed by Marumakkathayam law at any anterior point of time. They must be governed by that law at the time when succession opens, for Section 17 shall have application only on the death of a person and not before. Section 17 is only a modification of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act and has to be read together. The opening words of Section 15 "the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve." are very significant in this context. The above aspect was lost sight of in the above two decisions and accordingly 1 express my respectful dissent from the above view.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">68. In the light of what is stated above, I hold that the continued operation of the system of Marumakkathyam law on the date of death of a person is a necessary precondition for the operation of Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act. The fact that persons were governed by the respective State enactments mentioned in Section 3(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act and by Marumakkathayam Law when the Hindu Succession Act came into force is not sufficient for the applicability of Section 17, but must be continued to be governed by Marumakkathayam law till succession opens on their death. Points 2 and 3 answered accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">69. Point No. 4: Certain communities in Kerala were following a system of law called the 'Marumakkathayam law'. It is a body of customs and usages which received judicial recognition. The main characteristic and distinguishing feature of this system of law is that the descent is traced in the female line. While under the Hindu Mitakshra law the members claim their descent from a common ancestor, the members of a marumakkathayam tarwad are descended from a common ancestress. The joint family is called the tarwad and the seniormost male member will be the manager who is called 'Karnavan'. The interest of a member in tarwad property was neither heritable nor alienable and on his death it would devolve on the other members by survivorship. Under the pristine Marumakkathayam law, the separate property of a member also would devolve upon members of the tarwad and not on his wife and children. In the case of a female member her self-acquisitions descend to her thavazhi or sub-tarwad constituted by her children and further descendants in the female line. A member had no right to demand partition of tarwad properties. Impartiality was the rule and there could be no partition without the concurrence of all the members of the tarwad.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">69A. The customary Marumakkathayam law had been very materially altered by Statutes in the three component parts of Kerala, namely Malabar. Travancore and Cochin and those enactments are mentioned in Section 3(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act. They dealt with the law of marriage, succession, adoption and maintenance, and minority and guardianship. By these enactments the rule of succession in regard to self-acquired or separate property changed and separate rules of succession were prescribed for the property of a male and a female. Right to partition was also conferred on the members.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Certain statutes permitted only thavazhi partition (partition into branches) and certain statutes allowed individual partition on certain conditions. Under the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1933 only thavazhi partition was originally recognised. But by the 1958 amendment to the Madras Marumakkathayam Act by the Kerala Legislature, individual partition is allowed and the consent of the common ancestors was dispensed with. In 1956 the Parliament passed four enactments on marriage, succession, minority and guardianship and adoptions and maintenance, as mentioned earlier in this judgment. Succession was regulated by the Hindu Succession Act among the Hindus throughout the country. The Act contained two special provisions in regard to persons governed by the Marumakkathayam law which have already been referred to by me, namely Section 7 which deals with devolution of interest in the tarwad property and Section 17 which makes a special provision in regard to intestate succession among Marumakkathayees.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">70. Though the Hindu Succession Act provides for devolution of interest in the tarwad property, the Act did not do away with the Marumakkathayam system or with tarwads. The marumakkathayam system or the joint family system continued in spite of the Act. As observed by Govindan Nair J. in Ammalu Amma v. Lakshmy Amma, 1966 Ker LT 32 (FB):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Hindu Succession Act does not do away with the Marumakkathayam system or with tarwads though that will doubtless be its ultimate result, and none of its provisions affects the way in which the members of a tarwad hold the joint property during their life-time."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">71. Thereafter, it was felt that it was necessary and desirable to have a uniform law for all Marumakkathayees in Kerala in regard to the right to obtain dissolution of marriage and tarwad and its management including partition. Accordingly a Law Commission was also appointed and on the basis of its report the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act was passed which came into force on 1-12-1976.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">72. After the Parliament passed the four enactments mentioned above, the provisions therein prevailed over those in the State enactments. The only topic that was not dealt with in the above Acts is the tarwad and its management and partition. As stated earlier, by the provision contained in the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act (which is a composite legislation in regard to Marumakkathayees as also followers of Mitakshara law) in Section 3, right by birth which is inherent in evey member of a tarwad following Marumakkathayam law was abolished. By Section 4 joint tenancy was abolished and instead the members of the tarwad holding tarwad property on the date of coming into force of the Act were made tenants-in-common from that day holding his or her share separately as full owner. Section 5 deals with rule of pious obligation which has no relevance so far as Marumakkathayees are concerned and by Section 7 any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act were made inoperative. By Section 7(2) the entire State Acts mentioned in Section 3(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act were also repealed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">73. From the above development of the law, it can be seen that the pristine Marumakkathayam law was interfered with by the various enactments and later by the four Central Acts in 1956. The only matter which was untouched by the Central Acts was the law relating to tarwad and its management. On that subject also a legislation was made by the Kerala Legislature, namely the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, and the whole joint family system was abolished. Community of interest, unity of possession, right by birth and survivorship are the incidents of joint family property, whether of a marumakkathayam tarwad or a mitakshara coparcenary. Descent through the female line in another distinguishing feature of the Marumakkathayam law. By the coming into force of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 there is no community of interest, unity of possession, right by birth and rule of survivorship. Descent through female line has also come to an end and property on death devolves upon the personal heirs as mentioned in the Hindu Succession Act. The essence of Marumakkathayam law which is that the woman is the stock of descent, which is to be in the female line, is avoided by the Act. The changes effected are so drastic that none of the characteristic features and incidents of the Marumakkathayam law survive today. The provisions of the Act are clear that it does not envisage the emergence or contemplate the continuance of a Marumakkathayam tavazhi or tarwad after its date. It does not contemplate the possibility of the existence of a group of persons having community of interest in property on account of any personal law governing them, and the tarwad that existed before and at the date of the Act was liquidated by it. No vestige of the Marumakkathayam law remains after the passing of the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act and the system of Marumakkathayam law has come to an end.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">74. The repealing Section in the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act also indicates that the system has come to an end. The Act deals with both, the Hindu joint family as also Marumakkathayam tarwads. Under Section 7(1) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law is abrogated. In M.K.B. Menon v. A.C., Estate Duty, AIR 1971 SC 2392, it was held by the Supreme Court that Marumak-kathyam law is only a branch of Hindu Law, The setting and the provisions contained in that Act also indicate that it decided to do away with the system of tarwad. By the operation of Section 7 as well the system of Marumakkathayam law has ceased to exist. Point No. 4 is answered accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">75. Point No. 5: I have already found that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act is not-repealed by the provisions contained in the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act nor is it in any way repugnant to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Even if there is no repeal or repugnancy between the two enactments, in certain cases if the provision in a former enactment become unworkable or cannot be applied in the light of the latter enactment, the former provision become inoperative and ineffective. If the application of a provision in the earlier enactment is dependent on the existence of certain factors and if those factors are effaced by a latter enactment, such a provision becomes unworkable and ceases to be operative. Tested in the light of the, above principle, I have no hesitation to hold that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act has become inoperative. Sections 7 and 17 are the two special provisions in regard to Marumakkathayee contained in the Hindu Succession Act. It was agreed by all counsel appearing for the parties that after the coming into force of the Abolition Act, Section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act which deals with devolution of interest in a tarwad property has become inoperative, for there is no interest in a tarwad property after the coming into force of the Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act. So far as Section 17 is concerned, by the abolition of the Marumakkathayam system of law, the substratum of Section 17 is gone and the object for which the special provision in Section 17 of the Act was made has ceased to exist. The provisions contained in Section 17 cannot be applied to any person as nobody will be governed by the Marumakkathayam law after 1-12-1976 which is a condition precedent for the applicability of that section. Accordingly I hold that Section 17 of the Hindu Succession Act has become inoperative and ineffective after the coming into force of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 from 1-12-1976 and no person dying after that date will be governed by Section 17 but only by the general provision contained in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. Point No. 5 answered accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">76. In the view that I have taken in regard to succession of Lakshmikutty Amma it is Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act that is applicable and not Section 17. If that be so, the plaintiff who is her husband alone will be her heir as admittedly she died issueless. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for with the decree of the trial court and accordingly. I dismiss the appeal, but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">77. In view of the majority view, the appeal is allowed and the suit will stand dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 24.5333px;">ABHISHEK 06012020</span></b></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-76851305766951557672020-01-27T17:58:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:58:33.741+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">SMT. ASHRAFI DEVI VS. SMT. GAYATRI DEVI<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 16.09.2008</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">This is a succession petition filed by the petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi for the grant of Succession Certificate in her favour, in respect of debts and securities left behind by his deceased son Sh. Krishan Kumar, who died at Delhi on 15.03.2006, leaving behind besides petitioner, his widow and a daughter namely Smt. Gayatri (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma, who are respondent No. 1 and 2 in this petition.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">After filing of this petition, notice of filing of this petition was given to the general public by way of publication in the newspaper 'VIR ARJUN' dated 03.05.2007, but none has appeared from general public to oppose or contest the present petition. Notices were sent to respondents, in response to the notices, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed objections in this case.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">An application under order 1 rule 10 CPC has been filed by the objector in which the obector request that since the objectors have claimed that Om Parkash has obtained amount from LIC therefore he becomes a necessary party and also the LIC becomes a necessary party in this case. In reply to the application the petitioner opposes it stating that Omprakash is neither a necessary nor a proper party. Admittedly Omprakash is brother of deceased and a brother of deceased does not fall in class one legal heir category.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no impediment for grant of Succession Certificate in favour of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi and also in favour of objectors No. 1 and 2 namely Smt. Gayatri Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma in the service benefits of deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar. I, accordingly direct that a Succession Certificate be issued in favour of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi and also in favour of objectors No. 1 and 2 namely Smt. Gayatri Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma in equal shares that is 1/3rd share each in the service benefits that is DCRG, CGEGIS'80 of deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar, on filing of requisite court fee and on furnishing an Indemnity Bond with one surety within 15 days.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">So far as pension and arrears of pension of the deceased are concerned, as per CCS Pension rules, the same is indivisible and payable to widow in case widow is alive and has not remarried. Thus, payment shall be exclusively right of the widow including arrears of pension, if any. The remaining service benefits be divided in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">However, the objector Smt. Gayatri Devi also deposed that besides the securities proved by the petitioner, the deceased has also left behind a LIC bearing No. 3330370147 in which one Om Parkash was a nominee and who has already obtained the said LIC policy amount of Rs.1,13,325/-, vide Cheque No. 636853 dated 06.05.2006 drawn on Corporation Bank, Adil Bagh, Palam, New Delhi. Law is well settled that the nominee is merely a receiving hand and a nominee does not steps into the shoe of (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) successor. Nominee accept money for and on behalf of successor as a trustee only. Thus, the petitioner as well as objectors being true successors are also entitled for that amount in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DELHI DISTRICT COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">SMT. ASHRAFI DEVI VS. SMT. GAYATRI DEVI<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 16.09.2008</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE COURT OF SHRI DIG VINAY SINGH: ADMINISTRATIVE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL JUDGE : DELHI</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Petition No. : 484/2006<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of Institution : 31.07.2006</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of order when reserved : 16.09.2008<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of order when announced :16.09.2008</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the matter of:-</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Smt. Ashrafi Devi, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">w/o. Late Sh. Munshi Lal, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">r/o. IX/4526, Gali No. 5, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Ajit Nagar, Gandhi Nagar, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Delhi-110031. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">....Petitioner.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Versus</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smt. Gayatri Devi, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">w/o. Late Sh. Krishan Kumar,</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ms. Pratikcha Sharma, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">d/o. Late Sh. Krishan Kumar,</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Both R/o. Type-I/40, Press Colony, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Mayapuri, New Delhi-64.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Government of India Press, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Ring Road, Maya Puri, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">New Delhi - 110064, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">through its Director. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">.....Respondents.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT :</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This is a succession petition filed by the petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi for the grant of Succession Certificate in her favour, in respect of debts and securities left behind by his deceased son Sh. Krishan Kumar, who died at Delhi on 15.03.2006, leaving behind besides petitioner, his widow and a daughter namely Smt. Gayatri (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma, who are respondent No. 1 and 2 in this petition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2 After filing of this petition, notice of filing of this petition was given to the general public by way of publication in the newspaper 'VIR ARJUN' dated 03.05.2007, but none has appeared from general public to oppose or contest the present petition. Notices were sent to respondents, in response to the notices, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed objections in this case.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Vide detailed order dated 07.04.2008, the objections filed by the both objectors have been decided. Reproduction of relevant para No. 3 to 5 would be relevant here.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Both objectors Respondent No 1 and 2 do not dispute the relationship of the petitioner with the deceased. Nor is there any dispute of the relationship between the two objectors and the deceased. It is also undisputed that deceased died intestate. Admittedly there is no other class one legal heir left behind by the deceased. A mother, widow and a daughter of a deceased male dying intestate falls in class one legal heir category as provided in the schedule of Hindu Succession Act and, section 8 section 9 of the said Act states that the assets of a deceased male dying intestate shall devolve upon all the class one legal heirs simultaneously and exclusively thereby meaning that the legal heir in class II category cannot inherit the property of a male Hindu until there are class one legal heir alive left behind by the deceased. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Objectors claimed that they were not made party in the case nor the relationship was disclosed with the deceased. This contention is against the records. (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) In the petition name of respondents are duly mentioned and in the list of near relatives of the deceased Annexure a filed along with the petition the relationship of both the respondent is mentioned as that a wife of deceased and daughter of deceased in the name of the two respondents itself. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is claimed by the objectors that the petitioner in connivance with the life insurance Corporation and brother of deceased Om Parkash obtained an amount of Rs 1,1 3,325 in the month of May 2006 against an LIC policy left behind by the deceased. It is claimed that LIC is a necessary party. It is also argued that mother of deceased cannot be sole beneficiary of the assets of deceased. There is no dispute to this question that as per Hindu succession Act mother, widow and daughter of a deceased are all entitled to equal share being class one legal heir. It is lastly claimed by the objectors that the respondent No 1 widow of deceased was residing along with the petitioner during the lifetime of deceased and entire istridhan of respondent No 1 is still lying in the custody of the petitioner which is proximity to the tune of Rs 5 lakhs and therefore petitioner is liable to return those articles. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">So far as this contention is concerned it cannot be a subject matter of succession petition. The claim of istridhan cannot be agitated in this court and the proper course for respondent No 1 is to approach ordinary civil court for recovery of the same. This is a summary proceeding wherein succession to the assets of a deceased male dying intestate has to be ascertained. Section 373 of Indian succession Act clearly provides that this court is to prima facie see as to who is entitled to the succession. In such summary proceedings recovery of istridhan articles cannot be made a subject. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">So far as objection that the petitioner in collusion with Om Parkash brother of deceased and in collision with life insurance Corporation of India obtained an LIC policy amount is concerned it is claimed on behalf of the petitioner that Omprakash was a nominee made by the deceased in the said LIC policy. In case LIC has made payment to the nominee, no wrong has been committed by the LIC. It is a different matter that a nominee is merely is a trustee who holds money or receives money on behalf of actual successors. In such circumstances if the objectors claim that they have their rights to the said amount of LIC policy, the proper course for them would be to file appropriate recovery proceedings in ordinary civil court.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. An application under order 1 rule 10 CPC has been filed by the objector in which the obector request that since the objectors have claimed that Om Parkash has obtained amount from LIC therefore he becomes a necessary party and also the LIC becomes a necessary party in this case. In reply to the application the petitioner opposes it stating that Omprakash is neither a necessary nor a proper party. Admittedly Omprakash is brother of deceased and a brother of deceased does not fall in class one legal heir category. I've already mentioned above that as per Hindu succession Act only class one legal heirs as mentioned in schedule one of Hindu succession Act are entitled to succession exclusively and simultaneously. Till the time class one legal heirs her alive class II legal heirs cannot succeed to the property of a deceased. Merely because Omprakash was a nominee who has obtained some money of LIC policy as a nominee, he does not become a necessary party or even a proper party in this case. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">At the most if objector claims that the nominee has taken away the money which belongs to the objector, the proper course would be for the objector to file suit for recovery in ordinary civil court. This application under order I rule 10 CPC is liable to be dismissed on this short ground along. The application is dismissed In view of above discussion it is held that the petitioner as well as the two objectors namely Smt Ashrafi Devi, Smt. Gayatri Devi and Pratiksha Sharma are entitled to succession certificate to the assets of deceased in the share of one-third each subject to payment of court fees proportionately. The objections are accordingly decided and put up this matter now for recording statement of the petitioner to exhibit the securities of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3 The deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar was the son of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi. He expired on 15.03.2006 at Delhi and his death certificate is proved as Ex.PW1/1. Besides the petitioner, the deceased has left behind (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) his widow Smt. Gayatri Devi and one daughter Ms. Pratikcha Sharma, who are objectors No. 1 and 2 in this petition. There is no other class-I legal heirs of the deceased except petitioner and objectors No. 1 and 2. The deceased was working with Government of India Press. A reply has been filed by the said department furnishing the outstanding dues of the deceased, the same is proved as Ex.PW1/2. The deceased was ordinarily a resident of Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4 Therefore, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no impediment for grant of Succession Certificate in favour of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi and also in favour of objectors No. 1 and 2 namely Smt. Gayatri Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma in the service benefits of deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar. I, accordingly direct that a Succession Certificate be issued in favour of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi and also in favour of objectors No. 1 and 2 namely Smt. Gayatri Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma in equal shares that is 1/3rd share each in the service benefits that is DCRG, CGEGIS'80 of deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar, on filing of requisite court fee and on furnishing an Indemnity Bond with one surety within 15 days.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5 So far as pension and arrears of pension of the deceased are concerned, as per CCS Pension rules, the same is indivisible and payable to widow in case widow is alive and has not remarried. Thus, payment shall be exclusively right of the widow including arrears of pension, if any. The remaining service benefits be divided in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">However, the objector Smt. Gayatri Devi also deposed that besides the securities proved by the petitioner, the deceased has also left behind a LIC bearing No. 3330370147 in which one Om Parkash was a nominee and who has already obtained the said LIC policy amount of Rs.1,13,325/-, vide Cheque No. 636853 dated 06.05.2006 drawn on Corporation Bank, Adil Bagh, Palam, New Delhi. Law is well settled that the nominee is merely a receiving hand and a nominee does not steps into the shoe of successor. Nominee accept money for and on behalf of successor as a trustee only. Thus, the petitioner as well as objectors being true successors are also entitled for that amount in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No further orders are required to be passed in the matter. File be consigned to Record Room.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Announced in the open court<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 18.6667px;">on 16.09.2008</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 18.6667px;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">(DIG VINAY SINGH )</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Administrative Civil Judge:Delhi</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Objector with counsel Sh. S.P. Chaudhary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Statement of petitioner and objector recorded as PW1 and OW1. PE closed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Recalled<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Present :<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>None.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vide separate judgment announced in the open court today, Succession Certificate is ordered to be issued in favour of petitioner Smt. Ashrafi Devi and also in favour of objectors No. 1 and 2 namely Smt. Gayatri Devi and Ms. Pratikcha Sharma in equal shares that is 1/3rd share each in the service benefits that is DCRG, CGEGIS'80 of deceased Sh. Krishan Kumar, on filing of requisite court fee and on furnishing an Indemnity Bond with one surety within 15 days.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">So far as pension and arrears of pension of the deceased are concerned, as per CCS Pension rules, the same is indivisible and payable to widow in case widow is alive and has not remarried. Thus, payment shall be exclusively right of the widow including arrears of pension, if any. The remaining service benefits be divided in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">However, the objector Smt. Gayatri Devi also deposed that besides the securities proved by the petitioner, the deceased has also left behind a LIC bearing No. 3330370147 in which one Om Parkash was a nominee and who has already obtained the said LIC policy amount of Rs.1,13,325/-, vide Cheque No. 636853 dated 06.05.2006 drawn on Corporation Bank, Adil Bagh, Palam, New Delhi. Law is well settled that the nominee is merely a receiving hand and a nominee does not steps into the shoe of (Jud./P.No.484 of 06/dtd.16.09.08/Smt. Ashrafi Devi Vs. State/total pages (6)/KK) successor. Nominee accept money for and on behalf of successor as a trustee only. Thus, the petitioner as well as objectors being true successors are also entitled for that amount in the ratio of 1/3rd share each.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No further orders are required to be passed in the matter. File be consigned to Record Room.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-16917749616261859132020-01-27T17:56:00.003+05:302020-01-27T17:56:37.083+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">G. VENKATESAN VS. THE TAHSILDAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 30.09.2016</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Introduction:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">This Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the order passed by the second respondent dated 07.04.2016 rejecting the petitioner's application for grant of legal heirship certificate on the ground that the petitioner's father V.Ganesa Sastrigal, died on 11.11.1997 and that 20 years have lapsed.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">According to the petitioner, the petitioner's father died on 11.11.1997 and he had obtained the death certificate of his father from Zone VIII of Corporation of Chennai in B & D.No.49678/97 issued by the Sanitation Inspector. The petitioner was residing at Jafferkhanpet, Chennai-83. It is further stated that his house and entire building collapsed due to the rain. Hence the petitioner shifted his residence from Jafferkhanpet to Chrompet during the month of April 2016. Then he applied for change of address in the petitioner's family card to the Taluk Supply Officer, Pammal and to various authorities. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The petitioner submitted his application along with relevant documents before the first respondent to issue the legal heir certificate. Thereafter the first respondent had passed the impugned order in O.Mu.372/2016/A3 dated 08.06.2016. The petitioner had given self declaration duly signed by the Notary Public Advocate and the same was filed along with the application for issuing of legal heir certificate before the first respondent and the self declaration was considered by the first respondent. The third respondent vide report 01.04.2016, recommended to the first respondent and the same was not taken by the first respondent. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">According to the petitioner, the petitioner's father died on 11.11.1997 and he had obtained the death certificate of his father from Zone VIII of Corporation of Chennai in B & D.No.49678/97 issued by the Sanitation Inspector. The petitioner was residing at Jafferkhanpet, Chennai-83. It is further stated that his house and entire building collapsed due to the rain. Hence the petitioner shifted his residence from Jafferkhanpet to Chrompet during the month of April 2016. Then he applied for change of address in the petitioner's family card to the Taluk Supply Officer, Pammal and to various authorities. The petitioner submitted his application along with relevant documents before the first respondent to issue the legal heir certificate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Thereafter the first respondent had passed the impugned order in O.Mu.372/2016/A3 dated 08.06.2016. The petitioner had given self declaration duly signed by the Notary Public Advocate and the same was filed along with the application for issuing of legal heir certificate before the first respondent and the self declaration was considered by the first respondent. The third respondent vide report 01.04.2016, recommended to the first respondent and the same was not taken by the first respondent. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Considering the above facts and circumstances of this case and also in the light of the order stated supra, this Court directs the first respondent to consider application submitted by petitioner afresh, after giving opportunity to all parties concerned, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In view of the above, this Writ Petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">G.VENKATESAN VS. THE TAHSILDAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 30.09.2016</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATED :<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>30.09.2016</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.RAJENDRAN</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">W.P.No.29681 of 2016 and </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">WMP No.25690 of 2016</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">G.Venkatesan<span style="mso-tab-count: 7;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">.. Petitioner</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.The Tahsildar </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Pallavaram Taluk Office, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Pallavaram, Chennai 600 043.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The Revenue Inspector, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Pammal Range, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Office of the Pallavaram Taluk Office,</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pallavaram, Chennai 600 043.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.The Village Administrative Officer, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Pammal Village, Pallavaram Taluk, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Kancheepurm District.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">.. Respondents</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Prayer :-Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent in the letter no.Q.Mu.372/2016/A3 dated 08.06.2016 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st respondent to issue legal heir certificate to the petitioner after completing all formalities by considering the reports already submitted by the 2nd and 3rd respondent to the 1st respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Petitioner<span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>: Mr.K.S.Jeya Ganeshan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Respondents : Mr.A.Kumar<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Spl.Government Pleader<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>ORDER</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the order passed by the second respondent dated 07.04.2016 rejecting the petitioner's application for grant of legal heirship certificate on the ground that the petitioner's father V.Ganesa Sastrigal, died on 11.11.1997 and that 20 years have lapsed.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. According to the petitioner, the petitioner's father died on 11.11.1997 and he had obtained the death certificate of his father from Zone VIII of Corporation of Chennai in B & D.No.49678/97 issued by the Sanitation Inspector. The petitioner was residing at Jafferkhanpet, Chennai-83. It is further stated that his house and entire building collapsed due to the rain. Hence the petitioner shifted his residence from Jafferkhanpet to Chrompet during the month of April 2016. Then he applied for change of address in the petitioner's family card to the Taluk Supply Officer, Pammal and to various authorities. The petitioner submitted his application along with relevant documents before the first respondent to issue the legal heir certificate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thereafter the first respondent had passed the impugned order in O.Mu.372/2016/A3 dated 08.06.2016. The petitioner had given self declaration duly signed by the Notary Public Advocate and the same was filed along with the application for issuing of legal heir certificate before the first respondent and the self declaration was considered by the first respondent. The third respondent vide report 01.04.2016, recommended to the first respondent and the same was not taken by the first respondent. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.Learned counsel placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court in R.Manivalraj V.s State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Fort St George, Chennai and another, dated 10.07.2009, wherein this Court considered the case where similar order of rejection was passed and wherein the application seeking for legal heriship certificate was filed after the death of the petitioner's father therein, after a period of 38 years and this Court, after hearing the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents who relied upon the Manual for Revenue Administration, disposed of the writ petition with certain directions. The said order reads thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This writ petition is filed for issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to issue legal heirship certificate to the petitioner herein in respect of death of his father R. Raju on the application made by the petitioner dated 24.11.2008.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. The case of the petitioner is that his father, R. Raju Naidu died on 22.2.1971 and as on date, the petitioner and his three sisters are the legal heirs of the deceased R. Raju Naidu. According to the petitioner, he applied for legal heirship certificate to the 2nd respondent by application dated 24.11.2008. But, no orders were passed on the same. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is in need of the legal heirship certificate in order to dispose of a property to arrange the marriage of one of his sisters. Though the application seeking legal heirship certificate submitted to the 2nd respondent along with the relevant documents was forwarded to Revenue Inspector <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I for enquiry, the Revenue Inspector-I, without assigning any reasons, declined to conduct an enquiry and consequently, no legal heirship certificate was issued.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents has produced the manual for Revenue Department wherein, in the annexure to the said manual, certain guidelines have been issued with regard to issuance of legal heirship certificate and they are as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">According to the learned Additional Advocate General, as per clauses 4 and 5 of the said guidelines, on receipt of the application seeking legal heirship certificate, the Revenue Inspector and the Village Administrative Officer concerned have to enquire the applicant, his family members, relatives, neighbours and general public and record statements from them. The officers concerned will also have to carefully scrutinize documents such as ration card, Will, Marriage invitation card and other documents relating to the assets of the deceased, ascertain as to who are the legal heirs of the deceased and thereafter submit a report to the Tahsildar. Learned Additional Advocate General, fairly conceded that no time limit has been prescribed under the guidelines with regard to the issue of legal heirship certificate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his father died 38 years back cannot be a ground to deny the legal heirship certificate sought for by the petitioner without conducting an enquiry as stipulated in the guidelines has to be accepted. Further, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that as per the above guidelines, the Tahsildar concerned has to make an enquiry and issue the legal heirship certificate. Now, as on date, though the petitioner is residing within Tambaram jurisdiction, the application for legal heirship certificate has been made to Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk, who is not the competent authority.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Considering the above submission made by the learned Additional Advocate General, the petitioner is at liberty to make a request for issue of legal heirship certificate to Tahsildar, Tambaram and on receipt of such application, the authority concerned shall consider and pass orders in accordance with the guidelines issued in the manual for Revenue Department. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Considering the above facts and circumstances of this case and also in the light of the order stated supra, this Court directs the first respondent to consider application submitted by petitioner afresh, after giving opportunity to all parties concerned, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In view of the above, this Writ Petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30.09.2016 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No kkd B.RAJENDRAN,J., kkd To<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.The Tahsildar Pallavaram Taluk Office, Pallavaram, Chennai 600 043.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The Revenue Inspector, Pammal Range, Office of the Pallavaram Taluk Office, Pallavaram, Chennai 600 043.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.The Village Administrative Officer, Pammal Village, Pallavaram Taluk, Kancheepurm District.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">W.P.No.29681 of 2016 and WMP No.25690 of 2016 30.09.2016</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-28915814919044040182020-01-27T17:54:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:54:10.630+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">M. G. MAMTHA VS. THE TAHSILDAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 06.02.2018</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The first petitioner is the mother and the second petitioner is the adopted daughter of the first petitioner and her deceased husband by name Chandrasekar. These petitioners are aggrieved against the order of the respondent in refusing to issue them the Legal Heirship Certificate in pursuant to the death of the said Chandrasekar only on the reason that the second petitioner is Class II heir of the deceased and therefore, the petitioners have to approach the Civil Court and get remedy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The case of the petitioners, in short, is as follows:</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The first petitioner was married to the said S.Chandrasekar in the year 1987. As there was no issue out of their wedlock for long number of years, they have adopted the second petitioner, while she was 1 1/2 years old from the first petitioner's brother and his wife, on 24.11.1994, as per their family customs followed in that locality. A deed of adoption was entered into on 24.11.1994 and registered as Document No.18 of 1995 on the file of the Sub Registrar, Dhenkanikottai. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The said Chandrasekar died intestate on 19.06.2017, leaving behind the petitioners as his legal heirs. All the records like School Transfer Certificate, Ration Card, Community Certificate carried the name of the second petitioner as daughter of late Chandrasekar and the first petitioner. An application was filed before the respondent on 03.07.2017, for issuing the Legal Heirship Certificate for the purpose of transferring patta and for operating bank accounts, etc., However, the said request was rejected by passing the impugned order, as stated supra.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In this case, the respondent has not doubted the genuineness of the documents produced by the petitioners in support of their claim including the deed of adoption. Therefore, there cannot be any legal impediment for the respondent in issuing a Legal Hiership Certificate to the petitioners, as sought for by them.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the matter is remitted back to the respondent to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate of the deceased Chandrasekar to the petitioners. Such exercise shall be done by the respondent within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">M.G.MAMTHA VS. THE TAHSILDAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 06.02.2018</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATED : 06.02.2018<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Orders Reserved on 01.02.2018</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Orders Delivered on 06.02.2018<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">THE HON'BLE Mr.JUSTICE K. RAVICHANDRABAABU<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">W.P.No.27592 of 2017<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.M.G.Mamtha<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.C.Soundarya<span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...Petitioners</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Tahsildar,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Dhenkanikottai Taluk Office,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Dhenkanikottai,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Krishnagiri District.<span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>...Respondent<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Prayer:Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the respondent relating to Na.Ka.4276/2017/B2 dated 17.10.2017 and quash the same and consequently direct respondent herein to issue Legal Heirship Certificate of late Chandrasekar including the names of the petitioners as wife and daughter on the basis of the petitioner's application dated 03.07.2017, within the time to be stipulated by this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For petitioners <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>: Mr.R.Bharath Kumar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Respondent<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>: Mr.R.Govindasamy<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Special Government Pleader<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The first petitioner is the mother and the second petitioner is the adopted daughter of the first petitioner and her deceased husband by name Chandrasekar. These petitioners are aggrieved against the order of the respondent in refusing to issue them the Legal Heirship Certificate in pursuant to the death of the said Chandrasekar only on the reason that the second petitioner is Class II heir of the deceased and therefore, the petitioners have to approach the Civil Court and get remedy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The case of the petitioners, in short, is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The first petitioner was married to the said S.Chandrasekar in the year 1987. As there was no issue out of their wedlock for long number of years, they have adopted the second petitioner, while she was 1 1/2 years old from the first petitioner's brother and his wife, on 24.11.1994, as per their family customs followed in that locality. A deed of adoption was entered into on 24.11.1994 and registered as Document No.18 of 1995 on the file of the Sub Registrar, Dhenkanikottai. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The said Chandrasekar died intestate on 19.06.2017, leaving behind the petitioners as his legal heirs. All the records like School Transfer Certificate, Ration Card, Community Certificate carried the name of the second petitioner as daughter of late Chandrasekar and the first petitioner. An application was filed before the respondent on 03.07.2017, for issuing the Legal Heirship Certificate for the purpose of transferring patta and for operating bank accounts, etc., However, the said request was rejected by passing the impugned order, as stated supra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.The respondent filed a counter affidavit by stating as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The first petitioner married to the said Chandrasekar and they adopted a girl child on 24.11.1994. The said Chandrasekar died intestate on 19.06.2017, leaving behind the petitioners as his legal heirs to succeed estate. The petitioners applied for Legal Heirship Certificate. The Revenue Inspector, on verification and enquiry, submitted a report on 06.10.2017 and recommended for issuance of Legal Heirship Certificate, certifying that the petitioners are the legal heirs of the said Chandrasekar. A legal opinion dated 11.10.2017 was also furnished by the learned Government Pleader, Dhenkanikottai. However, the petitioner's request was not considered, since the second respondent being an adopted daughter, cannot be considered as Class I heir as per the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4.Learned counsel for the petitioners, after inviting this Court's attention to Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2003(4) SCC 71, (Namdev Vyankat Ghadge vs Chandrakant Ganpat Ghadge), contended that the reasoning of the respondent in refusing to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Thus, he submitted that the second petitioner, the adopted daughter is to be treated as the child of the first petitioner and the deceased Chandrasekar for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption and therefore, the respondent is bound to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate by including the name of the second petitioner also as Class I heir of the deceased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5.On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader reiterated the contentions raised in the counter affidavit as well as the reasons stated in the impugned order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6.Heard both sides.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7.The adoption of the second petitioner by the first petitioner and her deceased husband is not under dispute. On the other hand, the respondent himself admitted in the counter affidavit about the factum of such adoption on 24.11.1994 followed by the verification and enquiry conducted in the locality, by the Revenue Inspector, who in turn also filed a report on 06.10.2017, to that effect as well. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, now the question that arises for consideration is whether the second petitioner, as the adopted daughter, is entitled to be treated as Class I legal heir, to be included as one of the legal heir of the deceased while issuing the Legal Heirship Certificate or it is for the petitioners to agitate the matter before the Civil Court to get the right and status of the second petitioner so declared therein, as stated in the impugned order. In order to answer the above question, it is better to understand the relevant provisions of law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. Section 3(1)(f) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 defines the word "heir" as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">" "heir" means any person, male or female, who is entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under this Act;"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, it shows that a person who inherits or by law inherit the estate of the deceased is called heir.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9.Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with effects of adoption. It reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"12.Effect of adoptions:- An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided that-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10.The above said provision of law has come up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in 2003(4)SCC 71, (Namdev Vyankat Ghadge v. Chandrakant Ganpat Ghadge), wherein at paragraph Nos.17 and 18, it has been observed as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"17.It is plain and clear that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adopted father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption as is evident from the main part of Section 12. Proviso (c) to Section 12 in clear terms states that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate, which vested in him or her before the adoption.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18.In the case of Dharma, ((1988) 2 SCC 126) aforementioned, the adopted son became a member of coparcenary with Dharma and there was no question of divesting of any property already vested in the view expressed by this Court in Vasant, ((1987) 1 SCC 160)."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11.In fact, the Apex Court relied on the earlier decisions made and reported in 1998(2)SCC 126, (Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe) and 1987(1)SCC 160, (Vasant v. Dattu), to hold that the adopted son therein became a member of the Coparcenary, entitled to claim share in the property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.Perusal of the above said provision of law as well as the decision of the Apex Court, as discussed supra would show without any ambiguity that an adopted child, from the date of the legal adoption, becomes the child of adoptive father or mother for all purposes since such child severed his or her ties in the family of his or her birth from the said day onwards. Consequently, all the ties of the child are replaced in the adoptive family created by adoption. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Though such adopted child, in the adoptive family, is not the child by biological creation, however, it should be born in mind that such adopted child is the child of the adoptive family by legal creation, which status certainly confers on such child all such rights as a biological child in the adoptive family. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Once such right is conferred under law, the said child is to be considered, treated, looked into, given the status as the child of the adoptive family, as the prefix "adopted" is bound to vanish or atleast loose its significance any more for any purpose from the day of adoption. Hence, the respondent is not empowered to deny the same and refuse to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate to the second petitioner, as she is to be treated as the child of the deceased Chandrasekar for all purposes and consequently, she becomes the Class I heir of the deceased and thus, entitled to get her name also included in the Legal Heirship Certificate.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13.At the same time, it is to be noted that a duty is cast upon the competent authority, before whom such an application is made, to get himself satisfied as to the genuineness of the supportive documents produced in support of such claim of adoption, like deed of adoption, etc., Only when such authority has any reasonable doubt in his mind with regard to genuineness of such adoption, that too, after conducting an enquiry in the locality, he can direct the parties to approach the Civil Court and get their rights established. Otherwise, the authority has to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate based on such documents. In this case, the respondent has not doubted the genuineness of the documents produced by the petitioners in support of their claim including the deed of adoption. Therefore, there cannot be any legal impediment for the respondent in issuing a Legal Hiership Certificate to the petitioners, as sought for by them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14.Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the matter is remitted back to the respondent to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate of the deceased Chandrasekar to the petitioners. Such exercise shall be done by the respondent within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">06.02.2018 Speaking/Non Speaking Index :Yes/No vri To The Tahsildar, Dhenkanikottai Taluk Office, Dhenkanikottai, Krishnagiri District.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">K.RAVICHANDRABAABU, J.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-76858161666546176702020-01-27T17:51:00.003+05:302020-01-27T17:51:47.342+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">KARAN SINGH VS MOLHAR & OTHERS<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 06.03.2018</span></b><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Introduction:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">This is an appeal filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree of reversal passed by the lower Appellate Court; whereby while reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the suit filed by the defendant was ordered to be decreed.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The brief facts of this case are that one Kartara was the owner of the suit property. He had three brothers and one sister. Kartara died unmarried and issueless. One of the brother, Gopala had five sons. The other brothers of 1 of 9 Kartara had also expired. Kartara had executed a Will dated 15.01.1980 in favour of the five sons of Gopala. Thereafter, the testator expired on 14.04.1980. After the death of Kartara, the mutation regarding his properties was entered in the name of five sons of Gopala. The sister of Kartara, namely Kartari Devi, filed the suit on 04.01.2001 challenging the mutation dated 11.09.1982 qua the properties of Kartara in favour of five sons of Gopala. Hence, Kartari Devi, sister of Kartara is the plaintiff in this case and nephews of Kartara, i.e. the sons of his brother Gopala, are the defendants in the present case.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the mutation entered in the name of the defendants, is illegal, null and void and was entered by the revenue authorities without any notice. It is further averred by her that she was not aware about the mutation because the defendants used to give her the share of the agricultural produce and represented to her that she should not bother about the entries in the revenue records. However, in the year 2000, she wanted to obtain loan by mortgaging her share in the suit property. At that time, she found that she had been excluded from the inheritance from her brother Kartara. Hence, she challenged the mutation.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record with their able assistance, this Court is of the considered opinion that the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants or defendants deserve to be sustained. Admittedly, the mutation was sanctioned in the year 1982 and in the revenue records itself it is so mentioned that the mutation was being sanctioned on the basis of the Will executed by deceased Kartara and that the Will was produced before the revenue authorities.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Once the Will is the basis of sanction of the mutation which the plaintiff was challenging; the plaintiff was under duty to challenge the Will as well. Unless the Will itself is challenged by the plaintiff, the mutation only cannot be set aside. A bare perusal of the plaint filed by the plaintiff shows that there is not even a single line questioning the execution or the validity of the Will of the deceased Kartara in favour of the defendants.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Neither any issue is framed by the Court regarding the execution or validity of the Will of the deceased Kartara. Rather pleadings in plaint reflect her acquiescing to the Will in favour of defendants. In view of the above situation, it is not the bounden duty upon the defendants to lead evidence regarding the execution of the Will or to prove the Will by examining the witness as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act. The findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court in this regard are totally perverse and are liable to be reversed.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In view of the above, the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court are held to be perverse and non-sustainable. The same are set aside. The present appeal is allowed. The suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein is ordered to be dismissed.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">KARAN SINGH VS MOLHAR & OTHERS<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 06.03.2018</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">AT CHANDIGARH<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RSA No.2107 of 2008 (O&M)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Decided on: 06.03.2018<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Ranjit Singh and others<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>..........Appellants<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Versus<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Kartari Devi (deceased) through LRs<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>..........Respondents<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Coram : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJBIR SEHRAWAT<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Present : Mr. Arun Jain, Senior Advocate with Mr. Amit Jain, Advocate for the appellants. Mr. Jagdish Manchanda, Advocate for the respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Rajbir Sehrawat, J.(Oral)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CM-2072-C & 2054-C of 2018<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Since there is already sufficient material on the record for just decision of the case, therefore, the applications moved by the learned counsel for the appellants are dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RSA No. 2107 of 2008 (O&M)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. This is an appeal filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree of reversal passed by the lower Appellate Court; whereby while reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the suit filed by the defendant was ordered to be decreed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. For convenience, the parties would be referred herein as the plaintiff and defendants; as they were referred in the original suit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The brief facts of this case are that one Kartara was the owner of the suit property. He had three brothers and one sister. Kartara died unmarried and issueless. One of the brother, Gopala had five sons. The other brothers of 1 of 9 Kartara had also expired. Kartara had executed a Will dated 15.01.1980 in favour of the five sons of Gopala. Thereafter, the testator expired on 14.04.1980. After the death of Kartara, the mutation regarding his properties was entered in the name of five sons of Gopala. The sister of Kartara, namely Kartari Devi, filed the suit on 04.01.2001 challenging the mutation dated 11.09.1982 qua the properties of Kartara in favour of five sons of Gopala. Hence, Kartari Devi, sister of Kartara is the plaintiff in this case and nephews of Kartara, i.e. the sons of his brother Gopala, are the defendants in the present case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. In the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the mutation entered in the name of the defendants, is illegal, null and void and was entered by the revenue authorities without any notice. It is further averred by her that she was not aware about the mutation because the defendants used to give her the share of the agricultural produce and represented to her that she should not bother about the entries in the revenue records. However, in the year 2000, she wanted to obtain loan by mortgaging her share in the suit property. At that time, she found that she had been excluded from the inheritance from her brother Kartara. Hence, she challenged the mutation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Upon notice, the defendants appeared and filed their joint written statement by taking routine preliminary objections regarding locus standi, maintainability of suit and regarding limitation. It is claimed that the plaintiff was having full knowledge about mutation No. 536 dated 11.09.1982 which was sanctioned in her presence and she was very much a consenting party in the said transaction. On merit, it is pleaded that the plaintiff is not a legal heir of the deceased Kartara according to Hindu Succession Act; since only brother have a right to inherit the property left by his issueless brother. It is further averred that the legal Will was made by Kartara in favour of the 2 of 9 defendants and the mutation on the basis of the same has been duly sanctioned in favour of the defendants. No payment or any share of the agricultural produce was ever given to the plaintiff because she had no right in the suit land.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Plaintiff filed replication to the written statement. She reiterated the contents of the plaint and denied the contents of the written statement. After considering the respective pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for declaration as prayed for?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file and maintain the present suit?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file and maintain the present suit?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Whether the suit is time barred?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by her own act and conduct from filing the present suit?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. Relief."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Parties led their evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the evidence recorded in file, the learned Trial Court held that, admittedly, the mutation in question has been sanctioned by the revenue authorities on the basis of a Will; and the factum of production of the Will before the authorities at the time of sanction of this mutation has been mentioned in the revenue records itself. The plaintiff has not challenged the execution of the Will or the authenticity of the Will in favour of the defendants. The challenge of the plaintiff in the suit is limited to the mutation in favour of the defendants. Since there was no challenge to the execution or authenticity of the Will, 3 of 9 therefore, the defendants were not required even to lead evidence or to prove the Will in question. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to any declaration that the mutation is illegal, null and void. Aggrieved against this judgment and decree, the plaintiff filed the appeal before lower Appellate Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. The lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and ordered that the suit filed by the plaintiff to be decreed. While decreeing the suit, the lower Appellate Court held that the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession Act. As per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the properties of a Hindu male are required to be devolved on the legal heirs of the deceased. Since the defendants had claimed a testamentary transaction to exclude the natural succession, therefore, it was for the defendants to plead and prove the Will in their favour. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Since the defendants have not led any evidence to prove the Will, therefore, it shall be assumed that no Will was even executed by the said Kartara in favour of the defendants. While controverting the inference drawn by the Trial Court, the lower Appellate Court has recorded that since the impugned mutation was sanctioned on the basis of the Will, therefore, challenge to mutation amounts to challenge to the Will as well. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed by the defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. While arguing the case, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is perverse and is beyond the pleadings of the parties. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the Will in favour of the defendants has not even been questioned by the plaintiff in her plaint. Since there were no averments in the plaint regarding challenge to the Will, therefore, the defendants were not 4 of 9 required to assert the execution or the authenticity of the Will as such. Accordingly, keeping in view the pleadings of the parties, the Court had framed issues. As per the issues framed by the Court, the execution or authenticity of the Will was not a fact in issue between the parties. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, the lower Appellate Court has gone wrong in law in assuming a burden of proof upon the defendants to, suo moto, come forward and to plead and prove the execution and validity of the Will. Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Will was executed way back on 15.01.1980. The present suit has been filed only on 04.01.2001. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff is hopelessly time barred. Accordingly, the prayer for reversal of the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is made by the learned counsel for the appellants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. Controverting the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that since the mutation which was based on a Will itself has been challenged, therefore, it would tantamount to challenge to the Will as well. Still further, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the property of a male Hindu is to devolve upon the legal heirs of the deceased in accordance with Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, the property should have come, proportionately, to her as per the law of succession. Regarding the point of limitation, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the respondent came to know about the mutation only in the year 2000. Hence, the suit is not barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that otherwise also; for challenging the mutation by way of assertion of the title, there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Gurcharan Singh and others Versus Surjit Kaur and 5 of 9 others; 2005(3) RCR(Civil) 628.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. Having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record with their able assistance, this Court is of the considered opinion that the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants deserve to be sustained. Admittedly, the mutation was sanctioned in the year 1982 and in the revenue records itself it is so mentioned that the mutation was being sanctioned on the basis of the Will executed by deceased Kartara and that the Will was produced before the revenue authorities. Once the Will is the basis of sanction of the mutation which the plaintiff was challenging; the plaintiff was under duty to challenge the Will as well. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Unless the Will itself is challenged by the plaintiff, the mutation only cannot be set aside. A bare perusal of the plaint filed by the plaintiff shows that there is not even a single line questioning the execution or the validity of the Will of the deceased Kartara in favour of the defendants. Neither any issue is framed by the Court regarding the execution or validity of the Will of the deceased Kartara. Rather pleadings in plaint reflect her acquiescing to the Will in favour of defendants. In view of the above situation, it is not the bounden duty upon the defendants to lead evidence regarding the execution of the Will or to prove the Will by examining the witness as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act. The findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court in this regard are totally perverse and are liable to be reversed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. Argument of learned counsel for the respondent, as was sought to be pressed into the service before the lower Appellate Court as well, that the properties of Hindu male devolve upon his legal heirs as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act; is also not worth sustaining. A bare perusal of Section 8 shows that this Section is meant to cover succession of an 'intestate' Hindu 6 of 9 male. In the present case, the admitted position between the parties is that the mutation in question is not regarding the properties of an 'intestate' Hindu. Rather the mutation is specifically based upon a testamentary transaction of 'Will' claimed to have been executed by deceased Kartara. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, the applicability of Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, per se, cannot be presumed in the case. Had the plaintiff challenged the Will so as to dinude the mutation of its very basis and had the defendant failed to prove the execution and authenticity of the Will, only then the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would have been operative. Hence, the claim of the plaintiff regarding challenge to the mutation is not well founded. Hence, the same has to be declined.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. The another aspect of the case is that the mutation in question is dated 11.09.1982. The present suit has been filed only on 04.01.2001. On the face of it, the suit is time barred, this being a suit for declaration. To cover up the limitation, the plaintiff has tried to claim that she came to know about the mutation only in the year 2000; when she intended to take loan and she contacted the revenue officials in this regard. However, no such evidence has been led by the plaintiff to substantiate her claim regarding having no knowledge of the mutation prior to the year 2000. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Otherwise also, the bare pleadings raised by the plaintiff in the suit show that she was aware of the entry of mutation entered in favour of her nephews, the defendant, because it has been pleaded by her that earlier the defendants were giving her the share of the agricultural produce and were assuring her that she need not bother about the revenue entries. This reflects that the plaintiff was very much aware of the entry of mutation. Either she was convinced of the validity and legality of the mutation based on 'Will' or she had acceded to the factum of the mutation; consoling herself with the share which she was getting as 7 of 9 agricultural produce, if at all she was being given by the defendants. In either case, the plaintiff cannot avoid the consequences of limitation; in view of the facts of the present case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Gurcharan Singh's case(supra). There is no dispute regarding the proposition of the law laid down in the judgment. However, that judgment is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. That judgment is restricted to challenge to the entries of the mutation on the basis that the fraudulent mutation based on false pedigree table which does not confer a title and there is no limitation for filing a suit for declaration regarding asserting the title of the person. It is settled law that there is no limitation for challenging an entry of mutation which is not based on a recognized transaction of transfer of title and also for asserting the title by a person. In such case limitation starts when there is a threat to the title of such person. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">When the title of a person is threatened by a recognized mode of transfer of title; testamentary or non-testamentary; then the person whose title is sought to be threatened is required to question the said recognized transaction of transfer of title within period of prescribed limitation. In that situation, the limitation would start running from the date of transaction of transfer threatening the title. In the present case, as is reflected even in the revenue record, a recognized transaction of transfer of title; through a testamentary mode; is dated 15.01.1980. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Hence, the limitation would start running from this date itself unless the plaintiff was able to assert and prove the exemption from or extension of the limitation. Nothing of that sort has been attempted by the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is also held to be time barred. Although, it is right that the issue as recorded by the Trial Court; regarding limitation was not pressed by the defendants before it, 8 of 9 however, that does not mean that the plaintiff can avoid the consequences of the limitation. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 3 of the Limitation Act cast a bounden duty upon the Court to take into consideration the point of limitation even if the same is not raised by the parties if the same is apparent on the fact of it . Otherwise also, learned counsel for the appellants has rightly submitted that although before the Trial Court, this point was not pressed in view of the fact that the suit was being dismissed on other preliminary points only, however, before the lower Appellate Court this point was duly agitated by the appellants. However, the same was wrongly and illegally rejected by the lower Appellate Court. This Court finds itself in agreement with the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff is held to be time barred.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. No other argument was raised by the learned counsel for the parties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. In view of the above, the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court are held to be perverse and non-sustainable. The same are set aside. The present appeal is allowed. The suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein is ordered to be dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6th March, 2018<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[RAJBIR SEHRAWAT]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">shabha<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>JUDGE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether speaking/reasoned - Yes<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-90671382702787293192020-01-27T17:49:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:49:32.375+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DELHI DISTRICT COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MRS. GEETIKA BAHL VS. SH. KRISHAN TIWARI<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 22.12.2018</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2qIBHqVqTFTuuFBFAxzA81noinh-hETr2tkWL-jFVcdBsIQTFVcPxQ45FEAprxeZsJjz1FzH2skILWVJrj5EDE46iVJOTJqBlPGPRF3UwsbwmD25L5vT_SRK0TNwOHy75MXYYhZ22zVc/s1600/tis+hazari+court.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="315" data-original-width="630" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2qIBHqVqTFTuuFBFAxzA81noinh-hETr2tkWL-jFVcdBsIQTFVcPxQ45FEAprxeZsJjz1FzH2skILWVJrj5EDE46iVJOTJqBlPGPRF3UwsbwmD25L5vT_SRK0TNwOHy75MXYYhZ22zVc/s640/tis+hazari+court.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Introduction:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">This judgement shall dispose of the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition and permanent injunction against the defendants in respect of property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Briefly stated the case of the plaintiffs is that late S. K. Tiwari the father of plaintiffs died on 07.06.2003 leaving behind Will dt 07.02.2003 executed in their favour thereby bequeathing his estate on all the plaintiffs in equal share.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Grandfather of the plaintiffs namely Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari had three sons and one daughter namely late Sh. Surender Kumar Tiwari, Sh. Krishan Tiwari i.e. efendant No.1, Sh. Rakesh Tiwari i.e. defendant No.2 and Smt. Nargis Vohra i.e. defendant No.3.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Grandfather of the plaintiffs owned a house bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A., Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The said House was the self acquired property of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari. Sh. Des Raj Tiwari died on 20.01.2003 intestate. Father of the plaintiffs was residing/occupying the ground floor of the said property and defendant No.1 is residing on the second floor and defendant No.2 is residing on the first floor of the said property.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Unfortunately, Sh. S. K. Tiwari, the father of the plaintiffs died CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 2 of 14 on 07.06.2003 leaving behind plaintiffs as his only legal heirs and thus plaintiffs inherited the estate/properties, shares, rights in all the properties held, own and possessed by their father. It is stated that Sh. S.K.Tiwari by way of registered Will dated 07.02.2003 bequeathed his share in the partnership business and his 1/4th share in the immovable property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, Delhi in favour of his daughters i.e. plaintiffs in equal shares.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Admittedly, plaintiffs are settled in their matrimonial home but they do have legal right in the property in case their father was having share in the suit property. Defendant No. 3 did not dispute that plaintiffs are legal heirs but disputing that plaintiffs' father executed the Will in favour of plaintiffs. It has already been discussed herein before that irrespective of the Will plaintiffs being legal heirs are entitled to inherit the estate of deceased Sh. S.K. Tiwari particularly when no other Will is set up to have been executed by Sh. S.K. Tiwari. What defendant No. 3 is talking about is the physical possession of any part of the suit property by the plaintiffs but in the present suit neither defendants No. 1 and 2 nor defendant No. 3 have pleaded ouster of the plaintiffs from the suit property. In this circumstance principle that possession of one co-owner is on behalf of all co-owner is squarely applicable in the present suit and therefore plaintiffs being in legal possession are liable to pay fixed court fees. Hence, issue No.3 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Relief In view of the above discussion, suit of the plaintiffs is allowed and preliminary decree of partition is hereby passed in favours of the plaintiffs CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 13 of 14 thereby declaring that plaintiffs are jointly and each of the defendants are individually entitled to 1/4th share in the suit property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A. Karol Bagh, Delhi.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Decree of permanent injunction is also hereby passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants thereby restraining the defendants, their agents, assignee, legal heirs etc not to part with possession of the suit property or create third party interest in any manner in the suit property till the time suit property is partitioned by meats and bound or otherwise partition takes place.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DELHI DISTRICT COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MRS. GEETIKA BAHL VS. SH. KRISHAN TIWARI<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 22.12.2018</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE COURT OF SH. HARISH KUMAR : ADDITIONAL DISTRICT<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGE -13 : CENTRAL DISTRICT : TIS HAZARI COURTS : DELHI<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CS No. 9684/2016<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Mrs. Geetika Bahl, W/o Sh. Jeewan Mohan Bahl, R/o E-168/169, IIIrd Floor, Amar Colony, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Mrs. Deepika Kalra, W/o Sh. Ajay Kalra, R/o 26/14, Second Floor, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi- 110008<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Mrs. Neetika Chopra, W/o Sh. Sunil Chopra R/o 61/16, Old Rajender Nagar, New Delhi-110060<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>.... Plaintiffs<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">VERSUS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Sh. Krishan Tiwari S/o Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari, R/o 9-A/82, W.E.A. 2nd Floor, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Sh. Rakesh Tiwari, S/o Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari, R/o 9-A/82, W.E.A 1st floor, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Smt. Nargis Vohra D/o Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari R/o 61/15, Old Rajiinder Nagar, New Delhi - 110060<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>............... Defendants<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of institution of present suit<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>18.05.2004<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of receiving in this court<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>29.11.2018<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Date of Judgment<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>22.12.2018</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Suit for Partition and Permanent Injunction<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This judgement shall dispose of the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition and permanent injunction against the defendants in respect of property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Case of the plaintiffs<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Briefly stated the case of the plaintiffs is that late S. K. Tiwari the father of plaintiffs died on 07.06.2003 leaving behind Will dt 07.02.2003 executed in their favour thereby bequeathing his estate on all the plaintiffs in equal share.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Grandfather of the plaintiffs namely Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari had three sons and one daughter namely late Sh. Surender Kumar Tiwari, Sh. Krishan Tiwari i.e. defendant No.1, Sh. Rakesh Tiwari i.e. defendant No.2 and Smt. Nargis Vohra i.e. defendant No.3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Further grandfather of the plaintiffs namely Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari along with defendant No. 1 and 2 and father of the plaintiffs namely Sh. S. K. Tiwari was doing business of printing in partnership under the name and style of M/s British India Press at H-35/2, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. After the death of grandfather of the plaintiff, father of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 and 2 continued the partnership firm in equal share.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Grandfather of the plaintiffs owned a house bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A., Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The said House was the self acquired property of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari. Sh. Des Raj Tiwari died on 20.01.2003 intestate. Father of the plaintiffs was residing/occupying the ground floor of the said property and defendant No.1 is residing on the second floor and defendant No.2 is residing on the first floor of the said property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Unfortunately, Sh. S. K. Tiwari, the father of the plaintiffs died CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 2 of 14 on 07.06.2003 leaving behind plaintiffs as his only legal heirs and thus plaintiffs inherited the estate/properties, shares, rights in all the properties held, own and possessed by their father. It is stated that Sh. S.K.Tiwari by way of registered Will dated 07.02.2003 bequeathed his share in the partnership business and his 1/4th share in the immovable property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, Delhi in favour of his daughters i.e. plaintiffs in equal shares.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Plaintiffs approached the defendants No.1 and 2 through defendant No.3 to settle the accounts of the partnership business M/s British India Press and with respect to the 1/4th undivided share in the immovable property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, Delhi but despite the said approach and service of legal notice dt. 12.01.2004 the defendants have failed to settle the accounts of partnership firms and partition the suit property. Hence, plaintiffs have filed the present suit for partition of the above said property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Upon summons being served, defendant No. 1 & 2 filed joint written statement. Defendant No. 1 & 2 except denying the execution of Will by father of the plaintiffs in favour of the plaintiffs did not dispute the narratives as pleaded by plaintiffs but disputed that Sh Des Raj Tiwari died intestate. It has been stated that property No. 9-A/82, WEA, Karol Bagh, Delhi was self acquired property of Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari, who had executed Will dt. 22.10.2002 in respect of above said property thereby bequeathing the said property upon defendant No. 1 and 2 in equal share. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As per defendant No. 1 & 2 father of the plaintiffs was excluded from inheriting any share in the suit property and plaintiffs knew of the Will dt 22.10.2002 of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari. It has been further submitted that entire ground floor is in possession of defendants where they are carrying on business activities. Plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit property. Rest of the allegation has been denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 3 of 14 Case of defendant No.3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. Defendant No. 3 filed written statement submitting therein that plaintiff have indulged in material suppression as well as misstatement of facts. Defendant No. 3 is the eldest among three brothers and a sister. She is also paternal aunt (Bua) of the plaintiffs. It is pertinent to mention here that the property bearing No. 9-A/82, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi was built with the funds and through the efforts of the father of the defendants late sh. Desh Raj Tiwari.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. It is further mentioned that partnership firm in question i.e. M/s British India Press was also created out of the funds and capital generated by the last Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari. Furthermore, it was through his efforts that the said partnership firm developed into a full fledged business entity. Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari died on 20.01.2003.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. Father of the plaintiff and brother of the defendants Sh. S. K. Tiwari and defendant No. 1 & 2 were separately inducted as partners in the said firm in the year 1958 and 1974 respectively in order to train them in business. They had no contribution whatsoever to the creation of the said firm. No funds had been contributed by them towards the same. They were included in the said firm merely because they were the sons of the late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari. All the defendants and Sh. S.K.Tiwari were living in the suit property jointly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. It is further stated that mother of the plaintiffs and the wife of Sh. S. K. Tiwari died in the year 1977. After the death of mother of the plaintiffs it was defendants who had taken care of their nutrition, health, education as well as their marriage. Sh. S.K.Tiwari did not even participate in the business of the firm. The reason for this was his alcoholism and addiction to pan masala, betel and zarda.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 4 of 14<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. The contents of the alleged Will, in fact, betray a complete lack of appreciation of relevant fact. In the alleged Will there are such facts, which are completely untrue. Defendant No. 3 that Sh. S. K. Tiwari would never have singed such a Will if he had perused the contents thereof even cursorily, moreover, to strangers witness the said Will. One of the witness, conveniently is the brother of the husband of the plaintiff No. 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. The alleged Will of 7th February 2003 purportedly executed by Sh. S. K. Tiwari is a procured document and has not been signed by S. K. Tiwari out of his free will and is a product of undue influence, coercion and pressure applied on a dying man by the plaintiff and their husbands.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. It is further stated that answering defendant is a Professional Assistant in the Library of Guru Tegh Bahadur Khalsa College, University of Delhi and she had taken Rs. 12,000/- from her college and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- from Khalsa College Cooperative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd. and constructed a room in the ground floor of the suit property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. It is asserted by defendant No. 3 that plaintiffs have never been in possession of any portion of the suit property. They are happily ensconced in their own matrimonial home and come to visit the suit property once in a while during major festivals or family ceremonies after seeking permission of the defendants. The ground floor is fact in possession of the defendant No. 3. The plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief as prayed for in the plaint.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. Plaintiff has filed replication thereby denying the contents of the written statements and reiterating the contents of the plaint.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Issues<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 5 of 14 the Ld. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Predecessor vide order dated 15.09.2005:-</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Whether the suit is barred under Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956? OPD3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether the plaintiffs are not in possession of any portion of suit property? If so, its effect on court fees and jurisdiction? OPD3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of probate with regard to the Will in question? OPD3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Whether the plaintiffs has no locus standi to file the suit? OPD1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Relief<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. Vide order dt 31.07.2007 an additional issue was framed to the following effect:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whether the Will dated 22.10.2002 was executed by deceased Sh. Des Raj Tiwari? If so, its effect? OPD 1&2 Plaintiffs' Evidence<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. Plaintiff No.1 examined herself as PW1 who filed her affidavit Ex P-1 in her examination-in-chief and relied upon his father's Will Ex PW1/1 (exhibition of Will was objected being photocopy) and Site Plan Ex. PW1/2 (exhibition of Site Plan was objected to for the mode of proof). She was cross examined by the defendants no. 2 and 3 separately.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. Plaintiffs examined Sh. Vishal Mohan Bahl as PW-2 who tendered his affidavit Ex. PW2/A in his examination-in-chief and relied upon Will already Ex. PW1/1 (exhibition of Will was objected to for the mode of proof). He was cross-examined by the defendants no. 1, 2 and 3 separately.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thereafter, plaintiffs closed their evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Defendants' Evidence<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. Defendant No.1 did not lead any evidence. Defendant No.2 examined himself as D2W1 and tendered his affidavit in his examination-in- CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 6 of 14 chief Ex. D2W1 and relied upon copy of Saral Forms Mark A and Will already Ex. PW1/D1. He was cross examined by the plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. Defendant no. 2 also examined Smt. Tara Dubey as D2W2 who filed her affidavit. She is stated to be witness to the Will stated to have been executed by Sh. Des Raj Tiwari. She was cross examined. Thereafter defendant No.2 closed his evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">23. Defendant no. 3 examined herself as D3W1 and tendered her affidavit in examination-in-chief Ex. D3W1/A and relied upon following documents:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. Registration Card issued by Rajiv Gandhi Cancer Institute and Research Centre, Delhi dated 27.01.2003 Ex. D3W1/1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Photocopy of investigation report dated 01.02.2003 issued by Rajiv Gandhi Cancer Institute and Research Centre, Delhi Mark A<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Incomplete Will, executed by Sh. S.K. TiwariEx. D3W1/3,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Site Plan Ex. D3W1/4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. Certificate dated 01.06.2004 of Guru Tegh Bahadur Khalsa College, University of Delhi Ex. D3W1/5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Certificate dated 01.06.2004 issued by Khalsa College Co-</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">operative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd. Ex. D3W1/6</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. Photocopies of 9 photographs Mark B<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. Complaint dated 14.03.2005 Ex. D3W1/16 She was cross examined by the plaintiffs. Thereafter defendant no. 3 closed her evidence.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Findings<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">24. After going through the pleadings, evidence, material on record and appreciating the arguments of respective Counsel for the parties, issue wise findings are as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 7 of 14 ISSUE No. 3:- Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of probate with regard to the Will in question? OPD3 ISSUE No. 4:- Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit? OPD1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">25. Issues No. 3 and 4 are taken up together ahead of all other issues. Onus to prove issue No. 3 is upon the defendant No. 3 and onus to prove issue No. 4 is upon the defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 3 has raised objection that since plaintiff's have not obtained probate of the Will of Sh. S.K. Tiwari, the father of the plaintiffs, therefore, present suit is not maintainable. Defendants No.1 and 2 have raised objection that plaintiffs have no locus standi to seek partition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26. Before discussing further it is made clear that obtaining probate is not mandatory in Delhi unless dispute regarding the existence and validity of Will is raised. No doubt defendant No. 3 in her written statement has disputed the execution and existence of Will dated 07.02.2003 stated to have been executed by Sh. S. K. Tiwari in favour of the plaintiffs but this Court does not think it necessary to discuss the Will dated 07.02.2003 stated to have been executed by Sh. S. K. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Tiwari for the reason that it is not in dispute that all the plaintiffs are daughters of late Sh. S. K. Tiwari. It is also not the case of any of the parties that Sh. S.K. Tiwari has left behind other legal heirs other than plaintiffs. It is also not the case of any of the party to the suit that Sh. S. K. Tiwari had executed another Will thereby bequeathing his estate upon persons other than the plaintiffs. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is the case of the plaintiff that their father executed Will thereby bequeathing his estate equally upon all his legal heirs i.e. plaintiffs. Even otherwise as per Hindu Succession Act if Hindu male dies intestate the first class legal heirs of the said male Hindu inherits the estate of deceased male Hindu in equal share. Thus, plaintiffs being the only first class legal heirs are certainly entitled to inherit the estate of deceased Sh. S. K. Tiwari in equal share. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, irrespective of Will dated 07.02.2003 plaintiffs are even otherwise entitled to inherit the estate of deceased Sh. S. K. CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 8 of 14 Tiwari as per Hindu Succession Act and for the same reason plaintiffs have locus standi to file the present suit. Therefore, in view of above discussion, issues No. 3 and 4 are decided in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ISSUE No. 1:- Whether the suit is barred under Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956? OPD3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27. Onus to prove this issue has been cast upon defendant No. 3. Although it is immaterial who share the burden of proving this issue because this is an legal issue because as per Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act there is legal bar on the female heirs to seek partition of dwelling unit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">28. The present suit no doubt was instituted in the month of May, 2004 when Section 23 was existing in statue book. It is also not in dispute that w.e.f. 09.09.2005 the said Section 23 has been deleted by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. This suit remained pending from 2004 till 2018 i.e. for 14 years. The plaintiffs being the female legal heirs of Late Sh. S.K. Tiwari might not have been able to seek partition of the dwelling units in view of Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act at least on the day when the suit was instituted but after 09.09.2005 the said legal inhibition was over. Hence, plaintiffs' present suit if it had been instituted after 09.09.2005 would not have suffered from such legal infirmity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">29. Now the question which arises is whether after 14 years it is in the interest of justice to deny such right if even otherwise plaintiffs are entitled to do so in the current regime of law w.e.f 09.09.2005 and whether after 14 years plaintiff be relegated back to original position to re-institute fresh suit for partition. Adopting such approach would be hyper-technical as admittedly as on date suit filed by the plaintiffs being female legal heirs would be maintainable. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No doubt lis is decided on the basis of law prevailing on the date of institution of the suit but if in the present suit in the present suit a CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 9 of 14 hyper-technical approach is adopted it will result into miscarriage of justice as it will not only result into wastage of time of litigating parties of the present suit but also result into wastage of precious judicial time. Hence, this court is of the view that with the amendment in Hindu Succession Act, 2005 plaintiffs legal inability stands cured.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30. Apart from this, this court is also of the view that since plaintiffs are claiming their right through their father who was certainly male member and was entitled to seek partition of the suit property, therefore, plaintiffs having been stepped into the shoes of their father draw their rights from the male member of the family and are therefore, certainly entitled to seek partition. Therefore, present suit is not hit by Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ADDITIONAL ISSUE:- Whether the Will dated 22.10.2012 was executed by deceased Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari? If so, its effect? OPD1 &2<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">31. Onus to prove this issue is upon defendants No. 1 and 2. This is the crucial issue upon which final fate of the case depends. Both defendants No. 1 and 2 has set up the Will dt. 22.10.2002 of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari but defendant No. 3 is silent as to existence of the Will. In order to prove the Will dt 22.10.2002 in terms of Section 68 of Evidence Act defendants have examined Smt. Tara Dubey, the sister of deceased Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">32. Smt. Tara Dubey in her examination-in-chief deposed that late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari informed her sometime in October' 2003 that he wants to execute the Will and then he came to her house on 22.10.2003 with one Mr. Sumit Kumar Sharma who was an advocate by profession. She further deposed that Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari showed her a Will drafted by him and read the Will to her after which he in their presence affixed his signature at point A of the Will Ex. PW2/1 and thereafter she signed the Will at point B and Sh. Sumit Kumar Sharma thereafter signed at point C. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">She further CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 10 of 14 deposed that by way of said Will the suit property was devolved upon his two sons defendants No. 1 and 2 in equal share. Father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 was not given any share. His business being run under the name and style of M/s British Inida Press and tenancy right of the shop was also bequeathed upon defendant No. 2.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">33. Smt Tara Dubey filed her affidavit Ex. D2W2/A in examination- in-chief on 24.10.2010. She was cross examined on 08.05.2015, 24.11.2015 and on 30.03.2016 in this matter as well as in the connected matter bearing suit No. 10035/16 titled as Geetika Bahal v. Krishan Tiwari.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">34. During her cross-examination she was incoherent in her testimony. She deposed that her signature is at point X1, that of Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari at point X2. She further stated that the Will was also signed by her son Karan Dubey and when she was asked to identify the signature of Karan Dubey she stated that it was put just bequeathed her signature. When it was pointed out that where she is pointing out to be the signature of Karan is in fact address is mentioned then she stated that somebody else had signed on that day in her presence. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">But she was unable to identify his signature. She further told that her brother had 3-4 children namely Krishan Tiwari, Prem, Guddi Tiwari and Babli Tiwari. When the original Will was shown to her she identified her signature at point X1, that of her brother at point X2 and said that at point X3 the signature of some Shyam Lal & Sons is there. She further deposed that besides her and her brother one Guddi Tiwari her niece was also present. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">She voluntarily stated that Will was scribed at Connaught Place. She further deposed that Will was prepared before her and it was handwritten and the Will was executed in some restaurant at Connaught Place and again stated that it was executed in the house of her brother. Handwritten Will is in her possession and she is still in possession thereof. When she was asked in whose favour his brother executed the Will she deposed that it was executed in her favour as well as in favour of Guddi Didi. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Question was repeated again and CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 11 of 14 she again repeated the same. She further deposed that when she signed the Will besides her, her brother Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari, Guddi Didi, Milli Bhaiya and their family members were present. She deposed that in her presence no other person signed the Will in question.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">35. Number of times it has been observed by the Court that witness because of her old age was unable to understand the questions and answers properly. Her testimony cannot be relied upon because of many contradictions as has been noted above. As per her the Will she witnessed was in her favour and in favour of one Guddi Didi and the Will was handwritten but the Will which is propounded by the defendants No.1 & 2 is a printed one and in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus this witness cannot be relied for the purpose of proving the Will dated 22.10.2002 of Late Sh. Desh Raj Tiwari. No other witness has been examined by the defendant for the purpose of proving the Will dt 22.10.2002 of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari. Merely because plaintiff in her cross-examination admitted that she knew of the Will will not amount to prove of the Will. Testimony of other witness is not relevant for proving the Will therefore need not be discussed at all. Thus, defendants No. 1 and 2 have failed to prove the Will dt 22.10.2002 of late Sh. Des Raj Tiwari and accordingly additional issue is decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ISSUE No. 2:- Whether plaintiffs are not in possession of any portion of the suit property? If so, its effect on court fees and jurisdiction? OPD3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">36. Onus to prove this issue is upon defendant No. 3. Admittedly defendant No. 3 is not in possession of the suit property. Her stand in the present suit is not understandable because on the one hand she is bitterly opposing the plaintiffs but at the other hand she is not supporting defendants No.1 and 2 so far Will of her father is concerned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">37. Defendants No. 1 and 2 are in possession of the suit property but CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 12 of 14 they have not pleaded ouster of the plaintiffs from the suit property. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin v. Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul Quadri; (1971) 1 SCC 597 held that possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners unless it is established that the possession of the co-owner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in hostility to co-owners by exclusion of them. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was further held that there has to be open denial of title to the parties who are entitled to it by excluding and ousting them. It is thus only when such ouster is pleaded and established then such co-owner is required to pay advolerem court fee in a suit for partition and possession of separate possession of his/her share. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The objection regarding plaintiffs not being in possession has been taken by defendant No. 3 who is admittedly resident out of the suit property. Admittedly, plaintiffs are settled in their matrimonial home but they do have legal right in the property in case their father was having share in the suit property. Defendant No. 3 did not dispute that plaintiffs are legal heirs but disputing that plaintiffs' father executed the Will in favour of plaintiffs. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It has already been discussed herein before that irrespective of the Will plaintiffs being legal heirs are entitled to inherit the estate of deceased Sh. S.K. Tiwari particularly when no other Will is set up to have been executed by Sh. S.K. Tiwari. What defendant No. 3 is talking about is the physical possession of any part of the suit property by the plaintiffs but in the present suit neither defendants No. 1 and 2 nor defendant No. 3 have pleaded ouster of the plaintiffs from the suit property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In this circumstance principle that possession of one co-owner is on behalf of all co-owner is squarely applicable in the present suit and therefore plaintiffs being in legal possession are liable to pay fixed court fees. Hence, issue No.3 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Relief In view of the above discussion, suit of the plaintiffs is allowed and preliminary decree of partition is hereby passed in favours of the plaintiffs CS No. 9684/2016 Geetika Bahl Vs. Krishan Tiwari & Ors. Page No. 13 of 14 thereby declaring that plaintiffs are jointly and each of the defendants are individually entitled to 1/4th share in the suit property bearing No. 9-A/82, W.E.A. Karol Bagh, Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Decree of permanent injunction is also hereby passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants thereby restraining the defendants, their agents, assignee, legal heirs etc not to part with possession of the suit property or create third party interest in any manner in the suit property till the time suit property is partitioned by meats and bound or otherwise partition takes place.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Preliminary decree sheet be prepared accordingly.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-30245843222785876892020-01-27T17:47:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:47:31.426+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">BOMBAY HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">PARVATABAI @ BEBY WD/O PARASRAM ... VS. SUREEKHA @ REKHA WD/O DASHRATH ...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 13.02.2019</span></b><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Introduction:</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 18/06/2018 passed by the Court of 11 th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur (Trial Court) in M.J.C. No.192 of 2017, whereby application filed by the petitioners below Exhibit- 18 for dismissal of the proceedings initiated by the respondent herein, was rejected.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The facts leading to filing of the present writ petition are that the petitioners had filed an application for grant of legal heirship certificate under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 (hereinafter referred to "Regulation"). The said application was granted by the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur by judgment and order dated 13/06/2017. An application was filed KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 3/18 by the respondent on 02/03/2017 under the very same Regulation for grant of legal heirship certificate wherein the petitioners were made parties as non-applicants. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">The respondent specifically described certain properties in the said application and a declaration was sought to the effect that the respondent was legal heir of deceased Parasram Fakira More. It is not in dispute that the legal heirship certificate already granted in favour of the petitioners also pertained to the said deceased Parasram Fakira More.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, it is evident that the impugned order passed in the present case was not based on proper appreciation of KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 17/18 the relevant provisions of law. Insofar as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Manda R. Pande v. Smt.Jankibai S. Dubey (supra) is concerned, a perusal of the said case shows that a suit for declaration had been filed in respect of succession certificate with which the plaintiff was aggrieved. There is no quarrel with the proposition that under section 387 of the Act of 1925, an aggrieved party can certainly file a suit claiming aforesaid relief. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, the said judgment would not be helpful to the case of the respondent. As regards the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the said judgments reiterate the scheme envisaged in Part X of the aforesaid Act, which is also evident from a bare reading of the provisions contained in the said Part. Therefore, specific reference to the said judgments would not be necessary. This Court finds that the impugned order by the Court below is unsustainable.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Accordingly, the impugned order is quashed and set aside and the present writ petition is allowed. Consequently, the application below Exhibit-18 filed by the petitioner is allowed and KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 18/18 the proceeding initiated by the respondent i.e. M.J.C. No.192 of 2017 before the Court below stands dismissed. It is made clear that the respondent would be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings under section 383 of the Act of 1925 for revocation of certificate granted in favour of the petitioners or for annulment of the certificate under clause 7 second of the Regulation or to file appropriate suit under section 387 of the Act of 1925 before the Competent Civil Court.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No costs.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">BOMBAY HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">PARVATABAI @ BEBY WD/O PARASRAM ... VS. SUREEKHA @ REKHA WD/O DASHRATH ...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 13.02.2019</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Bench : Manish Pitale</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WP5447.18 - Judgment </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WRIT PETITION NO. 5447 OF 2018</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">PETITIONERS :- 1. Parvatabai @ Beby Wd/o Parasram More, </span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">(Ori.Non-applicants) Aged about 52 years, Occupation : Household,</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">2. Suresh S/o Parasram More, Aged about 33 years, Occupation : Milkman,</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Both 1 & 2 residents of Suraksha Nagar, Vinoba Gram Society, Plot No.47, House</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">No.3881, Nagar Parishad Wadi, Dist. </span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Nagpur.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">...VERSUS...</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">RESPONDENTS :- 1. Surekha @ Rekha Wd/o Dashrath </span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">(Ori. Applicant) </span><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Surjuse, Aged about 50 years, Occupation Vegetable Seller, R/o. Amarnagar, Post MIDC, Tah. Hingna, Dist. Nagpur.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> Mr. Sahil S. Dewani, counsel for the petitioner.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> Mr. Nitin D. Sonare, counsel for the respondent.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">DATE : 13.02.2019.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">KHUNTE</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WP5447.18-Judgment </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ORAL JUDGMENT</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Heard.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The writ petition is heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">3. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 18/06/2018 passed by the Court of 11 th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur (Trial Court) in M.J.C. No.192 of 2017, whereby application filed by the petitioners below Exhibit- 18 for dismissal of the proceedings initiated by the respondent herein, was rejected.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">4. The facts leading to filing of the present writ petition are that the petitioners had filed an application for grant of legal heirship certificate under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 (hereinafter referred to "Regulation"). The said application was granted by the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur by judgment and order dated 13/06/2017. An application was filed KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 3/18 by the respondent on 02/03/2017 under the very same Regulation for grant of legal heirship certificate wherein the petitioners were made parties as non-applicants. The respondent specifically described certain properties in the said application and a declaration was sought to the effect that the respondent was legal heir of deceased Parasram Fakira More. It is not in dispute that the legal heirship certificate already granted in favour of the petitioners also pertained to the said deceased Parasram Fakira More.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">5. The petitioners appeared in the said subsequent proceedings initiated by the respondent and filed an application for dismissal of the proceedings, which was marked as Exhibit-18. It was contended in the said application on behalf of the petitioners that since they had been granted legal heirship certificate by order dated 13/06/2017 passed by the Court of Joint Civil Judge Junior Division, Nagpur, the application filed by the respondent was not maintainable. By impugned order dated 18/06/2018, the Trial Court in the present case had rejected the said application holding that there was a possibility that the KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 4/18 petitioners had obtained the legal heirship certificate in their favour by suppressing material facts.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">6. The said order has been challenged in the present writ petition wherein Mr. Sahil Dewani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the subsequent application filed by the respondent was not maintainable under the aforesaid Regulation as also under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as "Act of 1925"). It was pointed out that in the Act of 1925, particularly as per section 390 thereof, the certificate issued under the aforesaid Regulation would be subject to the provisions of the Act of 1925 and on this basis, it was submitted that the respondent ought to have either invoked the relevant provision of the aforesaid Regulation or the Act of 1925, in order to seek revocation of the certificate granted in favour of the petitioners. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It was submitted that in the absence of seeking revocation of the certificate already granted in favour of petitioners, the application filed by the respondent under the provisions of the said Regulation was not maintainable. It was submitted that section 383 of the Act of 1925 provides for KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 5/18 revocation of certificate while clause 7 (second) of the said Regulation provides for annulment of the certificate granted in favour of the respondent and that having failed to approach the Competent Court under either of the provisions, the respondent could not have filed the said application for grant of legal heirship certificate. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The learned counsel also referred to section 387 of the Act of 1925 to contend that the legal heirship certificate granted in favour of the petitioners could certainly be challenged by the respondent by instituting appropriate proceedings before the Civil Court. In these circumstances, according to the learned counsel, the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application at Exhibit-18. Learned counsel placed reliance on judgment of this Court in the case of Bainabai v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, 2018 (6) Mh.L.J. 91 and Kusum Chandrakant Shankardas and others v. Rajeshri Chandrakant Shankardas and others, 2018 (1) Mh.L.J. 681.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">7. On the other hand, Mr. Nitin Sonare, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the impugned order did not deserve any interference because it was correctly held that KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 6/18 subsequent application filed by the respondent was indeed maintainable. It was submitted that when the application was filed by the respondent, he was not aware about grant of legal heirship certificate in favour of petitioners and that in any case, such certificate had been obtained by suppression of material facts by the petitioners. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It was submitted that on a proper reading of section 387 of the Act of 1925, it would be evident that when the words "any other proceedings" were used in the said provision, it included an application in the nature filed by the respondent under the aforesaid Regulation for grant of legal heirship certificate. It was further submitted that in such an application the Court could certainly go into the question of validity of grant of legal heirship certificate in favour of petitioners. The learned counsel relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of Manda R. Pande v. Smt.Jankibai S. Dubey, 2006 (2) Mh.L.J., 162.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record. The short question that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is, as to whether the application filed by the respondent under the aforesaid Regulation for grant of legal KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 7/18 heirship certificate was maintainable, in the light of such a certificate granted in favour of the petitioners by judgment and order dated 13/06/2017 passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur. It has come on record that when the petitioners applied for grant of certificate under the said Regulation, they did not show any person as a non-applicant. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In this situation, as contemplated under the law, notice inviting objections was published in a newspaper and the said Court proceeded to decide the application filed by the petitioners. By the said order dated 13/06/2017, the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, granted legal heirship certificate in favour of petitioners and it has come on record that there was no objector to grant of such certificate.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">9. The respondent filed the aforesaid application before the Trial Court i.e. Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, under the said Regulation claiming that he was entitled to grant legal heirship certificate wherein he indeed joined the petitioners as non-applicants. It is the case of the respondent that since he was not aware of grant of legal heirship certificate in favour of the KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 8/18 petitioners, she did not make any mention of the same and that, in any case according to her, she was the only person entitled to be declared as legal heir of deceased Parasram More. The question is whether in such an application filed under the aforesaid Regulation for grant of legal heirship certificate, the respondent could claim that by implication, it had to be inferred that she was challenging the legal heirship certificate granted to the petitioners. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">According to the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, such an application was maintainable under section 387 of the Act of 1925 because apart from the word "suit", the words "any other proceedings" were used in the said provision. According to the learned counsel, the application so filed on behalf of the respondent was included under the said expression and that such an application was to be treated as an application under Part X of the said Act, pertaining to succession certificate and there was no question of the application being rejected as being not maintainable.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">10. In this context, certain provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1925 and the Regulation are relevant. The said provisions read as follows:-</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WP5447.18-Judgment </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"383. Revocation of certificate.- A certificate granted under this Part may be revoked for any of the following causes, namely:--</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) that the proceedings to obtain the certificate were defective in substance;</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b) that the certificate was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false suggestion, or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case;</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(c) that the certificate was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant thereof, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(d) that the certificate has become useless and inoperative through circumstances;</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(e) that a decree or order made by a competent Court in a suit or other proceeding with respect to effects comprising debts or securities specified in the certificate renders it proper that the certificate should be revoked.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">384. Appeal.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of a District Judge granting, refusing or revoking a certificate under this Part, and the High Court may, if it thinks fit, by its order on the appeal, declare the person to whom the certificate should be granted and direct the District Judge, on application being made therefor, to grant it accordingly, in supersession of the certificate, if any, already granted.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) must be preferred within the time allowed for an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (5 of 1908).</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and to the provisions as to reference to and revision by the High Court and as to review of judgment of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908), as applied by KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 10/18 section 141 of that Code, an order of a District Judge under this Part shall be final.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">385. Effect on certificate of previous certificate, probate or letters of administration.- Save as provided by this Act, a certificate granted thereunder in respect of any of the effects of a deceased person shall be invalid if there has been a previous grant of such a certificate or of probate or letters of administration in respect of the estate of the deceased person and if such previous grant is in force.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder.- No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">390. Provisions with respect to certificates under Bombay Regulation III of 1827.- Notwithstanding anything in Bombay Regulation No.VIII of 1827, the provisions of section 370, sub-section (2), section 372, sub-section (1), clause (f), and sections 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 381, 383, 384, 387, 388 and 389 with respect to certificates under this Part and applications therefor, and of section 317 with respect to the exhibition of inventories and accounts by executors and administrators, shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply, respectively, to certificates granted under that Regulation, and applications made for certificates thereunder after the 1st day of May, 1889, and to the exhibition of inventories and accounts by the holders of such certificates so granted."</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">WP5447.18-Judgment </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The relevant provisions of the Regulation are as follows :-</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">"7. First.- An heir, executor or Recognized administrator, holding the proper certificate, heirs, etc. may do all acts and grant all deeds competent competent to to a legal heir, executor or administrator, and manage may sue and obtain judgment in any Court in property. that capacity.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Second. - But, as the certificate confers no right But to the property, but only indicates the person recognition who, for the time being, is in the legal gives no title management thereof, the granting of such to property. certificate shall not finally determine nor injure the rights of any person ; and the certificate shall be annulled by the Zilla Court, upon proof that another person has a preferable right.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Third.- An heir, executor or administrator, holding a certificate, shall be accountable for Not relief his acts done in that capacity to all persons from having an interest in the property, in the same responsibility manner as if no certificate had been granted. to claimants.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">8. The refusal of a certificate by the Refusal of Judge shall not finally determine the rights of recognition the persons whose application is refused, but it no judgment shall still be competent to him to institute a suit against claim for the purpose of establishing his claim." of applicant.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">11. A perusal of the above quoted provisions shows that section 387 of the Act of 1925 and clause 7 second of the said Regulation specifically provide for revocation and annulment of a KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 12/18 certificate in the nature granted in favour of the petitioners herein. Section 385 of the Act of 1925 specifically provides that a certificate granted in favour of a person shall be invalid if there has been a previous grant of such a certificate and when such a previous grant is in force. Section 387 of the Act of 1925 provides that no decision in Part X of the said Act would prevent the question involved to be raised in a suit or "any other proceedings between the same parties". </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">A proper reading of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that there is a scheme provided for revocation or annulment of certificate, with which any person is aggrieved and that there is also the option of approaching the Civil Court by filing a suit or any other proceedings and that grant of earlier certificate would not act as res judicata between the parties. In the present case, even if the respondent was not aware about grant of heirship certificate in favour of the petitioners, the moment the grant of certificate in favour of the petitioners was brought to her notice, the only course available for her was to have taken appropriate steps either for revocation of the certificate under section 383 of the said Act or for annulment of the said certificate under clause 7 second of the said Regulation or to have KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 13/18 filed a suit as contemplated under section 387 of the Act of 1925. To proceed with the present application, filed by the respondent, which is only for grant of legal heirship certificate to her would be an exercise in futility, in view of section 385 of the said Act. This becomes further clear by a perusal of the prayer clause of the application filed by the respondent, which reads as follows : "PRAYER : It is therefore humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court please to:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">i) To allowed this applicant.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ii) To declare the applicant are Legal Heir of the deceased Parasram Fakira More and issue the legal heir Certificate in favour of the applicant so as to submit the Revenue Authority for necessary mutation.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">iii) Any other relief as this hon'ble court deems fit and proper under the circumstance be granted in the interest of justice."</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">12. As long as the certificate granted in favour of the petitioners continues in force, the entire exercise sought to be KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 14/18 undertaken by the Trial Court at the behest of the respondent would result in an invalid certificate. This cannot be contemplated in law. Therefore, the correct remedy for the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the present case, was to have moved an application either for revocation or annulment of the legal heirship certificate granted in favour of the petitioners, which admittedly still continues to be in force.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">13. A contention has been raised on behalf of the respondent that the application filed by her would be maintainable under section 387 of the said Act, since the words "any other proceedings" have been used therein. The said contention is raised in ignorance of the entire scheme contemplated under Part X of the aforesaid Act and the significance of the words "between the same parties" used in the aforesaid provisions. The use of the words "any other proceedings between the same parties" emphasizes that even if an heirship/succession certificate is granted after contest between the same parties under Part X of the said Act, it would still not operate as res judicata if a suit or any other proceeding is instituted by a person aggrieved. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">A proper KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 15/18 reading of the said provision would demonstrate that either of the aggrieved party could file a suit for raising grievance against grant of heirship/succession certificate or such a party could institute proceedings either for revocation or annulment of grant of certificate in favour of the other party. An application for either revocation or annulment of the grant of certificate in favour of the other party could not be thrown out merely because such a certificate had been already granted, even when the same parties contested such a proceeding. In fact, section 383 of the said Act provides for specific grounds on which revocation can be sought.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">14. Therefore, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent that the application filed in the present case by the respondent was maintainable under section 387 of the said Act is not sustainable. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also referred to section 384 of the said Act, which pertains to appeal and he submitted that an appeal would lie even against an order refusing or revoking a certificate under this act and on that basis, contended that as long as the respondent in the present case could demonstrate that the petitioners had obtained certificate in KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 16/18 their favour by suppressing material facts, an application in the nature filed by the respondent was clearly maintainable. The said contention is also without any substance, because section 384 of the Act is concerned only with the aspect of filing of an appeal by a person aggrieved when either the grant of certificate is refused or it is revoked under Part X of the aforesaid Act. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In the present case, there is no question of the Court going into the issue of either granting or refusing legal heirs/succession certificate to the respondent, in the face of legal heirship certificate already granted to the petitioners, which is admittedly in force even today. Therefore, the only remedy available to the respondent would be either to file a suit under section 387 or an application for revocation under section 383 of the Act of 1925 or an application for annulment of the certificate under clause 7 second of the said Regulation. The remedy of filing appropriate suit before the Civil Court is of course available to the aggrieved party in such facts and circumstances.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">15. Therefore, it is evident that the impugned order passed in the present case was not based on proper appreciation of KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 17/18 the relevant provisions of law. Insofar as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Manda R. Pande v. Smt.Jankibai S. Dubey (supra) is concerned, a perusal of the said case shows that a suit for declaration had been filed in respect of succession certificate with which the plaintiff was aggrieved. There is no quarrel with the proposition that under section 387 of the Act of 1925, an aggrieved party can certainly file a suit claiming aforesaid relief. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Therefore, the said judgment would not be helpful to the case of the respondent. As regards the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the said judgments reiterate the scheme envisaged in Part X of the aforesaid Act, which is also evident from a bare reading of the provisions contained in the said Part. Therefore, specific reference to the said judgments would not be necessary. This Court finds that the impugned order by the Court below is unsustainable.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">16. Accordingly, the impugned order is quashed and set aside and the present writ petition is allowed. Consequently, the application below Exhibit-18 filed by the petitioner is allowed and KHUNTE WP5447.18-Judgment 18/18 the proceeding initiated by the respondent i.e. M.J.C. No.192 of 2017 before the Court below stands dismissed. It is made clear that the respondent would be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings under section 383 of the Act of 1925 for revocation of certificate granted in favour of the petitioners or for annulment of the certificate under clause 7 second of the Regulation or to file appropriate suit under section 387 of the Act of 1925 before the Competent Civil Court.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "" serif "" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">17. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No costs.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-50955018645003450052020-01-27T17:44:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:44:08.869+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">P.KUPAMMAL VS KESAVAN<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 18.11.2019</span></b><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case :</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The case of the plaintiffs is that the property situate at Door No.94, Plot No.429, 7th Cross Street, Trustpuram, Pullyur Village, Kodambakkam, Chennai 600 024 in T.S.No.26, Block No.26 measuring an extent of 880 sq.ft. belonged to them. Originally, the said property was allotted by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (in short, “the TNSCB”) to the first plaintiff's father, viz., Ponnan, who died on 01.03.1998, leaving behind his wife Kathayee Ammal and the first plaintiff. After the demise of the said Ponnan, the first plaintiff's mother Kathayee Ammal got a sale deed executed in her favour on 05.08.2005 and registered as Document No.3281 of 2005. During the life time, the plaintiff's father, Ponnan had put up a hut in an extent of 380 sq.ft in the front portion and a tiled house in an extent of 400 sq.ft. in the rear portion of the suit property and they were living there. The defendant is the nephew of the first plaintiff's father.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">It is also stated that the first plaintiff, out of love and affection, had settled the entire "A" schedule property in favour of her three children. It is stated by the first plaintiff that during the life time of her father-Ponnan, he had permitted the defendant, who is his nephew, to occupy the front portion of the suit property. Thus, the defendant was in occupation of the front portion of the property measuring an extent of 380 sq.ft, which is described as "B" schedule property in the plaint. The first plaintiff alone is the sole legal heir of the deceased Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal, whereas the defendant claimed to be their legal heir based on the fabricated legal heirship certificate. Knowing the motive of the defendant, the plaintiff requested him to vacate and handover the possession of the "B" schedule property.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court :</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In view of the findings rendered qua additional issue No.(i) and (ii), issue No.1 is answered against the defendant holding that the defendant cannot be said to be the absolute owner of an extent of 380 sq. ft. forming part of A schedule property as mentioned the B Schedule property. Thus, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiffs. Issue Nos.2 to 4 :</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The first plaintiff became absolute owner of A schedule, which includes B schedule property. Accordingly, the Settlement Deed executed by her in favour of her children, who are arrayed as plaintiffs 2 to 4, is valid and the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of delivery of vacant possession of B schedule property from the defendant. Thus, issue Nos.2 to 4 are also answered against the defendant favouring the plaintiffs.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement :</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">In view of the above findings, C.S.No.562 of 2011 is decreed, as prayed for. Consequently, T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 is also decreed as prayed for. As a corollary, T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 is dismissed.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">P.KUPAMMAL VS KESAVAN<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 18.11.2019</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATED: 18.11.2019<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM : THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">C.S.No.562 of 2011 and T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 and 25 of 2017<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">C.S.No.562 of 2011 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. P.Kupammal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. V.Meena<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. G.Thambidurai ... Plaintiffs</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Kesavan ... Defendant<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 (in O.P.No.222 of 2011 ) :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">P.Kesavan .. Petitioner</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">G.Kuppammal .. Respondent<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 (in O.P.No.219 of 2017 ) :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">P.Kuppammal .. Petitioner<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Kesavan .. Respondent</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PRAYER in C.S.No.562 of 2011 : Plaint filed under Order IV Rule 1 of Original Side Rules, read with Order VII Rule 1 of C.P.C praying for (a) declaring that the 1st plaintiff is the absolute owner of the B Schedule </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 property morefully described in the schedule hereunder (b) directing the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the schedule B property morefully described in the schedule hereunder to the plaintiff (c) for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men, servants, agents and anybody acting on behalf of him from alienating, encumbering or otherwise in the schedule B property and (d) direct the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PRAYER in T.O.S.No.13 of 2015: Petition filed under Sections 232, 255 and 276 of Indian Succession Act XXXIX of 1925 for the grant of Letters of Administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PRAYER in T.O.S.No.25 of 2017: Petition filed under Sections 232 and 276 of Indian Succession Act XXXIX of 1925 for the grant of Letters of Administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Plaintiffs in C.S. No.562/11: Mr.Praveen Alexander and T.O.S.No.25/2017 & For Defendant in T.O.S.No.13/15 For Defendant in C.S.No.562/11: Mr.Asif Ali and T.O.S.No.25/17 & For Plaintiff in T.O.S.No.13/2015 COMMON JUDGMENT The suit in C.S.No.562 of 2011 is filed for declaration that the first plaintiff is the absolute owner of the 'B' schedule property; for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men, servants, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 agents and anybody acting on behalf of him from alienating, encumbering or otherwise in the schedule B property; and for direction to the respondent to deliver the vacant possession of the schedule B property.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. The case of the plaintiffs is that the property situate at Door No.94, Plot No.429, 7th Cross Street, Trustpuram, Pullyur Village, Kodambakkam, Chennai 600 024 in T.S.No.26, Block No.26 measuring an extent of 880 sq.ft. belonged to them. Originally, the said property was allotted by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (in short, “the TNSCB”) to the first plaintiff's father, viz., Ponnan, who died on 01.03.1998, leaving behind his wife Kathayee Ammal and the first plaintiff. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">After the demise of the said Ponnan, the first plaintiff's mother Kathayee Ammal got a sale deed executed in her favour on 05.08.2005 and registered as Document No.3281 of 2005. During the life time, the plaintiff's father, Ponnan had put up a hut in an extent of 380 sq.ft in the front portion and a tiled house in an extent of 400 sq.ft. in the rear portion of the suit property and they were living there. The defendant is the nephew of the first plaintiff's father. The said Kathayee Ammal, the mother of the first plaintiff, died on 02.05.2006 leaving behind the sole surviving legal heir, namely, the first plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 be in possession of the property. It is also stated that the first plaintiff, out of love and affection, had settled the entire "A" schedule property in favour of her three children. It is stated by the first plaintiff that during the life time of her father-Ponnan, he had permitted the defendant, who is his nephew, to occupy the front portion of the suit property. Thus, the defendant was in occupation of the front portion of the property measuring an extent of 380 sq.ft, which is described as "B" schedule property in the plaint. The first plaintiff alone is the sole legal heir of the deceased Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal, whereas the defendant claimed to be their legal heir based on the fabricated legal heirship certificate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Knowing the motive of the defendant, the plaintiff requested him to vacate and handover the possession of the "B" schedule property. While so, the defendant had approached this Court in O.P.No.222 of 2011 for probate of the alleged Will said to have been executed by the said Ponnan. In the said Will, the defendant has alleged that the said Ponnan was his father, who had executed the Will in his favour. Earlier, the defendant had also filed a suit in O.S.No.2813 of 2000 on the file of the City Civil Court seeking permanent injunction against the first plaintiff in respect of the "B" schedule property, which was dismissed on 31.01.2007. In such circumstances, the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. In the written statement, the defendant had denied all the facts contending that the Ponnan was married to one Kathayee and out of the said wedlock, they had one son by name P.Kesavan, who is the defendant and one daughter, viz., Kuppammal, who is the first plaintiff. According to the defendant, in respect of "A" and "B" schedule properties, the said Ponnan had executed his last Will and Testament dated 03.09.1997 and the same was registered as Document No.126 of 1997 on the file of the Sub Registrar Office, Kodambakkam. The defendant had also filed O.P.No.222 of 2011 for probate of the same. According to the defendant, as per the said Will, bequest was made in favour of the defendant to an extent of 380 sq.ft with superstructure forming the front portion of "A" and "B" schedule properties with the condition that the defendant's mother Kathayee Ammal shall be entitled to enjoy the "A" schedule property throughout her life time as life estate holder. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, on the death of the said Kathayee Ammal on 02.05.2006, the defendant became the absolute owner of the property. One of the witnesses, namely, Kumaresan had filed an affidavit before this Court for probate of the Will. The defendant further denied the fact that he is the nephew of the first plaintiff's father, but he is the son of the deceased Ponnan. The other allegations set out in the plaint are all Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 denied and the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit excepting 380 sq.ft. described in the "B" schedule property. T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Originally, the defendant in C.S.No.562 of 2011 had filed O.P.No.222 of 2011 for grant of Letters of Administration for the Will dated 03.09.1997 executed by the testator C.Ponnan. As the Will was resisted by the respondent, the same was converted into T.O.S.No.13 of 2015. In the said O.P., the petitioner- Kesavan had stated that the property was allotted in favour of C.Ponnan by the TNSCB on 09.12.1983, who had taken possession of "A" and "B" schedule properties and constructed a residential house. The said Ponnan was married to one Kathayee Ammal and out of the said wedlock, Kesavan and Kuppammal were born. It is further stated that the testator, Ponnan had executed a last Will and Testament on 03.09.1997, which was registered as Document No.126 of 1997 on the file of the Sub Registrar Office, Kodambakkam. As per the Will, the testator Ponnan had bequeathed an extent of 380 sq.ft. of land with superstructure thereon forming the front portion of the "A" schedule property in favour of the petitioner with the condition that the petitioner's mother Kathayee Ammal i.e., wife of the testator, shall be entitled to enjoy the </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 property during her life time and thereafter, the petitioner would become the absolute owner. As the said Kathayee Ammal died on 02.05.2006, the petitioner had become entitled to the said property. T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 :</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. O.P.No.219 of 2017 was filed by Kuppammal, who is the first plaintiff in C.S.No.562 of 2011 for grant of Letters of Administration of the Will of the deceased testatrix dated 05.04.2006. In the said petition, it is stated that the said Kathayee Ammal, who is the wife of the late Ponnan and the mother of the petitioner- Kuppammal, had purchased the land measuring an extent of 880 sq.ft. from the TNSCB by way of a registered Sale Deed dated 05.08.2005. There was a hut put up in an extent of 380 sq.ft in the front portion and a tiled house measuring 400 sq.ft in the rear portion of the schedule mentioned property. The said Kathayee Ammal during her lifetime wrote a Will dated 05.04.2006 and the same was registered as document No.40 of 2006 bequeathing the entire schedule property in favour of the petitioner. The said Kathayee Ammal died on 02.05.2006. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As per the Will, Kuppammal is the sole surviving legal heir and she is in possession of the schedule mentioned property. It is stated that there is no executor appointed under the said Will and the Will was executed by the </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 said Kathayee Ammal out of her own volition without any coercion or undue influence. The said Will was attested by one Murugesan and another. The respondent has been making false claims, as if he is the brother of the petitioner and claiming right through the alleged Will executed by the petitioners' father Ponnan and also filed O.P.No.222 of 2011. The present Original Petition was converted into T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 and the said T.O.S was also resisted by the defendant claiming that he is the son born out of the wedlock between the Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">“1. Whether the defendant has become an absolute owner of an extent of 380 sq. ft. land with superstructure thereon situated at No.94, in Plot No.429, 7th Cross Street, Trustpuram, Kodambakkam, Chennai-600 094, forming the front port of A & B Schedule property and more fully described in the A-Schedule property by virtue of the registered Will dated 03.09.1997 executed by C.Ponnan, the father of the first plaintff and the defendant granting life estate to their mother Kathayee ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether the Settlement deed executed by the first plaintiff in respect of the said schedule property in favour of her children, plaintiffs 2 to 4 is valid in view of the registered Will executed by the said late C.Ponnan bequeathing the B-Schedule mentioned property in favour of the defendant ?</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether the first plaintiff is the absolute owner of the B-Schedule property ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of seeking the first defendant to deliver vacant possession of Schedule B property ?”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. On 11.12.2015, the following additional issues were framed in C.S.No.562 of 2011 and T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 for determination :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">i. Whether the Will dated 03.09.1997 executed by late C.Ponnan is genuine or not?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ii. Whether the Will dated 03.09.1997 executed by late C.Ponnan is surrounded by any suspicious circumstances? </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">iii. Whether the plaintiff is biological son of late C.Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">iv. Whether late C.Ponnan ws bequeated the property as the true owner?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">v. To what relief the parties are entitled to?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. Based on the directions of this Court dated 26.10.2017, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 30.01.2018 directed the Registry to tag T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 along with C.S.No.562 of 2017 and T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 and post it for trail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. During the trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and also examined P.Ws.2 to 5 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.14. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and marked </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 Exs.D.1 to D.8.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials placed before this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to hereinafter as per their ranking in C.S.No.561 of 2011. Additional Issue No.(iii) :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. Whether the plaintiff (the defendant in C.S.No.562 of 2011) is the biological son of late C.Ponnan and late Kathayee Ammal ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.1. The issue in the suit revolves around 880 sq.ft of land, which was allotted to one C.Ponnan by the TNSCB. After his death, the TNSCB executed a Sale Deed in favour of his wife Kathayee Ammal and got it registered on 05.08.2005. The allotment was made in the year 1983 and the death of Ponnan was on 01.03.1998. Thereafter, the sale was effected in the year 2005. It is the case of the first plaintiff that the defendant is not born to her parents, namely, Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal, but he is the son born to one Maari and Kannamma. On his own imagination, he called himself that he was born to Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">t is the admitted case of the first plaintiff that the defendant Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 was allowed to be in possession of 380 sq.ft. even during the life time of her father. The first plaintiff has produced the death certificate of Ponnan and also the legal heirship certificate of Ponnan dated 20.06.2000, which is marked as Ex.P.-5. A perusal of the legal heirship certificate in Dis/C4/18004/2000 reveals that the same was issued by the Tahsildar, Egmore - Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai, in which, Kathayee Ammal is described as his wife and the Kuppammal- the first plaintiff is described as daughter. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The name of the defendant does not find a place in the said legal heirship certificate. There is no reason given by the defendant for not including his name as legal heir of deceased Ponnan. If not the plaintiff at least, the mother Kathayee Ammal would not have given up her own son, as alleged by the defendant. The defendant also had not bothered about it and allowed Kathayee Ammal to complete the payment of installements and take the sale deed in her favour. On 02.05.2006, Kathayee Ammal, wife of Ponnan died. Once again, the first plaintiff Kuppammal had obtained the legal heirship certificate in Ne.Mu.E4/18489/2011 issued by the Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam. In the said legal heirship certificate also, only Kuppammal was shown to be the sole heir to the deceased Kathayee Ammal. The defendant had also produced the legal heirship certificate dated 06.07.2006, wherein, Kuppammal, the first plaintiff Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 and the Kesavan, the defendant are shown as legal heirs and it is also mentioned that Tmt.Kathayee Ammal died as early as on 02.05.2006.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.2. As there has been discrepancy in the legal heir ship certificates issued, the plaintiff has examined the Special Tahsildar, Egmore-Taluk. The Tahsildar, who has been examined as P.W.2, stated as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">“...... Usually, the legal heir ship certificate, if applied, will be issued in one month at maximum. Prior to my joining as the Tahsildar, Egmore Taluk in the year 2014, 3 legal heir ship certificates dated 20.06.2000, 06.07.2006 and 15.07.2011 were issued by my predecessors, in respect of the deceased Ponnan. It is true that in the legal heir ship certificate dated 20.06.2000, wife and daughter of the deceased Ponnan, who died on 01.03.1998, were mentioned as his legal heirs. Based on the death certificate of Ponnan, Family Card of Ponnan and Verification Report submitted by the then Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, the legal heir certificate dated 20.06.2000 in respect of the deceased Ponnan was issued. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As per the legal heir ship certificate 20.06.2000, it was issued for the purpose of the transfer of Tamilnadu Slum Clearance Board's Allotment. Subsequently, Kathaiyammal died on 02.05.2006. The legal heir ship certificate dated 15.07.2011 in respect of Ponnan was issued on the basis of the death certificate of Kathaiyammal, Electricity Consumption Card standing in the name of Kuppammal, Electroal I.D. Card of Kathaiyammal, death certificate of Ponnan, Report of the then Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Affidavit of Kuppammal, Sale deed dated 09.08.2005 executed in favour of Kathaiyammal by the Tamilnadu Slum Clearance Board, registered as Doc.No.3281 of 2005 on the file of the SRO, Kodambakkam. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the Ration Card, which was submitted for </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 issuance of legal heir ship certificate dated 20.06.2000 only the names of Mr.Ponnan and Kathiyammal find a place. ....” From the above evidence, it appears that the legal heirship certificate for the death Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal were obtained by the first plaintiff based on the electricity consumption card, electrol I.D.Card, the sale deed executed in favour of Kathayee Ammal by the TNSCB and also the ration card, which was submitted for issuance of legal heirship certificate.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.3. So far as the legal heirship certificate, that was produced by the defendant-Ex.D.2 is concerned, the same is based on the allotment order issued by the TNSCB and the ration card of Kesavan. In this regard, the Tahsildar / P.W.2, stated as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">“.... Along with the application submitted by Mr.Kesavan for issuance of legal heir ship certificate in respect of the deceased Ponnan, he submitted 2 death certificates of Ponnan one was issued on 23.11.1999 and another one was issued on 15.06.2006, death certificate of his mother Kathaiyammal, allotment order issued by Tamilnadu Slum Clearance Board, Ration Card of Kesavan, in which the names of Kesavan, Muniyammal, Arun and Saravanan find a place. The legal heir ship certificate dated 06.07.2006 was issued on the basis of the aforesaid documents submitted by Mr.Kesavan and also on the basis of the report submitted by the then Zonal Deputy Tahsildar.....”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 The ration card submitted by the defendant for the purpose obtaining the legal heirship certificate only contained the names of Kesavan, Muniyammal, Arun and Saravanan. After the submission of the application form, there should be an enquiry by the Revenue Inspector or the Zonal Deputy Tahsildar. But the Legal Heirship Certificate was issued to the defendant based on the report submitted by the then Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, which is not based on the documents submitted. The name of Kesavan, though living in the portion of the suit premises, had not been included. The Tahsildar has also given a report without verifying the actual facts. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Not only the Tahsildar had failed to advert to the fact that earlier legal heirship certificate has been issued to the first plaintiff for the death of the same Kathayee Ammal, wherein, the said first plaintiff is shown as the only legal heir of the Kathayee Ammal. Other than the legal heirship certificate, the defendant had produced Ex.D.6, which is the Burial Certificate. In the said certificate against the column name and address of the Informer, the defendant's name has been mentioned, which does not mean that the defendant would be the relative of the deceased therein, as it is only the name of the informer and not the relative. Therefore, the said certificate also will not help the defendants to prove his paternity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12.4. It is pertinent to mention that except examining himself as Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 D.W.1, the defendant has not examined any other person to prove his paternity. Even in the cross-examination, the defendant denied, when confronted with the question that the name of his biological father is Maari, who is the paternal uncle of the plaintiff. Thus, in the absence of any evidence to show that he is the son of Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal, the irresistible conclusion is that he is not the son born to Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal. Accordingly, the additional issue No.(iii) is answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. Additional Issue Nos.(i), (ii) and (iv) :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. The defendant/plaintiffs in T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 has produced the Will dated 03.09.1997 marked as Ex.D.8. The said Will is registered as Document No.126 of 1997 before the Sub Registrar Office, Kodambakkam. As per the said Will, Ponnan, who is the father of Kuppammal / the first plaintiff had been alleged to have executed the Will in favour of the defendant Kesavan as well as the first plaintiff Kuppammal. In the said Will, Ponnan's wife Kathayee Ammal is given the life interest and thereafter, A Schedule was given to P.Kesavan/the defendant and B Schedule was given in favour of P.Kuppammal/the first plaintiff absolutely. The Testator of the Will dated 03.09.1997 died on 01.03.1998. On his death, the alleged Will ought to have come into Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 force. The property mentioned in the Will is the one, which was allotted in his name by the TNSCB. While he was paying the monthly installments, he died. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thereafter, his wife Kathayee Ammal paid the balance of the installments and obtained the sale deed from the TNSCB on 05.08.2005 under Ex.P.3. To obtain the sale deed Kathayee Ammal had produced the legal heir certificate-Ex.P.5, as per which, Kathayee Ammal and the first plaintiff - Kuppammal alone were shown as legal heirs of the deceased Ponnan. Based on the same, the TNSCB had executed the sale deed in favour of the Kathayee Ammal on 05.08.2005. If really the deceased Ponnan had executed a Will in favour of the defendant and when the said Ponnan died on 01.03.1998, he would have taken steps to get the sale deed registered in his favour, as indicated in the Will. But the defendant had not taken any steps to either probate the Will or claim his half share as per the Will. He had only produced the said Will as a counter-blast for the suit, when the plaintiff had claimed title to the same. Whether the said Will is true and genuine or not had to be decided in the manner known to law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. A perusal of the said Will dated 03.09.1997 shows that there were two Attestors, namely, one P.Kumaresan and Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 P.Duraikannan. The said Kumaresan / the first Attestor, has given his address as “Grandipuram Village in Dindivanam Taluk”. The second witness is from Trustpuram, Chennai-24, where, the Testator himself was living. There is no reason forthcoming from the defendant as to why the first Attestor is brought from Dindivanam and also nothing is stated as to how he is known or related to the deceased Ponnan. It is also not explained as to why none of the Attestors were examined to prove the Will. It is not also pleaded that the Attestors are not alive or available to be examined. Thus, the defendant could not prove the Will, which is the subject matter in T.O.S.No.13 of 2015, as the execution of the same is surrounded by suspicious circumstances.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. As discussed earlier, the Ponnan was the original allottee of the suit property by the TNSCB as per the Chennai Metropolitan Development Scheme. After his death on 01.03.1998, at the request of his wife Kathayee Ammal, on production of the required documents, the allotment was transferred in her name. After the date of transfer, i.e., from 21.10.2000, which is evidenced by the memo issued by the TNSCB as per Ex.P.2, the said Kathayee Ammal was paying the further installments. Once the installments were paid, the sale deed was executed by the TNSCB in favour of Kathayee Ammal on 05.08.2005.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 The case of the defendant is that the said Ponnan had bequeathed the suit property equally between himself and the first plaintiff. The said Ponnan died in the year 1998, on which date, the installments of the sale consideration was not paid in full and the said Ponnan had not become the owner of the property. Admittedly, on the death of the Ponnan, Kathayee Ammal, who is his wife, had got the allotment transferred in her name and completed the payment of installments towards the sale consideration. Thereafter, on 05.08.2005, the TNSCB had executed the sale deed in her favour. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, on the date when the Will under Ex.D.8 was executed, Ponnan was not the owner of the property, as the ownership continued only with the TNSCB. Therefore, it is only the allotment, that was alone made, in favour of the said Ponnan. When the Testator himself did not have absolute right over the suit property, he could not have executed the Will, as alleged by the defendant and even he executed such a Will, the same is invalid in the eye of law. Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. When Ponnan executed the alleged Will nothing is mentioned about his wife, who was with him throughout. Even if no bequest is made in her favour, it is but natural to atleast mention the reason for excluding his wife. Having not mentioned the name of his wife Kathayee Ammal and the Testator being only the allottee and not yet become the full fledged owner could not have made the bequest as alleged, which leads to suspicion. As found supra, the Attestors or the scribe are not examined in proof of the Will. There is also no explanation forthcoming from the defendant for not producing the Will before the death of Kathayee Ammal, when she died only on 02.05.2006. Thus, the version of the defendant about the execution of the Will is highly improbable and the whole evidence in this regard is unsatisfactory. The defendant having taken active part in the execution, the onus is very heavy on him to remove the suspicion, which is not discharged by the defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. From the date of Ponnan's death, i.e., from 01.03.1998, till the date of the sale deed executed in favour of Kathayee Ammal on 05.08.2005, the defendant had not taken steps even to find out whether the installments have been paid or anybody is paying the balance of the sale consideration. Even in the Legal heirship certificate Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 obtained by the first plaintiff for the death of Ponnan, the names of the wife of the deceased, viz., Kathayee Ammal and daughter Kuppammal have been shown as legal heirs and the name of the defendant was not included. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The defendant also not taken steps to get his name included in the said certificate. Kathayee Ammal, wife of Ponnan, also died on 02.05.2006. Even in the legal heirship certificate obtained by the first plaintiff for the death of Kathayee Ammal, the first plaintiff-Kuppammal alone is shown as the sole legal heir, which had not been challenged by the defendant. It is also not the case of the defendant that after the death of Ponnan, he continued to pay the installments to get the sale deed executed in his name or in the name of Kathayee Ammal. When there is absolutely no relationship between the defendant and his alleged parents Ponnan and Kathayee Ammal, the claim of the defendant is not sustainable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. When Ponnan himself had not become the complete owner of the property on the date of his death, it is not possible for him to execute the Will over the suit property and on the other hand, he had got no right to deal with the same. Therefore, the bequest made by the late Ponnan of the suit property, not being the true owner, is not valid in the eye of law. In view of the above discussion, the additional issue Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 Nos.(i), (ii) and (iv) are also answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. In T.O.S.No.25 of 2017, the issue “Whether the Will dated 05.04.2006 executed by the plaintiff's mother Kathayee Ammal is genuine or not ? is required to be determined.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19.1. The first plaintiff has produced a Will of her mother dated 05.04.2006 bequeathing all her rights in the suit property in favour of the first plaintiff alone. The said Will is also registered before the Sub Registrar Office, Kodambakkam, as Document No.40 of 2006. The said Will is attested by one Murugesan and one Shankar. One of the Attestors is died and other Attestor Murugesan has been examined as P.W.5. The Attestor Murugesan in the chief examination filed in the form of proof affidavit has stated as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">“2. That on the 5th day of April, 2006, I was present together with one Shanmugam at the house of Kathayee Ammal and we did then and there see the said deceased set and subscribe her name at the foot of the testamentary paper in the Tamil language and character hereunto annexed and marked with the letter A and declare and publish the same as and for her last Will and testament.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. That thereupon, I this deponent and the said Shanmugam did at the request of the said deceased and in her presence and in the presence of each other and all being present at the same time, set and subscribed our respective names and signatures at the foot of the testamentary paper as witnesses thereto.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 19.2. The said chief examination of P.W.5 was not disturbed in the cross-examination by the defendant. The witness had specifically stated that the suit property belonged to the plaintiffs and they have been enjoying the same over a period of 25 years. A party propounding the Will or otherwise making a claim under a Will is seeking to prove the document. The courts are to refer to the statutory provisions, which govern the proof of Will, viz., Sections 67 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the person, who relies on a document in the Court of law. As the propounder of the Will, the first plaintiff has shown satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the Testatrix and that the Testatrix was in a sound disposing state of mind during the relevant point of time having understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put her signature in the document on her own free-will. As the plaintiff has examined one of the attestors, viz., Murugesan, in proving the signature/thump impression as required in law, the finding is in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19.3. As the Will executed by Kathayee Ammal dated 05.04.2006 is true and genuine and it is proved in the manner known to law, the plaintiff in T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 is entitled for issuance of letter of administration, as prayed for.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 Issue No.1 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. In view of the findings rendered qua additional issue No.(i) and (ii), issue No.1 is answered against the defendant holding that the defendant cannot be said to be the absolute owner of an extent of 380 sq. ft. forming part of A schedule property as mentioned the B Schedule property. Thus, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiffs. Issue Nos.2 to 4 :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. The first plaintiff became absolute owner of A schedule, which includes B schedule property. Accordingly, the Settlement Deed executed by her in favour of her children, who are arrayed as plaintiffs 2 to 4, is valid and the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of delivery of vacant possession of B schedule property from the defendant. Thus, issue Nos.2 to 4 are also answered against the defendant favouring the plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. In view of the above findings, C.S.No.562 of 2011 is decreed, as prayed for. Consequently, T.O.S.No.25 of 2017 is also decreed as prayed for. As a corollary, T.O.S.No.13 of 2015 is dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18.11.2019 gg Witnesses examined on the side of Plaintiffs :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">P.W.1 - P.Kuppammal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Witnesses examined on the side of Defendant :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">D.W.1 - Kesavan Documents marked on the side of the Plaintiffs : Ex.P.1 - 12.10.2000 - Order passed by Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board Ex.P.2 - 21.10.2000 - Memo issued by Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board Ex.P.3 - 05.08.2005 - Sale Deed by Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board in favour of Kathayee Ammal Ex.P.4 - 01.03.1998 - Death Certificate of Ponnan Ex.P.5 - 20.06.2000 - Legal Heirship Certificate for the death of Ponnan Ex.P.6 - 02.05.2006 - Death Certificate of Kathayee Ammal Ex.P.7 - 15.07.2011 - Legal Heirship Certificate for the death of Kathayee Ex.P.8 - 31.01.2007 - Judgment in O.S.No.2816/2000 Ex.P.9 - 06.04.2011 - Petition in O.P.No.222/2011 Ex.P.10- 05.04.2006 - Will Ex.P.11- 05.08.2011 - Plaint in C.S.No.562 of 2011 Ex.P.12- 05.08.2011 - Affidavit of Attesting Wtiness Murugesan in O.P.No.219 of 2017 Ex.P.13- 19.08.1998 - Voter ID of Kathayee Ammal Ex.P.14- 15.02.1977 - Installment receipt to TNSCB Documents marked on the side of the Defendant : Ex.D.1 - 25.03.1977 - Passbook of TNSCB Ex.D.2 - 06.07.2006 - Legal Heir Certificate of Ponnan Ex.D.3 - 03.11.1995 - TNSCB Receipt Ex.D.4 - 30.06.1980 - TC of the defendant Ex.D.5 - 09.09.1996 - Community Certificate of the defendant Ex.D.6 - 02.03.1998 - Burial Certificate of Ponnan Ex.D.7 - 31.01.2007 - Judgment in O.S.No.2813/2000 Ex.D.8 - 03.09.1997 - Will 18.11.2019<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Nos.13 of 2015 & 25 of 2017 PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA, J.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-66192153568485630602020-01-27T17:41:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:41:29.026+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">VIJAYALAKSHMI VS. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 13.12.2019</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Introduction:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">This writ petition has been filed for the issuance of writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent in O.Mu.No.3669/2018/A3, dated 06/12/2018 and quash the same and consequently directing the 2nd respondent to issue Legal Heirship Certificate to the petitioners .</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">The petitioners are the daughter and sons of late S.Bagvath Singh. The petitioners states that their father late S.Bagvath Singh had two wives and that through the first wife petitioners 1 to 3 were born and through second wife petitioners 4 to 6 were born. It is also stated that there is no dispute with regard to the status or relationship between the parties. It is the case of the petitioners that the first wife died long back and that their father married the second wife only after the death of the first wife. It is now admitted before this court that the second wife also died in the year 1999, even before the death of her husband. The Legal Heirship Certificate for the deceased second wife Raja Lakshmi is also produced before this Court to show that the petitioners 4 to 6 are her children.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">When the application is submitted before the second respondent, the second respondent originally rejected the application on the ground that in respect of cases where there are more than one wife, the parties have to approach the Civil Court and they cannot approach the Tahsildar for issuance of Legal Heirship Certificate. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Melur.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Since the deceased had more than one wife, it is submitted by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the Tahsildar cannot issue the Legal Heirship Certificate. From the facts admitted among the persons interested, it is made clear that the second marriage is also valid as it was contracted after the life time of first wife. Hence, Tahsildar can not treat this case where more than two wives are claiming Legal Heirship Certificate. When the validity of the second marriage and the status of second wife is admitted, the children of second wife namely petitioners 4 to 6 have to be treated as legitimate children born to Mr.S.Bagvath Singh.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14pt;">Judgement:</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 14pt;">Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the second respondent, dated 06.12.2018 is hereby quashed. The second respondent is directed to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate to the petitioners by stating the petitioners are the legal heirs of the deceased, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></b><span style="font-size: 20pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">VIJAYALAKSHMI VS. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 13.12.2019</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATED : 13.12.2019</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CORAM : THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.S. SUNDAR<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">W.P.(MD).No.7600 of 2019<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.Vijayalakshmi<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.B.Sekar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.B.Anandhan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4.B.Thirumaran<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5.B.Thirumaran<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6.B.Thangadurai<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7.B.Senthilkumar .. Petitioners<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Vs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.The Revenue Divisional Officer, Revenue Divisional Office, Melur,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Office at Y.Othakadai, Madurai District.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The Tahsildar, Office of Tahsildar, Madurai East Taluk, Madurai. .. Respondents<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Petitioner : Mr.M.P.Senthil<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For Respondents : Mr.C.Ramar Additional Government Pleader<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>ORDER</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This writ petition has been filed for the issuance of writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent in O.Mu.No.3669/2018/A3, dated 06/12/2018 and quash the same and consequently directing the 2nd respondent to issue Legal Heirship Certificate to the petitioners.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The petitioners are the daughter and sons of late S.Bagvath Singh. The petitioners states that their father late S.Bagvath Singh had two wives and that through the first wife petitioners 1 to 3 were born and through second wife petitioners 4 to 6 were born. It is also stated that there is no dispute with regard to the status or relationship between the parties. It is the case of the petitioners that the first wife died long back and that their father married the second wife only after the death of the first wife. It is now admitted before this court that the second wife also died in the year 1999, even before the death of her husband. The Legal Heirship Certificate for the deceased second wife Raja Lakshmi is also produced before this Court to show that the petitioners 4 to 6 are her children.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3.When the application is submitted before the second respondent, the second respondent originally rejected the application on the ground that in respect of cases where there are more than one wife, the parties have to approach the Civil Court and they cannot approach the Tahsildar for issuance of Legal Heirship Certificate. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Melur. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Revenue Divisional Officer, after recording the fact that there is no dispute among the petitioners as to the status and that the petitioners have no quarrel among themselves, remitted the matter to the second respondent to issue Legal Heirship Certificate as per the guidelines of the Land Commissioner. However, the second respondent after remand, once again passed the same order and rejected the application on the same ground, on which he had earlier rejected on 05.01.2018. The second rejection by order, dated 16.12.2018, is challenged in this writ petition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4.The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents produced before this Court a Circular, dated 09.08.2017, giving certain directions to the Tahsildar concerned, for issuance of Legal Heirship Certificate. The general instructions as found in the circular are as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5.Since the deceased had more than one wife, it is submitted by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the Tahsildar cannot issue the Legal Heirship Certificate. From the facts admitted among the persons interested, it is made clear that the second marriage is also valid as it was contracted after the life time of first wife. Hence, Tahsildar can not treat this case where more than two wives are claiming Legal Heirship Certificate. When the validity of the second marriage and the status of second wife is admitted, the children of second wife namely petitioners 4 to 6 have to be treated as legitimate children born to Mr.S.Bagvath Singh. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Applying the Hindu Succession Act, the claim of the petitioners as legal heirs of the deceased cannot be negatived by reference to the guidelines or circular issued by the Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration. Since the relationship of the petitioners is not dispute, this Court is inclined to quash the order passed by the second respondent, dated 06.12.2018, dismissing the petition of the petitioners for issuing Legal Heirship Certificate of deceased S. Bagvath Singh.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6.Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the second respondent, dated 06.12.2018 is hereby quashed. The second respondent is directed to issue the Legal Heirship Certificate to the petitioners by stating the petitioners are the legal heirs of the deceased, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1.The Revenue Divisional Officer, Revenue Divisional Office, Melur, Office at Y. Othakadai, Madurai District.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2.The Tahsildar, Office of Tahsildar, Madurai East Taluk, Madurai.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-14439276775175975382020-01-27T17:29:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:29:05.676+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">ORISSA HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">RADHI BEWA & ANR. VS. BHAGWAN SAHU<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 09.02.1951</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Introduction :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">For the purpose of the present discussion, it is of importance to consider at what point of time the right accrues to the widow under the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The essential facts have been fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother Justice Das. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appellant Radhi Bewa (who was defendant No. 2 in the original suit) is the widow of one Bairagi who died sometime in 1932 or 1934. Respondent Bhagawan (plaintiff no. 1) is the own brother of Batragi and respondents Brundaban and Hrudanand (plaintiffs 2 and 3) are the sons of another brother of Bhagawan and Bairagi named Natha who is dead. There was another brother of Bhagawan named Bharat who died leaving a widow named Keluni (defendant no. 1) and a daughter (defendant no 3.) They were also parties to the litigation in the early stages and it appears that they eventually compromised with the plaintiffs. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The whole case proceeded on the assumption that the Mitakshara coparcenary which originally consisted of Bhagawan and his three brothers Natha, Bharat and Bairagi remained in tact even after the death of Natha, Bharat and Bairagi and that at present the surviving coparceners are Bhagawan on the one hand and Natha's two sons Brundaban and Hrudanand on the other. They, therefore, claimed the suit property (which are agricultural lands) as the surviving members of the coparcenary and urged that appellant Radhi Bewa who is the widow of a deceased coparcener whose death took place prior to 1937 was entitled only to maintenance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Radhi Bewa's main contention however was that though she became a widow prior to 1937 there was nothing in the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 to disentitle her from claiming an interest in the property of her deceased husband under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of that Act in view of the fact that the coparcenary has yet been disrupted. She, therefore, claimed the share of her deceased husband. My lord the Chief Justice took the view that though the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act XVIII of 1937) as amended by the amending Act of 1938 (Act XI of 1938) was not retrospective in the broad sense in which it is ordinarily understood yet there was nothing in that Act to prevent the widow of a deceased coparcener who died prior to 1937 leaving an interest in the joint family from claiming that interest when that interest had not vested in any person either by partition amongst the coparceners or otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The point to be considered is whether we can legitimately draw any presumption as to the intention of a person who has died intestate. I venture to point out respectfully that if it is permissible to say that a man did not leave a will, because he was satisfied with the state of the law regarding the order of succession to his estate, it is equally permissible to say that his intention might have been to let the law take its course and that he was not thinking of any particular heir at all. It being impossible to predicate as to who would succeed to the estate until the succession opens, it is difficult to say that a person who dies intestate had contemplated at the time of his death that he would be succeeded by any particular person or persons. There will be still less justification for presuming that if he had known that a change was going to be effected in the existing law, he would have disposed of his property by means of a will.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">That being so, there is no question of frustrating the presumed intention of a person to whose estate the Act applies, and as already stated, to hold that the Act applies only when succession opens is not to give it a retrospective effect and therefore the principles bearing upon the question as to when a statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation have no relevancy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It is therefore ordered that this appeal be allowed and that the widow concerned will have the same interest in the joint family property as her husband had at the time of his death. There will be no order for costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">ORISSA HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">RADHI BEWA & ANR. VS. BHAGWAN SAHU<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 09.02.1951</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: AIR 1951 Ori 378<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: Narasimham<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: Ray, Jagannadhadas, Narasimham<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT Narasimham, J.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. This reference to the special Bench was necessitated in consequence of a difference of opinion between my lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Justice Das who first heard the appeal as a Division Bench.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. The essential facts have been fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother Justice Das and it is unnecessary to repeat them at length. Appellant Radhi Bewa (who was defendant No. 2 in the original suit) is the widow of one Bairagi who died sometime in 1932 or 1934. Respondent Bhagawan (plaintiff no. 1) is the own brother of Batragi and respondents Brundaban and Hrudanand (plaintiffs 2 and 3) are the sons of another brother of Bhagawan and Bairagi named Natha who is dead. There was another brother of Bhagawan named Bharat who died leaving a widow named Keluni (defendant no. 1) and a daughter (defendant no 3.) They were also parties to the litigation in the early stages and it appears that they eventually compromised with the plaintiffs. The whole case proceeded on the assumption that the Mitakshara coparcenary which originally consisted of Bhagawan and his three brothers Natha, Bharat and Bairagi remained in tact even after the death of Natha, Bharat and Bairagi and that at present the surviving coparceners are Bhagawan on the one hand and Natha's two sons Brundaban and Hrudanand on the other. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">They, therefore, claimed the suit property (which are agricultural lands) as the surviving members of the coparcenary and urged that appellant Radhi Bewa who is the widow of a deceased coparcener whose death took place prior to 1937 was entitled only to maintenance. Radhi Bewa's main contention however was that though she became a widow prior to 1937 there was nothing in the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 to disentitle her from claiming an interest in the property of her deceased husband under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of that Act in view of the fact that the coparcenary has yet been disrupted. She, therefore, claimed the share of her deceased husband. My lord the Chief Justice took the view that though the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act XVIII of 1937) as amended by the amending Act of 1938 (Act XI of 1938) was not retrospective in the broad sense in which it is ordinarily understood yet there was nothing in that Act to prevent the widow of a deceased coparcener who died prior to 1937 leaving an interest in the joint family from claiming that interest when that interest had not vested in any person either by partition amongst the coparceners or otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by the Act of 1938 was held by the Federal Court in Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, In the matter of A. I. R. (28) 1941 P. C 72, to be inapplicable to agricultural lands. Thereupon the Orissa Legislature passed an Act in 1944 (Orissa Act V of 1944), extending the Act to agriculture lands in Orissa and giving retrospective effect to the same. Before the Division Bench it was contended, relying on the word 'always' in Section 2 of the Orissa Act, that the Orissa Act had unlimited retrospective effect. But this contention was rightly given up by Mr. Mohanty on behalf of the appellants at the time of arguing the appeal. The retrospectivity of the Orissa Act extends to the date of the commencement of the Central Act of 1937. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the true meaning of the expression 'always' occurring in the Orissa Act which has been dealt with at some length in the judgments of the learned Judges who constituted the Division Bench. The sole question for consideration by the Special Bench is whether the benefits of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act are available to a Hindu woman who became a widow prior to the passing of the Act but whose husband's interest in the joint family property had not vested in any other person either by partition of the joint family property or by valid alienation. A decision of this question depends on a construction of Section 3 (2) of the Act along with other provisions of the Act such as Sections 2, 4 and 5. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Though the Act is a small one consisting of five sections its construction is by no means easy and as pointed out in Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edition, at page 701, the Act even after the amendment of 1938 "remains defective and obscure in some respects." The difficulties in construing that Act have also been fully discussed at pages 4 to 10 of the report of the Hindu Law Committee, 1941. I must, therefore, confess to a feeling of diffidence in approaching the subject especially when my lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Justice Das for both of whom I have the greatest respect have taken two divergent views.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. Before discussing the relevant provisions of the Act I may reiterate some well-known rules of statutory construction which bear repetition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained." (Maxwell, 9th edition, page 55). To these rules must be added the special rules of beneficial construction which are applicable to remedial Acts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the Legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words if they are fairly susceptible of it. .The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words," ('ibid', page 71.) At the Bar it was faintly contended that the Act was not a remedial one. This argument apparently overlooks the following observations of the Chief Justice of India in A. I. R. (28) 1941 P. C. 72 at p. 76:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The underlying purpose of the Act is plainly stated in its Preamble: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the Hindu Law to give better rights to women in respect of property." It is, therefore, a remedial Act seeking to remove or to mitigate what) the Legislature presumably regarded as a mischief; and as such it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Chief Justice of India relied on the following passage in 'Cover's case'; In re, Coal Gas Co., (1875) 1 Ch. D. 182:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Act must be construed so as to give the most complete remedy which the phraseology will permit."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. I may now quote Sections 2 to 5 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Section 2. Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Section 3 (1). When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his widows together shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3) be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a son's son if there is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Provided further that the same provision shall apply 'mutatis mutandis' to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time or his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Women's Estate, provided, however, that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the terms of the grant applicable thereto descends to a single heir or to any property to which the Indian Succession Act, 1925, applies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Section 4. Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Section 5. For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The original Act of 1937 did not contain Section 5 and in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of that Act the word 'intestate' was found after the word 'dies. By the amending Act of 1938, the word 'intestate' was omitted from Sub-section (2) of Section 3 as 'inept' and Section 5 was newly inserted so as to give the expression 'die intestate' an extended meaning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. Beading Sub-section (2) of Section 3 as it now stands it will be noticed that there is nothing in it to indicate that the death of the person referred to therein must have taken place prior to the commencement of the Act. All that it says is that when a Hindu goyerned by a particular school of Hindu law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), have in the property the same interest s he himself had. The date of widowhood is not referred to at all. It was, however, contended that the expressions 'dies' and 'at the time of his death' indicate that the Legislature was thinking of deaths which might take place after the commencement of the Act. This argument, however, overlooks the well-known rule of statutory drafting.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"A statute is to be regarded as always speaking" ('Halsbury' Vol. 31, 2nd Edition, page 572.) The tense and the mood of the verb used in the Act are such that whenever the Act is taken up for consideration it should appear as if the Act is then speaking. Therefore merely because the verb 'dies' is in the present tense it is not correct to say that the Act refers to the present and to the future and not to the past. Moreover, the subjunctive mood has been used in a conditional sense and the word 'when' is not used as indicating time factor but as indicating a condition. It is true that the word 'when' may sometimes be indicative of the time factor but here it appears to have the same meaning as 'where.' Thus in Section 2, the words used are "The provisions of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus 'when' and 'where' have been used indiscriminately in the Act to convey the meaning 'in cases in which' (see Sir A. Alison's Legislative Drafting and Forms, 4th Edition, p. 117.) I would paraphrase Sub-section (2) as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In cases in which a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law leaves an interest in a Hindu joint family property at the time of his death, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3) have in the property the same interest as he himself had."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The words 'at the time of his death' have been specially insested to restrict the application of this Sub-section to the interest which he then leaves in the Hindu joint family property whatever might have been his interest prior to his death and they have nothing to do with the prospective or retrospective application of the Act. The most decisive argument in favour of the view that the word 'dies' does not necessarily indicate prospectivity is found in Section 4 of the Act itself. That section expressly says that nothing in the Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It, therefore, expressly bars giving restrospective effect to the property of a Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the Act. The word 'dies' occurs in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 which deals with the separate property of a Mitakshara Hindu or the property of a Dayabhaga Hindu dying intestate. If the expression 'dies' in Sub-section (2) is itself sufficient to bar retrospective operation, by parity of reasoning the same expression in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 should be a bar to retrospective construction and there would have been absolutely no need for the Legislature to insert a new section like Section 4. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was, however, urged that Section 4 might have been inserted by way of abundant caution and that it should not affect the reasonable inference arising from the tense of the verb 'dies.' I am, however, unable to accept the view that a section like Section 4 which expressly bars retrospective effect in certain cases can be said to have been inserted by way of abundant caution. It seems to have been inserted mainly because the Legislature fully realised that if Section 3 (1) stood by itself it might be reasonably construed as retrospective to a limited extent and with a view to remove all possibility of such a construction it found it necessary to provide a new statutory section. Thus taking into consideration the rule of drafting regarding the use of the tense and mood and the implications arising out of the language used in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Act it seems clear that there Is nothing in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 to limit its application to the widow of a Hindu who died after the commencement of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. There is ample authority for such a construction. As pointed out by my lord the Chief Justice the Privy Council while construing the words 'dying Intestate' occurring in the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amending Act of 1929) pointed out that those words do not necessarily connote the future tense but that they are descriptive of the status of the deceased and have no reference and were not intended to have any reference to the time Of the death of a Hindu male. Similarly in 'The Queen v. St. Mary Whitechapel', (1848) 116 E R 311, the following provisions of Section 2 of Stat. 9 & 10 Viet. c. 63 came up for consideration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"No woman residing in any parish with her husband at the time of his death shall be removed ..................................."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The argument that the word 'residing' in that section though connected with the words 'shall be removed' is not meant to confine the enactment to future residence but that it is a descriptive word haying the effect of adjective and referable to any time was accepted by Lord Denman, C. J., word held that though the Act was prospective In its operation as it related to future removals only there was nothing to prevent a construction by which 'a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In 'The Queen v. Birwistle', (1889) 58 L J M C 158, the decision turned on the construction of the following extract from Section 1 of 49 & 50 of Viet. C. 52.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"From and after the passing of this Act it shall tie lawful for any married woman, who shall have been deserted by her husband to summon Her husband before any two Justices, etc. etc."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The question for consideration was that section would apply to desertions which took place rior to the commencement of the Act also. Lord Coleridge, C.J, answered this question in the affirmative saying:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Scores of Acts are retrospective, and may without express words be taken to be retrospective, since they are passed to supply a cure to an existing evil. This Act was intended to afford married women a remedy for desertion, and desertion may have commenced before the Act.............."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The recent judgment of Viswantha Sastri, J., in Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami', AIR (37) 1950 Mad 321, while construing the words "if he marries again" in Clause (4) of Section 2 of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 is also very instructive. The learned Judge held that the said expression is not limited to second marriages which might take place after the coming ' to force of the Act but would apply to such marriages which took place prior to the passing of the Act and the words were "Merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice married man at the date when the wife's claim for separate maintenance is made Hinder the Act................"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. It is unnecessary to cite other authorities. Even on a fair construction of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 it cannot be said that there is any indication therein barring its application to the widows of those Hindus who died before the commencement of the Act. When there is no such indication there seems to be no reason as to why the benefit of that Sub-section should be denied to those classes of persons who became widows prior to the commencement of the Act unless such a construction is inconsistent with the other provisions of the Act or offends against other well known canons of the statutory construction. Such a construction is strictly speaking not giving retrospective effect to the statute as ordinarily understood but to quote the words of Lord Denman, C. J., (1848) 116 E R 811, to apply the Act prospectively though 'a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing.'<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. It was contended that Section 4 read with Section 5 left no room for doubt that the whole of Section 3 including Sub-section (2) could not apply to the property of a Hindu who died before the commencement of the Act. It will be noticed that Section 4 refers to the property of, a Hindu dying intestate. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 expressly refers to the property of such a Hindu and that Sub-section has therefore clearly no retrospective operation. But) Sub-section (2) does not refer either to 'property' or to a Hindu who 'dies intestate.' It refers only to the 'interest' of a Hindu in the joint family. The word 'intestate' which was originally inserted in that. Sub-section was deliberately omitted by the Legislature in 1938 as 'inept.' </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">That is to say, the Legislature considered that it will not be appropriate to say that a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara who has an interest in the joint family property can be said to 'die intestate' in respect of that interest because he has no right to make a testamentary disposition. If, therefore, it will not be good English to say that such a Hindu died 'intestate' how can it be said that Section 4 applies to him also? In other words, if the word 'intestate' is inappropriate in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 and is deliberately omitted from that Sub-section of retained in Section 4 it necessarily follows that Section 4 cannot apply to those Hindus referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 3. Moreover, in ordinary language when a person is said to 'die intestate' the reference is to a person who having the capacity to make a will either omits to execute any will at all or executes a will which is found to be invalid due to other causes.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It will, therefore, be not good English to say that a 'minor died intestate' or else that a 'congenital idiot died intestate' because neither of them has the capacity to make a will. The position of a coparcener in an undivided Hindu family is of a similar type in respect of his interest in the joint family property and Section 4 cannot be applicable to him in respect of that interest.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. It was, however, contended that even though in terms Section 4 may not be applicable to a coparcener of an undivided Hindu joint family, by virtue of the extended definition given in Section 5 it became so applicable. It was urged that the words in Section 5 'he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect' would also include those cases where an undivided Mitakshara Hindu does not make any will at all or makes a will which on account of his incapacity is incapable of taking effect. I would have been inclined to accept this argument but for the deliberate omission of the word 'intestate' from subsection (2) of section 3 by the Legislature in 1938. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If intestacy and the interest of a Mitakshara Hindu joint family property are incongruous in one sub-section of the Act they must be incongruous in all other sections of the Act because it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that words and phrases should be given the same meaning throughout the Act, unless there is any repugnancy in the context. Section 5 should therefore be construed to refer to those cases where a person having the. capacity to make a will executes a will which due to other reasons such as failure to comply with the formalities or contravention of the law of transfer of property is rendered invalid in whole or in part in respect of a portion of the property. The necessity for inserting section 5 was obvious. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Ordinarily, the word 'intestate' would mean intestacy in fact; that is to say, the fact that no will was executed by a person capable of executing a will. But legal intestacy goes further and includes those cases where a will though executed in fact is declared to be invalid in whole or in part. If section 5 were not there then difficulties might have arisen in construing section 4 in those cases where there is intestacy in law though not in fact and it was to remove this difficulty that section 5 was inserted adopting the language of section 30 of the Indian Succession Act. If section 5 were meant to include those cases of persons who had no capacity to make a will at all the necessity for omitting the word 'intestate' from section 3(2) would not have arisen.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. One important argument against this construction is that it may lead to the anomalous result of section 2 being not applicable to subsection (2) of section 3. This argument appears to have weighed very much with my learned brother Justice Das. Section 2 undoubtedly refers to a Hindu who dies intestate and it says that the devolution of property as described in section 3 shall apply to the property of such a Hindu 'notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary'. It is argued that unless this controlling section 2 is made applicable to subsection (2) of section 3 difficulties of construction would arise when there is a conflict between section 3(2) on the one hand and any provision of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary on the other. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There are two answers to this argument. The first one is that given by Srinivasa lyengar in his 10th edition of Mayne's Hindu Law at page 716 and reiterated in the 11th edition of the same book at page 704. There, it has been pointed out that: 'as intestacy cannot by any legal possibility be a condition for the operation of sub-section (2) to section 3 the words 'dies intestate' in section 2 must be treated as a surplusage having no meaning.' Another reason which I venture to put forward is that section 2 was inserted by way of abundant caution and the full operation of sub-section '2) of section 3 is not in any way affected even if section 2 be completely omitted. The Act purports to be an amendment to the Hindu law. It is well-known that Hindu law consists not only of sacred texts but includes customary law which modifies those texts and the judicial decisions interpreting those texts and recognisirig such custom. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">When an Act therefore purports to be an amendment to the existing Hindu law it must, to the extent to which it can be reasonably construed, prevail over any existing provision of Hindu law or custom to the contrary. An amending Act ex-hypothesi will be contrary to the existing law which it purports to amend and must prevail notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the then existing law. Section 3 is a self-contained provision and sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section would prevail by their own force and section 2 was apparently inserted by way of abundant caution. Where custom is saved, there is express provision to that effect in sub-section (4) of section 3. The word 'intestate' in section 2 cannot therefore limit the giving full effect to sub-section (2) of section 3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. Another reason which also appears to have weighed very much with my learned brother Justice Das will be clear from the following quotation of his Judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The quantum of the interest which a widow gets is the same as what the husband had during his life-time and therefore does not fluctuate with reference to any further changes in the constitution of the family. It is also clear that that Interest is measured by what it was when the husband died, since the interest is referred to subsection (3) as 'devolving' on her from her husband and in sub-section (2) as being the same which he had when he died."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">From this premise he infers that the commencement and the quantum of. the widow's interest have reference to the point of time when her husband died and that it is almost impossible to fit in the case of a widow whose husband died prior to the Act, into the framework of section 3 (2). 1 am however unable to find any clear authority to support the view that the quantum of interest which the widow gets is fixed with, reference what her husband had at the time of his death and does not fluctuate. This question is certainly not free from difficulty as pointed out in the 11th edition of Mayne's Hindu Law at pages 710, 711 where the learned editor has observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The anomaly of a widow holding a woman's estate in the undivided property of her husband must necessarily be dealt with as a special case; the interest she takes may well be a fluctuating interest till there is a partition."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">To a similar effect are the following observations at page 334 of the same book.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"While she cannot be in strict sense a coparcener with the other members, her position. will be analogous to that of a member of an undivided family under the Dayabhaga Law with this possible difference that, as she is only to have the 'same interest' as her husband himself had, the share to which she will be entitled at a partition may be liable to the same fluctuation caused by changes in the family as if she occupied the place of her husband or as the share of any member of an undivided Mitakshara family."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Madras High Court has also taken the same view in 'Chinniah Chettiar v. Sivagami Achi', I L R (1945) Mad 402. Therefore, even in respect of post-1937 deaths it has been held that the quantum of interest of a Hindu widow is liable to fluctuation until partition. There seems to be thus no legal impossibility in applying section 3(2) to the ease of a widow whose husband died prior to the Act, when joint family property continues intact after the passing of the Act. If there was any valid alienation by the manager of the family or by a coparcener in States like Madras where such alienations are recognised as valid to the extent of his interest, the quantum of interest available to the widow at the time of partition would have to be worked out as if her husband were alive the date of partition while at the same time preserving vested rights which, had accrued to persons before the commencement of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. It is true that no statute should be construed retrospectively so as to affect, vested rights I unless such a construction can be justified either by express words or by necessary implication. But the question is what are the vested rights that are adversely affected by the construction suggested in this judgment. It has been, strenuously contended that the rights of the other coparceners in the joint family property are adversely affected. It is unnecessary to elaborate at length the various rights of an individual coparcener in a Hindu joint family until partition. I would content myself with quoting the following observations of the Privy Council in 'Ananta Bhikappa v. Shankar Ramchandra', 70 Ind App 232 at p. 239.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"As Appovier's case made clear, the fraction which is at any time employed to describe the quantum of interest of. a male member of the family 'does not represent, his rights while the family is joint', but the share which he would take if a partition were then to be made. His interest is never static but increases by survivorship as others die and lessens as others enter the family as by birth or adoption."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">A coparcener has undoubtedly an interest in the joint family. But the quantum of his interest at any particular time being indeterminate and inchoate till actual partition it cannot be said that he has any right - much less a vested right - to such a quantum of interest. By applying the Act to widows whose husbands died prior to 1937 the effect may undoubtedly be to reduce the quantum of interest which the other coparceners might have obtained, had they partitioned the property at the time of the deaths of those husbands. But as they had no vested right to that quantum at that time it cannot be said that right was 'adversely' affected by such a construction. Unless it is a well defined right there can be no question of its being either adversely affected or impaired. The rule against retrospective construction (even in a limited sense) has been thus explained in Halsbury, Vol. 31, 2nd edition, page 516.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The rule, therefore strictly stated applies to rights which are at the moment of enactment matters of active assertion, and not to rights which may thereafter be the subject of litigation".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">How can it be said that the quantum of interest of a coparcener in the coparcenary property is a matter of active assertion until partition? The learned Counsel for the respondent however contended that the other rights of the coparcener in the joint family property such as his right of joint possession and enjoyment etc. fully described in section 235 at page of Mulla's Hindu Law, 10th edition are also adversely affected. I am however unable to understood how any right of a coparcener except the quantum of his interest is adversely affected when the widow of a deceased coparcener is held to have her husband's interest in the property. She is not a stranger but also a member of the joint family and as such is always entitled to maintenance like coparceners themselves. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">By giving her the same interest in the property which her husband had the joint possession and enjoyment of the property by the other coparceners is not in any way adversely affected. The Karta continues to manage the property as before and the other coparceners' right to claim partition at any time is not affected at all. The coparceners had the privilege (if I may use that expression) of admitting male issues of coparceners alone to an interest in the coparcenary property. The Act by admitting the widows of deceased coparceners also to some interest in the property may be said to have deprived the coparceners of that exclusive privilege of limiting the interest to males alone. But a mere deprivation of privilege cannot be a ground for not giving limited retrospective effect to a statute when the words are capable of such construction. In 'Reynolds v. Attorney General for Nova Scotia' 1896 A C 240, it was held that a mere privilege was not a vested right so as to prevent a court from giving retrospective effect to a statute.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">The judgment of the Federal Court in 'Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi', A. I. R. (32) 1945 P. C. 25 has been cited at the Bar and emphasis has been laid on the following observations of Varadachariar J. at page 33.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"But that is due to the circumstances that her husband died before the passing of the Act........<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">..The possibility of such varying consequences cannot be allowed to control the natural and reasonable interpretation of the Act. It is prima facie prospective...................."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The use of the word 'prima facie' by Varadachariar J. makes it absolutely clear that there is no decision by the Federal Court of this question. This point was not specifically taken up and moreover in that case it could not be taken up because the entire property had vested in a sole coparcener before the commencement of the Act of 1937.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. To conclude: the Act being a remedial Act there seems no justification for not giving full effect to the words of sub-section (2) of section 3 so as to embrace within its scope persons who became widows not only after the commencement of the Act but also those persons who became widows before the commencement of the Act so long as the interest which their husbands had in the joint family property at the time of their death had not vested in any individual. The tense and mood used by the draftsman in sub-section (2) of section 3 are not at all decisive on the question of prospective construction but are consistent with the alternative construction also. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If section 4 be made applicable to sub-section (2) of section 3 there would certainly be a definite bar to giving such a limited retrospective construction to section 3(2) but by deliberately omitting the word 'intestate' from sub-section, (2) of section 3 and retaining it in section 4 the legislature obviously indicated that section 4 should not in any way control sub-section (2) of section 3. Any such construction which would affect vested rights of any person may be open to other objections based on well-known canons of construction. But so long as such vested rights are not affected there seems no justification for depriving one class of widows from the benefits which the Act intended to confer on them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. I would therefore, with great respect, agree with the view taken by my Lord the Chief Justice.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. We have heard elaborate arguments on his reference and I have had the advantage of considering carefully the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice in the Division Bench and ail the arguments in support of it from the Bar and the Bench and also of reading with close attention the judgment prepared by my learned brother Justice Narasimham. But after giving the matter my best and anxious consideration I regret, with great respect, my disagreement with their views and I feel unable to come to any different conclusion than that which I had reached when I heard the matter as a member of the Division Bench. I am indeed bound to say that I feel reinforced in the view that I have already expressed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. In view of the importance of the matter and out of respect for the views of my learned brothers and out of regard for the strenuous arguments advanced at the Bar, I am obliged to deal with the question involved, at some length, even at the possible risk of repetition of portions of my previous judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. Under Section 3, sub-section (2) of Centra). Act XVIII of 1937, as amended by Central Act XI of 1938, the widow of a coparcener who dies leaving an interest in joint family property gets his interest therein. The question for decision is whether this applies equally to a widow whose husband died prior to the passing of the Act, as it does indisputably to the case of a widow whose husband died after the passing of the Act. It is common ground that the Act is not to be construed as retrospective in operation. But it is argued that it is possible to give prospective operation to it, also in its application to a widow whose husband died before the commencement of the Act. This depends upon a construction of the relevant provisions of the Act itself and upon, the question whether, so construed, it does or does not adversely affect any vested rights which had accrued prior to the commencement of the Act. The feasibility of such a construction depends, largely, on the nature of the interest given to such a widow and the time of the accrual of that interest, generally, under the Article<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. The relevant provisions are sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 3 of the Act. These provisions have come in for consideration before the various High Courts during the thirteen years for which the Act has by now been in force. It is now well settled that the Act has not the effect of introducing the widow as a coparcener into the joint family along with the other coparceners, that the widow gets the interest of her husband by succession as his heir and not by survivorship, but that no disruption of the coparcenary is effected thereby, that the widow holds her interest in the property not as the interest of a tenant-in-common with the coparceners, but as an interest in joint family property, subject to all the normal and well understood incidents relating to ownership of joint family property, viz., its liability to common management by the family manager, its liability for family debts, family expenses, and so forth. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These propositions are clearly laid down in A. I. R. (28) 1941 F. C. 72 at p. 74 Col. (2),'Siveshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Harnarainmal', AIR, (32) 1945 Pat 116; 'Sardambal v. Subbarama Ayyar', AIR (29) 1942 Mad 212; 'Kallian Rai v. Kashinath', AIR (30) 1943 All 188; 'Jadaobai v. Purnmal', AIR (31) 1944 Nag 243; 'Vinod Sagar v. Vishnubhai', AIR (34) 1947 Lah 388; and Radha Ammal v. Commr. of I. T., Madras', 1950-1 Mad L Jour 399 and 'Seethamma v. Veerana Chetty', I LR (1950) Mad 1076. They emerge from the wording of the sub-sections above referred to. The widow gets "the same interest in the joint family property which the husband had", but the interest which devolves on her is "the limited interest known as the Hindu Woman's estate". She gets her interest from her husband by "devolution". By the "devolution" of the interest on her she intercepts the right of survivorship thereto of the other coparceners, including the direct lineal male descendants of the husband himself. She has the right, under Sub-section (3) to obtain separation of her interest by claiming a partition. Her interest is a present interest capable of enjoyment, as such, even without division, and is not dependent upon her enforcing partition. Her interest is, in this respect, unlike that of the mother under the pre-existing law who was entitled to a share only on partition, but who had no right to compel partition and whose right to get a share depended on partition. See 'Pratapmull v. Dhanbati Bibi', AIR (23) 1936 P. C. 20. S</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">he can therefore question alienations made or partitions effected behind her back after the right accrues to her. The interest which she gets from her husband, in her hands being the limited interest of a Hindu Woman's estate, is subject to alienation and devolution in the same way. It follows that while her interest is an interest in the joint family property, it is not a coparcenary interest - it is only an ex-coparcenary interest. On her death, her interest in the joint family property, or the share therein which she may take on separation, does not prima facie, revert back to the joint family or coparcenary as such, but goes to the heirs of her husband as the fresh stock of descent. These positions are clearly deducible from the wording of the sub-sections and are substantially supported by the decisions cited above, besides being in complete accord with the closely reasoned views expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice in 'Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Mohanty', I. L. R. (1949) 1 Cut. 483, with most of which Justice Panigrahi has agreed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. For the purpose of the present discussion, it is of importance to consider at what point of time the right accrues to the widow under the Act. Having regard to the wording of the sub-sections above referred to, there can be no reasonable doubt that the right accrues at the very moment of the husband death. This is indisputably so with reference to the case of a widow whose husband dies after the commencement of the Act, and is quite independent of the correctness or otherwise of the suggested construction - which I shall presently refer to - of the word "when" occurring at the beginning of -sub-section (2) of section 3 as indicative only of the conditions, for the accrual of the right). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The only two possible alternatives, on principle for the commencement of the accrual of the right in the case of such a post-Act widow - if I may use the expression - are either her husband's death itself or the actual partition between the remaining coparceners. But, as has been pointed out already, there is nothing in the Act indicating that the rights of the widow, are to arise only on, or remain in abeyance until, partition. The right accrues therefore at the moment the sole condition for the birth of the right is fulfilled, viz., the death of the husband, having at the time an interest in joint family property. This is also clearly brought out by the use of the words and phrases "when", "at the time of his death" and "the same interest as he himself had" in sub-section (2), and the word "devolving" in sub-section (3). So far therefore as can be gathered with reference to the wording of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 3 of the Act, the interest taken by the post-Act widow is, merely an interest in the joint family property, and accruing at the very moment of her husband's death. There is absolutely no reason for thinking that the position is different in respect of the pre-Act widow. in case the Act applies to her.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. In my previous judgment, as a member of the Division Bench, I stated as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is reasonably clear that the commencement and quantum of the widow's interest has reference to a point of time when her husband died and it would also appear that her rights are in respect of the family property as it stood at the time when her husband died. If this is the correct view of the amplitude, quantum, and commencement of the widow's interest, it appears to me to be almost impossible to fit in the case of a widow, whose husband died prior to the Act, into the framework of Section 3, sub-section (2)".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">23. It has been argued before us, on this reference, that this assumption is erroneous. My attention has been drawn to a passage in Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edition, p. 710 and to a decision reported in I L R (1945) Mad 402 to the effect that the interest which the widow takes by devolution from her husband is the same fluctuating interest as that of her husband. For the purposes of the present discussnon, it may not be necessary to express any final opinion as to whether those views are correct. But I must point out that the core of the reasoning indicated in the above quotation from my previous judgment is that the widow's interest accrues right at the very moment of her husband's death, - quite independently of the question whether or not the interest is fluctuating - and that, therefore, the case of a widow whose husband died prior to the Act but whose rights came into operation after the commencement of the Act, is incompatible with the wording of the sub-sections quoted above. To counter the argument that the wording in these sub-sections indicate also the time-factor relating to accrual of the right of the widow, my learned brother Justice Narasimham has construed the word "when" as meaning "if" and has pointed out the use of "where" in section 2 of the Act as meaning "if". </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">He has also attempted a paraphrase of sub-section (2) of Section 3 in order to support his point of view. But it appears to me, with great respect, that the very use of the word "where" in a different context and in a different section and the necessity felt by my learned brother to paraphrase in different language what he conceives to be the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 3 are, to my mind, themselves cogent arguments against the meaning that he would attribute to the sub-section, and demonstrate that it is a forced construction. The construction, so adopted, proceeds on the omission to take note of the use of the important and decisive word "devolving" occurring in sub-section (3) of section 3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">24. Though as I have already stated the question as to whether the interest that the widow takes, is a fluctuating one, or one denned and determined with reference to a point of time, viz., the date of her husband's death, does not require to be finally decided for the purposes of this case, a consideration of this question helps the discussion and is not out of place. I would, therefore, with very great respect to the learned Editor of Mayne's Hindu Law and the learned Judges in the Madras decision, venture to submit that the view taken as to the fluctuating character of a widow's interest appears to be erroneous. As I have shown above, the interest taken by the widow is not a coparcenary interest but only an interest that had been once a coparcenary interest. The essential characteristics of a coparcenary interest are that it arises by birth and lapses by death, except in so far as such lapse is prevented by the right of representation inhering in the three direct lineal male descendants of the coparcener. The fluctuating nature of a coparcenary interest is merely the result of these characteristics being a common feature of the interest of each and every member of the coparcenary group who between them own the entire family properties. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is obvious from the above that the rights of accrual by survivorship arising there from are mutual. In the case of a widow's interest under the Act, her interest arises not on her birth but on her husband's death. Further, on her own death, the interest does not, prima facie, lapse or revert back to the family, but goes to her husband's separated heirs. Her interest, therefore, does not accrue, on her death to the coparceners. It is difficult therefore to see how the benefit of survivorship can accrue to her own interest on the death of the other coparceners, there being no mutuality. It is also equally difficult to see how her share can be diminished by changes in the family. Some stress has been laid on the phrase in Schedule (1) that the widow shall have the same interest as her husband had. But it is not provided that, in her hands, it shall 'continue' to be the "same" interest, but on the other hand it is provided in Schedule (3) that in her hands it is "the interest in Hindu woman's estate". This has the effect - and it has been so judicially construed - of completely changing the character of the interest in her hands. It is in no sense therefore the "same" coparcenary interest in her hands, nor even a modified coparcenary interest. This conclusion is in no way affected by the line of decisions which hold that her interest is an interest in joint family property to the incidents thereof until partition. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In my view therefore the interest of the widow does not continue in her hands as the "same" interest of her husband, but was so only at the time of devolution, the word "same" having reference to the measure and amplitude of the interest and not to the continuance of its equality. It appears to me, to follow, that her interest is not liable to fluctuations arising from the changing circumstances of the coparcenary group with whom she holds the joint family property in common. It must also follow that the quantum of her interest in the joint family must be one that is determined with reference to the time of the accrual of such interest, viz., the death of her husband. This view is in complete accord with what my Lord the Chief Justice has said in I.L.R. (1949) 1 Cut. 483, wherein his Lordship has specifically dissented from the view expressed in I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 402. I have since had the opportunity of reading my Lord's draft judgment on this reference and have considered carefully what his Lordship has said about his previous judgment. I take leave to say with respect that I prefer to follow My Lord's earlier reasoning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">25. At any rate, if the view taken by me above is correct, viz., that the moment of the husband's death is the determining factor at least for the accrual of the widow's interest, if not also for the quantum, etc., thereof (note that this has been assumed to be so in 'Bhagwat Shukul v. Mt. Kaporni', AIR (31) 1944 Pat. 298 at p. 302; A I R (29) 1942 Mad. 212; 'Subba Naicker v. Nallammal', AIR (37) 1950 Mad. 192 at p. 193, and more clearly assumed in I L R (1949) 1 Cut. 483 at pp. 487 to 489), I am unable to see how the case of a widow whose husband died prior to the Act, can be brought within the scope of Sub-section (2) of Schedule , without giving the Act retrospective operation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26. It has been suggested that the rights of a widow in such a case may well be taken to commence from or after the date when the Act comes into force provided there has been no partition of that joint family property between the members of the coparcenary previous thereto. This is the view expressed by my Lord in his referring judgment when he stated:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Such an interpretation does not give the Subsection any retrospective operation when it applies to a case in which the joint family and the joint family property remain undivided and undisposed of till after the commencement of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It appears to me with respect that this is a construction wholly unwarranted by the language of the Act and imposes limitations on the accrual of the right not found in the Act itself. It is not enough that the word "dies" may be capable of being construed as applicable to the case of death prior to the Act. Every other requirement flowing from the wording of the Sub-sections must also be equally applicable to such a case and nothing which is not in it can be imported into it. One cannot shut his eyes to the inescapable implication of the Act that the right accrues by devolution at the moment of husband's death and no other. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is nothing in the Sub-section to warrant the accrual of the widow's right at any point of time other than the moment of the death of her husband, or to make the accrual conditional upon the property remaining undivided between the members of the coparcenary until the commencement of the Act. The Sub-section merely refers to the case of the husband dying as an undivided member of the family and the accrual of the widow's right at the moment of the husband's death. Indeed, if, as my Lord the Chief Justice is inclined to think, the widow is introduced as a sharer by giving her a right to represent the husband just like the son, there is no reason why she should not be able to reopen even a partition already made before the Act just as a posthumous, natural or adopted, son would be entitled to do, the more so after the case in 70 I A 232. This shows the untenability of imposing the condition of no partition (or no disposal) before the Act and of the view that the widow is the representative in the same way that the son is.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27. It is also suggested that there is nothing against such a right, though determined with reference to a point of time prior to the date of the Act, springing up into operation at or after the commencement of the Act. This might have been possible, if the Act purported only to grant to the widow, out of the common pool of the joint family property an interest equal to that of her deceased husband's interest, as indeed was the case in respect of a mother prior to the Act, and did not provide for 'devolution' of that interest. I have already attempted to show that such devolutions occur at the very moment of death. To say that there can be devolution on death but accrual of the right thereafter, would be opposed to the fundamental principle that there can be no accrual on devolution with a gap and that heritage cannot be in abeyance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">A devolution 'by succession' and accrual of right thereon must occur at the very moment when the succession opens. The same is also the case with devolution by survivorship as for instance where a member of an undivided Hindu family dies and his interest devolves on the survivors. The analogy of an adopted son divesting the interest of his deceased adoptive father on such adoption even after it has vested in a separated coparcener as in 70 Ind App 232, and the analogy of a reversioner succeeding to a propositus after the death of his widow, which have been suggested in the course of the arguments, have absolutely no relevance in this context and provide no exceptions to the fundamental rule that devolution by inheritance or survivorship cannot remain in abeyance. Nor does the decision of the 'Federal Court in AIR (28) 1941 FC 72, indicate that the devolution on the widow under Schedule (2) is not by heirship (interrupting survivorship), though of course as pointed out therein the word "devolution" in its generic import is wide enough to include both succession and survivorship.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">28. The next point for consideration is whether or not the introduction of the widow as a sharer in the joint family property affects pre-existing rights of the other coparceners. My Lord the Chief Justice, in his referring judgment, has taken the view that the previous death of the widow's husband does not result in vesting any of his rights in the other coparceners and that what the Act does is only to give the widow a right of representation to her husband and that, consequently, there is no question of divesting of vested rights arising, on the construction adopted by him. My learned brother Justice Narasimham has put the matter in a different way and has said that no coparcener has a vested right to a particular share and that he cannot, therefore, complain of any vested right of his being affected by the introduction of an additional sharer in the person of the widow of a deceased coparcener. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It appears to me, with great respect, that neither view makes a correct approach to the question at issue. The question is not whether the death of the widow's husband has vested any fresh rights in the other coparceners and if so whether they are taken away by the Act or whether a coparcener has a vested right to a definite arithmetical share. The question is - what are the normal rights of the coparceners 'from their birth' and are they vested rights and if so are they adversely affected by the introduction of the widow as a sharer. If the Legislation, in its general application, affects such vested rights, it can only be construed so as to bring it about either directly or indirectly by retrospective operation and so as not to affect adversely situations resulting from events prior to the Act. It is also pertinent to observe that in order to judge whether the construction of a statute leads to retrospective operation or not, it is not necessary that a pre-existing vested right should be completely divested. It will suffice if the vested right is adversely affected. As pointed out by Justice Mookerjee in 'Promotha Nath v. Soran Dasi', A I R (7) 1920 Cal. 435:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Every statute which takes away or 'impairs a vested right', under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes any duty, or 'attaches a new disability'.................... in respect of transection or consideration already passed .......... must not be deemed retrospective in its operation."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">See also In re 'Pulborough School Board Election; 'Bourke v. Nutt, (1894); 1 Q. B. 725 at p. 737.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">29. The Privy Council has laid down as early as in 'Katama Natchier v. Rajah of Shivagunga', 9 Moo Ind App 539, at p. 611 that:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"According to the principle of Hindu Law, there is coparcenership between the different members of a joint family and survivorship following upon it. There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family and upon death of any one of them the others take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased's lifetime a common interest and a common possession."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In 'Sudarsanam v. Narasimhulu', 25 Mad. 149 at p. 154, Justice Bhashyam Iyengar has further amplified the position as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Mitakshara doctrine of joint family property is founded on the existence of an undivided family as a corporate body and the possession of property by such a corporate body. The first requisite, therefore, is a family unit and possession of property is the second requisite. For the present purpose, the female members of the family may be left out of consideration. 'The conception of a Hindu family is a common male ancestor with his lineal descendants in the male line' (the underlining (here into inverted commas) (is mine); and so long as that family is in its normal condition; viz., in an undivided state, it forms a corporate body. Such corporate body, with its heritage, is purely a creature of law and cannot be the creation of any act of the parties save in so far that by adoption a stranger may be affiliated as a member of that corporate family."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The conception of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary is founded on the text of the Mitakshara, which, by elaborate logic, established that in ancestral property the son has a right by birth and. that his ownership is equal to that of the father. As pointed out by Mayne at page 317, this itself is founded on the right of representation according to which, son, grandson and great grandson take together. It is the essence, therefore, of the ownership of joint family property that every coparcener has co-ownership in and common possession of the entire property and that the interest of each coparcener arises by birth and lapses on death to his male descendants or male collateral coparceners. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The property belongs to the joint family and to each male member thereof in common. Anyone acquiring by birth and retaining the status of being its member has certain rights over and from the family property which are not, in any sense, those of mere maintenance holders without any ownership in the property, but are proprietary rights. It is true that the individual rights are, in a sense, overshadowed by the family right of which the manager is the representative while the family is undivided. But the coparcenary is a close corporation consisting entirely of the male descendants of a common ancestor whose membership fluctuates by deaths, births, or adoptions 'and in no other way.' </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The right which a coparcener has, being a right by birth, it is impossible to say that it is not a vested right. It is Apratibandha Daya according to Mitakshara concept. That interest, though fluctuating, - and in some jurisdictions inalienable, - is itself property. It is on that footing that its attachability and saleability in execution has been laid down by the Privy Council in 'Deendayal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain', 3 Cal 198. Though the interest, at any point of time before partition, is not predictable in terms of an arithmetical share, owing to the very constitution of a coparcenary, that very constitution determines and defines the interest. The interest besides being property before partition is such that it entitles the coparcener to a well-defined share in the family property or the partition according to definite rules based on predetermined facts of which the most important are:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) In the distribution the three lineal male descendants have a right of representation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) The distribution is between male members only but per stirpes and not per capita (apart from mother, etc., who get shares in lieu of maintenance.) (See Mulla's Hindu Law, p. 403, para. 321.) The interest, therefore, of a coparcener, while it cannot be measured in terms of any arithmetical share before partition, is still one which is definite and definable in terms of the class of membership of the joint family corporation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30. The above being the nature of a coparcener's interest in the joint family property, the question for consideration is whether the rights of the surviving coparceners can be said 'not' to be adversely affected by introducing the widow of a predeceased coparcener as a sharer in the joint family property. If, as I have attempted to explain above, the interest of a coparcener is, from the moment of his birth, a vested interest carrying with it the right to a share on partition only between the members of a close corporation determined in accordance with prescribed rules of law, it seems to be ununderstandable to say that the coparcener's rights are not adversely affected by the introduction of a sharer not falling within these rules. The case in 'Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Ltd., (1900) 1 Ch 656 at p. 673, shows that in the case of a company, existing rights founded and dependant on 'alterable' articles can be affected by their alteration, so as to have retrospective operation. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This decision, therefore, clearly implies that if the articles on which the rights are founded are not by the constitution of the company alterable, they can only be so altered by retrospective legislation. If, therefore, the rights of a coparcener in a coparcenary depend on the Mitakshara text of the equal right of the son by birth in the ancestral property of the father, such rights are unalterable in the usual way to affect past situations. They can only be affected by an Act with retrospective operation, if the interference with the rights is to be on account of an event prior to the Act. Of course, if the event is subsequent to the Act, vested rights are necessarily affected thereby, because that is the very purpose and intendment of any such prospective legislation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">31. The arguments above noticed to the effect that the death of the widow's husband does not result in vesting his interest in the other coparceners or the introduction of widow as a sharer on her husband's death does not adversely affect any vested interest of coparceners, lay too much stress on the unpredictable nature of a coparcener's arithmetical share on partition. But that is not the sole criterion of a coparcener's interest. His is a vested interest. It is no doubt fluctuating in one sense. But the fluctuation is not erratic. It is determined by well-defined rules which flow from the very concept of a Mitakshara coparcenary and constitute the essential criteria of a coparcenary interest. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It seems to me therefore, with great respect, well nigh impossible to say that the introduction of the widow as a co-sharer does not adversely affect the coparcener's vested interest. There may have been some plausible argument if the widow was not introduced not as a mere co-sharer but as a coparcener. Then at least in some contingencies, i.e., on death of widow each coparcener may get the benefit of an augmented share. But as already pointed out her death cannot 'prima facie' benefit the other sharers. Hence her introduction as co-sharer must in every case have the inevitable result of reducing the share which. each coparcener would otherwise have had.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">32. It has been suggested that the widow of a coparcener is a member of the joint family and is, in any case, entitled to maintenance and that the right of the coparceners to admit only the male descendants of a common ancestor to a share in the property at the time of the partition amounts to no more than a privilege to exclude the female members from any share in the property and that therefore admitting such female members to a share in the family property cannot be said to have an adverse effect on the rights of the coparceners as such and the case in (1898), A. C. 240, has been relied on. My Lord has also said that one coparcener obtaining a benefit by survivorship on the death of another is a privilege. I confess with respect my inability to appreciate these views. The distinction between the alleged right in (1896) A. C, 240, and that in the present case is obvious from the facts in the former. As pointed out already it is of the essence of a coparcenary, as a corporation owning joint family property, that it is confined to the male descendants of a common ancestor and that it lapses on his death. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The female members do not come into the picture at all according to that concept excepting for purposes of maintenance. The only exceptions are the mother, grandmother and the like and the unmarried daughter, who get on partition certain specified shares, but it is settled that they get these snares in lieu of maintenance and not by virtue of any pre-existing right in the property. See AIR (23) 1938 P C 20. Kven this right of sharing has itself become obsolete in certain jurisdictions such as in Madras. It is to be noticed in this connection that the effect of the Act is not merely to introduce the widowed mother as a sharer but the widows of all other predeceased coparceners, both ascendant and descendant, as co-sharers. This is entirely beyond anything that even the ancient Hindu Law contemplated.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">33. Further, it should be noticed that it is not merely the quantum of the share on a future partition that is adversely affected by the introduction of the widows of predeceased coparceners, but that the interests of the coparceners are affected by the Act in various other ways also. In the first place, the share allotted to the coparcener's widow under the Act is 'prima facie' taken altogether out of the joint property, as such, and does not revert back to the family on her death, unlike for instance, as in the case of a share allotted to a mother under the pre-existing law - See 'Debi Mangal Prosad v. Mahadeo Prasad', 34 All. 234. This follows from the provision that the widow takes her interest as a Hindu Woman's estate which, appear to mean, that on her death, it goes to the heirs of the separate property of her husband. There is no direct decision on this specific point, but it may be noticed that the same view has been expressed by Justice Viswanath Sastri of Madras High Court in A I R (37) 1950 Mad. 538, at p. 540. Secondly, under the preexisting law relating to the allotment of a share to the mother, the mother was not entitled to demand partition, but could only gel; a share on partition - See AIR (23) 1936 P C 20. Under the Act, however, the widow is given the right to demand partition by virtue of the interest that she gets. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is clear therefore that she is entitled to compel partition even though all the other coparceners are united in not requiring a partition. Then, again, before partition, the coparceners can, as between themselves jointly, alienate any specific item of joint family property but on the introduction of the widow as a co-sharer they cannot do so unless she also consents to the same. Further, while, according to the law prevailing in jurisdictions other than Madras and Bombay, no coparcener can alienate his interest by private sale for consideration, the widow who gets the deceased coparcener's interest under the Act can alienate her interest without reference to the others introducing thereby complications in the management of the joint family property against the will of the other coparceners. These and other ways in which the interest of the coparceners as a group, and of individual coparceners as comprising that group, are adversely affected, in the sense that new disabilities or fetters are attached to the joint holding of the property by coparceners as a group can be multiplied. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It seems to me, therefore, that it is not merely the quantum of the coparceners' share that is affected adversely but also their rights in several other respects; and it is not permissible to whittle down the effect on the coparcenary of the introduction of the widow as a co-sharer of the joint family property by assuming the coparcener's share to be an inchoate and indistinct privilege, and the other rights as having relation to sentimental objections to the deprivation of privileges.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">34. Let us now consider what would be the position, if, after the death of the widow's husband and before the Act, there have been partitions. In the normal case of the post-Act widow she can undoubtedly reopen partitions made behind her back after her husband's death. But it has been suggested that a pre-Act widow cannot so reopen prior partitions because the Act is not retrospective. That, to my mind, is begging the question. To say that the pre-Act widow gets an interest, only to the extent that there has been no previous partition or previous alienation of the family property and cannot therefore reopen them is, as already pointed out, to introduce limitations on the right which are not to be found in the Act itself. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Let us also consider the case of an alienation of an individual coparcener's interest, after the husband's death and prior to the Act, the alienation being either of the coparcener's interest in the entire family property or in a specific item thereof. Such alienation can be inter vivos in Madras and Bombay and in invitum elsewhere but the considerations are the same. Suppose the alienee has worked out his interest, before the Act, by a partition, but the coparceners remain joint; the coparceners are put to a double loss, once by the alienation which must have been worked out on the footing that the widow's husband does not count and later by introduction of the widow as a co-sharer treating her husband as continuing for the purpose. Take again the case where the alienee did not happen to work out his rights until the Act. How are the widow's rights to be adjusted? Consonantly to the assumption that the widow gets her husband's interest, if the property remains without partition till the Act it must be taken that the alienee will have to get the share as affected by the emergence of the widow as a ootsharer. This is definitely affecting adversely the vested interest of such an alienee - at least as understood in Madras - See 'Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu', 35 Mad. 47, which I pointed in my earlier judgment. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I think the same is the position of execution sale purchasers in other jurisdictions. Again take a case, where the widow herself has entered into some arrangements with her coparceners for her life in lieu of maintenance, before the Act. Does the Act entitle her to repudiate and reopen the arrangement? To these and other complications that must arise in respect of arrangements prior to the Act as a result of the view sought to be urged in favour of the pre-Act widow, I could find no answer in the course of the arguments except the evasive one that those cases do not, arise for decision in the present case and may have to be dealt with when they arise and that each such case must be decided on its own facts virtually implying that, the Court must arrogate to itself 'ad hoc' legislative function for each case. But in my view a tentative and 'prima facie' consideration of these complications is necessary for arriving at a proper conclusion in this case and without going into further elaboration it is enough to say that I am inclined to think that the view urged will have the effect of adversely affecting rights vested by previous transactions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">35. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the introduction of a widow of a deceased coparcener as a sharer in the joint family property has the definite result of adversely affecting in. general the interests of the coparcenary as a whole,, as well as of the individual coparceners in the property and of strangers in certain events and that the Act cannot be construed as comprising within its scope the view of a coparcener who died, before the commencement of the Act, unless it can be definitely held to be retrospective in the operation which it is admitted it is not. It appears to me therefore with the greatest respect to my learned colleagues that from the unequivocal wording of sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 3 indicating that the widow's right accrues, by devolution at the very moment of her husband's death and from the nature of a coparcener's interest as being a vested right by birth defined and determinable according to the prescribed rules of Mitakshara system which must be affected by the introduction of a widow as a co-sharer, the result inescapably follows that the Act cannot apply to the case of a widow whose husband died prior to the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">36. This without more should be enough for supporting my conclusion. But out of respect, for other arguments advanced, I shall proceed to. notice the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">37. In the course of the argument, the case in 'Queen v. St. Mary's Whitechapel, (1848) 116 E R. 311 and in 'The Queen v. Birwistle', (1889) 58 L J M C 158 (See also 'Jogadanund Singh v. Amritalal', 22 Cal 767 at pp. 779-780) has been relied on in support of the position that a statute is not retrospective merely because a part of the requisites of its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. I am not at all sure that the principle of such cases is not confined to what may be called mere remedial rights and whether they can be extended to statutes relating to substantive property rights. On a careful perusal of these decisions, however, it will be seen that they have no application to the situation of this case. It is necessary to notice that, on the facts of the case in (1848) 116 E R 811, it was pointed out in the report itself, that the statute in its direct operation was prospective since it relates only to future removals and that only 'a part' of the requisites for such action is drawn from a time antecedent to the passing of the Act.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In that case the requisites for the operation of the power of removal under the statute consisted of two facts (1) widowhood as indicated therein and (2) continuance of widowhood for 12 months thereafter. The right of removal of pauper widows from the parish by the authorities can, in no sense, be considered a vested right at any rate, it is not a vested property right. It is also necessary to emphasise that the significance of the word "part" in the relevant passage in that report cannot be missed or blurred over. The reason is that, in such cases, the totality of the requisites becomes complete only after the Act, and hence the right itself accrues after the Act. Similarly in (1889) 58 L.J., M.C., 158, the accrual of the right conferred depended on desertion plus continuance thereof until after the Act. In the case 22 Cal. 767, also it will appear from the facts that the principle in (1848) 116 E R 811, was applied since only a part of the requisites for the operation of the statute was prior to the Act, viz., the passing of the decree in the case - See pp. 779-730. In the case before us the 'only' requisite for the 'accrual of the right under the Act is the single, fact of the death of the husband owning an interest in joint family property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, if the Act is to be applied to the case of the widow of a husband who died before the Act, both the requisites for the operation, and the operation itself, are antecedent to the Act, and .hence retrospective and there is no scope for a prospective operation on such facts. There may have been some possible room for argument - based on the principle of the above cited case - only if it could be deduced from the language of the Act that the accrual of the right - though partly dependent on the death of the husband - is, in some way at least, directly connected with and dependent on the factum of a partition taking place subsequent to the passing of the Act. But, as I have already stated before, there is no room for any such construction, and no such construction has been attempted to be argued. I may add that in this connection the cases under Hindu Law of Inheritance Amendment Act (II (2) of 1929) have been pressed into service in which I can find no analogy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">38. Another rule of construction has been pressed into service, based on a passage in Halsbury, Second Edition, Vol. 31, page 572, namely, that a statute is to be regarded as "always speaking." But this, I apprehend, does not mean that the statute is to be construed as operative with reference to the past as much as with reference to the present and the future: it only means that, with reference to any particular case that falls within the scope of the wording of the statute, the statute must be taken to be speaking with reference thereto - and it is not to be regarded as a rule of guidance as to the retrospective or prospective operation of the statute. It seems to mean what Lord Esher has pointed out in (1894) 1 Q B 725 at p. 735, viz.:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"That when the present tense is used, the time to be considered is the time at which the Court has to act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the other hand, the principle applicable to such cases has been clearly laid down by Lord Justice Lopes in the same case at p. 737 as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is a well-recognised principle in the construction of statutes that they operate only on cases and facts which come into existence after the statutes are passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. This principle of construction is specially applicable when the enactment to which retrospective effect is sought to be given would prejudicially affected vested rights."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This very principle has been referred to by Justice Varadacharlar in A I R (32) 1945 FC 25 at p. 33, in the following terms:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Act is 'prima facie' prospective and its proper construction and operation must be determined with reference to conditions and contingencies likely to arise, after its commencement, because these alone could presumably have been within its contemplation."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The same principle of construction has also been adopted in a Pull Bench case of the Patna High Court relating to the Inheritance Amendment Act 1929 - See 'Bhagwat Narain v. Srinavas', AIR 124) 1937 Pat. 113, at p. 121, and also by Chief Justice Sir Courtney Terrell in 'Punyabrata Das v. Monmohan Ray', AIR (21) 1934 Pat. 427 at p. 430, when he construed the words "who marries" occurring in the Special Marriages (Amendment) Act XXX (30) of 1923 as synonymous with "who shall marry hereafter."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">39. I shall now turn to the sections of the Act other than Section 3 and the implications thereof. In my judgment) in the Division Bench I came to the conclusion - on a consideration also at Sections 2, 4 and 5 of the Act, 1937, as amended by the Act of 1938 - and having regard to the history of the amendment - that the Legislature had clearly intended that the Act ought not to be applied to the case of a widow of a coparcener who died prior to the passing of the Act. My Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Justice Narasimham have however - on a consideration of these very sections - come to a different conclusion. I do not propose to go into the matter any further except to make the following observations,. My learned brothers point out that, in the view I take of Sections 2, 4 and 5, the use of the phrase "dying intestate" appearing in Section 2, as applied to the case of a coparcener in respect of his joint family interest, will not be in consonance with accepted legal notions of testacy and intestacy and is - to say the least - bad English if not also bad law. They further point out that the word "intestate" occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, as it stood in 1837, was omitted in the Amendment of 1938 and that having regard to that circumstance Section 4 would be absolutely redundant if it was not meant to imply and convey that Section 3 (2) is to apply to a death prior to the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">While I do not deny the force of this criticism, I would with respect point out that, if the contrary view is taken of Sections. 2, 4 and 5 as my learned brothers have done, one is obliged to say - as indeed Justice Narasimham, has done - that Section 2 is redundant and the word "intestate" therein should in any case be deleted. As between the two views of the construction of Sections 2, 4 and 5, viz., that which, renders Section 4 redundant and that which renders Section 2 otiose, I would, with respect, submit, that the former is definitely preferable, having regard to the history of the Act which shows that originally Section 4 must have applied to both. Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2). I may also add that the redundancy of Section 2 is not so obvious to me as it appears to my learned brother Justice Narasimham. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the absence of Section 2, it may be - as pointed out by him though I am not, sure about it, that Section 3 might prevail even as against a relevant rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary; but it would prevail only as against such a rule relating, to inheritance or devolution, i.e., a rule designating the person who is to take the property of the deceased person as his successor and as against nothing else. It appears to me, however, that Section 2 is intended to provide for - and in fact has - a much larger content than that; it seems to me to be intended to provide, for instance, that the devolution is to take effect notwithstanding, that such devolution may bring about certain anomalies in the application of the law relating to coparceneries or interfere with vested rights of coparceners and notwithstanding that it results in the curious position of a coparcener and a non-coparcener sharing together joint family property a position hitherto unknown. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This I have mentioned only to show one of the many possible contingencies to which Section 2 might apply which may require to be specifically provided for statutorily. It may also be pointed out that the section has in fact also been construed to bring about the result that a widow would obtain her rights under the Act, irrespective of the disqualifications imposed under the normal law consequent on the unchastity of the widow at the time when succession opens - See 'Akoba Laxman v. Sai Genu Laxman', AIR (28) 1941 Bom 204. In the absence of Section 2, as already stated, the rules in Section 3 might prevail as against other competing rules governing devolution of the property in question, but they cannot prevail over the rules which may affect but do not directly relate to devolution or succession such as the rules governing disqualifications on such devolution. I am, therefore, not prepared to agree with a view which involves such an important section as Section 2 being rendered otiose and which in any case requires the deletion of the word "intestate" therefrom.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">40. In the view that I have taken of Sections 2, 4 and 5 there is no doubt some inappropriateness in referring to a coparcener - who dies leaving only an interest in joint family property, as a person "dying intestate." But having regard to the specific definition of the phrase "dying intestate" in Section 5, it appears to me that there is nothing so very incongruous in relying on the literal meaning and in referring to a person - who may not make a will in respect of property over which he has no testamentary capacity - as a person "dying intestate" in respect of that particular property, for the simple reason that even if such a will is made it cannot take effect.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">41. Nor am I impressed by the argument that the use of the word "property" in Section 5 renders it inapplicable to an "interest" because, in terms, the Act itself, as its preamble shows, gives better rights to women in respect not only of property but also interest, - See Sub-section (2) of Section 3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">42. If the matter rested merely on the view that is to be taken of the construction of Sections 2, 4 and 5, I might have hesitated, in view of the admittedly bad drafting of the Act, to differ from the view taken thereof by my learned brothers. But it appears to me that quite irrespective of the construction to be put on these sections the plain meaning of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Act is clear and decisive against the construction that has appealed to them. To say the least there is nothing in these sections to override the plain meaning of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3, except the supposed negative implication of Section 4 which is found to be unwarranted if one has regard to the unamended Act in 1937 and the history of 1938 amendment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">43. It has been strenuously pressed on us that the Act is a remedial measure and must be construed benevolently and that the test to "be applied in construing a remedial Act is not merely whether a particular construction thereof is the normal meaning of the language used, but that the question is whether the language is sufficiently wide to admit of a construction which brings in all members of the class who are intended to be benefited by it. While I have no quarrel with this proposition, I must point out that even in the case of a remedial statute it is the language of the statute that must govern and there is no warrant for any construction which cannot reasonably be deduced from a fair construction of the Act. The Act is merely one "to give better rights to women" as the preamble shows. But it is not clear what particular class of women are intended to be benefited thereby. It cannot even be maintained that at least all widows are intended to be benefited, thereby. Indeed the contrary can be demonstrated, viz., that certain women who were entitled to rights under the pre-existing law are deprived of their rights. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For instance, the mother or daughter of a widower (male) having self acquired property who leaves him surviving no male issue but a widowed daughter-in-law is excluded by the said daughter-in-law by virtue of Section 3, Sub-section (1). Therefore the Act helps only some women who are widows and not all women or all widows. It may, therefore, well (sic) that the Act intended to help only future widows of joint families and was anxious not to disturb the domestic equilibrium of joint families, into which or outside which, widows must have settled themselves under the pre-existing law. It may also well be that the Legislature was more anxious about the fate of future widows of joint families who are an ever-present class in the present conditions of Hindu society rather than about past widows of such families whose number, in any case, must be definite and gradually dwindling and who must disappear altogether by mere lapse of time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">44. In my previous judgment, I have relied on the judgment of the Federal Court In A I R (32) 1945 F C 25, as amounting to an implied decision that Sub-section (2) of Section 3 does not apply to the case of the widow of a coparcener who died before the Act. My Lord the Chief Justice is inclined to think that in that particular case the widow was not given a share in the interest of the husband who\died prior to the Act, not because the Act was not applicable to such a case, but because the death of the widow's husband left the entire family property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener and the question of the widow's interest arose only on the death of that coparcener after the commencement of the Act. With great respect, I am unable to see how that makes any difference. My Lord has observed as follows in his previous judgment:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"On the facts of that case, the joint family property had become vested in one owner before the Act commenced. It having become the absolute and exclusive property of Arunachala, the last male-holder, to hold her as entitled to inherit would amount to reopening a transaction or consideration already vested."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">With great respect, this view of the nature of the interest that Arunachala took ignores the very decision of the Federal Court which, in terms,' decided that what Arunachala held as the sole surviving coparcener was not his absolute property but was an interest in joint family property liable to be effected by posthumous adoption to a deceased collateral and that, therefore, Sub-section (1) of Section 3 was not applicable. In the view of the Federal Court "the difference between the position of a person owning self-acquired property and that a person who happens to be the holder of property as the sole surviving coparcener for the time being, is shown by the fact that in the latter case his right as full owner will be reduced to that of a coparcener the moment adoption is made by a predeceased coparcener's widow" - See AIR (32) 1945 F C 25, at p. 33."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the words of the Judicial Committee in 70 Ind App 232 "this possibly challenges the character of a surviving coparcener's right as an absolute right' and creates qualifications which impair its completeness."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If, as my Lord is prepared to think, the result of the Act is to clothe the widow with the right of representation to the interest of her husband, there is absolutely no reason why even the sole surviving coparcener's interest in the joint family property cannot be divested in her favour in the same way as it could have been in. favour of a son adopted by her. It appears to me that the fact of the matter is that the widow does not represent the husband except in a very loose sense and that the property is not so absolutely vested in the sole surviving coparcener as to furnish the reason for the assumed decision of the Federal Court that the widow in that case was not entitled to succeed to her husband's interest in the joint family property. I must, therefore, respectfully disagree with the view that the decision in A I R (32) 1945 P C 25, is not a decision on the very question at issue in the case now before us. In my view the earlier passage in the report, viz., "It is true that on the above view the plaintiff in the present case will derive no benefit from the Act though she happens to be the widow of a predeceased son, but that is due to the circumstance that her husband died before the passing of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">appears to me to be the expression of the unequivocal opinion of the Federal Court and I can see nothing in the use of the word "prima facie", in the later passage, viz., "the possibility of such varying consequences cannot be allowed to control the natural and reasonable interpretation of the Act; it is 'prima facie' prospective etc."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">as militating against the view expressed in the earlier passage which is a definite and decisive opinion on the point. The use of the word "prima facie" indicates only that no reason for a contrary interpretation appeared from the Act; and it is only a Judge's cautious way of stating his conclusion on a matter which was taken for granted without argument. The fact that the widow was not given a share in her pre-deceased husband's interest in the joint family in that case is indisputable and the reason for it has been stated by the Federal Court itself in the first passage quoted above. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There can, therefore, be no reasonable doubt that there was a clear, though assumed, decision that the Act was inapplicable to her case and 'that it was given effect to in refusing her a share. All that can be said is that the point of law itself was not specifically raised before the Federal Court and debated. But that must be so because the eminent counsel who appeared for the widow in that case felt the position to be unarguable. I would, therefore, with respect, follow the above implied decision of the Federal Court as I understand it - on the very question as in this case. I can find no reason to think that any of the arguments now relied upon for the contrary view would have escaped notice if found tenable.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">45. To sum up, my view is, that the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act is clear and does not admit of the suggested benevolent construction. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Schedule , show that the widow's interest accrues by devolution at the moment of husband's death and such devolution adversely affects the rights of each coparcener vested in him from the moment of his birth, defined and determined with reference to fixed Hindu Law Rules and may also have the effect of adversely affecting past transactions. The machinery in the Act provided for benefiting Mitakshara joint family widows is not by a mere declaration vesting in all such widows the interest of their deceased husband from and after the passing of the Act and therefore in effect, providing for a grant of that interest to them, taking it out of the common pool of the joint family property, but it is by way of devolution of that interest from the husband to the widow. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The widow while introduced as a sharer of the family property, is not made a statutory grantee, but a statutory heir, of the coparcenary interest therein of her husband. It is, therefore, impossible to extend the benefit of the Act to a pre-Act widow except by giving the Act retrospective operation. The principle of prospective operation of rights founded partly on past events is inapplicable to the present case in view of the nature of the interest created in favour of the widow by the Act. Such authority as there is in A I R (32) 1945 F C 25, is in support of the conclusion that the Act does not apply to pre-Act widows to give them a right in joint family property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">46. I cannot help pointing out that the law has been understood in the sense in which I understand it since the date of its passing in 1937. (See also 'Ram Bilas Singh v. Loke Nath', AIR (36) 1949 , Pat 405 at p. 408), and that the opposite view will have the consequence of reopening at least the transactions and partitions between 1937 and 1951, of families who have pre-Act widows, if not transactions prior to the Act, except probably to the limited extent of transactions relating to agricultural lands between 1937 and 1944, vide Schedule of Orissa Act V of 1944. It will have the unfortunate effect of disturbing the domestic equilibrium of such families and will lead to disastrous and speculative litigation. These considerations can of course have no bearing if the statutory provisions are clear in favour of such widows. But the contrary is the position in this case so far as I can see, and what all is said for the other view, is not that the language is compelling, but is wide enough. I can only close with a passage from Lord Brougham delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in 'Crawford v. Spooner', 4 Moo Ind App 179, as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Statute; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for Judges to invent something which they do not meet with in the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning, for, in reality, it would be supplying it: the true way in these cases is, to take the words as the Legislature has given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered; and therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, then let another Act supply that meaning, and supply the defect in the previous Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">47. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgments prepared by my learned brothers Das and Narasimham, JJ., I am in entire agreement with Narasimham, J., and for the reasons expounded by him. I would hold along with him that there is nothing in the language of the Act which compels one to hold that women widowed prior to the Act are not intended to be benefited by its provisions. The Act is intituled as an Act to amend the Hindu Law governing Hindu Women's Right to Property. The scope and object, except what appear from the preamble, are sought to be succinctly epitomised in Section 2 of the Act. It reads:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 (the only operative section) shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In its operation, the section is not intended to repeal the Hindu Law but to amend it to an extent specified in the following section of the Act. The changes thus introduced, either in the rules of inheritance or survivorship are to be understood in the context of Hindu Law of Succession, in general, and the system of coparcenary, in particular, interfering with the pre-existing system as little as cannot be avoided. In the case of 'Secretary of State v. Bank of India, Ltd.', 65 Ind App 286(sic) "A statute Is 'prima facie' to be construed as changing the law to no greater extent than its words or necessary intendment require."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned author (S. Srinivas Iyengar) of Mayne's treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 10th Edn., observes at p. 716:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Where the provisions of the Act are clear, effect of course must be given to them. But the legislature may well be presumed to have left Hindu law unaltered in other respects."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Pre-eminently therefore, the words, phrases and their connotations should be interpreted and evolved in conformity with the notions and concepts of Hindu Law. There are many instances occurring in the Hindu Law which, tested in the light of general juristic principles that prevail in the jurisprudence of most of the civilised countries and which constitute the basic spring-board for the various legislations undertaken by the British Government up-to-date, may appear anomalous; but to one conversant with the particular features of social and socio-economical framework of the . society of Hindus, their concepts of family properties of various kinds, their modes of holding, devolution, disposal, suspension, re-animation and various other kinds of incidents and rights, privileges, obligation and liabilities incidental thereto, those instances will appear nothing but naturally and justly, though not logically, flowing from such principles of justice as are inextricably inherent in such conditions and features of the social framework of the Hindu society. We, therefore, in interpreting the statute, should not run away from such peculiarities or peculiar concepts inseparable from Hindu Law. Reference may be made to a few such instances. Take the case of an impartible estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The holder thereof is designated by survivorship and the estate, whenever any occasion for it arises, devolves by rule of survivorship; but almost all the normal rights and privileges of a coparcener remain in suspension all the while, the single holder is alive 'Baijnath Prashed Singh v. Tej Bali Singh', 48 Ind App 195. Though it appears unjust and, at the same time, illogical in view of its being coparcenary property in which all the coparceners ought to have equal interest, the solitary holder has not only the exclusive dominion but also the full power of disposal except in Madras Presidency (State of Madras) where the Hindu Law has been, in this respect, amended by the statutory law of the Impartible Estates Act. No coparcener of such a family has a right of claiming partition. This is against all logical canons of inductions and deductions applicable to the coparcenary system. Still, the system has been obtaining and working from time immemorial till the modern individualistic age of equality of men and their rights and status. Take the instance of a' widow of a coparcener. She has a charge for maintenance against the coparcenary property to the extents of her deceased husband's interest therein though her husband left no such interest behind him. His interest on his death simply became extinct or lapsed. No other coparcener, who survived him, can be said to have derived any interest from him. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The said interest is neither identifiable nor definable so as to be proceeded against by his creditors except under an attachment effected while he was alive. This position does not conform to strict logic. Compare, the position of a widow, as a dependant and mere maintenance-holder, is abruptly converted by a process of renovation, as it were, from a sort of suspended animation to that of a sharer when the sons and grandsons, etc., of her late husband effect a partition of the coparcenary estate in which her husband had an interest at the time of his death. Is this justifiable by appli (sic) been so, the widow would be entitled to the same right of a share at the partition of the coparcenary properties between the collaterals of her husband who left no issue of his own amongst his survivors - coparceners. This was, in fact, an anomaly of Hindu Law, and it is now removed by the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The result is that while a partition of the joint family property shall take place as between the coparceners, be they her husband's lineal descendants or collaterals, she shall be entitled to a share representing chat of her husband. This remedies the standing deficiency in Hindu Law. If you hold that the right to maintenance is such an interest in the joint family property that its normal mode of enforcement or realisation is a share at the partition of the property, then the Act does not introduce any change in the law. But it cannot be so held. Right to maintenance is an interest in the family property but is not equivalent to a right to a share. It was just by way of compromise that she was given a share at a partition between her husband's sons, that is, her sons and step-sons and their sons, etc. Search for the logic as to why the same right was not acceded to her as against her husband's collaterals and why she was not given the right to claim partition on her own initiative and you do not find any except that the society's economy stood in need of co-operation and conjoint labour of the members of the family ,and occasioned the setting up of the corporate body of a coparcenary.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The body was the personal unit and the properties owned by it were the estate units. The unit character was rigorously maintained under the managership of one head - an autocrat. No female was endowed with the power to disrupt it so long as the males did not desire to do. Minor males also were allowed no right to call for a partition except on special circumstances affecting them prejudicially in relation to their interests. The distinction between the existence of a widow's right to share against her husband's descendants and its negation as against the collaterals, in similar circumstances, is understandable on the hypothesis of the theory that till now obtains that a collateral does not represent another deceased collateral as he derives no interest from him on his demise. He on partition represents his ancestor, however high, who had once an interest in the coparcenary. The strict logical deduction resulted in an unequal treatment to a widow whose husband had left no issue. Here is an instance, where logic would work out an injustice. This is now removed by introducing an exception to this logical deduction by way of compromise. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Now under the Act, the widow is given a share, on partition, of the property in which her husband had an interest as a coparcener. This is to be worked out in keeping with the family unit, both in relation to person and property. Naturally, if there is any apparent anomaly, viewed as a compromise, it is not so in reality. After a right to share is conceded, it, is but natural that the remedy for the enforcement of such right shall be provided as in Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. A disqualified heir has no right to succession; but in a joint family if a son is born to him, he becomes a coparcener. An invalidly adopted son acquires a right to maintenance in the adopter's family. Hindu Law is the cumulative result of checks and balances and various compromises. Any patch repair by piecemeal statutory amendments is bound to give rise to various doubts and difficulties. But this repair work is not intended to alter the character of the structure but to maintain it notwithstanding. The interpretation of the Act shall be approached in that background.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">48. With regard to the language of the statute, under review. I do not intend to speak more than what I have already said in my judgment in the Division Bench, rather the referring judgment, and what has been said by my learned brother Narasimham, J. The key sections of the Act, for the present purpose, are Sections 2 and 4. Section 2 defines the ambit of operation of Section 3, and Section 4 prescribes the exception, or is inserted by way of a proviso to it. If we concede to the view taken by Das, J., both the sections should appear to be conterminous and co-extensive. It would mean as if the Legislature was needlessly redundant in defining the same rule twice over. Section 2 defines that the Act shall apply to the properties of a Hindu dying intestate. Section 4 says that the Act shall not apply to the property of Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the Act. According to brother Das, J., an equivalent reading of Section 2 should as well be "Notwithstanding any. rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate 'after the commencement of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Legislature shall then be deemed to have said that same thing both affirmatively and negatively. Nothing could have simpler for the Legislature than to enact Section 2 as "Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply where Hindu dies intestate after the commencement of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This would completely obviate the necessity of enacting Section 4 at all.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The only explanation why Section 4 was there notwithstanding Section 2, is that Section 2 makes the Act applicable to cases of deaths of Hindus occurring either before or after the Act and Section 4 emphasises the same by excepting, from the general rule of applicability prescribed in Section 2, the cases specified therein, namely, the cases where a Hindu leaves separate exclusive properties of his own which he could have disposed of by valid testamentary disposition, but had failed to do so, and which would descend on his death to his heirs as distinguished from survivors, by rules of inheritance, the Act having introduced some new heirs into the pre-existing list of heirs under Hindu Law, as it then stood.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">49. Furthermore, a distinction between the property of a deceased Hindu, and the interest that lie had at the time of his death in a Hindu joint family property has been laboriously maintained in the Act, wherever it is relevant to the purpose, particularly in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3. True, that the word 'interest' is of greater comprehension than 'property.' In some circumstances, notion of property may be expressed toy the word 'interest.' The altered rule of succession provided for in Sub-section (1) deals with a .deceased intestate Hindu's property. Here 'property' is interest in movables and immovables, corporeal or incorporeal rights and here ditaments in such properties over which he has, 'at all material times, during his life', the complete power of disposition while "the interest" dealt with in Subjection (2) conveys quite a different conception of property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">For the sake of perspicuity and clear visualisation of the differences as to the incidence of the newly introduced rule into the Hindu Law of succession, the Legislature has been particularly careful to maintain the two different phraseologies. In Sub-section (3), the word 'interest' has been used in the more comprehensive sense of including both what is 'interest' within the meaning of Sub-section (2) and what is 'property' within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of the section. A peep into the significance of the word "interest' in the eyes of a great lawyer like Sir George Rankin may throw some light on the discussion. His Lordship in the case of 'Kalyanji Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal'. 64 Ind App 28 at p. 37, observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Does then the existence of a wife, or of a wife and daughter, make it income of a Hindu undivided family rather than income of the individual partner? Their Lordships think not. A man's wife and daughter are entitled to be maintained by him out of his separate property as well as out of property in which he has a coparcenary interest, but the mere existence of a wife or daughter does not make ancestral property joint. 'Interest' is a word of wide and vague significance and no doubt it might be used of a wife's or daughter's right to be maintained, which right accrues in the daughter's case on birth; but if the father's obligations are increased, his ownership is not divested, dived or impaired by marriage or the birth of a daughter. This is equally true of ancestral property belonging to himself alone as of selfacquired property."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No interest of a coparcener in coparcenary property can be said to be such of his property as he can leave behind him to be inherited or otherwise disposed of, except on partition after dissolution of the corporation of a coparcenary and division of the unit of its estate. Until separation in estate, no fragment of it can be called property of an individual in the fullest sense of the term.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">50. Coming to Section 4, we find that the Legislature confined its operation to the property of any Hindu dying intestate. Mark the singularity of the sameness of language in this section with that in Sub-section (1) of Section 3. That Subsection deals with intestate deceased Hindu's property governed by Dayabhag School and the separate property left by him, on his death, in any other School of Hindu Law or customary law. One cannot shut his eyes to this remarkable identity of expression. It cannot be without a significance and meaning. While dealing with an interest in Sub-section (2), the Legislature gave preference to the words "having at the time of death" rather than 'leaving' used in Sub-section (1). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This is because, the Mitakshara coparcener dying leaves nothing behind. Thus, for the purpose of succession or inheritance and various other purposes cognate thereto, and in relation to his testamentary or non-testamentary disposition, no Hindu coparcener can predicate of himself of having such property in the coparcenary estate as he could leave on his death. No doubt, he cannot be said to be propertyless when he is a member of the coparcenary owning coparcenary properties. This conceptual difference between property of a Hindu and his interest in the joint family property having been laboriously maintained by the Legislature in phrasing the Act, all the implications of the Act inconsistent with or repugnant to the said distinction, which is fundamental and basic, must have to be ruled out. In this context, the contention that, for the purpose of attachment and sale by a creditor, a Hindu coparcener has property seems to me to be wholly beside the point. In this background, the language of Section 4 negatives any assumption that "the interest of a Hindu", irrespective of his being testate or intestate or otherwise, in the coparcenary property is included within the words "the,property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of this Act." </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, it is clear that Section 4 is an exception to Section 2 and, in that sense, does not limit the operation of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 to cases of women widowed subsequent to the Act. The word 'intestate' in Section 2 is no doubt 'extra' as pointed out by the learned author of the 10th Edition of Mayne's Hindu Law. I would quote a passage from the learned author's exposition at p. 716.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"As the Act stands, on a strict construction, Subsection (2) to Section 3 can apply only when under Section 2 a Hindu dies intestate, especially as those words are not required in connection with Section 3 (1), being already there. If, therefore, he has made a complete and valid disposition of all his separate and self-acquired property, he cannot be said to have died intestate. But as intestacy cannot by any legal possibility be a condition of operation of Sub-section (2) to Section 3, the words 'dies intestate' in Section 2 must be treated as surplusage having no sensible meaning, to-avoid an absurd result."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As this aspect has been sufficiently dealt with by brother Narasimham, J., I do not think it is worthwhile to dilate upon it any more. That the words "dying; or dies', wherever they occur in the Act, do not necessarily convey an idea of futurity is not seriously disputed. Similar words did occur in the Hindu Law of Inheritance Amendment Act (II of 1929.) They received the judicial interpretation including the notions of deaths both before and after the Act. The expression of a contrary view was not favoured by almost all the High Courts and finally the Judicial Committee. I would refer to a passage from 'Pokhan Dusadh v. Mt. Manoa', A IR (24) 1937 Pat. 117, at p. 120.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The first objection admits of a simple answer. It implies that the words "Hindu male dying intestate" mean a Hindu male who will hereafter die intestate. It appears to me, however, that the words in question were never intended to convey this meaning. The words "dying intestate" which qualify the preceding words "Hindu male" are merely descriptive and limit the operation of the Act to the estate of those Hindu males only who answer the description. It is true that the participle in the expression "dying intestate" is in the present tense; but that is the present tense of logic and the expression connotes the intestacy of the deceased owner without any reference to whether the death occurs before or after the Act comes into force. "The Hindu male dying inestate" simply means the Hindu male who has died or may die intestate."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">That legislation is in 'par! materia' with the present one. The Legislature with that knowledge used similar words or the same words or their grammatical variations in phrasing relevant references to the deaths of Hindus. As a settled canons of construction, the Legislature shall be presumed to have employed the self-same words with the selfsame meaning. With the utmost respect to brother Das, J., I must say that the word 'when' - the first word - in Sub-section (2) cannot force the construction of future death upon us. If that were so, the words "at the time of his death" would be wholly superfluous. It would do to frame the Sub-section by saying "When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than Dayabhag School or by customary law dies having an interest in a Hindu joint family property his widow shall.........."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As the word 'when' did not connote the time of death, the words "at the time of death" were needed as it would, if the section began with the word 'if instead of 'when.' I would, therefore, agree entirely with brother Narasimham, J., that the word 'when' means "if or in the event of" and does not refer to 'the time when the Hindu dies.'<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">51. By way of reinforcing this interpretation, brother Das, J., relies very much upon the word 'devolving' in Sub-section (3) of the section. I would note that the dictionary meaning of the word 'devolve' is "lapse of an unexercised right to the ultimate owner." According to him, 'devolve' or its grammatical variations, such as, "devolution, devolving, &c." denote descent by succession or inheritance, as distinct from survivorship. The next step, in his logical process, is that if what the widow gets is by succession or inheritance and not by survivorship, any gap between the time of the death of her husband and the time of her taking is inconceivable. By this process of reasoning, he comes to what he calls "inescapable conclusion" that the time of "her husband's death must occur after the Act as she could, in either view of the case, not be deemed to have or not to have taken before the commencement of the Act. Devolution does not necessarily mean descent by succession or inheritance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I would, in this connection, invite attention to the highest authority on the subject, namely, the decision of the Federal Court in the case 'In the matter of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, A I R (28) 1941 F C 72, at p. 78. The passage from the judgment of the Court, delivered by Gwyer, C. J., of India, which I am going: to rely upon and to quote below, was spoken by his Lordship while dealing with 'the fourth question.' o "That even if it were permissible to uphold the Act to a limited extent, the provision in Schedule (2) relating to the interest of the deceased in Hindu joint family property would be 'ultra vires' the Indian Legislature, on the ground that the mention of 'succession' in Entry No. 7 of List 3 of Scb. 7 does not include or authorise legislation in respect of the benefit which accrues to the members of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family under the rule of survivorship."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The question thus arose directly and' substantially; and his Lordship, in overruling the contention, proceeds to say, 'inter alia':<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is equally important to remember that neither in their ordinary grammatical significance nor by a long continued use in a technical sense have the words 'devolution' and 'succession' 'acquired a connotation that would preclude their application to describe the operation of the rule of survivorship as above explained.' Eminent text writers and Judges have used one or the other of these terms to include the accession of right which takes place on the death of one of the members of a Mitakshara joint family. Many enactments of Parliament and of the Indian Legislature have used the words 'inheritance' and 'succession' in juxtaposition, justifying the inference that succession is either another category from or a wider category than 'inheritance' (See some of those enactments referred to in Ilbert's Government of India, Chapter 4, and in Mulla's Hindu Law, p. 4.) If in these enactments 'succession' should be held not to include the principle of survivorship, it would be difficult to say what else that word is. meant to refer to and in any other view the continued administration of that part of the Hindu Law by the British Indian Courts could not have been provided for, because there are no other appropriate words in those provisions. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Such being, the position as to the meaning of the words, it is permissible to add that it is difficult to conceive of any reason why in framing Lists 2 and 3 Parliament should have thought fit 'to take away the law of survivorship' from the jurisdiction of the Indian Legislatures, and there is no justification for attributing oversight either, when, as above explained, the language employed 'may properly be held to comprehend the law of survivorship as well."</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In one or two instances, eminent writers have employed language suggesting that 'devolution' may comprehend cases of survivorship but not the word 'succession' (See Mayne's Hindu Law,, para. 270,) but it is difficult to find any basis for this distinction. 'Devolution' may be wider in scope than 'succession' in the sense that the former is not restricted to the result of a 'death" (See Order 20, Rule 10, Civil P C), but that is immaterial for the present purpose; and, as already stated, eminent Judges have used both the terms in a sense that will include the operation of the principle of survivorship."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The point can be further elucidated by referring to an earlier part of his Lordship's judgment, which reads :</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In addition to the constitutional points above summarised, a suggestion was made on the construction of the Act, that it does not provide for the devolution of any property by survivorship nor confers on the widow a right by survivorship, though it gives her the same interest in the joint property as the deceased husband had. This does not seem to be tenable. It is true that Section 3 of the Act does not use the word 'survivorship', and it may be that the widow taking a share under the Act does not become a coparcener with the other sharers; but there can be no doubt that in the cases in which, it gives to the widow of a deceased coparcener a right to a share in the joint property which she did not possess under the pre-existing law, it takes away to that extent the benefit of the rule of survivorship which would have accrued to the remaining coparceners. The reference must, therefore, be dealt with on the footing that so far as its effect goes, the Act does legislate 'with respect to' the law of survivorship."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If I may say so with great respect, in the illuminating judgment of Gwyer, C. J., the connotation of 'survivorship' has been rightly commented upon. It is a term which is borroyjed from the English Law as what takes place on the death of a coparcener and bears resemblance to the operation of principle of survivorship in the case of joint tenancy on the death of one of the joint tenants according to the English jurisprudence. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Lord Dunedin in 'Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tejbali Singh', 43 All 228, sounded a note of caution about the use of the terms "coparcenary and coparcener" in relation to the Mitakshara joint family. Gwyer, C. J., observes that the note is equally applicable to the use of the terms "joint tenancy and survivorship" for the incidents associated with joint ownership under the Mitakshara Law. 'The only degree of resemblance between the two systems of law is the 'jus rescendi' and the effect of death of one coparcener, namely, an extinction of the deceased person's interest and diminution in the number of sharers whose preexisting interest extended over the whole property.' This is just the reason why, when a coparcener dies, no property, nor even his interest, devolves upon any person. It remains in the" coparcenary to be worked out and separated at the partition in favour of the person who can represent him at the time. That it devolves upon the widow is an exception to the rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">52. In order to make the position clear, I would for a moment consider what should happen in the case of the death of a Hindu after the Act leaving a widow and a body of coparceners. It is clear at the moment, the husband's interest will become extinguished and would lapse in the same manner as it would if the Act were not in force with the only difference that the number of persons for whose benefit the effect of extinction will operate will include the widow. The interest thus grows in her and can be not Inappropriately described as devolving on her by survivorship. Like all other survivors, she should acquire a right of claiming partition. My learned brother Das, J., relies upon a decision of the Patna High Court in holding that accrual of this right is by way of inheritance. The decision is reported in the case of 'Siveshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Haranarain Mal', AIR (32) 1945 Pat. 116. What was held in that case by Fazl Ali, C. J., (as he then was) is summed up in the following words:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Therefore if the interest which she has in the property at present is an asset of the husband, then it can be lawfully oattached. As I have already stated if she acquired the interest of her husband as an heir, then it must be deemed to be the latter's asset in her hahds."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I have nothing to disagree with this learned judgment. But I do not consider, it supports the theory that the process that takes place at that psychological moment is one of inheritance as distinguished from devolution by survivorship. The law amends the Hindu Law to the effect of adding the widow to the list of survivors as if she would be a member in the corporate body of the coparcenary for the purpose of devolution of his interest. The character or extent of such devolution is to be determined according to the rule implied in the words "she shall have the same interest as her husband had at the time of death." The judgment of Venkataraman Rao, J., of the Madras High Court in the case of 'Sardambal v. Subbarama Ayyar', AIR (29) 1942 Mad. 212, to be presently referred to, would make the position clear as to why the creditor of the husband can lawfully attach the widow's interest in the joint family property accruing to her under the provisions of this Act. A relevant passage occurring in the judgment of Gwyer, C. J., which runs as follows will throw light on the subject:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Whatever may be the position under the English Law, the theory of extinction does not exactly (in the sense 'completely') describe the position which arises on the death of a member of a Mitakshara joint family. The result of a long course of decisions is that certain legal acts continue to operate on the interest of the deceased even when what is ordinarily spoken of as the rule of survivorship is taking effect." (the bracketed words are mine.) The following extract from the judgment of Venkataraman, Rao, J., is very illuminating:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"If for instance an undivided member dies leaving a son and also his widow, the property would devolve upon both of them and though, so far as the widow is concerned, her interest is limited, no such limitation can be placed upon the interest taken by the son. It cannot be said that the interest of the son is attached but not that of the widow. 'The fact that a right of partition is conferred upon the widow goes to show that the property is taken by her subject to all the rights and liabilities which the husband would have had because it is the same interest that is conferred upon her.' Therefore, giving the language its plain meaning, the property taken by her must be held to be liable for the payment of her husband's debts and is liable to be attached by the plaintiff."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is abundantly clear from the above that liability to her husband's debts of the interest accruing to her on his death, under the benefits of the Act, arises not on account of the process of accrual being either succession or inheritance rather than survivorship, but because she gets the same interest that her husband had which means she gets it subject to the rights, obligations, liabilities and equities that would have been available to any outsider as against that interest. To use the words of Sir Maurice Gwyer, the legal act of the liability incurred by the loan of the husband is already in operation as against the interest that he had. The other coparceners cannot be said to be getting the "same interest" for the purpose of the liability. The joint family property in the hands of the son is liable for the father's debts. That does not necessarily make out the position that the son gets his father's interest by inheritance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Madras jurisdiction, a coparcener can sell his interest in family property. That does not mean that he succeeds by inheritance, not by survivorship, if Pazl Ali C. J. used the word 'heir' or 'succession', he did not mean' to use it strictly in the technical sense; he meant nothing other than what Venkataraman, J. laid down, on which he relied, it being the admitted position that by that interest accruing to the widow, the coparcenary does not become disrupted, or, in other words, the share accruing to her does not become separated, carved out and held as an asset different from the assets of the joint family property. What his Lordship said was true for the limited purpose of enforcing the liability for the husband's debts against the interest devolving on her. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">No corrolaries should be drawn to support the proposition that she must get the interest at her husband's death or not at all. In the Hindu law jurisdiction, a coparcener's creditor can follow the joint family property in the hands of his sons but not so if the property is in the hands of his sons living in commensality with others who are collaterals to their father. This does not amount to mean that the sons get by inheritance while others get by survivorship, in a joint family constituted by father and his sons, the father dying after the Act, the entire property comes to the possession of the sons and their mother. The property would be equally liable in their hands even though the sons are surviving coparceners while the mother, as a widow, is assumed to be heir. My conclusion is that the fixation of this liability on the assumption that the deceased husband's interest is an asset in the hands of his widow is not at all a relevant consideration for the purpose. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It would have been relevant if it were an infallible proposition that an heir, or, in other words, one who takes by inheritance, must take at the death of the propositus. Various other estates may interpose to postpone the vesting of succession to a later date. This is illustrated by the reversionary succession interrupted by widow's estates' or other life estates, such as, that of a daughter, sister and so on. The Hindu law introduces the fiction of death of the last male holder occurring, as it were, after the said estates expire.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">53. I would further point out that I could come across no decision in which it has been held not only that the interest of the husband, that is acquired by the widow, gets disrupted from the joint family property once for all, and never comes back to it even though the family continues to function and exist as a corporate coparcenary body after the widow's death, but also that it goes, on her death, to her husband's heirs as distinguished from coparceners or survivors. On the other hand, one of the decisions cited by my learned brother Das, J. lays down the contrary, I would, in this connexion, invite attention to a decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of 'Vinod Sagar v. Vishnubhai', AIR (34) 1947 Lah. 388. Paragraphs 56 and 57 of the judgment delivered by Abdur Rahman, J. deal with the question. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The sum and substance of this judgment is to the effect that accrual or growth of the right of a widow does not amount to disruption of the coparcenary nor separation of any particular interest from the joint family property, until the widow effects a partition by metes and bounds; that even if she divides her interest by metes and bounds the rest of the joint family and joint family property remain completely unaffected; that until a partition is brought about, the Karta of the joint family would be entitled to act as such and the widow shall be bound by his acts in the fullest possible sense in his capacity to represent the entire of the coparcenary. On partition, the Karta's power of management and control would be kept in abeyance in regard to the property which has fallen to a widow, for such time as she remains in its possession. The learned Judge says:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Whether its character would change even after a partition by metes and bounds does not arise for decision at this stage, although, as at present advised, I seem inclined to the view that it would not."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In my judgment, I see nothing in the nature of interest that devolves upon the widow under the Act which, except temporarily for the purpose of enabling the widow to enjoy widow's estate and that on partition by metes and bounds, would alter the character and the destination of the property for the purpose of its ultimate devolution. Such alteration may occur on change of circumstances, such as, family haying broken up in the meantime. If the unit of the joint family and the joint family property, as such, continues till after the widow's death, the estate must return to and merge in the stock of the coparcenary property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I would sum up the position like this that on the death of the husband, his interest in the joint family property would lapse. In the coparcenary estate including her husband's interest, she shall have the same interest as her husband had at the time of his death. That interest will be an unpredicatable and unpredictable one. Under the management of the Karta of the joint family, she shall be bound to sue and to be sued through him, who will represent her and her undivided interest, just in the same manner as he would for the other coparceners and their coparcenary interests. She will have the same right of claiming partition as every other coparceher would have. Till partition her right will be only to maintenance, just in the same manner as that of any male coparcener. I would here quote Gour's Hindu Code, Article 1069:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"But it is clear that even in this family all persons do not possess equal rights. The property which it owns is called 'joint family property,' but it is a misnomer if it implies possession of any common rights other than the right to maintenance."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">When partitioned at her instance, portion carved out she shall be entitled to enjoy separately and during such enjoyment which enures till her death, the dominion of the Karta of the joint family remains in suspension. When she dies the woman's estate goes back to the joint family if it exists. The conception of Hindu law is that after woman's estate terminates, the property goes back to the stock from where it had come. In the present case, the stock is the coparcenary and coparcenary property. It is the same interest that her husband had, that means, a coparcener's interest in the coparcenary property. There is absolutely no guarantee either in the implied conception or connotation underlying the idea of Hindu women's estate or in the language of the Act that would warrant the conclusion that the property should go to her husband's heirs as his separate property, he being considered to be a fresh stock of descent for the purpose of inheritance. I would here quote a few passages from Mayne's Hindu Law at pp. 720-21:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Act however does not effect. a statutory severance or disruption of the entire family. To interpret the Act as effecting such a severance would cut across the recognised principles of Hindu Law and would not make for a rational and orderly succession. As the wives of coparceners are undoubtedly members of a joint Hindu family, there is nothing incongruous in the widow of a coparcener being viewed as occupying a position more or less analogous to the position of a coparcener in a Dayabhag family. As the other members of the family will remain undivided and as she cannot be regarded as the widow of a divided member, the joint family system and management will continue as before, probably an advantage. Except to the extent of the widow taking her husband's interest, the Act leaves the rights of the other members of the family untouched. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The result is that while the deceased coparcener's interest vests in has widow, his male issue will continue in the strictest sense to be coparceners along with the other male members of the family with mutual rights of survivorship. So also under sub-section (1), in a Mitakshara family, the sons, grandsons and great-grandsons of her husband will be coparceners 'inter se' while the widow will hold" her interest in quasiseveralty but along with them. To hold that the widow of a coparcener who takes his interest on his death is strictly a tenant-in-common with the coparcenary body is not to give full effect to the words in Schedule (2), according to which she is to have 'in the property the same interest as he himself had', apart from the grave complications which it will involve. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On that view, she will be entitled to an account and for a definite share of the income, while the others will not be; more than that, it will lead to anomalies' and hardships in connexion with the allotment of shares; and even before partition there would be separate management and representation and separate incurring of debt. 'But evidently the intention of the Act is only to interrupt survivorship and to protect the right of a widow so that she may have the same interest as if she continued the legal persona of her husband till partition'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Though, if she were assumed to be a coparcener in the Mitakshara sense, the working of the Act would be easier, the circumstance that she will hold her interest under the Act in quasi-severalty does not materially alter the position of the joint family in other respects."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">54. Substantially, the devolution by survivorship, while acting on undivided coparcenary property, has, dormantly inherent in it, the principle on which the Hindu law of succession is based, which is for the time being eclipsed by the dominant concept of Hindu coparcenary, and the implications implicit in it for the purpose of its corporate functioning. When the time for disruption of the coparcenary arrives, and the coparcenary property is divided, the right by survivorship manifests itself in the form of a right to succession. The deceased coparcener, whose interest in the coparcenary property lapsed, or extinguished itself at the time of his death, is at the time of division represented by those who would be his male heirs within the coparcenary under the laws of inheritance and they will take that interest which he could have taken had he lived till partition. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In this view of the matter, his interest remains undisposed of, and what goes down from time to time by deaths and births is the right to represent him which is not, in the strict sense of the term, the same as the right to property. By the time, if the law could interpose a representative of its own making, its effect would be the same as if representatives could be added or deducted by birth, adoption and death under the Hindu law. For the purpose of determining the time of accrual of the widow's interest under the Act, the test of its fluctuability has been applied by my learned brother Das, J. with some amount of rigour. He himself, however, is not certain about its fluctuability and has reserved his opinion about it. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the circumstances, no certain result could be achieved on admittedly uncertain basis. He, in this connexion, has referred to a decision of this Court, to which I was a party reported in I. L. R. (1949) 1 Cut. 483. The aspect of the question with which we are dealing did never arise then. I am still of opinion that on the facts of that case my decision was correct. I do not fear that in the light of the present decision of mine, the decision reached there should have been anything different. At any rate, I am quite sure that such fluctuations as are inherent in the character of "the same interest as her husband had" would affect the interest before devolution. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The question before us in the case of 'Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Mohanty', I. L. R. (1949) 1 Cut. 483 was if the widow, on whom the same interest as her husband had had devolved, would be entitled to alienate before partition by metes and bounds. It was argued that "the same interest" should mean "the coparcenary inalienable interest that her husband had'. In support of this argument, the decision of Leach, C. J. in the case of 'Chinniah Chettiar v. Sivagami Achi', AIR (32) 1945 Mad 21 was cited, to show that according to the learned Chief Justice Leach the word "same interest" would compel him to hold that the widow's interest would be subject to such reduction by fluctuation by an adoption as it would in the hands of her husband. To that contention, I observed with great respect, I cannot go so far as that because it would be difficult to assume that her interest will be enhanced on the death of coparcener as it would have had her husband been alive". My observation is not tantamount to saying that there will be no fluctuation of whatsoever kind. I did not, in fact, dissent from the learned Chief Justice, but I said I could not go to the fullest extent that all kinds of fluctuations including enhancement by fluctuation would also occur. Reduction by fluctuation is permissible but not enhancement, because evidently, as the trend of authorities so far goes to establish, with which I very respectfully agree, she is not a coparcener in the full sense. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The main decision proceeded on the basis that hers was a widow's estate according to sub-section (1) and the meaning of "same interest" in sub-section (2) must be arrived at in that context. As such an estate, it is alienable and its main attribute cannot be cut down by the doctrine of fluctuability being called in aid. At any rate, I must observe once again that the problem of fluctuability creates greater difficulty in the case of post-Act widows than in the case of pre-Act widows. To the question arising in the latter case, there is a very simple answer, namely, that she must take the same interest subject to such variations as might have in any way impaired it by time a right accrues to her. Suppose, the entire joint family property is sold away for joint family debts between the husband's pre-Act death and post-Act devolution upon the widow. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The benefit of the Act cannot be said to materialise not because the Act does not apply to pre-Act deceased's widow but because the interest that the Act intends for her was not in existence at the time the Act came into operation. The same is the case with regard to mutilation -of the said interest or its impairment within the time by agencies either voluntary or involuntary. Take the simple illustration of a Mitakshara son. He becomes a coparcener on birth, but he cannot in any event challenge an alienation of the joint family property that had taken place before he was legally born.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The real difficulty arising out of fluctuability or otherwise would be almost baffling in a case where the interest devolves upon the widow on her husband's death after the Act and she never alienates her interest nor partitions till a number of deaths and births in the coparcenary body had occurred and then she comes out with a suit for partition claiming that she should get the same interest as her husband had at the time of his death. In case the fluctuation takes place from such a cause as operates on the interest that her husband had, that is, a coparcener's interest in coparcenary property from its inherent character the widow's rights thereto must be governed by it, even to its curtailment. There may be cases in which the fluctuation takes place on account of (sic) due to increase in the number of coparceners of the same degree of relationship with the common ancestor. In such cases, the widow may not be entitled to the increase, because she does not inherit her husband's status in the family.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">55. Besides, as I have already expressed myself very clearly, in applying the rule of fluctuability, we shall have to make compromises or exceptions in order to meet the ends of justice, illustrations of which are numerous in the rules of Hindu law or custom in their application to the realities of life. It is too difficult to lay down any inflexible rule. Each case shall to be decided on its own facts. Fluctuations due to natural causes of deaths or births in the coparcenary body are associated with gain or loss of status. A new birth brings in a coparcener. That affects not the status but has the potentiality of affecting the interest of others, while death, resulting in loss of status of the deceased, attracts accrescence in the case of those only who have the requisite status at the moment. Hence the difference. Assuming my casual observation in that case, where, too, I have observed logical deductions would land us in anomalies rather than remove them, to be true, my present conclusion is not in the least affected.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">56. The learned author of Mayne's Hindu Law, 10th Edn., has given an illustration at p. 722 at the end of Article 592, which I will quote here:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The anomaly of a widow holding a woman's estate in the undivided property of her husband must necessarily be dealt with as a special case: the interest she takes may well be a fluctuating interest till there is a partition."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It must be remembered, however, that such cases will occur very rarely, if not, not at all. So long as any coparcener dying after the death of the concerned widow's husband leaves surviving him any male issue within the prescribed degree, or even a widow of his, or any of his male descendants, the concerned widow's interest shall not be affected as they or any one of them shall represent the subsequently deceased coparcener at the partition. The ambiguity, if any, being common to the cases of pre-Act and post-Act widows, its determination is not material for testing the correctness of either of the rival contentions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">57. I would just point out an instance which would testify to the correctness of the view that I have taken. Suppose the Act operates only in cases where a Hindu dies after the Act both within the meaning of sub-sections (1) and. (2) of section 3. Take a Hindu dying after the Act who leaves besides his widow, a daughter-in-law and a granddaughter-in-law whose husbands predeceased him before the Act. The rule of devolution of interest on the last two widows will operate differently according as sub-section (1) or (2) of section 3 applies. In the former case, they should each get she share of a son or grandson along with the widow; but in the latter case, they will get nothing while the deceased's widow will get the entire interest. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This will happen because their husbands died before the Act. In this connexion, I should note that it is not disputed that the benefit of subsection (1) will accrue to the predeceased son's widow or predeceased grandson's widow even if their husbands died before the Act, provided that the properties to be inherited were those of the Hindu dying intestate after the Act, in which their husbands had no vested interest at the time of their deaths. They shall, however, be deprived of the interest that their husbands had at the time of their deaths in coparcenary estate. It would be difficult to appreciate that this discrimination is within the intendment of the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The object of the amendment was obviously to give the right that a Hindu had, or could have had, if alive, at the (sic) coparcenary, to his widow. This object was, however, subordinated to the consideration of leaving undisturbed transactions, or considerations that were lawfully completed under the law in its preamended state. If we presume the Legislature to be free from arbitrariness and guided by rules of justice and equality to all, similarly circumstanced, we cannot make the assumption of discrimination that must have to be made in order to justify the opposite view. Sub-section (2), interpreted as I do, would completely obviate the anomaly referred to. If the rival contention is acceded to, their widows get an interest in the property in which they had none, while they are excluded from the coparcenary property in which their husbands had an interest an the time of their respective deaths. That such widows were intended to be given better rights cannot be denied in view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">58. In expounding that to give the benefit of the Act to women widowed prior to the Act would amount to divesting the coparceners of the normal rights vested in them from their births, my learned brother, Das J. has enumerated the various rights and. privileges, either in existence or in expectancy, of a coparcener in a Hindu joint family. On the assumption that they are vested rights, their impairment, even to the slightest possible degree, is held out as the determining factor of retrospectivity. Though in my view they are not so, I should, assume for argument's sake that what my learned brother Das, J. enumerates as vested rights are so in reality. At the same time, I would assume with him that the Act cannot be given the meaning so as to affect such rights. The result that would inevitably follow is that, so long as a single coparcener, born prior to the Act, is alive in a joint family, at the time of the post-Act death of a Hindu coparcener, his widow shall not be entitled to the benefit provided for under sub-section (2) of the section. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This, in other words, means that in order that the Act shall operate prospectively, the joint family must have been one in which the surviving coparceners would be all born after the Act, or one that is constituted after Act. It is, however, conceded that the Act must operate in all cases of deaths of coparceners after the Act, independently of the fact that the surviving coparceners had acquired their vested rights by births before the Act came into effect. In this contention, no distinction is made as to the impairment of the rights of the surviving coparceners between those born before and those born after the Act. In that event, the Act must be taken to be retrospective in its very nature. The distinction between the effects of the two rival interpretations in this respect, therefore, is without difference. The apparent retrospectivity is thus not real, nor it is sanctioned by the language of the Act. It will apply to the devolution of interest of a Hindu dying before as well as after the Act, with the same effect on the rights of surviving coparceners. It has been accepted by all such eminent Judges and Jurists as had had the occasion to consider it that the operation of the Act is prospective in nature notwithstanding that its operation does deprive all the coparceners born before the Act of what brother Das J. calls vested rights of theirs. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These views, for which I am full of respect, cannot be explained except on the hypothesis that the rights of the coparceners before partition are not vested rights. It is too late in the day to flout the views of theirs. So in whatever manner and extent the surviving coparceners' rights are affected, its operation should not be condemned as retrospective. I shall not be understood to advocate the position, nor has it been pointed out to us, that acceptance of my view would amount to reopening the completed transactions, such as, pre-Act alienations or partitions or the like. The Act operates only on joint family having coparcenary properties that continue to be so at the time it comes into force. This is exactly the view that has been taken by my Lord Varadachariar, J. in the case of 'Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi', AIR (32) 1945 F.C. 25 at p. 33. The paragraph in which this position has been expounded is very much liable to be misconstrued; but on a close reading it is clear that it means exactly what I have just now said above. The passage that can give rise to misconstruction, if and when read stripped off from its context, reads:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is true that, on the above view, the plaintiff in the present case will derive no benefit from the Act, though she happens to be the widow of a predeceased son. But that is due to the circumstances that her husband died before the passing of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The death of "her husband" before the Act was considered to be the circumstance on which depended the result of "derivation of no benefit from the Act" for the plaintiff. That is because on her husband's death, prior to the Act, the joint family, as such, came to an end with the result that at the commencement of the Act there was no joint family nor joint family property. This position is made clear by his Lordship by illustrating it on reference to a hypothetical case. In this case, though not expressly but by necessary implication, it may be understood that B's widow lost her husband before the Act. This is made clear by the learned Judge saying that the adoption by A's widow was after the Act. Last comes the concluding passage which reads:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The only possibility of calling the Act to her aid is by the application of Sub-section (2) of Schedule if a double fiction could be imported so as to justify the assumption not only that, 'the joint family was being continued by the adopted boy but that B must be deemed to have died after the adoption. On this assumption, B's widow could retain a half of the estate as against the adopted son of A, only if B's ownership could be described as 'interest in joint family property."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">An "interest in the joint family property" in the aforesaid passage is quoted from sub-section (2) of Section 3. Three things are clear from this passage, viz., that (a) the husband's interest at the time of his death, while he is sole surviving coparcener, is to be distinguished from "his interest in the joint family property". (It can be his separate property which according to the learned Judge is not embraced within the scope, intendment and object of the Act. In order to be "an interest in the joint family property" within the meaning of Sub-section (2), it must be an interest in such property for the purpose of the sub-section only when at the death of the widow's husband one or more other male coparceners were alive); (b) the joint family must be continuing from before the commencement of the Act till the Act came into force, (c) so that the interest devolving on the widow could be said to be "an interest in the joint family property" that her husband had. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Like the case of a completed partition of the family estate accompanying a disruption of the coparcenary prior to the Act the death of the widow's husband as the sole surviving coparcener amounts to a completed transaction or part consideration which, according to my view, is not in the least affected by the operation of the Act. I shall show presently that conceding that my view is one demanding retrospective operation of the Act, it is limited and confined to cases where such past transactions or considerations are not affected. It is well known as a canon of construction of statutes that a statute may be retrospective to certain extent and no further.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">59. I would here refer to a passage from the. judgment of Gwyer, C. J. of India, in which his Lordship says that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act is a remedial Act seeking to remove or to mitigate, what the Legislature presumably regarded as a mischief; and as such it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation, and even though it be found in a small minority of cases to prejudice rather than to benefit those whom it was intended 'to help, this would be no reason why the Court should not adopt the construction which is on the whole best calculated to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature.' Brother Das,, J. does not dispute this proposition but says that the beneficial construction must be one. admissible under the language of the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">True, when two reading or two interpretations are equally admissible, this doctrine would give preference to the one which would render a larger measure of. benefit to a larger number of people. With reference to this, my learned brother Das, J. in his judgment in paragraph 43 has said "But it is not clear what particular class of women are intended to be benefited thereby. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It cannot even be maintained that at least all widows are intended to be benefited thereby. Indeed the. contrary can be demonstrated, viz., that certain, widows who were entitled to rights under the preexisting law are deprived of their rights. For instance, the mother or daughter of a widower (male) haying self-acquired property who leaves him surviving no male issue but a widowed daughter-inlaw is excluded by the said daughter-in-law by virtue of Section 3 Sub-section (1). Therefore the Act helps only some women who are widows and not all women or all widows."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I am sorry to have to say that I do not at all comprehend that the mother or the daughter of a widower has been deprived of her reversionary right to succession by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 3. They do, notwithstanding the Act, retain their places in the list of heirs. Mother is a later heir than son, grandson, great-grandson, widow and daughter of the last male holder. The Act has introduced son's widow, grandson's widow and great-grandson's widow in the places of their husbands. By this process, the chance of succession of either the daughter or the mother is not in the least rendered more remote than what it was before. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It has also to be noticed that these widowed daughters-in-law or grand-daughter-in-law take side by side with the living sons and grand-sons in whose presence neither the mother nor the daughter could inherit, even though daughters-in-law and the grand-daughtersin-law were not conferred the right to succeed, under the Act. So the apprehended consequence is. more imaginary than real. On the contrary, the Act has increased the number of women heirs in. the place of their husbands along with the male relations of the same degree without removing other women relations even a step further than the places they have been occupying under the. Hindu law. Here, I would point out that the Act pre-eminently intends to benefit predeceased sons' and grandsons' widows. Brother Das's construction would defeat this. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 uncontrolled by Section 4 would achieve this very efficiently. This establishes the correctness of my exposition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">60. My learned brother Das, J. would ask me to interpret the Judgment of Mr. Varadachariar J. of the Federal Court, already referred to in the way which he has done in order that I may appear to, pay due regard to it as a Judgment of a Superior Court by which I am bound. But it is within my right to comprehend the judgment in my own way, and my learned brother should kindly remember that I have followed the judgment of Mr. Justice (sic) the view that I have taken. If his Lordship Mr. Justice Varadachariar has said that the Act is prospective I have not said anything to the contrary. On the other hands, I have not fallen a prey to the contention that all other considerations being equal, retrospectivity would consist in merely relying on a pre-Act event as attracting its operation. In either of the cases, impairment or divestation of pre-Act acquired coparcenary right being common, there is no logic in distinguishing one as prospective from the other as retrospective. I do not apprehend, as brother Das, J. says, that distortion of domestic equilibrium would occur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">61. In my judgment, the view that we have taken will restore the equilibrium in the domestic sphere of life, where it has been lost. It will remove the cold indifference with which the Hindu widows are being treated by their husband's coparceners and relations even in cases where their husbands have thrown all their earnings into the family funds and added immensely to the opulence of the coparcenary and have, in substance, built it up. It is apprehended by my learned brother that this pronouncement will adversely affect or otherwise reopen completed transactions and thus unsettle settled rights and obligations created on their basis and should give rise to numberless litigations and liabilities changing the legal relations already established. This apprehension is, to my mind, wholly unfounded. In this connexion, I shall refer to section 3 of the Orissa Act (V of 1944) which reads :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Notwithstanding anything contained in section 2, where any person, who, but for this Act, would have been entitled to any property, has been in possession thereof or has made a transfer thereof, his possession up to the date of the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be as lawful, and the transfer so made by him shall be deemed to be as valid, as if this Act had not been passed."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">62. Besides, I shall draw attention to the fact that it is not a case in which we are going against a series of judgments which had founded legal rights and obligations amongst the people. Even so, that there will be a few cases in which completed private transactions will have to be reopened should not stand in our way of interpreting the Act rightly to the best of our judgment. The principle of 'stare decisis' is not called for in the facts of this case. I would conclude, therefore, my judgment with the remark that, with the greatest deference to the views of my learned brother Das, J., I could not persuade myself to hold that by taking the view of giving benefit to the widows, whose husbands died before the Act, we are at all giving it a retrospective operation so long as it does not affect the completed transactions or past considerations that took place before the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If anything is affected, it is the presumed chance potentiality of pre-Act born coparceners. A similar argument was advanced in relation to the construction of the Hindu Law of Inheritance Amendment Act and it found favour with the learned Judges in the case of 'Krishna Chettiar v. Manikammal,' 57 Mad. 718. I would cite a passage from this judgment of Madras Court, which was quoted by Sir Pazl Ali C. J., who delivered the judgment of the court in the Patna Full Bench case of 'Pokhan Desadh v. Mt. Manoa', AIR (24) 1937 Pat. 117.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"At p. 187, the learned author (Maxwell) observes that a testator is presumed to have in view the state of the law when he made his will. If it be so, we can reasonably presume that a person competent to make a will is satisfied with the state of the law regarding the order of succession to his estate among his heirs, if he prefers to die intestate without making a will . If he wishes to prefer a remoter to a nearer heir he will certainly have recourse to the making of a will. If he does not make a will, it may be because he wishes that his property should devolve according to the existing law of succession. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The policy of the legislature is not to make a subsequent enactment operative against the estate of such a man and thus frustrate his presumed intentions, unless, for special weighty reasons, such a retrospective operation is bound to be necessary. If Act 2 of 1929 is given suck a. retrospective operation, it would be frustrating the intentions of the last male owner who preferred to die intestate before the passing of this Act. Such an anomaly will not arise if this Act should be held to apply only prospectively".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In reference to this contention, Fazl Ali, C. J., in that Patna Pull Bench case, observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The point to be considered is whether we can legitimately draw any presumption as to the intention of a person who has died intestate.' I venture to point out respectfully that if it is permissible to say that a man did not leave a will, because he was satisfied with the state of the law regarding the order of succession to his estate, it is equally permissible to say that his intention might have been to let the law take its course and that he was not thinking of any particular heir at all. It being impossible to predicate as to who would succeed to the estate until the succession opens, it is difficult to say that a person who dies intestate had contemplated at the time of his death that he would be succeeded by any particular person or persons. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There will be still less justification for presuming that if he had known that a change was going to be effected in the existing law, he would have disposed of his property by means of a will. That being so, there is no question of frustrating the presumed intention of a person to whose estate the Act applies, and as already stated, to hold that the Act applies only when succession opens is not to give it a retrospective effect and therefore the principles bearing upon the question as to when a statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation have no relevancy".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The observations of Fazl Ali, C. J. will apply 'mutatis mutandis' to this case with reference to the view of my learned brother Das, J., particularly, as the statutes under consideration are in 'part materia'. ......<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">63. In the premises aforesaid, I would agree with the order proposed by my learned brother, Narasimham, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">64. It is therefore ordered that this appeal be allowed and that the widow concerned will have the same interest in the joint family property as her husband had at the time of his death. There will be no order for costs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-28920872841198042382020-01-27T17:26:00.002+05:302020-01-27T17:26:59.162+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">MADRAS HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">V. SAMPATHKUMARI VS. M. LAKSHMI AMMAL<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Three main contentions were urged by him. The first related to the applicability of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to this case. It consisted of two parts, the first part factual and the other part legal. The factual part consisted in the argument that the possession of the estate by the 2nd defendant amounted to alienation of the properties by the widows and consequently the widows should be held to be not in possession of the estate when alone the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act would be attracted. The argument has been dealt with fully by my learned brother and I do not propose to add anything more to what he has said. I agree with him that the possession of the estate, either move-able or immoveable, by the and defendant does not amount to alienation of it by the widows, as he occupies the position of an agent of the widows or one of them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The facts in , were these. The last maleholder Rajendra Singh died in 1931, leaving as his heir only his grandmother Mst. Ari Kuer, the thirteeth defendant in the suit. In 1951 she executed two sale deeds in favour of defendants 2, 3, and 4. The suit was brought by the plaintiffs claiming to be the nearest reversioners of Rajendra Singh in 1951 for a declaration that the alienations were without legal necessity and were nominal. The trial judge found that the sale deeds were neither genuine nor were acted upon and there was in fact no legal necessity or consideration. The declaration prayed for was therefore granted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the defendants in the High Court the Hindu Succession Act had come into force. The appellants contended that Section 14 had become a complete defence to the plaintiffs' suit. The learned Judges repelled this contention pointing out that Section 14 was not intended to enlarge the estate of the alienees. Thereupon the appellants relied upon the Supreme Court decision in and urged that on the findings of the trial judge that the sale deeds were not acted upon at all and were nominal, Mst. Ari Kuer must still be deemed to be possessed of the properties for the purposes of Section 14(1) of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">This submission was also repelled and in doing so the learned Judge distinguished the Supreme Court decision emphasising the difference between a transaction which is void and a transaction which is voidable at the instance of the reversioners and they pointed out that in the Supreme Court decision, the adoption was assumed to be void ab initio and therefore destitute of any legal effect and that was why the actual possession of the adopted son was held to be permissive on behalf of Veeravva. But in the case before the learned Judges the sale deeds executed by Mst. Ari Kuer could not be said to be void but were good against Mst. Ari Kuer herself and even the reversioners might eventually elect to abide by it. We agree with this decision. But of course Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar does not tely on it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It is justified on the ground that there was no actual transfer of possession from the widow to the alience and that therefore Section 14(1) was properly applied. We do not think it necessary to discuss it further. Similarly in the decision of the Patna High Court in Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, , also there is a discussion of the scope of the word "possessed" in Section 14(1). In view of the Supreme Court decision we do not think it necessary to discuss that case either in detail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In the result, we hold agreeing with the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff's suit must fail because of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, even taking the plaint allegations to be true. The dismissal of the suit was therefore justified, but we do not think that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in asking the plaintiff to bear the costs of the contesting defendants when the dismissal of the suit was based on a ground which arose subsequent to the institution of the plaint and when the original allegations had not been tried. The proper order to make was to direct the parties to bear their own costs and we feel that the same direction should be made for the costs in the appeal, particularly when the question raised is agitated for the first time in this Court. Accordingly, while dismissing the appeal we direct the parties to bear their own costs in both the Courts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">V. SAMPATHKUMARI VS. M. LAKSHMI AMMAL<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 26.10.1961</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: AIR 1963 Mad 50<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: G Pillai<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT Ganapatia Pillai, J.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">1. I have already perused the judgment about to be pronounced by my learned brother Venkataraman J. and although I entirely agree in the conclusions he has reached, I would like to add a few words of my own on the questions of law raised by Mr. Gopalaswami Aijrangar, counsel for the appellant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Three main contentions were urged by him. The first related to the applicability of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to this case. It consisted of two parts, the first part factual and the other part legal. The factual part consisted in the argument that the possession of the estate by the 2nd defendant amounted to alienation of the properties by the widows and consequently the widows should be held to be not in possession of the estate when alone the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act would be attracted. The argument has been dealt with fully by my learned brother and I do not propose to add anything more to what he has said. I agree with him that the possession of the estate, either move-able or immoveable, by the and defendant does not amount to alienation of it by the widows, as he occupies the position of an agent of the widows or one of them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. The other aspect of the question is not now open having regard to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kotturuswami v. Veeravva, . The true interpretation of the word "possession" occurring in Section 14(1) which commended itself to Rajagopalan O. C. J. and Rajagopala Aiyangar J. in App. No. 423 of 1946 viz., that the expression does not connote possession as distinct from title, in a way receives confirmation from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kotturswami's case, . However, I doubt whether the requirement as to possession in the section qualifies only estates acquired by a Hindu female before the commencement of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">4. In none of the decisions so far available on this topic has this distinction been brought out. It may be material to point out this distinction though it does not affect the disposal of the appeal now before us. Cases may arise where a Hindu female acquires property after the commencement of the Act but does not get possession of it at once. In which event, the distinction may become relevant to find out whether the enlargement of the limited estate into a full estate takes effect from the date of the acquisition or after possession also is acquired by the female. I do not expatiate further upon this point because the question does. not arise for our consideration in this appeal and possibly the decision in Appeal No. 423 of 1946 cited above may furnish the answer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">5. The second argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar was that this case should be governed by Section 14(2) of the Act. The nature of a transaction of partition between co-owners like widows has been sufficiently explained by leading decisions which have been referred to by my learned brother in his judgment. It is enough to say that in a transaction of partition between co-owners like co-widows, there is no element of transfer of property but only an element of relinquishment of interest in property. Consequently I agree with my learned brother that the partition in this case would not amount to any kind of transaction covered by Section 14(2) of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">6. The third question which is the substantial question argued by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar related to the effect of Section 8 of the Act in cases where a widow had already succeeded to the estate of a deceased Hindu male who had died intestate before the Act came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">7. His contention was that in every case where a Hindu male dies intestate leaving a female heir to succeed him like widow or daughter, succession to the estate of the male does not really open until the death of the intervening female heir when alone it would be possible to ascertain who would be the persons entitled to take the estate as reversioners. That principle of Hindu law has been relied upon for applying the provisions of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 to the case of persons who had died even before that Act came into force. See the decision of the Privy Council in Duni Chand v. Mst. Anarkali, 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173); the leading authority establishing this principle of the heirs of a deceased male being ascertained after the death of the intervening female heir founded upon the other leading case Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitany, ILR 5 Cal 776 (PC). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar laid stress on this principle and contended on the strength of tie Privy Council decision in 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173), that there was no vesting of the estate on the date of the death of the male whenever he leaves a female heir to succeed him like widow or daughter. There are no doubt observations in 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173) which might lend support to the contention that in every case where a Hindu male dies leaving a female heir to succeed him the estate does not vest in the female heir on the death of the Hindu male. The following quotation is relied upon by him :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"There is no vesting as at the date of the husband's death and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir, or what is the class of reversionary heirs fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives, Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar, ILR 39 Mad 634 : (AIR 1916 PC 117). The death of the Hindu female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">8. The second sentence in the quotation explains what their Lordships meant by the estate not vesting in the female heir at the date of the death of the male. It is only in the sense of the inheritance being open to the reversioners on the death of the female owner that one can say that there is no vesting of the estate in the female heir as soon as the male propositus dies. It is a well settled principle of Hindu law that the widow is not a mere life estate holder. As was pointed out in Lakshmi Ammal v. Anantarama Aiyangar, ILR (1937) Mad 948 : (AIR 1937 Mad 699), the widow is in more than one sense heir of the last male holder and she completely represents the estate during her lifetime including the right to exercise nearly all the attributes of ownership of the estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In a way the estate might come to an end in her hand leaving nothing for the reversioners to succeed to because for legal necessity the widow is authorised to alienate the estate. To speak of such an hen as a person in whom the estate is not vested at the date of the death of the male owner might not be quite correct. Therefore, having regard to the fundamental principles that succession is never in abeyance, the estate must vest in some heir as soon as the owner of the estate dies. In this case it vested in the two widows of Muthuswami Chettiar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">9. It is only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the reversionary heirs that a fiction has been created by which the deceased person is deemed to have lived up to the date of the death of the female heir who immediately succeeds him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">10. It is well known that a fiction in law cannot be relied upon for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which law has sanctioned the creation of such fiction. The Parliament in enacting the Hindu Succession Act was recasting the entire law of Hindu Succession. Indeed, Section 4 has enacted that, "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The matter is not left in doubt because Section 4(1)(b) expressly states that any other law applicable to Hindus before the commencement of the Act shall cease to apply in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Hindu Succession Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">11. Thus we start with the position that old ideas about the nature of the estate of female heirs in Hindu law in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 14 of the Act could not apply after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. It is also well known that one of the major objects of the reform of the Hindu law undertaken by the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act was to improve the legal status of women in the matter of right to property. Having this in view, it should be the duty of the court to construe the provisions of Section 8 as to give effect to Section 14 in every appropriate case where it could apply.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">12. The argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar that on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, Section 8 must be applied and, in this case, the daughter (Plaintiff) also should get a half share in the properties of Muthuswami Chettiar along with his two widows is really based upon two assumptions; First, that the operation of Section 8 is really retrospective and Section 14 can be givan effect to only in cases where the propositus dies after the Act came into force. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The second assumption can be readily seen to be a fallacy because Section 14 in terms applies not only to estates held by widows by reason of inheritance by the death of the male owner after the Act came into force, but it also applies to estates held by widows in the case of death of male owners having taken place already. This dual application of Section 14 would be nullified if we accept the argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar and hold that even though the widows, in this case had inherited the properties of their husbands even before the Act came into force they would have to give up a half share in the properties to the daughter because under the Hindu Succession Act the daughter takes simultaneously with the widows.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The language of Section 8 as also the language of Section 10 is pointed out by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar as leading to his contention. Particularly he laid stress upon Section 10 which says that the property of an intestate shall be divided among the heirs in class I of the schedule in accordance with the rules prescribed therein. This, Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar contended, implied an imperative duty to divide the properties among the heirs in class I immediately on the coming into force of the Act. Difficulty in the matter arises because, according to the old Hindu law, whenever a female heir succeeds to a male propo-situs she is deemed to hold the property as representing the entire body of heirs and for the benefit of the ultimate reversioners who would take the estate on her death. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This special concept of Hindu law is pressed into service for contending that the estate is now (sic. not?) hers and she has only a limited interest in the estate, viz., to enjoy it subject to the limitations imposed upon her by the rules of Hindu law. This anomaly does not, however, lead to the assumption or inference that she has no interest in the estate. In other words, the Hindu law never considered a widow or a daughter as a mere life estate-holder. In one sense, as already pointed out, she represents the estate fully and she can even put an end to it by alienation justified by necessity. To call such an heir as a mere life estate holder would be an anomaly. Consequently it would not be proper to press into service this notion of the limitation imposed upon the enjoyment of the estate by the widow and her inability to pass on the estate to her own heirs as equivalent to her having no interest in the estate as owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">13. In order to avoid the numerous difficulties that might arise in giving effect to the policy of converting the limited estate owned by females into absolute estates Parliament has made a separate provision for it in Section 14. The same object could have been achieved by a proviso to Section 8, but the fact that a separate provision was made for this purpose, in Section 14 does not affect the result. The subject of enlargement of widow's estate or women's estate into an absolute estate required separate section of the enactment because it had to be carried out having certain limitations which Parliament thought was inherent. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As an instance we may point out the provision in Section 14(2) of the Act. Another feature which explains the separate treatment of this subject was the comprehensive nature of the provision which Parliament intended to make. I am referring to the explanation to Section 14(1) which includes every kind of property which a Hindu woman, could possess under the Hindu law. The various schools of Hindu Law had different rules in regard to different kinds of properties owned by Hindu woman, and, Parliament in jits wisdom thought that all such rules should be abrogated and a uniform rule of absolute estate for woman should be enacted and that explains why the subject-matter of Section 14 could not be enacted as a proviso to Section 8.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. The first assumption underlying the argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar viz., Section 8 was intended to be retrospective in operation, is mainly based upon a comparison of other sections in the Act which specifically state that those sections should come into operation in the case of succession occurring after the date when the Act came into force. My learned brother has dealt with this argument and I agree with him that this circumstance is of no importance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">15. The other sections which specifically state that they would come into operation only in the case of male Hindus dying after the commencement of the Act are Sections 6, 7, 22 and 26. Section 6 deals with devolution of interest in coparcenary property. In the very nature of things, it could only apply to cases where a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Act because the object of the section was to introduce an exception in the case of female relatives specified in class I of the schedule to the Act or a male relative in that class who claims through such female relative. In their case the interest of the male Hindu, dying after the commencement of the Act, in a Mitakshara ceparcenery property, was directed to devolve by testamentary or intestate succession under the Act and not by survivorship.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">16. Similarly, Section 7 deals with devolution of interest in the property of a tarwad, tavazhi, kudumba, kavaru or illom and this provision was intended to cover cases of succession under the Marumakattayam and Aliyasantana systems of Hindu law prevailing in the West Coast of the peninsula. Section 22 deals with preferential right of heirs specified in Class I of the schedule to acquire the property inherited by other heirs in that schedule simultaneously. In other words, it gives effect to the principle of pre-emption as between co-heirs specified in class I of the schedule. It was necessary to limit this principle to cases of succession occurring after the commencement of the Act. Section 26 of the Act gives effect to the principle of disqualification of heirs by conversion to another religion. The rule enacted in this section deals with all cases of conversion of a Hindu, whether before the commencement of, the Act or thereafter. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The prohibition applied to children born to the convert after the conversion and also their descendants. The exception made in the rule is in the case of such children or descendants who were Hindus at the time when the succession opens. It would be a moot question, what was intended by the phraseology "When the succession opens" occurring in this section. But, this does not affect the question which we have to decide with respect to Section 8 in this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In order to make the prohibition universal Parliament had to say that the rule in Section 26 would apply not only to a case of death occurring after the commencement of the Act but also to deaths occurring before the commencement of the Act. Thus, it will be seen that the scheme of succession embodied in the Hindu Succession Act is essentially prospectivte, and, in the absence of any compelling reasons we could not read Section 8 in the manner asked for by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar without doing violence to the scheme of the enactment, viz, Section 8 and Section 14 and other sections. We need not rely upon the rule of interpretation of statutes that every provision in a statute should be normally regarded as prospective in operation unless either by words used in the enactment, or by necessary intendment the enactment should be held to be retrospective in character. Much more so would be the case here where the contention urged by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar would lead to the divesting of the estate already vested by reason of succession to males who had died before the Act came into force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">17. It is unnecessary to dilate further upon this point. My learned brother has pointed out in his judgment the anomaly which would result on the application of Section 8 to a case like the present where the male Hindu, who died before the Act, had left a father and a daughter by a predeceased son of a pre-deceased son. The daughter in that case would not have been an heir under the Hindu law before the Hindu Succession Act, and the father who had taken the estate absolutely would have become a fresh stock of descent. If we accede to the argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, the father's estate would be divested as he does not come under the class of heirs in class I of the schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, and, the daughter by a pre-deceased son of the predeceased son would take the estate on the coming into force of the Act. Certainly, such a contingency was never contemplated by Parliament and we cannot see any justification for this interpretation having regard to the scheme of succession adumbrated in the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">18. The other aspects of the argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar on this question having been sufficiently dealt with by my learned brother I do not propose to consider them myself. My learned brother has also dealt with fully all the cases cited before us and it would serve no useful purpose for me to cover the same ground over again.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">19. This is an appeal by the plaintiff Sampathakumari whose suit has been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli, without going into the merits of the preliminary issue that even taking the plaint allegations to be correct, the suit became not maintainable by virtue of the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The question before us is whether this view of the learned Subordinate Judge is right.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">20. The Act (by which we mean hereinafter the Hindu Succession Act) came into force on 17-6-1956. The plaint had been filed on 18-4-1956. It will be noted that the contention of the contesting defendants on which the plaintiff has been non-suited on the preliminary ground is that the suit became not maintainable because of the Act. The plaintiff made some amendments to the original plaint in answer to this contention and the case has been dealt with by the learned Subordinate Judge after taking those amendments into consideration. The case has been argued before us on the footing that these amendments also must be taken into consideration by us. It will however be convenient to set out briefly the basis of the plaintiff's action as the plaint originally stood.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">21. The suit concerns the estate of one K. G. Muthuswami Chettiar who died intestate on 28-4-1945. He left him surviving his two widows, Lakshmi Ammal and Balammal, who are the first and fourth defendants in the suit, one Nagabhushanammal, a daughter, by the first defendant (Naghabhushanammal, is now dead, the date of her death being 9-6-1949) and the plaintiff Sampathkumari, daughter by the fourth defendant. He had no male progeny. A partition had taken place between him and his two brothers even in 1928. Besides owning immovable properties, the brothers had been carrying on two family businesses, namely, the Standard Aerated Water Works and the Standard Engineering Works at Madras. As a result of the partition, these family businesses were converted into partnership businesses with the three brothers as partners.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">22. Muthuswami Chettiar had executed a registered settlement deed dated 26-1-1945 before his death, in favour of his daughter Nagabhushanammal. The properties covered by that deed are listed out as items 1 to 4 in the B schedule to the present plaint. By that deed items 1 to 3 were settled on Naghabhushanammal for life without powers of alienation, and item 4 was set apart for the performance of charities by her during her lifetime without powers of alienation. On her death the properties were to revert to his heirs with an obligation to perform the charities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">23. According to the plaint, K. S. Muthuswami Chetti, the 2nd defendant in the suit, a man of no means and closely related to the first defendant, took advantage of the death of K. G. Muthuswami Chettiar. He was in illicit intimacy with Naghabhushanammal. On 11-6-1945 he secured a general power-of-attorney from the two widows, defendants I and 4, empowering him inter alia to collect the amounts due to K. G. Muthuswami Chettiar from the Standard Aerated Water Works and the Standard Engineering Works. It is averred in the plaint that he collected substantially larger amounts than what he actually accounted for to defendants 1 and 4, and appropriated the balance to his own use. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On 18-9-1945, he persuaded the two widows to enter into a partnership agreement with him and started a new business at Madras under the name and style of Sri Ganesa Engineering Works. He fomented dispute between the two widows, and on 29-4-1946 cut off the junior widow, namely, the 4th defendant, from the new partnership business. He brought about the partition deed dated 5-6-1946 between the two widows. In that deed he omitted to disclose some of the assets of the late Muthuswami Chettiar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">24. The partition deed provides for the first defendant taking the immovable properties listed out in the C schedule to the present plaint, and outstandings to the value of Rs. 28748-4-0 and the other widow was to take the immovable properties listed out in the D schedule to the plaint and outstandings to the value of Rs. 28014-10-0. According to the plaint the two widows were to have only a right of enjoyment of the properties and were not entitled to touch the corpus, which was given to the reversionary heirs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">25. After the death of Nagabhushanammal, on 9-6-1949, items 2 and 3 of the B schedule to the plaint were taken possession of by the first defendant, and item 1 by the fourth defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The trust property, namely item 4 is in the first defendant's exclusive possession. The trusts have not been performed.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26. On 26-11-1953, the second defendant got a new power-of-attorney from the first defendant taking advantage of her helplessness and assumed full control of the estate committed to his care and management. He also concocted a will dated 29-12-1955 purporting to have been executed by the first defendant giving a lion's share to the second defendant and a portion to the 3rd defendant, who is the son of the fifth defendant, who in turn is the sister of the first defendant. The 2nd defendant leased out the properties of the first defendant to defendants 7 to 10 receiving large premia. With monies really belonging to the estate, he purchased house properties listed out in the E schedule to the plaint, associating the name of the sixth defendant also in respect of one of the houses. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was on these allegations that the plaint was originally brought. The first prayer was for the appointment of a receiver of the B, C and E schedule properties. The basis of this prayer was the allegation that the first defendant had surrendered control of the estate in so far as it belonged to her completely into the hands of the second defendant and has thereby forfeited her right to remain In possession of the estate any longer (vide paragraph 13 of the plaint). It may be noted that the D schedule properties were left out, the reason presumably being that they were in the possession of the plaintiffs mother, the fourth defendant. The second prayer was to direct defendants 1, 2, 3 and 5 "to render a true and correct account of all the dealings, misfeasances, malfeasances and non-feasances and all the omissions and commissions and all the management and mis-management relating to the estate and pay and deliver to the credit of the estate what is found due."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">27. Written statements were filed by the contesting defendants after the Act came into force raising the contention that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the two widows, namely, the first defendant and the fourth defendant became full owners each in respect of a half portion of the estate and that consequently the suit as originally framed was not maintainable. It was after this the plaintiff made the amendments making the averments contained in paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 and claiming the additional reliefs in paragraphs 25. Before indicating these amendments it will be convenient to reproduce here itself Section 14 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(I) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Explanation: In this sub-section: 'property' includes both moveabje and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her owa skill or exertion, or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will of any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">28. By the new paragraphs the plaintiff contended that Section 14(1) could not be invoked by the defendants for two reasons; firstly because in this particular case Section 14(2) excluded the operation of Section 14(1). According to the plaintiff, the two widows, the first defendant and the 4th defendant, got their respective propertied only under the partition dated 5-6-1946 and that partition deed even restricted the ordinary Hindu Woman's estate which they otherwise would have had because it permitted them only to enjoy a portion of the income for maintenance and even the surplus income was to be added on to the corpus of the estate which would descend to the heirs of the plaintiff's father in due course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">29. Secondly, even assuming that Section 14(2) did not apply, the first defendant was not possessed of her portion of the estate, she having parted with possession in favour of the second defendant, and the third defendant, and was "civilly dead altogether". The plaintiff also contended that in any case she would be entitled to a half share of the entire. estate Under Section 8 of the Act. It is now necessary to quote that section :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter : -<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">30. The daughter is one of the heirs mentioned in class I of the schedule to the Act. Under Section 9, those in class I shall take simultaneously to the exclusion of all other heirs, and if that provision is to apply and a division is to take place Under Section 10, the two widows together shall take one share and the daughter shall take one share, and that is how the plaintiff claimed a half share, in the properties. She claimed that she became entitled to this half share on the date of the passing of the Act itself, namely, 17-6-1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">31. On the last mentioned basis she prayed for two reliefs which were not contained in the original plaint, namely, the partition of the entire estate in two equal shares, one share being delivered to the plaintiff and for ascertainment and recovery of mesne profits from 17-6-1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">32. The learned Subordinate Judge first dealt with the contention that the first defendant was not possessed of her portion of the estate within the meaning of Section 14(1). As we shall see presently, there is the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court dated 19-12-1958 on this question, . This decision was however not available to the learned Subordinate Judge when he pronounced his judgment on 8-2-1958. He followed two decisions which were available to him. The first was a decision of the Andhra High Court in Venkayamma v. Veerayya, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 280. In that case a reversioner filed a suit for a declaration that the alienations effected by the widow and the mother of the last maleholder Sambayya were not binding on the reversioner. The widow and the mother set up a will of Sambayya and claimed that they became absolutely entitled to the properties under the will. The trial Court found that the will had not been proved to be genuine. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the appeals preferred by the defendants it was urged that even if the will was not genuine, the widow would be the heir of Sambayya, and she became the full owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, that there would be no question of any reversioners and that the suit did not any longer lie. This contention was repelled by the learned Judges, Viswanatha Sastri and Satyanarayana Raju, JJ., who pointed out that the object of Section 14 was only to enlarge the interest the widow possessed in the estate and not to benefit an alienee who with open eyes had purchased the estate at a time when the Act was not in force and consequently she would normally have only a Hindu Woman's estate. It was also found that the will was not genuine. It was observed that where a widow had alienated the properties, she could not be said to be possessed of the estate and would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 14(1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">33. In that connection, the following observations were made as to the meaning of the word "possessed" :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The word 'possessed' in Section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force. Of course, the possession referred to is Section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. The possession of a licencee, lessee or mortgagee from the female owner or the possession of a guardian or trustee or agent of a female owner would be her possession for the purpose of Section 14. The word 'possessed' is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context 'possession' means 'the state of owning or having in one's hands or power'. It includes possession by receipt of rents and profits. Even if a trespasser is in possession of land belonging to a female owner on the date when the Act came into force, the female owner might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the land, if the trespasser had not perfected his title by adverse possession before the Act came into force. It is not however necessary for us to express an opinion on this point, where however, before the Act came into force, the female owner had sold away the property in which she had only a limited, interest and put the vendee in possession, she should in no sense be regarded as 'possessed' of the property when the Act came into force."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">34. The second decision relied on by the learned Subordinate Judge in this case was an un-reported decision of a Bench of this Court by Rajagopalan, O. C. J. and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., in C. M. P. No. 5819 of 1957 in A. S. No. 423 of 1946. In that case the reversioners filed a suit, O. S. No. 44 of 1945, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli, praying for the appointment of a receiver on the allegation that the widow had committed acts of waste. The waste was found established. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. On appeal preferred by the widow, A. S. No. 423 of 1946, to this Court, the learned Judges confirmed the finding of waste but appointed the widow herself as the receiver. Subsequently when the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17-6-1956, the widow made an application, C. M. P. No. 5819 of 1957, for discharge of her receivership and the obligation to account in that capacity. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">She invoked Section 14(1) of the Act and claimed that she had become the full owner. That application was resisted by the respondents firstly on the ground that Section 14(2) of the Act applied, the contention being that the widow got the property only under the decree in the suit. The learned Judges repelled this contention pointing out that the property had been acquired by the plaintiff by inheritance from het husband and what this court did was only to give effect to the restrictions on her ownership and enjoyment which obtained even under the Hindu law prior to the amendment thereof by the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. Secondly, it was urged by the respondents that the widow was not possessed of the estate in order to get the benefit of Section 14(1). This contention was also repelled and in that connection the learned Judges observed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The word 'possessed' in the expression 'property possessed' in Section 14(1) does not in our opinion, connote possession, as distinct from title. If for instance, at the date of the commencement of the Act, property inherited by a woman were in possession of a lessee from her it cannot be contended that Section 14(1) does not apply to the case on the ground that the woman was not in physical possession of the property. Again in the present case, if the stranger receiver had been continued, the same result would have followed. The receiver had been appointed to safeguard the interests of the reversioner against acts of waste by the widow, but such appointment could have no bearing on the title of the parties."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judges also observed that the fact that the widow herself had been appointed receiver could make no difference to the result.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">35. Applying the criteria in the above decision to the allegations in the plaint in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge pointed out that the allegations proceeded on the footing that assuming that the second defendant was in actual possession of the properties whether by himself of by the lessees, it was on account of the first defendant as her agent and that the first defendant was still possessed of the properties in that sense. In that view, the learned Subordinate Judge emphasised that there was no averment anywhere that the first defendant had alienated the properties. that no alienee was impleaded and that the execution of the will dated 20-4-1955 (29-12-1955?) could obviously be of no avail because the will would take effect only after her death, and of course, she did not have absolute testamentary power in 1955.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">36. As for the contention under Section 14(2) of the Act, the learned Subordinate Judge observed in the first place that the terms of the partition, deed did not in any way restrict the ordinary Hindu widow's estate which the widows would have in the properties which were allotted under the deed to them and secondly that it could not be said that widows acquired any right for the first time after the deed of partition, because even prior thereto they had the right as widows of their husbands, and the partition deed merely converted the joint right into separate right in respect of the properties allotted to each.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">37. On the contention that the plaintiff acquired a half share under Section 8 on 17-6-1956, the learned Subordinate Judge observed that Section 8 would only apply to the property of a male Hindu dying intestate after 17-6-1956, that to hold otherwise would result in divesting estates which had already vested prior to the commencement of the Act and that the enlargement of the widow's estate under Section 14(1) was not in any way curtailed by Section 8. The learned Subordinate Judge observed, "Section 14 deals with 'any property possessed by a Hindu female whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act'. Thus all the properties which a female Hindu had acquired before the commencement of this Act, and after the commencement of this Act, would vest in her absolutely. Hence the contention that Section 8 will apply and under Section 8, the plaintiff as an heir is entitled to a share in the properties is not sustainable."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On these findings the learned Subordinate Judge held that even assuming the plaint allegations to be true the two widows had acquired the rights of full ownership under Section 14(1) and he dismissed the suit with costs of the contesting defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">38. Sri R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, learned counsel for the appellant, raised before us the same contentions which were put forth in the amended plaint, namely, that on the allegations in the plaint the first defendant was not possessed of the property and therefore Section 14(1) cannot be availed of, that the rights of the two widows are really governed by the partition deed and therefore Section 14(2) would exclude the operation of Section 14(1), and that in any case the plaintiff became entitled to a half share under Section 8 on 17-6-1956 with the passing of the Act. He also urged that the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in awarding costs to the defendants particularly when the dismissal of the suit was on account of the Act which came into force after the plaint was instituted. We shall deal with these contentions in-order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">39. Taking the first contention, as we pointed out earlier, there is now available for us the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in , on the meaning of the word "possessed" occurring in Section 14(1). That case related to the estate of one Kasi Veerappa. He had authorised his widow to make an adoption observing certain conditions. The widow of Veerappa pur-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">ported to adopt Basayya on nth October 1942. Katturswami (appellant before the Supreme Court) </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">claiming to be the next reversioner of Veerappa </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">filed the suit for a declaration that the adoption was invalid and not binding on the appellant or the other reversioners. The suit was dismissed by </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">the trial judge and the appeal presented by the plaintiff to this court was unsuccessful. The High Court gave a certificate granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the question of the validity of the adoption. By the time, the </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">case came up for hearing before the Supreme Court, </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">the Hindu Succession Act had been passed. The respondents in the Supreme Court urged that in view of that Act, the appeal must necessarily fail. This was how they put it. Either the adoption was valid or it was not. If there was a valid adoption as found by the District Judge and the High Court, the dismissal of the suit was right. If however the adoption was either invalid, or in fact had not taken place, under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, Veeravva became tie full owner of her husband's estate and the appellant's suit would therefore not be maintainable.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In reply to this, it was urged by the appellant "that according to his case, the second defendant Basayya was in possession of the estate of Veerappa on foot of the alleged adoption, that consequently the widow Veerayya could not be said to be possessed of the estate in order to claim the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Act and since the question of who was in actual possession of the estate had not been tried by the courts below so far, it was at least necessary that a finding should be called for on that question before deciding the appeal. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Their Lordships observed that the case of the respondents was that the widow continued in possession of the estate despite the adoption because the ante-adoption agreement made a provision to that effect and that in the affidavit filed before them the second defendant had admitted that the widow was still in possession, that he was unlikely to have made such an admission against himself and that the counter affidavit of the appellant did not expressly deny this, and that if it was permissible for their "Lordships to give a finding on the materials before them, they would have held that the widow continued in actual physical possession notwithstanding the alleged adoption. But their Lordships recognised that the plaintiff-appellant had not been given an opportunity to prove his case on the question of possession and therefore they were willing to proceed to decide the question at issue on the assumption that the second defendant was in actual physical possession of the estate on 17-6-1956 when the Act came into force. Even so, they observed that the first defendant must be held to be possessed of the estate within the meaning of Section 14(1), the actual'physical possession of the second defendant being only permissive possession on her behalf.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">40. After noticing the different views expressed by the High Courts, their Lordships referred to the decision of the Patna High Court in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, (FB) and observed that the Patna High Court "............rightly pointed out that the object of the Act was to improve the legal status of Hindu women enlarging their limited interest in property inherited or held by them to an absoltue interest, provided they were in possession of the property when the Act came into force and, therefore, in a position to take advantage of its beneficial provisions but the Act was not intended to benefit alienees who with their eyes open purchased the property from the limited owners without justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when the vendors had only a limited interest of Hindu women. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the case before us, the essential question for consideration is as to how the words 'any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act' in Section 14 of the Act should be interpreted. Section 14 of the Act refers to property which was either acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and that such property should be possessed by a female Hindu. Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective, but even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no question in the present case that Veeravva acquired the property of her deceased husband before the commencement of the Act. In order that the provision of Section 14 may apply to the present case it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time the Act came into force. It was the case of the appellant that the estate of Veerappa was in actual possession of the and defendant and not Veeravva at the relevant time. On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the words 'possessed by' had a wider meaning 'than actual physical possession although physical possession may be included in the expression. In the case of (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 280, Viswanatha Sastri J. with whom Satya-narayana Rao J. agreed expressed the opinion that the word "possessed" in Section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force'.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Of course, possession referred to in Section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female but may be possession in law. The possession of a licencee, lessee or a mortgagee from the female owner or the possession of a guardian or a trustee or an agent of the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of Section 14. The word "possessed" is used in Section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in one's hands or power. It includes possession by receipt of rents and profits. The learned Judges expressed the view that even if a trespasser were in possession of the land belonging to a female owner, it might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the female owner, provided the trespasser had not perfected his title. We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges went. It is sufficient to say that 'possessed' in Section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one's hand ot power. In the case of Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samantra,, (S) , P. N. Mookherjee J. expressed his opinion as to meaning of the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu" in the following words :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The opening words 'property possessed by a female Hindu' obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act. They clearly contemplate the female's possession when the Act came into force. That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transferred, into absolute estate under this particular section, was at least in such possession, taking the word "possession" in its widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct view as to how the words 'any property possessed by a female Hindu' should be interpreted. In the present case if the adoption was invalid, the full owner of Veerappa's estate was his widow Veeravva and even if it be assumed that the 2nd defendant was in actual possession of the estate, his possession was merely permissive and Veeravva must be regarded as being in constructive possession of it through the and defendant. In this situation, at the time when the Act came, into force, the property of Veerappa must be regarded in law as being possessed by Veeravva."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is clear from the above pronouncement that the word 'possessed' in Section 14(1) is used in a broad sense and in the context means state of owning or having in one's hand or power. Applying these criteria to the allegations in the plaint in this case we are in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge that the utmost that these allegations would amount to is that the actual physical possession of items 2, 3 and 4 in the B schedule and the C Schedule and E Schedule and moveables and cash was with the and defendant, but all the same the plaint allegations proceeded on the footing that the 2nd defendant was in such possession as agent of the first defendant and accountable to her and consequently to the reversioners and that such possession would therefore be the possession of the first defendant for purposes of attracting Section 14(1) of the Act. In construing the averments in the plaint from this point of view, we have to remember that paragraphs 3 to 19 have been drafted at a time when the Act had not yet come into force and when the plaintiff only claimed the relief of appointment of receiver and rendering of account by defendants 1, 2, 3 and 5. The averments in paragraphs 3 to 19 of the plaint were certainly apt and might be assumed to be sufficient for seeking the reliefs originally claimed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">41. But when the plaintiff was met with the contention based on Section 14(1) of the Act, only the same allegations were retained and nothing new was added substantially, to avoid the effect of Section 14(1). In fact even paragraph 21 (d) is on the same lines as the original averments. Paragraph 21 (d) reads :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In the same way, all the other properties whatsoever belonging to plaintiff's father's estate, inclusive of the properties which the 2nd defendant and other defendants, who have intermeddled with plaintiff's father's estate should account for, as agents, managers, express trustees or other trustees, intermeddlers, and otherwise, and pay and deliver to the estate, have devolved in one half share on the plaintiff as full owner, and in defendants I and 4 in one-fourth share, each as a restricted estate, to be taken by paintiff on the respective deaths of defendants 1 and 4."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Since the point is important, we will briefly run over the material portions of the plaint.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">42. In paragraph 7 of the plaint dealing with the collections of the dues in respect of the Standard Aerated Water Works and Standard Engineering Works at Madras it is stated that the 2nd defendant "must render a true and correct account to the estate for all his acting under the General Power of attorney dated 11-6-1945, and account for all his misfeasance, malfeasances and non-feasances, and pay all that may be found due to it."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">43. At this stage to emphasise the point we are making we might notice the submission which Mr. Rajah Aiyar on behalf of the respondents made. He stated that assuming that a receiver had been appointed in this suit before 17-6-1956 on this and other similar averments in the plaint, the two widows could have by virtue of the passing of the Act come forward and legitimately asked for the discharge of the receiver and immediate possession of the estate just as the widow did in C. M. P. No. 5819 of 1957 in A. S. No. 423 of 1946. In our opinion Sri Rajah Aiyar is right in his submission. This is of course subject to the other questions under Section 14(2) and Section 8 which we shall be considering later. We may also bring out our point by observing that the position would be different if there had been an outright alienation by the widows in favour of strangers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">44. Now proceeding to the averments in the remaining paragraphs of the plaint, in our opinion, they are to be understood in the same way as paragraph 7. Thus for instance in paragraph 16(b) it is stated, "He (2nd defendant) has to account for and pay to the estate all the remaining sums of money, what he realised and what he omitted to realise from the surviving partners in the Standard Aerated Water Works and the Standard Engineering Works, Madras".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In paragraph 16 (f) it is stated, "He (2nd defendant) must have made not less than one lakh of rupees from the income of the landed properties. He must account to the estate of the amount with interest."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is a similar statement in paragraph 16 (g) in respect of jewels and other moveables. In paragraph 18 it is stated :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The 2nd defendant is accountable to the estate as an agent, manager, intermeddler, executor, trustee and otherwise for all his management, and mismanagement and is bound to return to it every pie he has taken out of it and deliver to it every inch of property of the estate he has taken or converted, and to make good every pie which he deliberately, fraudulently, collusively or negligently omitted to realise for the estate. He is accountable for all his commissions and omissions, and all his misfeasances, malfeasances and non-feasances and is bound to replace all that he has taken from the estate and all that he has omitted to take from others for the estate."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We have already quoted paragraph 21(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">45. We therefore hold, agreeing with the learned Subordinate Judge that subject to the ques tion of Section 14(2) and Section 8 which we shall consider, the widow, the first defendant, was in construc tive possession of the estate and was therefore pos sessed of the estate under Section 14(1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">46. Regarding the contention under Section 14(2), we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the partition deed dated 5-6-1946 does not in any way restrict the ordinary Hindu widow's estate which each of the widows would otherwise have had in the properties on that date. The document says that the first defendant Lakshmiammal should get and enjoy the A Schedule properties (plaint C Schedule properties), and cash of Rs. 28748-4-0; similarly defendant 4 was to get and enjoy the B Schedule properties thereto (plaint D Schedule properties) and cash of Rs. 28014-10-0. It says that each was to pay the public taxes due on the lands allotted to each. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The first defendant is asked to do some charities out of items 7 and 8 of the properties allotted to her. It then says that except ties of friendship there would be no other connection between the parties. It concludes with the recital that after their lives, the properties mentioned in the two schedules should go to the heirs at law. In support of the contention that there is restriction of enjoyment, reliance is placed by the learned advocate for the plaintiff, only on this last mentioned clause. But it merely states what would otherwise have happened, namely, that the property would go to the heirs according to law, namely, heirs of Muthuswami Chettiar. It is to be noted that there is no clause whatever restricting the ordinary Hindu woman's estate which the two widows would normally have.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">47. Secondly, we are also in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge that it cannot be said that the widows acquired the right to the properties only under the partition deed, for the simple reason that they had acquired the right even previously by inheritance as widows of their husband and the partition merely divided the properties allotting some to the first defendant and the rest to the fourth defendant. The word "acquired" means that prior to the acquisition, the widows could not have had any interest in the lands whatever. Though the point is simple and obvious, still it would not be out of place to refer to the decisions cited by Sri K. Rajah Aiyar in this connection. He first of all referred to Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Mypa Baee, 11 Moo Ind App 487 (PC) in support of the proposition that the possession of co-widows is the same as that of co-tenants or co-owners, and in that connection he also referred to the decision in Appalasuri v. Kannamma Nayuralu, 49 Mad LJ 479 at 485, 486 : (AIR 1926 Mad 6 at 10), indicating the incidents of a partition between co-widows. He cited some decisions to show that in a partition between co-owners there is essentially no acquisition or transfer of right, but only a release of rights and obligations and a division of rights and obligations. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus he referred to Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundirai, ILR 43 Cal 1031 : (AIR 1916 PC 104). At p. 1046 (of ILR Cal) : (at p. 107 of AIR) their Lordships of the Privy Council quote the text of Hindu law by Mitra Misra, "For partition is made of that in which proprietary right has already arisen, consequently partition cannot properly be set forth as a means of proprietary right. Indeed, what is effected by partition is only the adjustment of the proprietary right into specific shares."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">At p. 1048 (of ILR Cal) : (at p. 108 of AIR) their Lordships observed :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Partition does not give him (the member of a joint Hindu family) a title or create a title in him; it only enables him to obtain what is his own in a definite and specific form for purposes of disposition independent of the wishes of his former cosharers."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Similarly in Narasimhalu v. Someswara Rao, 1948-1 Mad LJ 150 : (AIR 1948 Mad 505), the learned Judges Patanjali Sastri and Happell JJ. observed, "The argument proceeds, in our opinion, on a misconception of the true nature of partition arrangement under which each co-owner gets a specific property in lieu of his rights in all the joint properties; that is to say each co-sharer renounces his rights in the other common properties in consideration of his getting exclusive right to and possession of specific properties in which the other co-owners renounce their fights. It is thus a renunciation of mutual rights and does not involve any transfer by one co-sharer of his interest in the properties to the others. That is why it has been held that a partition can be effected orally and without any registered instrument though it may affect immoveable properties of the value of one hundred rupees or more."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">48. This was quoted with approval in Radha Krishnayya v. Sarasamma, where Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar JJ. observed after summing up the case law :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Partition, therefore, is really a process in and by which a joint enjoyment is transferred into an enjoyment in severalty. Each one of the sharers had an antecedent title and therefore no conveyance is involved in the process as a conferment of new title is not necessary."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judges came to the above conclusion on the question whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could be availed of by a party to whom the properties had been allotted under an instrument of partition invalid for want of registration. The learned Judges answered the question in the negative on the ground that there was no transfer of properties necessary to attract Section 53-A. Mr. Rajah Aiyar referred incidentally to Income-tax Commissioner v. Smt. Indira, :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">49. We accordingly hold that Section 14(2) does not stand in the way of the defendants' reliance on Section 14(2) in this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">50. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant that under Section 8 of the Act, the plaintiff gets a half share immediately on the coming'into force of the Act (17-6-1956), and the two widows together get a half share, and each of these three persons got an absolute share, was developed in the following manner. It is enacted in Section 4(1)(a) and (b) as follows :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"4 (i). Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Jaw or any custom, or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any other law in force immediaetely before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In view of this provision, we must discard out notions of Hindu law as it stood before the Act and give full effect to the Act immediately it came into force. Section 8 already quoted says that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of Chapter II, firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the schedule and so on. The words used here are imperative and the devolution shall take place on the heirs specified in class I, in this particular case daughter and the two widows. The fact that the male Hindu, namely, Muthuswami Chettiar, died before 17-6-1956 will not affect this result. The words "dying intestate" occurring in Section 8 merely mean 'dying in a state of intestacy' and do not necessarily mean that the male Hindu should die intestate after 17-6-1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The same words "dying intestate" which occurred in the previous enactment, namely, the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act 2 of 1929) were so construed--vide among others the decision in 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173). That was a case under Act 2 of 1929 which enacted that the son's daughter, the daughter's daughter and sister and sister's son shall be entitled to rank in the order of succession next after the father's father and before the father's brother. It thus altered the mode of succession to a Hindu male. In that case the last male holder Dharam Das died in 1922 before the date of the Act leaving neither a widow nor descendants but only his mother, Mst. Chaman Devi, as heir, who took a Hindu widow's estate. But he left four sisters. Chaman Devi died in July 1936. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thereupon one of the sisters of Dharam Das instituted the suit out of which the appeal to the Privy Council arose, claiming that she and the other sisters were entitled to the estate of Dharam Das by virtue of Act 2 of 1929 in preference to her brother's collaterals who would otherwise have taken. The claim was resisted on the ground that Dharam Das had died before 21-2-1929. But the claim was upheld by the courts below and on appeal to the Privy Council on the ground that it was settled law that the succession of the reversionary heirs of the husband would open out only after the termination of the limited estate of the female heirs, in that particular case, the widowed mother Chaman Devi, and that till then the reversioners had no vested interest in the estate but had only a mere spes successionis or chance of succession and only the particular heirs who would be living on the date of the death of Chaman Devi would take. On that view of the matter the heirs in 1936 were the sisters, in preference to the collaterals.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">51. Their Lordships endorsed the view of the High Court that the words "dying intestate" were a mere description of the status of the deceased and had no reference and were not intended to have any reference to the time of the death of the Hindu male and that the expression merely meant "in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male." They further observed that to place such an interpretation on the Act was not to give retrospective effect to its provisions, the material point of time being the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the female heir (actually the mother).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">52. Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar contends that the same interpretation should be given to the words "dying intestate" in the Hindu Succession Act and that consequently the mere fact that Muthuswami Chettiar had died before 17-6-1956 would not affect Section 8 taking effect on 17-6-1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">53. The learned counsel fortified this argument by a reference to other sections in the Act such as Sections 6, 7, 22 and 26 which have specifically stated that they would apply only to cases where a male Hindu dies or lives to be Hindu male after the commencement of the Act. The learned counsel argues that the absence of similar words in Section 8 is a clear indication of Parliament not intending that Section 8 should be confined in its application to the case of a male Hindu dying on or after 17-6-1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">54. The learned counsel also laid emphasis on the fact that following Section 8, Section 10 also says the property of an intestate shall be divided among the heirs in class I of the schedule in accordance with "the rules prescribed therein, which again casts an imperative duty to divide the property among the heirs in class I immediately on the coming into force of the Act in a case like the present. The learned counsel attaches importance to the fact that Sections 8, 9 and 10 precede Section 14. He recognised that Section 14 also must be given effect to. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">He says that reconciliation must be effected between Section 8 and 10 on the one hand and Section 14 on the other and that the way to do this is to construe Section 14 so as not to abrogate Section 8 and on this interpretation Section 14(1) would mean so far as the present case is concerned that on 17-6-1956 the two widows, first defendant and fourth defendant, between them took a half share of Muthuswami Chettiar's estate absolutely (each getting a one-fourth share), as against the previous widow's estate which was all that they were having, and the plaintiff would get her half share absolutely. He urged further that to interpret Section 14 in the manner attempted by the respondents and by the lower court would shut out the reversioners, and is particular, the daughter who previous to the enactment, had at least a chance of succession.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">55. The learned counsel also stated that his interpretation of Section 8 might in some cases divest not merely the widows in respect of the half share but also in some cases a male heir, and that can be illustrated by an example. A father is under the Act only a heir in class II. The daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased son was not a heir previously. But she is a heir now under the Act in class I. Hence in a case where the last maleholder had died before 17-6-1956 and his father had inherited under the Hindu law as it stood before the Act, the Act would divest the father and give the estate to the daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. The learned counsel submitted that we should not be perturbed by such a result because divesting was not unknown under the Hindu Law before the Act, for example, in the case of adoption, the adopted son would divest the estate which had vested in the collaterals.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">56. Mr. Rajah Aiyar met the above arguments thus. It was settled law prior to the enactment of the Act that where a male Hindu died intestate leaving female heirs, in particular widows, the succession of the reversioners would open out only on the death of the female owners and the female owners themselves would have only a limited estate familiarly known in the Hindu law as a Hindu widow's estate. The very decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant on the construction of the words "dying intestate" which occurred in the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 had in fact proceeded on this principle. There was no difference of opinion on that point. The Legislature must be presumed to have had knowledge of the state of the law and with that knowledge it enacted Section 14 of the present Act, that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner, and the explanation also amplifies the meaning of the word "property" without cutting it down to a fractional portion, which would be the result if we apply Section 8 also.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, in this particular case the widows, the first and fourth defendants, were entitled to all the properties though with limited rights. But the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant applying Section 8 would cut down the extent of the property to a half of that previously possessed by them. There is no warrant in Section 14 for such a construction. On the contrary the words any property and the words "whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act" and the explanation make it clear that it was not intended to cut down the extent of the properties held by the widows. The only limitation was that they should be possessed of the properties in order to earn the benefit of Section 14, and once they are possessed of the properties on 17-6-1956 their limited right was enlarged to full ownership, and that, in respect of the entire extent of the properties and not merely a half share. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. Rajah Aiyar also criticised the argument of Sri Gopalaswami Aiyan-gar in so far as it involved divesting of estates which had previously vested, for instance, in the illustration given divesting of father by the daughter of the predeceased son of predeceased son. Mr. Rajah Aiyar urged that the statute should not be construed in such a manner unless there are compelling words and in his submission there are no such compelling words in this case. Mr. Rajah Iyer also pointed out that if Section 8 were to be applied retrospectively, in the extreme sense suggested by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, there would be no limit of time for reopening and divestiture of the estate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">57. Before proceeding to indicate the reply of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar to the submissions of Mr. Rajah Aiyar, it will be convenient to notice the decisions relied on by Mr. Rajah Aiyar, about the law as it stood before the present Act came into force, though really there was no doubt in the matter. He referred to Pokhan Dusadh v. Mt. Manna, ILR 16 Pat 215 : AIR 1937 Pat 117, a Full Bench decision of this court in Lakshmi Ammal v. Anantarama Aiyangar, ILR (1937) Mad 948 : (AIR 1937 Mad 699) (FB) and the decision of the Privy Council in 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173). Thus in 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173) which may be referred to first being the most authoritative decision, in upholding contention that the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 applied notwithstanding the death of the last male owner in 1922, it was observed :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate. Upon its termination the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived upto and died at the moment of her death, (ILR 5 Cal 776 (PC) ).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no vesting as at the date of the husband's death and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives, ILR 39 Mad 634 : (AIR 1916 PC 117). The death of a Hindu female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right is a mere possibility, or spes successionis, but this possibility is common to them all for it cannot be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Indian Law, however, permits the institution of suits in the lifetime of the female owner to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike. Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal, ILR 38 Mad 406 : .(AIR 1915 PC 124). The reversioner's rights during the lifetime of the female heir are merely of a protective character and nothing more, and whenever action is taken by the presumptive reversioner, it is in a representative capacity and on behalf of all the reversioners, and not on the footing that the person taking the action is in fact the next reversioner at the date of the suit. The decisions of Indian High Courts, on which the High Court had relied on this case, proceed on these principles and cover the precise point raised in this appeal."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">58. The same principles had been laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court and of our High Court. These two Full Bench decisions were also rendered on the same question arising under Act 2 of 1929 and the reasoning was to the same effect. Perhaps it will be useful to quote the following passage from, ILR (1937) Mad 948 at p. 959 = (AIR 1937 Mad 699 at p. 700) (FB).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The position of a Hindu widow or other female heir is an anomalous one, for although she is said to possess a qualified interest, she can in certain circumstances alienate the entire estate. That she is thus in one sense the heir of the last male holder, cannot be disputed. Referring to the widow their Lordships say that what she holds is 'an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband'. ILR 5 Cal 776 (PC).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The persons described here as the heirs of the last male holder are the reversioners, whose interest, so long as the female holder is alive, is only contingent differentiated little, if at all, from a spes successionis" ILR 39 Mad 634 : (AIR 1916 PC 117).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The relevance of this passage for our purpose will be mentioned later.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">59-60. In his reply to the submission of Mr. Rajah Aiyar, Mr. R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar naturally conceded that the settled law before the Act was that succession of that reversionary heirs would open out only on the death of the limited female owner, but he urged that on a true construction of Sections 4, 8, 10 and 14 of the present Act, the widow's estate came to an end on the coming into force of the Act and at the same time let in the other heirs specified in class I of the schedule under Section 8 in this particular case the daughter. He urged that Section 14 while enlarging the nature of the widow's right into one of full ownership, at the same time, cut down the quantum of her estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">He also stated that while Section 8 would have to be construed retrospectively in the sense that the mere fact of the male Hindu having died intestate prior to the Act need not stand in the way of the application of Section 8, for example, in this particular case, still on further consideration, he was not prepared to go to the extent which he had originally done, namely, that the logical extension of his argument might be to divest estates already vested, for being divested, for example, in the illustrations the father (F), being divested by the daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased son (SSD). So far as that illustration was concerned, he stated that there would not be such divesting and the reason he put forth for that was that on the father (F) succeeding to the last male holder (M) he (F) himself became a fresh stock of descent and the property could no longer be said to be that of (M) for the purpose of applicability of Section 8. He thus made a distinction between the case where a male heir had taken and a case where a female heir had taken.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">61. We feel that the argument of Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar cannot be accepted. When the present Act was enacted, Parliament fully knew that the reversionary heirs would only succeed on the death of the last female holder and that the female owners themselves were only limited owners, and with full knowledge of this situation, it enacted in Section 14 that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as, full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Words of widest amplitude are used here and that is made clearer by the explanation. The normal and natural interpretation of these words as applied to the present case would mean that the properties possessed by the two widows, namely, the first and fourth defendants, which had been acquired by them as heirs by inheritance from their husband Muthuswami Chettiar, shall be held by them from the date of the commencement of the Act as full owner and not as limited owners as before. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no justification in the language of the section for cutting down the extent of the properties thus held by them to a. half share as contended by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar. The words used are "any property" which would take in the entire extent. The further words "whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act" would also take in all the properties inherited by them from their husband, and are inconsistent with the suggestion that the Act put an end to the previously existing title of the widows and created a fresh title by cutting down the quantum of that estate into a half and enlarging the nature of the estate to full ownership. There are no words at all in Section 14 to indicate such an intention. We would really have to rewrite the section in a drastic manner to give effect to such a contention.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">62. We need not be alarmed by this, because as pointed out by Ramaswami and Subramaniam JJ. in Marudakkal v. Arumugha Gounder, 1958-1 Mad LJ 101 : (AIR 1958 Mad 255), and by the Supreme Court in the object of the Act was to improve the legal-status of Hindu women enlarging their limited interest in the property inherited, provided they were in possession of the property when the Act came into force. As pointed out by Ramaswami and Subramaniam JJ. in 1958-1 Mad LJ 101 : (AIR 1958 Mad 255), this is consistent with modern ideas that women are equal in status with men.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">63. The view of Section 14 taken by us is in accordance with the principle that really succession to the estate of Muthuswami Chettiar had already taken place on his death when the widows took his properties and the Act should not normally be construed as intending to reopen succession which had already taken place. It is to emphasise this idea we quoted the passage from ILR (1937) Mad 948 : (AIR 1937 Mad 699) (FB); "That she is thus in one sense the heir of the last male holder, cannot be disputed." and that it is only the succession of the reversionary heirs which is postponed till the termination of the estate of the limited female owner. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It may also be remembered that succession can never be in abeyance in Hindu law just as in any other system of law. It may be noted that even Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar concedes in his final reply that in the illustration given the father F who took before 17th June, 1956, could not be divested by the daughter of the predeceased son of predeceased son (SSD) by virtue of Section 8 of the Act. He put it on the ground that succession had already opened and the father F had become a fresh, stock of descent. On the same reasoning it can be said that in this case also, succession to Muthuswami Chettiar's estate had opened on his death when the widows took it, though in a different sense succession of the reversionary heirs had not yet opened out and it is at this stage the Legislature steps in and enacts Section 14 enlarging the limited interest to full ownership.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We do not see why full effect should not be given to the words used in Section 14. This does not involve any conflict with the main reasoning of the decisions in ILR (1937) Mad 948 : (AIR 1937 Mad 699) (FB) and 1946-2 Mad LJ 290 : (AIR 1946 PC 173), because there the question of succession under Act 2 of 1929 arose at a much later stage after the termination of limited female owner's estate under the old Hindu law, but the question here Under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 arises at an anterior stage, namely, as to what is to happen to the estate of the limited female owner herself. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Again this interpretation of ours is consistent with the settled rule that in the interpretation of statutes there should be as little interference with existing interests as possible. From this point of view, it seems to us that nothing turns on the fact that express words are used in Sections 6, 7, 22 and 25 stating that they would apply only where the male Hindu dies or lives to be a Hindu male after the commencement of the Act. Nor can any support be derived from Section 4 because the question would again be only of construction of Sections 8 and 14. The mere fact that Sections 8, 9 and 10 precede Section 14 seems to us to be irrelevant in construing Section 14.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">64. We shall now discuss the cases relied on or referred to by either side. It will be convenient to discuss them High Court by High Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">65. Taking the Allahabad High Court, the learned counsel for the appellant relies on Triveni Devi v. Sharada Devi, . In that case one Ragunath Prasad died on Ist April 1956, leaving him surviving his widow and four daughters. He left an amount of Rs. 7200/- and odd in the savings bank. The widow applied for a succession certificate in her own name. Because three of the daughters were minors a conditional certificate was issued by the learned District Judge stating that she would be entitled to deal with the money only with the permission of the Court. She filed an application for review on the ground that the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act had not been brought to the notice of the learned District Judge and that she was entitled to the certificate without any condition. The learned District Judge repelled this plea on the ground that Section 8 of the Act applied and that the daughters also were entitled to a share in the money along with the widow. The widow filed a revision to the High Court. Roy, J., upheld the decision of the learned District Judge. There is no detailed discussion by the learned Judge, and we are unable to see how he got over the plain language of Section 14(1). With respect, we think the decision was wrong.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">66. For his part, Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, relied on the decision in Janak Dulari v. Dist. Judge </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Kanpur, In that case certain</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">zamindari property of the last male owner Maheshilal was taken over and compensation amout of Rs. 21000/- was awarded. The daughter Janak Dulari was paid by the Court only Rs. 10,000/-and the rest was retained in the Court of the District Judge because she was only a limited owner. Later when the Hindu Succession Act was passed, she applied for the remainder also, claiming an absolute right Under Section 14(1). The learned District Judge thought that her claim was justified but that a separate suit should be filed. Against that order a writ petition was filed in the High Court. Bhargava, J., set aside the order of the District Judge and directed the balance of the money also to be paid to the daughter pointing out that Section 14(1) gave her an absolute right to the entire compensation amount. Section 14(2) was pressed into service against her on the ground that it was by the prior order of the Court she had been directed to be paid only Rs. 10000/-. It was held that Section 14(2) would not apply and that she did not acquire the right to the compensation amount by virtue of the prior order but by inheritance as heir to her father. It was further observed that it was not necessary to file a separate suit. We respectfully agree with the reasoning in this decision.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">67. Turning to the Andhra Pradesh High Court Sri Rajah Aiyar cited Sankara Rao v. Rajyalakshmamma, . In that case one Venkatasiva Rao died on 7-6-1956 leaving his widow Rajyalakshmamma and an adopted son, the plaintiff in the suit. The suit for partition was instituted on 17th July, 1956. The plaintiff claimed a three-fourth share in the properties. The basis of this claim was that because the widow had not asked for partition of her husband's share she was not entitled to that share under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and she acquired the right only Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that under that provision, the plaintiff was also entitled to a share as a simultaneous heir along with her and therefore the widow was entitled only to a one-fourth share and the plaintiff was entitled to the remaining three-fourth share. This contention was repelled by Umamaheswaram, J. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judge pointed out that she acquired the share of her husband under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, and that it became enlarged to full ownership Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and that a partition would merely work out the right and the absence of specific partition would not defeat that right. Sri Rajah Aiyar relied on this observation in support of his contention that in the case before us the widows did not acquire their right under the partition deed dated 5-6-1956 but were only working out the prior right they had. We agree with Umamaheswaram, J.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">68. Turning to the Calcutta High Court Sri Rajah Aiyar cited Billabasini v. Dulal Chandra, . There one Debendranath Datta, the last male owner died on 8-12-1947 leaving behind him as his heirs his widow, Billabasini, four sons and two daughters. In the partition suit which was instituted, a preliminary decree was passed on 21-12-1954 giving a fifth share to the widow to be enjoyed by her as a Hindu widow in the manner prescribed by the Hindu law. After the Hindu Succession Act came into force she made an application claiming that she was entitled to hold the share allotted to her as full owner and prayed for directions to the Commissioner to that effect. Bechawat, J., allowed the claim observing that the widow had been allotted her share under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the nature of her interest was enlarged to full ownership Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. He pointed out that it was wrong to suggest that she acquired her share under the preliminary decree, because the preliminary decree only recognised her antecedent title which she had acquired by inheritance. We respectfully agree.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">69. The decision in Krishna Dasi v. Akhil Ch. Shah, which followed Billibasini v. Dulal Chandra, held that the possession of the Receiver would constitute possession of the mother of the last male-holder for purposes of Section 14(1) so as to enlarge her interest to full ownership. We respectfully agree.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">70. Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bepin Behary v. Sm. Lakshasona Dassi, in support of his contention that the first and fourth defendants in this case acquired the pro perties in their possession only under the partition deed. The facts of that case necessary for our purpose are these. In a partition suit concerning certain estate one Madan Mohan Malik was award ed a one-seventh share by a preliminary decree dated 1-4-1938. He died on 2-8-1948 leaving him surviving a widow, three sons and four daughters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On 19-7-1954 Sarkar, J., made an order directing a further division of the one seventh share among the three sons and the widow, each being given a one-fourth share. The direction concerning the share of the widow Rati Manjari Dasi was :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The share of Rati Manjari Dasi being held and enjoyed by her as a Hindu widow during the term of her natural life as prescribed in Hindu, law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Rati Manjari Dasi died on 1-6-1958 and it became necessary to bring on record her legal representatives in certain proceedings. It was sought to bring on record the three sons and four daughters. But that application was opposed by one of the sons Dinnath Mallick.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The contention of Sri T. P. Das, learned counsel on his behalf, was that the one-fourth share of Rati Manjari Dasi had been given only in lieu of maintenance and in fact had come out of the shares of the sons, who alone had inherited the estate of Madan Mohan Mallick and that, on the death of Rati Manjari Dasi, her share went back to where it had come from, namely, to the sons, and the daughters would have no place. This contention was rejected by the learnSd Judges, Chakravarti, C. J. and Lahiri, J., on the ground that Rati Manjari Dasi had really inherited the share of her husband under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 though it was not clear whether Sarkar, J., had that Act in his mind. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judges observed that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 did not permit the raising of the contention that the share acquired by the widow under that Act was in lieu of maintenance and should go back to the sons. The question then arose as to how the position was altered by virtue of the Hindu Succession Act. In answer to the contention that Rati Manjari Dasi's estate became enlarged to that of full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) it was urged by Mr. T. P. Das the learned counsel that Section 14(2) of the Act applied, the contention being that she got her properties by the final decree in the partition suit, namely, the order of Sarkar, J., dated 19-7-1954 and that if Section 14(2) applied, the old orthodox Hindu law would apply and not Section 8 which would be only prospective in operation and under the Hindu law the contention was that the property should go back to the sons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Regarding this contention, the learned Judges felt a doubt whether Rati Manjari Dasi could be said to have been possessed of the estate Under Section 14(1) but thought it was not necessary to decide whether Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) applied, because in either case the daughters would also be entitled to be brought on record. The reasoning was that if Section 14(1) applied, Rati Manjari Dasi became the full owner and the daughters also would be her heirs besides the sons (Under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act). If, however, Section 14(1) did not apply and Section 14(2) applied it affected only the operation of sub-section (i) but otherwise the law applicable would not be affected. The position was that Rati Manjari Dasi got either a Hindu widow's estate under the order of Sarkar, J., or a Hindu woman's estate under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and in either case devolution of the estate would take place on her death to the heirs of her husband as by the time of the death of Rati Manjari Dasi, the Hindu Succession Act had come into force, Section 8 would apply letting in the daughters also as heirs along with the sons. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judges pointed out that this would not be giving retrospective effect to Section 8. We are in agreement with the reasoning in part, but we feel that Rati Manjari Dasi could well be said to have been possessed of her one-fourth share of the one-seventh share of her husband for purposes of Section 14(1) and that her estate became enlarged to full ownership by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that consequently on her death, Under Section 15 of the Act, the daughters also would be heirs along with the sons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">71. The learned counsel for the appellant tries to press that portion of the decision in paragraphs, 14 and 16 where the learned Judges expressed a doubt whether in view of the fact that Rati Manjari Dasi's one-fourth share in the one-seventh share of her husband was given by a final decree dated 19-7-1954, the application of Section 14(2) could be avoided on the reasoning that the final decree only recognised her antecedent right under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The learned Judges said that it might plausibly be urged that such reasoning might apply to the preliminary decree but not to the final decree. With respect we are unable to agree with this part of the decision. In our opinion this doubt is not justified and even in respect of the final decree it could be said that it only recognised the antecedent right of the widow. It will be seen that the learned Judges did not express any final opinion on the point.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">72. The next decision of the Calcutta High Court which Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar relied on was Jaria Devi v. Shyam Sundar, . That decision is a short one and runs thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"This rule raises a short question. It is directed against the order of the learned District Judge, Jagonkuri, in Misc. Judicial Case No. 21 or 1956 Under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, whereby the learned District Judge has refused the petitioner's prayer for payment to her of a moiety share of the award of Rs. 2400 on account of compensation of a masonry wall which had been deposited by the Collector in Court under the said provision of law. The petitioner claims payment on the ground inter alia, that, whatever might have been the position before the new Hindu Succession Act of 1956, Under Section 14(1) of that Act her interest in that money is no longer the limited interest of a Hindu widow but has become the absolute interest making her the absolute owner thereof. The question is whether the case would come Under Section 14(1) or would be governed by the exception thereto as enacted in the next sub-section.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The petitioner Jari Devi claims title to the money as the heiress of her husband who was one of the lour coparceners of the particular family owning, inter alia, the acquired property and urges that, under a deed of partition, she had been allotted a moiety share of the property along with the others in lieu of her admitted one-fourth share in the joint properties. She contends that in the circumstances, her limited interest as a Hindu widow in the properties allotted to her as aforesaid must be held to have been transformed into an absolute interest Under Section 14(1) of the new Hindu Succession Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If this had been a simple case of partition, allotting properties to the parties in proportion to their respective admitted shares, the petitioner's contention might have been correct. But where, as here the widow co-sharer has been allotted properties not strictly according to her share, under a deed which is described as a deed of partition, but which in reality is a deed of family arrangement, not allotting properties to the widow strictly in accordance with any admitted share but by way of family arrangement, expressly stipulating that the widow will have no more than a life interest therein, the case would, in our opinion, fall within the exception, Section 14(2), and not within the general rule enacted in Section 14(1) of the Act. The petitioner's title to the acquired property is really founded on the above deed and not on any admitted share of inheritance. In this view, we affirm the order of the learned District Judge and discharge this rule, though in the circumstances we would make no order as to costs."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">73. It seems to us that the above decision will not afford any assistance to the appellant on the question of Section 14(2) in the case before us, because that decision was given on the particular facts of that case and was resisted on the ground that the widow had been given more than the one-fourth share to which she was entitled. Actually we feel a doubt whether it could not have been a case of her being allotted a half share of the particular property alone in lieu of her admitted one-fourth share of all the family properties and, in that sense, whether it could be said she was given any larger share than she was entitled to. If our doubt is justified we would have to differ from the opinion of the learned Judges.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">74. Turning to the Mysore High Court, two decisions were brought to our notice. The first was Appa Saheb v. Gurubasawwa, AIR 1960 Mys 79. There one Basappa died in 1944. His wife (the plaintiff) adopted the first defendant on 3-8-1945. She filed the suit before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 claiming a half share against her adopted son. The defence was that she was unchaste and therefore forfeited her share. There was finding of unchastity by the Courts below but still the suit was decreed apparently on the ground that she had a right under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, notwithstanding unchastity. On appeal by the first defendant it was held by the High Court following the view of the Madras High Court that the rule of Hindu law ousting a widow on account of unchastity was still left untouched by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, the effect of which was merely to give her a half share where previously she had none, that consequently even in 1944, on her husband's death she was not entitled to any interest in her husband's property and therefore, Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, would not help her either to get her half share. We agree with the decision on the facts of that case, but it will not help either side in this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">75. The other decision of the Mysore High Court was Ramappa v. Chandangouda, AIR 1960 Mys 260. In that case one Hanamgouda's widow sold her husband's properties to the first defendant. She remarried in 1948. Thereupon the plaintiff reversioner brought a suit for recovery of possession. It was dismissed by the trial Court but decreed by the first appellate Court which found that there was legal necessity. In the second appeal by the alienee to the High Court, it was contended that the sister of Hanamgouda was the nearer heir than the plaintiff. This contention was met by the answer that the property involved in the suit was watan property and in respect of that the plaintiff, a male member, was the preferential heir. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This was the position before the Hindu Succession Act. But it wa,s contended in the High Court that Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act abolished that distinction between watan property and other property, and Under Section 8. of the Hindu Succession Act, the sister would be nearer heir than the plaintiff. The learned Judge repelled this contention observing that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act were not retrospective in their operation and Succession had already opened in 1948 on the remarriage of the widow and had vested in the plaintiff under the Law as it stood then, and that the estate so vested could not be divested by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. We agree. In his final reply Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar himself conceded, that in such a case Section 8 would not apply.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">76. Turning to the Patna High Court, there is the decision in Lateswar Jha v. Uma Ojhain, , on which Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar initially relied for his contention under Section 8 of the Act without knowing that the learned Judge himself (Rajkishore Prasad, J.,) reversed his opinion on that point in a later decision Ramgulam v. Palakdhari Singh, . The following pedigree will help to understand the facts of .</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"> BABUJI JHA (died)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"> Ramdhari Jha (Died) Bachan Jha (Died)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"> Deft.1 Deft.2 Deft.3 Deft.8 Deft.9 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It will be seen that one Babuji Jha died leaving two sons Ramdhari Jha and Bachan Jha. The plaintiff was the son of Ramdhari Jha. He brought a suit for partition. He was of course entitled to a half share of the entire estate. But the controversy in the High Court was confined to the remaining half share of the second branch. It will be seen that the son Bachan Jha died leaving his three sons, defendants 1, 2 and 3, and two widowed daughters-in-law, namely, defendants 8 and 9. The two widows claimed that their husbands had died in a state of separation, and each was entitled to a fifth share in the half share of that branch. The trial judge found that their husbands had nqt died in a state of separation but however held that they were entitled to the shares claimed by them under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, the finding being that their husbands had died after that Act came into force in 1938 and 1948 respectively.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The controversy in the appeal by defendants 1, 2 and 3 before the High Court related to the one-fifth share in the half share awarded to the widow, defendant 8, defendant 9 having compromised the matter. The appellants contended that the husband of defendant 8 had died in 1932 itself. But the learned Judge of the High Court agreed with the finding of the trial judge on that point, that he died only in 1938, and it followed that she was entitled to the same share as her husband under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 though of course it was only a limited widow's estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judge pointed out that with the passing of the Hindu Succession Act that limited ownership became enlarged to full ownership Under Section 14(1) (though the suit itself had been instituted before the Hindu Succession Act had come into force). The learned Judge did not however stop there, but accepted the further contention put forward on behalf of defendant 8 that even if her husband had died before the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, she was entitled to inherit the share of her husband by virtue of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there being no other simultaneous class I heir. Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar relied on the latter part of this decision. But in the later decision , Rajkishore Prasad, J., sitting with Sinha, J., pointed out that this latter part of the decision was wrong and that Section 8 was not retrospective. When this latter decision was pointed out, Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar fairly stated that be could not rely on the earlier decision.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">77. The facts in , were these. The last maleholder Rajendra Singh died in 1931, leaving as his heir only his grandmother Mst. Ari Kuer, the thirteeth defendant in the suit. In 1951 she executed two sale deeds in favour of defendants 2, 3, and 4. The suit was brought by the plaintiffs claiming to be the nearest reversioners of Rajendra Singh in 1951 for a declaration that the alienations were without legal necessity and were nominal. The trial judge found that the sale deeds were neither genuine nor were acted upon and there was in fact no legal necessity or consideration. The declaration prayed for was therefore granted. During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the defendants in the High Court the Hindu Succession Act had come into force. The appellants contended that Section 14 had become a complete defence to the plaintiffs' suit. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Judges repelled this contention pointing out that Section 14 was not intended to enlarge the estate of the alienees. Thereupon the appellants relied upon the Supreme Court decision in and urged that on the findings of the trial judge that the sale deeds were not acted upon at all and were nominal, Mst. Ari Kuer must still be deemed to be possessed of the properties for the purposes of Section 14(1) of the Act. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This submission was also repelled and in doing so the learned Judge distinguished the Supreme Court decision emphasising the difference between a transaction which is void and a transaction which is voidable at the instance of the reversioners and they pointed out that in the Supreme Court decision, the adoption was assumed to be void ab initio and therefore destitute of any legal effect and that was why the actual possession of the adopted son was held to be permissive on behalf of Veeravva. But in the case before the learned Judges the sale deeds executed by Mst. Ari Kuer could not be said to be void but were good against Mst. Ari Kuer herself and even the reversioners might eventually elect to abide by it. We agree with this decision. But of course Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar does not tely on it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">78. Another decision considered and endorsed as correct in is the decision in Jamuna v. Ramanup Singh, . It is justified on the ground that there was no actual transfer of possession from the widow to the alience and that therefore Section 14(1) was properly applied. We do not think it necessary to discuss it further. Similarly in the decision of the Patna High Court in Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, , also there is a discussion of the scope of the word "possessed" in Section 14(1). In view of the Supreme Court decision we do not think it necessary to discuss that case either in detail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">79. Turning to the Punjab High Court Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar referred to the decision in Benso v. Charan Singh, . There the widow of the last maleholder, Banta Singh, executed a registered gift of the properties in favour of the daughters. The plaintiffs, fifth degree collaterals, brought a suit for a declaration that the gift was invalid so far as it related to the ancestral property. The declaration was given. On appeal by the defendants it was urged that the distinction between the ancestral and non-ancestral property which was material under the customary law of Punjab before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, became immaterial with the passing of the Act and Under Section 8 of that Act, the daughters, would be nearer heirs being class I heirs and the plaintiffs would only be class III heirs being the agnates of the deceased and in that sense their chance of succession to the estate, if and when succession opened out on the death of the widow, would be very remote. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This contention was accepted and it was pointed out that it was within the discretion of the Court to make or refuse to make a declaration in such a suit and in that particular case they said they were not prepared to make the declaration because the chance of succession of the plaintiffs would be very remote. On that particular facts of that case the refusal to exercise the discretion may be right but that does not assist the appellant in this case. Similarly the decisions in Mt. Taro v. Darshan Singh, and Gurdas v. Mt. Prito, are not really useful for our purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">80. In the result, we hold agreeing with the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff's suit must fail because of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, even taking the plaint allegations to be true. The dismissal of the suit was therefore justified, but we do not think that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in asking the plaintiff to bear the costs of the contesting defendants when the dismissal of the suit was based on a ground which arose subsequent to the institution of the plaint and when the original allegations had not been tried. The proper order to make was to direct the parties to bear their own costs and we feel that the same direction should be made for the costs in the appeal, particularly when the question raised is agitated for the first time in this Court. Accordingly, while dismissing the appeal we direct the parties to bear their own costs in both the Courts. </span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-628204880550739682020-01-27T17:22:00.003+05:302020-01-27T17:22:46.475+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">SATRUGHAN <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>ISSER VS. SMT. SUBUJPARI<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 04.08.1966</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Musamat Chando Kuer, widow of Babuji, instituted a suit on April 23, 1949 in the Court of the Sabordinate Judge, Darbhanga, against the collaterals of her husband for a decree for partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties described in Schedules A to E and a fourth share in Sch. F annexed to the plaint. It was the case of Chando Kuer that her husband Babuji separated in 1934 from the coparcenary of which he was a member, and on his death on October 28, 1937 his share in the family property devolved upon her, but the defendants failed and neglected to divide the estate and deliver to her the share inherited by her. The suit was resisted by the collaterals of Babuji. Chando Kuer died on March 9, 1951, and her daughters Subujpari and Sujan Devi (hereinafter collectively called 'the appellants') were brought on the record of the suit as her heirs and legal representatives.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The plea of separation of Babuji from the coparcenary in 1934 was not established, and that the interest of Babuji in the copercenary property devolved upon the surviving coparceners, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. In appeal, the High Court of Judicature at Patna, granted a decree for possession of a share in the property as at the date of the suit. The held that on the death of Babuji on October 28, 1937, Chando Kuer by virtue of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, IS of 1937, acquired in the property of the coparcenary the same interest which Babuji had, and by the institution of the suit for partition that interest became defined, and oil her death it devolved upon the appellants as heirs to the estate of Babuji. With certificate granted by the High Court, Satrughan the son of Ghiran has appealed to this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, on the death of a coparcener his individual interest in the coparcenary property devolves by survivorship upon the remaining coparceners, and his widow if any is entitled to maintenance only out of the property. But the Parliament enacted Act 18 of 1937 which sought to invest the widow in a family governed by the Mitakshara law with the same interest which her husband had in the family estate at the time of his death, and also with the right to obtain by partition separate possession other interest<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation & Judgement of Court :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">On the finding recorded by the Trial Court which was not challenged in appeal before the High Court, Babuji did not separate in 1934 from the other coparceners. But he died in October 1937 and by the operation of Act 18 of 1937 as modified by Bihar Act 6 of 1942 Chando Kuer was invested with her husband's interest in the coparcenary property agricultural as well as non-agricultural. When she instituted a suit for partition that interest became de- fined, and vested in her free from all claims or rights of the coparceners of her husband. The right of the coparceners to take that interest by survivorship on Chando Kuer's death was then extinguished. On her death, even though the interest was not separated by metes and bounds, and was not in her exclusive possession it still devolved upon the nearest heirs of her husband, her daughters. The suit was therefore rightly decreed by the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA</span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">SATRUGHAN ISSER VS. SMT. SUBUJPARI <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 04.08.1966</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR 272, 1967 SCR (1) 7<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author : S C.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench : Shah, J.C.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITIONER : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SATRUGHAN ISSER</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RESPONDENT : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SMT.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SUBUJPARI & OTHERS</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATE OF JUDGMENT : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">04/08/1966</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BENCH : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SHAH, J.C.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BENCH : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SHAH, J.C. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">WANCHOO, K.N. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">BACHAWAT, R.S.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT :</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 939 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 28, 1958 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 458 of 1951.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Sarjoo Prasad, Indu Shekhar Prasad Sinha, B. P. Singh. Anil Kumar Sablok and U. P. Singh, for the appellant. N.C. Chatterjee and D. Goburdhun, or respondents Nos.1 and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. R. B. Datar, Vineet Kumar and K. R. Chaudhury, for the respondent No. 9.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Musamat Chando Kuer, widow of Babuji, instituted a suit on April 23, 1949 in the Court of the Sabordinate Judge, Darbhanga, against the collaterals of her husband for a decree for partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties described in Schedules A to E and a fourth share in Sch. F annexed to the plaint. It was the case of Chando Kuer that her husband Babuji separated in 1934 from the coparcenary of which he was a member, and on his death on October 28, 1937 his share in the family property devolved upon her, but the defendants failed and neglected to divide the estate and deliver to her the share inherited by her. The suit was resisted by the collaterals of Babuji. Chando Kuer died on March 9, 1951, and her daughters Subujpari and Sujan Devi (hereinafter collectively called 'the appellants') were brought on the record of the suit as her heirs and legal representatives.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Being of the opinion that the plea of separation of Babuji from the coparcenary in 1934 was not established, and that the interest of Babuji in the copercenary property devolved upon the surviving coparceners, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. In appeal, the High Court of Judicature at Patna, granted a decree for possession of a share in the property as at the date of the suit. The held that on the death of Babuji on October 28, 1937, Chando Kuer by virtue of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, IS of 1937, acquired in the property of the coparcenary the same interest which Babuji had, and by the institution of the suit for partition that interest became defined, and oil her death it devolved upon the appellants as heirs to the estate of Babuji. With certificate granted by the High Court, Satrughan the son of Ghiran has appealed to this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, on the death of a coparcener his individual interest in the coparcenary property devolves by survivorship upon the remaining coparceners, and his widow if any is entitled to maintenance only out of the property. But the Parliament enacted Act 18 of 1937 which sought to invest the widow in a family governed by the Mitakshara law with the same interest which her husband had in the family estate at the time of his death, and also with the right to obtain by partition separate possession other interest. Section 3 of Act 18 of 1937 as amended by Act 1 1 of 1938 insofar as it is material in this appeal) is:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"3. (1) (2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), have the same interest as he himself had.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited M14Sup. CI/66---2 interest known as a Hindu Woman's estate, pro- vided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This Act did not operate to regulate succession to agricultural lands in the Provinces,but the Province of Bihar enacted Act VI of 1942 extending the operation of Act 18 of 1937 to agricultural lands in Bihar with retrospective effect from April 14, 1937.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Act seeks to make fundamental changes in the concept of a coparcenary and the rights of members of the family in coparcenary property. The Hindu law, as laboriously developed by the Anglo-Indian Courts in the light of certain basic concepts expounded by the ancient law givers, had acquired a degree of consistency and symmetry. The Act in investing the widow of a member of a coparcenary with the interest which the member had at the time of his death has introduced changes which are alien to the structure of a coparcenary. The interest of the widow arises not by inheritance nor by survivorship, but by statutory substitution: Lakshmi Perumallu v. Krishnavenamma(1). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Her interest in the property is the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate: but the Act gives her the same power to claim partition as a male owner has. The Act is however silent about the mode of devolution of the property obtained on partition, on termination of her estate, about the rights of the surviving coparceners qua the interest vested in the widow, about the rights of the widow qua the interest of the surviving coparceners, and about several other matters. To resolve the problem raised before us, we may in the first instance refer to the principal characteristics of a Hindu coparcenary and of the limited estate held by Hindu females known as a Hindu woman's estate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">A Hindu coparcenary under the Mitakshara school consists of males alone: it includes only those members who acquire by birth or adoption interest in the coparcenary property. The essence of coparcenary property is unity of ownership which is vested in the whole body of coparceners. While it remains joint, no individual member can predicate of the undivided property that he has a definite share therein. The interest of each coparcener is fluctuating, capable of being enlarged by deaths, and liable to be diminished by the birth of sons to coparceners: it is only on partition that the coparcener can claim that he has become entitled to a definite share. The two principal incidents of coparcenary property are: that the interest of coparceners devolves by survivorship and not by inheritance; and that the male issue of a coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property by birth, not as representing his father but in his own independent right acquired by birth.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 26.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Property inherited by a Hindu female who has entered the gotra of the deceased owner by marriage acquires according to all schools of Hindu law a widow's estate or a Hindu woman's estate. In that estate her right is of an owner and not that of a tenant-for-life: the property is vested in her and she represents it completely: so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the property held by her. Her rights of alienation are however restricted: she may alienate the corpus of the property only for purposes of legal necessity or benefit of the estate. The limited estate of a Hindu female postulates ownership in the property held by her subject to restrictions on her power of alienation and devolution of that property on extinction of the estate of the female on the heirs of the last full owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">By the Act certain antithetical concepts are sought to be reconciled. A widow of a coparcener is invested by the Act with the same interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the property of the coparcenary. She is thereby introduced into the coparcenary, and between the surviving coparceners of her husband and the widow so introduced, there arises community of interest and unity of possession. But the widow does not on that account become a coparcener: though invested with the same interest which her husband had in the property she does not acquire the right which her husband could have exercised over the interest of the other coparceners. Because of statutory substitution of her interest in the coparcenary property in place of her husband, the right which the other coparceners had under the Hindu law of the Mitakshara school of taking that interest by the rule of survivorship remains suspended so long as that estate enures. But on the death of a coparcener there is no dissolution of the Coparcenary so as to carve out a defined interest in favour of the widow in the coparcenary property: Lakshmi Perumallu v. Krishnavenamma.(1) The interest acquired by her under s. 3(2) is subject to the restrictions on alienation which are inherent in her estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">She has still power to make her interest definite by making a demand for partition, as a male owner may. If the widow after being introduced into family to which her husband belonged does not seek partition, on the termination of her estate her interest will merge into the coparcenary property. But if she claims partition, she is severed from the other members and her interest becomes a defined interest in the coparcenary property, and the right of the other coparceners to take that interest by survivorship will stand extinguished. If she dies after partition or her estate is otherwise determined, the interest in coparcenary property which has vested in her will devolve upon the heirs of her husband. It is true that a widow obtaining, an interest in coparcenary property by s. 3(2) does not inherit that interest but once her interest has ceased to have the character of (1) [1965] 1. S.C.R. 26. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">undivided interest in the property, it will upon termination of her estate devolve upon her husband's heirs. To assume as has been done in some decided cases that the right of the coparceners to take her interest on determination of the widow's interest survives even after the interest has become definite, because of a claim for partition, is to denude the right to claim partition of all reality.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Counsel for the appellant contended that the right vested in the surviving coparceners to take the interest vested in the widow enures so long as the widow does not, by suit or by private arrangement reduce her interest in the property of the coparcenary to exclusive possession. He submitted that the expression "partition" in S. 3(3) means not merely severance of status, but division of interest by metes and bounds followed by assumption of exclusive possession by the widow. There is no warrant for this submission. The widow acquires by statute the same right to claim partition which a male owner has, and as pointed out by the Judicial Com- mittee of the Privy Council in Giria Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj and Others(1):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"In Hindu law, "partition" does not mean division of property into specific shares; it covers........... both division of title and division of property. In the Mitakshara, Vijnaneswara defines the word "vibhaga", which is usually rendered into English by the word "partition", as the "adjustment of divers rights regarding the whole by distributing them 'In particular portions of the aggregate." Mitra Misra explains in the Viromitrodaya the meaning of this passage: he shows that the definition of Vijnaneswara does not mean exclusively the division of property into specific shares as alone giving right to pro- perty, but includes the ascertainment of the respective rights of the individuals, who claim the heritage jointly. He says (Sarkar's translation, ch. I., s. 36); "For partition is made of that in which proprietary right has already arisen, consequently partition cannot property be set forth as a means of proprietary right. Indeed, what is effected by partition is only the adjustment of the proprietary right into specific shares".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This right to claim partition which a male owner may exercise is conferred upon a Hindu widow by s. 3(3). On the making of a claim for partition the interest of the widow gets defined. The right which the widow may claim is not different from the right which her husband could claim if he had been alive, therefore the right of the coparceners to take the joint property by survivorship on the death of a coparcener does not survive a demand for partition by the widow in the coparcenary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The interest which a widow acquires under s. 3(2) of Act 18 of 1937 has no analogy with the interest which a female member of a Hindu joint family acquires in the property of the joint family allotted to her on partition between her sons or grandsons. It is true, as observed in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi and Others(1) that under Mitakshara law when the family estate in a Hindu joint family is divided a wife or mother is entitled to a share, but is not recognized as the owner of such share until the division of the property is actually made, as she has no pre-existing rights in the estate save a right of maintenance. If she dies before the property is divided, her share in the property falls back into the property from which it was carved out. But a Hindu widow acquires under s. 3(2), even before division of the property, an interest in property and that interest gets defined as soon as an unequivocal demand for partition is made by her. The dictum of the Madras High Court in Movva Subba Rao and Another v. Movva Krishna Prasadam and Anr(2) that the widow's interest is a personal interest and comes to an end on her death cannot be regarded as a correct statement of the law. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The view expressed by the Nagpur High Court in Shamrao Bhagvantrao v. Kashibai and others(3) that "the right of a widow to obtain her share in the joint family property (even after a suit for partition is filed by the widow) under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act is a special one. It comes to an end with the widow, when her death occurs during the pendency of a suit (filed by her). The cause of action is not extended to her legal representatives" and the observations made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bhagabai v. Bhaiyalal Others(4) that "the property obtained by a widow of a deceased coparcener after a suit for partition does not become the separate property of her deceased husband and on her death the property reverts to the coparcenary", proceed upon an assumption which is inconsistent with well settled rules of Hindu Law according to the Mitakshara school. The assumption that though the right vested in the widow by the Act is a right of property which may on demand for partition become separated from the coparcenary property, it is still liable to revert to the coparcenary on the determination of the widow's estate, does not give full effect to the statutory conferment upon the widow of "the same right of claiming partition as a male owner."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The following observations made by Subba Rao., J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench in Parappagari Parappa alias Hanumanthappa and Another- v. Parappagari Nagamma and (1) L.R. 63 I. A. 33. (2) I.L.R. 1954 Mad. 257. (3) A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 110. (4) I.L.R. 1957 M.P. It 4.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Others, (1) in our judgment, correctly set out the effect of the Act on the question under review:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"She could ask for partition and separate possession of her husband's share. In case she asked for partition, her husband's interest should be worked out having regard to the circumstances obtaining in the family on the date of partition. If she divided herself from the other members of the family during her lifetime, on her demise the succession would be traced to her husband on the basis that the property was his separate property. If there was not severance, it would devolve by survivorship to the other members of the joint Hindu family:"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the finding recorded by the Trial Court which was not challenged in appeal before the High Court, Babuji did not separate in 1934 from the other coparceners. But he died in October 1937 and by the operation of Act 18 of 1937 as modified by Bihar Act 6 of 1942 Chando Kuer was invested with her husband's interest in the coparcenary property agricultural as well as non-agricultural. When she instituted a suit for partition that interest became de- fined, and vested in her free from all claims or rights of the coparceners of her husband. The right of the coparceners to take that interest by survivorship on Chando Kuer's death was then extinguished. On her death, even though the interest was not separated by metes and bounds, and was not in her exclusive possession it still devolved upon the nearest heirs of her husband, her daughters. The suit was therefore rightly decreed by the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the question referred to the High Court is answered in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-83958855613318306192020-01-27T17:16:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:16:27.408+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY MADRAS VS. ALLADI KUPPUSWAMY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 03.05.1977</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The respondent filed an appeal before the Board and contended that as Smt. Alladi died as a Hindu widow she possessed no coparcenary interest which could pass on her death: her interest merged without any benefit accruing or arising to the coparceners and hence s. 7 sub-s. (1) had no application<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the Case :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In order to decide the question of law arising in the appeal, it may be necessary to set out briefly the facts of the case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, one-fourth share of the deceased in the joint family properties, to which she was entitled under section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, was correctly included in her estate as property deemed to pass on her death under section 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the accrued inter- est on fixed deposits and Government securi- ties up to the date of death of the deceased was correctly included in her estate under section 34(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Although three questions had been referred to the High Court by the Board at the hearing of the appeal the respondent gave up questions Nos. 2 and 3 and confined his arguments only to question No. 1 which falls for determination in this case. The High Court, relying mainly on the decisions of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunacha- lam Chettiar;(1) and Gartside v. Inland Revenue' Commission- ers(2) came to the conclusion that the interest of Smt. Alladi was not a coparcenary interest which could have passed under s. 7 (1) of the Act and as the said interest was incapable of valuation was not exigible to estate duty. Thereafter the appellant applied to the High Court for granting a certificate of fitness for leave. to appeal to this Court and the same having been granted the appeal has now been placed before us for hearing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">By virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937 a Hindu widow undoubtedly possesses a coparcenary interest as con- templated by s. 7( 1 ) of the Act and she is also a member of a Hindu copercenary as envisaged by s. 7(2) of the Act. On the death of Smt. Alladi, therefore, there was clearly a cesser of her interest and her interest merged in the coper- cenary property and by reason of the inclusive part of sub- s. (1 ) of s. 7, it must be taken to have passed on her death and was hence exigible to estate duty. Since Smt Alladi was a member of the copercenary, this interest of her's which passed on her death was liable to be valued in accordance with the method provided by s. 39 of the Act. The interpretation of s. 40 of the Act is not free from difficulty, but as the present case squarely falls within the ambit of s. 7 (1 ) latter part and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the Act which attracts s. 39, it is not at all necessary for us to enter into the complex domain of the scope and ambit of s. 40 of the Act in this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> Judgement :</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the question referred to the High Court is answered in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY MADRAS VS. ALLADI KUPPUSWAMY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 03.05.1977</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 2069, 1977 SCR (3) 721<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: S M Fazalali<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITIONER : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY MADRAS</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Vs.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RESPONDENT : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">ALLADI KUPPUSWAMY</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATE OF JUDGEMENT : 03/05/1977</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BENCH : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BENCH : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">BHAGWATI, P.N. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">UNTWALIA, N.L.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT:</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2003/71 (From the Judgment and Order dated 5-12-1969 of the Madras High Court in Tax-Case No. 40 of 1965) S.T. Desai, P.L. Juneja and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">G. Venkatarama Sastry, K.R. Ramamani and J. Ramamurthi for the respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.--This appeal by certificate is directed against a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated December 5, 1969-Alladi Kuppuswami v. Controller of Estate Duty, Madras(1)--by which the reference made to the High Court by the Central Board of Revenue was answered in favour of the accountable person and against the Revenue. The case involves an interesting and important question of law in respect of ambit and scope of ss. 7(1) & (2) as also 39 of the (1) 76 I.T.R. 500 7--707SCI/77 Estate Duty Act, 1953--hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. In order to decide the question of law arising in the ap- peal, it may be necessary to set out briefly the facts of the case. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer died some time.before the passing of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, but during his life time he had settled certain properties absolutely on his wife Smt. Alladi Venkatakshmamma--to be referred in short as 'Smt. Alladi'--and he had also declared certain other properties to from part of the joint family properties. Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer hereafter to be referred to as "Shri Alladi" was a member of the Hindu coparcenary consisting of himself, his wife and three sons. In the instant case we are only concerned with the joint family properties left by Shri Alladi. Smt. Alladi died on January 5, 1956 a few months before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty valued her estate at a total amount ot Rs. 7,25,527 including a sum of Rs. 2,02,271 being the value of her the share in the joint family properties. The dispute in the present case centres round the inclusion of the aforesaid sum of Rs- 2,02,271/-. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Revenue assessed the estate duty on the footing that as Smt. Alladi was a member of the Hindu coparcenary her interest in the joint family proper- ties passed on her death to the other three sons and the value of this interest being 1/4th the heirs would be liable to pay estate duty on the value of the 1/4th share assessed at Rs. 2,02,271/-. The accountable persons raised several contentions before the Revenue including the question as to whether or not the Act would apply to agricultural lands as also whether interest on certain fixed deposits in Govern- ment securities would be assessable under the Act. It appears, however, that before the High Court the respondent pressed only the question relating to the inclusion of the value of 1/4th share of Smt. Alladi valued at Rs. 2,02,271/-. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The respondent filed an appeal before the Board and contended that as Smt. Alladi died as a Hindu widow she possessed no coparcenary interest which could pass on her death: her interest merged without any benefit accruing or arising to the coparceners and hence s. 7 sub-s. (1) had no application. The plea taken by the respondent did not find favour with the Central Board of Revenue which upheld the order of the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty. Thereupon the respondent moved the Board of Revenue to make a reference to the High Court of Madras for decision of the questions of law involved in the case. The Board ac- cordingly referred the following questions to the High Court:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, one-fourth share of the deceased in the joint family properties, to which she was entitled under section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, was correctly included in her estate as property deemed to pass on her death under section 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">2. Whether the Estate Duty Act. 1953, in so far as it seeks to levy duty on agricultur- al lands, is ultra vires of the legislative powers of the Union Legislature ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the accrued inter- est on fixed deposits and Government securi- ties up to the date of death of the deceased was correctly included in her estate under section 34(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Although three questions had been referred to the High Court by the Board at the hearing of the appeal the respondent gave up questions Nos. 2 and 3 and confined his arguments only to question No. 1 which falls for determination in this case. The High Court, relying mainly on the decisions of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunacha- lam Chettiar;(1) and Gartside v. Inland Revenue' Commission- ers(2) came to the conclusion that the interest of Smt. Alladi was not a coparcenary interest which could have passed under s. 7 (1) of the Act and as the said interest was incapable of valuation was not exigible to estate duty. Thereafter the appellant applied to the High Court for granting a certificate of fitness for leave. to appeal to this Court and the same having been granted the appeal has now been placed before us for hearing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The respondent reiterated his contentions before us and submitted that s. 7(1) of the Act had no application to the facts of the present case, and therefore, the share of Smt. Alladi was not exigible to estate duty. The appellant, however, submitted that a Hindu widow had a coparcenary interest in the joint family properties which could be valued on the basis of the factors enumerated in s. 39 of the Act, the High Court was in error in holding that the interest of Smt. Alladi was not capable of any valuation. The appellant, therefore, submitted that the High Court had not correctly appreciated the legal nature and character of the interest of the Hindu widow conferred on her by virtue of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In our opinion the answer to the problem would naturally lie in a correct interpretation of ss- 7(1) & (2) of the Act as also on a true construction of s. 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 as amended by Act 11 of 1938. It is true that while this Court has had occasions to interpret the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937--hereafter referred to as the Act of 1937'---on several occasions, yet the exact point which arises in this case has not yet been determined by this Court. In order to understand the implications Of the arguments advanced by counsel for the parties. before us, it may be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the Act as also of the Act of 1937. Section 7 sub-ss. (1) & (2) of the Act run thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"7. Interests ceasing on death,-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, property in which the deceased or any other person had an interest ceasing on the death of the deceased shall be deemed to pass on the deceased's death to the extent to which a benefit accrues (1957) A.C. 513--34 I.T.R. (E.D.) 20 (2) (1968) A.C5.53--70 I.T.R. 663 (II. L.) or arises by the cesser of such interest, including, in particular, a coparcenary inter- est in the joint family property of a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara, Marumakkat- tayam or Aliyasantana law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) If a member of a Hindu coparcenary governed by the Mitakshara school of law dies, then the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply with respect to the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property only :--<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) if the deceased had completed his eighteenth year at the time of his death, or<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) where he had not completed his eighteenth year at the time of his death,. if his father or other male as cendant in the male line was not a coparcener of the same family at the time of his death."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It would be seen that s. 7(1) consist of two parts--the first part refers to the interest of the deceased which ceases on his death and according to this part two condi- tions are necessary before there is a passing of the inter- est--(1) that there must be a cesser of the interest by virtue of the death of the deceased; and (2) that as a result of such cesser a benefit accrues or arises. The second part of sub-s. (1) contains an inclusive category which brings within the fold of sub-s. (1) a coparcenary interest in the joint family property of a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara, Marumakkattayarn or Aliyasantana law. In the instant case, we are mainly concerned with the Mitakshara law. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We might dispose of a short argument ad- vanced by Mr. S.T. Desai in support of the appeal on this question. It was submitted that the words "governed by the Matakshara, Marumakkattayam or Aliyasan ana law" clearly show that the coparcenary interest has been used in a wide sense and cannot be restricted to the strict coparcenary interest known to the Mitakshara law alone- In the view which we take in this case, however, it is not at all neces- sary to go into this point. The main question for determi- nation is as to whether the interest acquired by a Hindu widow under the Act of 1937 can be said to be a coparcenary interest in the legal sense of the term. Once a Hindu widow is held to have a coparcenary interest, then there would be no difficulty in treating her as a member of the Hindu coparcenary, in which case her interest could be easily valued according to the relevant provision of s. 39 of the Act which runs thus:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"39. (1) The value of the benefit accruing or arising from the cesser of a coparcenary interest in any joint family property governed by the. Mitakshara school of a Hindu law which ceases on the death of a member thereof shall be the principal value of the share in the joint family property which would have been allotted to the deceased had there been a partition immediately before his death."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In order to understand the content and charac- ter of the interest which a Hindu widow gets by virtue of the statutory provisions con- tained in the Act of 1937 there can be no doubt that prior to the passing of the Act of 1937 a Hindu woman had no right or interest at all in a Hindu coparcenary. She was neither a copar- cener nor a member of the coparcenary nor did she have any interest in it, except the right to get maintenance. She also had no right to demand partition of the coparcenary property after the death of her husband. The Act of 1937 introduced broad and important changes by bettering the rights of a Hindu widow and conferring on her the same interest as pos- sessed by her husband. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 run thus: "(2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(3)Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming parti- tion as a male owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The words "the same interest as he himself had" in sub s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 clearly indicate that the statute gave effect to the well settled doctrine of Hindu Shastric Law that the persons of the. husband after his death continues through his wife who is the surviving half of the husband and the husband continues to live through the widow so long as the widow is alive. It was this concept of the Hindu Law which was sought to be recognised and given effect to by the Act of 1937. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In these circumstances, therefore, when' the Legislature used the expression "the same interest as he himself had" it would include all the bundle of rights possessed by the husband which would de- volve on the wife and if there were to be any limitations on those rights they were spelt out by subs. (3) itself, name- ly, that while the Hindu widow would have the same right and interest as her husband, her interest would only be the limited interest known as a Hindu Woman's estate. Sub- section (2) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 further conferred on the widow the right to demand partition and on partition she was entitled to get the same share as her husband. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus the position appears to be that a Hindu widow was introduced for the first time into the Hindu coparcenary having the same rights as her husband and became as it were a member of the Hindu coparcenary with two qualifications, viz., (1) that she had only a limited interest; and (2)that she could not be a coparcener because having regard to the nature of her entry into the family after marriage with her husband there was no question of her getting interest in the Hindu copar- cenary by birth which is one of the most important incidents of a Hindu coparcenary. All the other rights of a coparcener were duly conferred on her by the Act of 1937. Dwelling on the content and import of the nature of the interest of a Hindu widow this Court pointed out in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey & Others(1) that on the death of her husband the properties vested in the widow and she fully represented the estate. In this connection, this Court made the following observations:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"When a widow succeeds as heir to her hus-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">band, the ownership in the properties, both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes succession's. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversion- ers but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Similarly in a later case in Potti Lakshmi Perumallu v. Potti Krishnavenamma(2) this Court reiterated that a Hindu widow was the surviving half of her husband and so long as she was alive the husband continued to live in her. This 'Court observed as follows: </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The decisions also recognise that though the widow does not, by virtue of the interest given to her by the new law become a coparcener she being entitled to claim parti- tion of the joint family property is in the same position in which her deceased husband would have been in the matter of exercise of that right. That is to say, according to these decisions her interest is a fluctuating one and is liable to increase or decrease according as there are accretions to or dimi- nutions of the property. In our opinion these decisions lay down the law correctly."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It may be pertinent to note that in the aforesaid case the Court was considering the nature of the interest which a widow derived by virtue of the statutory substitution con- tained in s.3(2) of the Act of 1937. It was also pointed out that like other coparceners of a Hindu coparcenary the interest of a widow until separated by a partition continued a fluctuating one which was liable to increase case or decrease with the deaths or additions in the family.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Satrughan Isser v. Smt. Subujpari & Others(3) this Court pointed out that the interest conferred on a Hindu widow arose by statutory substitution and the Act of 1937 introduced changes which were go far alien to the structure of a Hindu coparcenary. In this connection the Court observed as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The Act in inventing the widow of a member of a coparcenary with the interest which the member had at the time of his death has introduced changes which are alien to the (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 558, 564-565. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 26, 33.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) [1967] 1 S,C.R. 7.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">structure of a coparcenary. The interest of a widow arises not by inheritance nor by survi- vorship, but by statutory substitution: A Hindu coparcenary under the Mitakshara school consists of males alone: it includes only those members who acquire by birth or adoption interest in the coparcenary property. The essence of coparcenary property is unity of ownership which is vested in the whole body of coparceners. While it remains joint, no individual member can predicate of the undi- vided property that he has a definite share therein. The interest of each coparcener is fluctuating, capable of being enlarged by deaths, and liable to be diminished by the birth of sons to coparceners: it is only on partition that the coparcener can claim that he has become entitled to a definite share. The two principal incidents of coparcenary property are: that the interest of coparceners devolves by survivorship and not by inheri- tance; and that the mate issue of a coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property by birth, not as representing his father but in his own independent right ac- quired by birth."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As pointed out above the essence of coparce- nary property is the unity of ownership which is vested in the whole body of coparceners and the two principal incidents of coparcenary property are that the interest of coparceners devolves by survivorship and not by inheri- tance and that the male issue of a coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property by birth and not as representing his father. Alter having described the incidents of a Hindu coparcenary, the Court proceeded to observe as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"By the Act (Act of 1937) certain anti- thetical concepts are sought to be reconciled. A widow of a coparcener is invested by the Act with the same interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the property of the coparcenary. She is thereby introduced into the coparcenary, and between the surviv- ing coparceners of her husband and the widow so introduced, there arises community of interest and unity of possession. But the widow does not on that account become a copar- cener: though invested with the same interest which her husband had in the property she does not acquire the right which her husband could have exercised over the interest of the other copareeners. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Because of statutory substitu- tion of her interest in the coparcenary property in place of her husband, the right which the other coparceners had under the Hindu law of the Mitakshara school of taking that interest by the rule of survivorship remains suspended so long as that estate enures. She has still power to make her interest definite by making a demand for partition, as a male owner may. If the widow after being introduced into family to which her husband belonged does not seek partition, on the termination of her estate her interest will merge into the coparcenary property." Again this Court did not approve of the as- sumption made by some Courts that the fight vested in the widow was liable to revert to- the coparcenary, even where, on demand for partition it became separated from the copar- cenary property, and in this connection this court observed as follows:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The assumption that though the right vested in the widow by the Act is a right of property which may on demand for partition become separated from the coparcenary property it is still liable to revert to the coparce- nary on the determination of the widow's estate, does not give full effect to the statutory conferment upon the widow of the same right of claiming partition as a mate owner".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Finally this Court approved of certain obser- vations made by the Madras High Court in Parappagari Parappa alias Hammanthappa and Another v. Parappagari Nagamma and others(1) where Subba Rao J.as he then was, made the following observations:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"She could ask for partition and sepa- rate possession of her husband's share. In case she asked for partition, her husband's interest 'should be worked out having regard to the circumstances obtaining in the family on the date of partition. If she divided herself from the other members of the family during her lifetime, on her demise the succession would be traced to her husband on the basis that the property was his separate property. If there was no severance, it would devolve by survivorship to the other members of the joint Hindu family :" It is, therefore, manifest from the aforesaid deci- sion that if the widow had not chosen to exercise her right of partition, there is no severance of the Hindu coparcenary and on her death the interest of the widow merges in the coparcenary property or lapses to the other coparceners. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As already indicated above, this Court in Satrughan v. Smt. Sabujpari & others (supra) had taken the same view and had con- firmed the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Smt. Sabujpari and another v. Satrughan Isser and others(2), where the Patna High Court after considering the entire law on the subject, observed thus: "After having considered the various authorities and the various aspects of the case, my conclusions are that, under the Provisions of the Act a widow of a deceased coparcener is placed in same position as the deceased coparcener was, for the reason of the fiction that half the body of the deceased husband survived in the widow; that, like her husband, the widow also is entitled to effect severance of the joint status (2) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 405, 410. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">of the family by an unequivocal expression of intention separate; that in case the widow does not exercise her right of partition and dies without expressing any intention to separate, the interest of the husband, which she enjoyed, goes by survivor- ship to the other members of the joint family."</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by the Patna High Court to which one, of us (Untwalia, J., as he then was) was a party. The view taken by the Patna High Court in the aforesaid case was later on approved by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Mst. Khatrani Kuer v. Smt. Tapeshwari Kuer(1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram (dead) through Shri Gurbux Rai(2), this Court, while dealing with the incidents of Hindu coparcenary, observed as follows: "According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capa-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">city. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law are: first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties is common; secondly, that no alienation of the property. any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership ex- tending over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the Coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son be- comes a coparcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the lat- ter."</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus analysing the ratio of a aforesaid case regarding the incidents of a Hindu coparcenary it would appear that a Hindu coparcenary has six essential characteristics, namely, (1) that the lineal male descendants up to the third genera- tion acquire an independent right of ownership by birth and not as representing their ancestors; (2) that the members of the coparcenary have the right to work out their rights by demanding partition; (3) that until partition, each member has got. ownership extending over the entire property con- jointly with the. rest and so long as no partition takes place, it is difficult for any copercener to predicate the share which he might receive; (4) that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the property iS common; (5) that there can be no alienation of the property without (1) A.I.R. 1964 Pat 261. [19691 3 S.C.R, 681,686.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">the concurrence of the other coparceners unless it be for legal necessity; and (6) that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death and merges in the coparcenary property. Applying these tests to the interest of a Hindu widow who has been introduced into a coparcenary by virtue of the Act of 1937, we find that, excepting condition No. (1), all other conditions are fully satisfied in case of a Hindu widow succeeding to the interest of her husband in a Hindu coparcenary. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In other words, after her husband's death the Hindu widow under the Act of 1937 has got the right to demand partition, she cannot predicate the exact share which she might receive until partition is made, her dominion extends to the entire property conjointly with the other members of the coparcenary, her possession and enjoy- ment is common, the property cannot be alienated without concurrence of all the members of the family, except for legal necessity, and like other coparceners she has a fluctuating interest 'in the property which may be increased or decreased by deaths or additions in the family. It is manifest that she cannot fulfil the first condition, because she enters the coparcenary long after she is born and after she is married to her husband and acquires his interest on his death. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, short of the first condition, she possess- es all the necessary indicia of a coparcenary interest. The fact that before the Act of 1956, she had the characteristic of a widow-estate in her interest in the property does not detract any the less from this position. It must follow as a logical corollary that though a Hindu widow cannot be a coparcener, she has coparcenary interest and she is also a member of a coparcenary by virtue of the rights conferred on her under the Act of 1937.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is yet another important aspect of the matter which has to be considered. At the time when the Estate Duty Act was passed in 1953, the Legislature was fully aware of the statutory interest conferred on a widow by virtue of the Act of 1937 and the incidents thereof. In these circum- stances it is not reasonable to infer that the Legislature could have intended that though a Hindu widow has got the Same interest as her husband in the Hindu coparcenary and has also the right to demand partition and her interest which is a fluctuating. one would lapse to the other copar- ceners in case of her death without seeking partition in the same manner as that of other coparceners, yet it should be exempt from estate duty.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The sheet-anchor of the argument of the respondent was the Privy Council decision in Arunachalam Chettiar's case (supra). In the first place, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that case, the Hindu undivided family consisted of father, son and some female members. According to the Privy Council, the females were merely entitled to maintenance. The females there could not have any interest in the coparcenary nor could any such argument be advanced because there was no statute similar to the Act of 1937. Moreover, in the Estate Duty Ordinance which was being construed by the Privy Council there was neither any provision like the inclusive part of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 nor any provision similar to s. 39 of the Act. In these circumstances, we do not see how the Privy Council decision in Arunachalam Chattiar's case (supra) can be called in aid to support the contention of the respondent. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the instant case, once it is held, as it must be, that Smt. Alladi was a member of the Hindu coparce- nary, her interest was undoubtedly a coparcenary interest which lapsed on her death and merged into the coparcenary. It was also clearly capable of valuation, unlike the posi- tion in Arunachalam Chettiar's case where the Privy Council was construing a provision similar to s. 40 of the Act, which, in our opinion, has no application in the present case, it being covered by s. 39 of the Act. A fortiori the same observations apply to the case of Gertside v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (supra). That case has no application here where we are concerned with the concept of a Hindu coparcenary which is totally alien to the estates contem- plated under the English Acts. For these reasons, there- fore, we are clearly of the opinion that the two cases relied upon by the High Court do not appear to be of any assistance in deciding the points at issue in the present appeal, and the High Court was in error in basing its deci- sion on the aforesaid cases ignoring the decisions of this Court as also the peculiar and special provisions of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Finally, it was vehemently contended by Mr. Sastri for the respondent that the right of a Hindu widow under the Act of 1937 was merely a statutory substitution of a new status by her introduction into the copercenary and she could not be treated either as a coparcener or a me, tuber of the copercenary or to possess any kind of coparcenary interest. While we agree that the widow after the introduction in the coparcenary could not be held to have become a coparcener, because one of the essential characteristics of a coparcen- er, namely, acquisition of interest by birth, is wholly wanting in her case, yet when the Legislature which was fully aware of the status of a Hindu widow under the Shas- tric Law chose to improve her status by conferring a new right on her under the Act of 1937, and with this avowed object clothed her with all the rights and concomitants of a coparcener's interest, it is futile to contend that the widow could not be treated either as a member of the Hindu coparcenary or as having been conferred coparcenary interest in the property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Even though the widow is not a coparcener in the strictly legal sense of the term, the interest which she has is the same interest as her husband and that is the coparcenary interest with the only limitation placed on her by s. 3(3) of the Act of 1937, namely, that her interest would be the limited interest of a Hindu widow. The conclu- sion is therefore inescapable that Smt. Alladi did possess a coparcenary interest which lapsed on her death and merged into the coparcenary and the case was clearly covered by the inclusive part of sub-s. (1) of s. 7 and under s. 39 the value of the benefit accruing or arising from the cesser of her coparcenary interest was to be determined by taking the principal value of the share in the joint family property which would have been allotted to her, had there been a partition immediately before her death.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The last plank of the argument of the respondent was that the Estate Duty Act being a fiscal statute should be construed strictly so as to give every benefit of doubt to the subject. There can be no quarrel with this proposition but when the phraseology of a particular section of the statute takes within its sweep the transaction which is taxable, it is not for the Court to strain and stress the language of the section so as to enable the tax-payer to escape the tax. In the view that we take in this case, it is manifest that the legislative intent reflected in the Act of 1937 and the Estate Duy Act, 1953, must be given full effect.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Summarising, therefore, the position that emerges is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">By virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937 a Hindu widow undoubtedly possesses a coparcenary interest as con- templated by s. 7( 1 ) of the Act and she is also a member of a Hindu copercenary as envisaged by s. 7(2) of the Act. On the death of Smt. Alladi, therefore, there was clearly a cesser of her interest and her interest merged in the coper- cenary property and by reason of the inclusive part of sub- s. (1 ) of s. 7, it must be taken to have passed on her death and was hence exigible to estate duty. Since Smt Alladi was a member of the copercenary, this interest of her's which passed on her death was liable to be valued in accordance with the method provided by s. 39 of the Act. The interpretation of s. 40 of the Act is not free from difficulty, but as the present case squarely falls within the ambit of s. 7 (1 ) latter part and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the Act which attracts s. 39, it is not at all necessary for us to enter into the complex domain of the scope and ambit of s. 40 of the Act in this case. </span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-73368695582057406122020-01-27T17:14:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:14:14.874+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DELHI HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">ASHOK KUMAR VS. KISHAN KUMAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 24.08.1982</span></b><br />
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Introduction :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">This suit by two brothers claiming a declaration in respect of immoveable properties and for possession of a part thereof and recovery of damages mesne profits in respect of the use and occupation of a part of it, inter alia, raises an interesting question as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which a limited estate, held by a Hindu widow, may mature into an absolute estate by virtue of the provision of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The facts and circumstances leading to the suit are, by and large, beyond controversy. One Umrao Singh, who held joint Hindu family properties as the sole surviving coparcener, executed a Will on January 9, 1927, duly registered on January 27, 1927, in terms whereof <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>he bequeathed one of the properties absolutely in favor of Kalawati, widow of his pre-deceased son, Onkar Prasad, and created two successive life estates in respect of other properties, one in favor of Kalawati aforesaid, and the other in favor of her daughter, Shanti Devi, then an infant, and purported to bequeath the absolute ownership of the properties, forming subject-matter of life estates, to the male issue of Shanti Devi. Onkar Prasad had died in 1922. Umrao Singh died in 1928. Kalawati died in 1967 and Shanti Devi died in 1969. Kalawati assumed control and possession of the properties, forming subject matter of the absolute estate, as well as the life estate, and during her life time, alienated the property, which formed subject matter of the absolute estate in her favor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">When she died in 1967, she was survived not only by her daughter, Shanti Devi, but also a son, Krishan Kuma.r, defendant No. 1, who was admittedly born to Kalawati, but according to the plaintiffs, not during the lifetime of her husband or soon thereafter, but after a lapse of 10 years of the death of Onkar Prasad and was, therefore, an illegitimate child. When Shanti Devi died in 1969, the plaintiffs were admittedly her only male issues. During the lifetime of Kalawati. Krishan Kumar, defendant No. 1, was living with his mother in a part of one of the properties and continued to be in possession of that portion after her death. Defendants 2 to 5 are the tenants in the properties and were paying rent to Kalawati. Defendant No. 6 is another tenant, who had apparently been inducted in a portion of the property by defendant No. 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">If Kalawati held the property as an absolute estate by virtue of sub-section (1 ) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, either because the devise of a life estate in her favor in the will of the testator was a grant in recognition of of an existing right arising out of the right of being maintained out of the property or she held the property over the years by way of adverse possession, it follows that on her death, the second bequest in favor of Shanti Devi, as in. deed, the further bequest in favor of the plaintiffs stood frustrated, and the property passed by succession to two heirs of Kalawati i.e. defendant No. 1 and her sister, Shanti Devi. This would disentitle the plaintiffs to the declaration sought by them. Whether the plaintiffs succeeded to the half share that fall to the share of Shanti Devi as her sons or there were other heirs of Shanti Devi entitled to take the property along with the plaintiffs, is a further question with which I am not concerned in the present suit, the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit being solely based on the right flowing from the Will.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">For all these reasons, the suit fails and is hereby dismissed but, in the peculiar circumstances, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DELHI HIGH COURT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">ASHOK KUMAR VS. KISHAN KUMAR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 24.08.1982</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Equivalent citations: ILR 1983 Delhi 250<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Author: H Anand<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench: H Anand<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT H.L. Anand, J.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) This suit by two brothers claiming a declaration in respect of immoveable properties and for possession of a part thereof and recovery of damages mesne profits in respect of the use and occupation of a part of it, inter alia, raises an interesting question as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which a limited estate, held by a Hindu widow, may mature into an absolute estate by virtue of the provision of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) The facts and circumstances leading to the suit are, by and large, beyond controversy. One Umrao Singh, who held joint Hindu family properties as the sole surviving coparcener, executed a Will on January 9, 1927, duly registered on January 27, 1927, in terms whereof he bequeathed one of the properties absolutely in favor of Kalawati, widow of his pre-deceased son, Onkar Prasad, and created two successive life estates in respect of other properties, one in favor of Kalawati aforesaid, and the other in favor of her daughter, Shanti Devi, then an infant, and purported to bequeath the absolute ownership of the properties, forming subject-matter of life estates, to the male issue of Shanti Devi. Onkar Prasad had died in 1922. Umrao Singh died in 1928. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Kalawati died in 1967 and Shanti Devi died in 1969. Kalawati assumed control and possession of the properties, forming subject matter of the absolute estate, as well as the life estate, and during her life time, alienated the property, which formed subject matter of the absolute estate in her favor. When she died in 1967, she was survived not only by her daughter, Shanti Devi, but also a son, Krishan Kuma.r, defendant No. 1, who was admittedly born to Kalawati, but according to the plaintiffs, not during the lifetime of her husband or soon thereafter, but after a lapse of 10 years of the death of Onkar Prasad and was, therefore, an illegitimate child. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">When Shanti Devi died in 1969, the plaintiffs were admittedly her only male issues. During the lifetime of Kalawati. Krishan Kumar, defendant No. 1, was living with his mother in a part of one of the properties and continued to be in possession of that portion after her death. Defendants 2 to 5 are the tenants in the properties and were paying rent to Kalawati. Defendant No. 6 is another tenant, who had apparently been inducted in a portion of the property by defendant No. 1.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Plaintiffs claim relief in the suit on the basis of and purely in terms of the will of Umrao Singh. They contend that in terms of the will the properties forming subject matter of the suit, became their exclusive and absolute estate on the death of Kalawati and Shanti Devi. The claim is sought to be defeated by defendant No. 1 on the ground that on a true construction of the will it must be held that the will conferred an absolute estate in favor of Kalawati and on her death the property devolved on Shanti Devi and defendant No. 1 in equal share as the only heirs of Kalawati. In the alternative, it is claimed that if Kalawati or the life estate under the will matured into an absolute estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession had a life estate such a bequest was either bad in law and she became absolute owner by virtus of adverse possession Act. It is, therefore, urged that either way on her death the properties devolved on defendant No. 1 and Shanti Devi in equal shares. Various other pleas were raised with regard to the valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fees and non-joinder of parties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on May 14, 1980 after the statement of defendant No. 1 was recorded with regard to his date of birth and the date of death of his father. 1. Did Mr. Umrao Singh execute any will and bequeath his properties in favor of his wife Smt. Kalawati and Smt. Shanti Devi ? 2. Had Mr. Umrao Singh 'created limited estate enurable during the life times of Smt. Kalawati and Smt. Shanti Devi under the will ? If so to what effect ? 3. Is defendant No. 1 the son of Onkar Prasad ? (onus objected to ). 4. Was 'the limited estate of Smt. Kalawati not enlarged to full ownership on the coming into force the Hindu Succession Act ? 5. If issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are proved, is defendant No. 1 the owner of the properties in dispute ? 6. Has the suit been properly valued for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction ? 7. Is Sh. Harnam Dass a necessary or proper party in the suit ? If so, what is the effect of his being not imp leaded in the suit ? 8. To what mesne profit, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to ? 9. Is the suit for mere declaration with respect to portions of the properties in dispute which are in possession of the tenants, maintainable ? 10. Relief.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(5) On January 13, 1981 the following additional issue was framed by consent. "IA. Is the Will referred to in issue No. 1 not valid according to law ?" <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(6) By an order of February 23, 1981 in I.A. 57 of 1981 certain issues were deleted and rest were reframed in the following manner : 1. Whether Umrao Singh did not duly execute a will on 9th January 1927 ? OPD.. 2. If issue No. 1 is decided against the defendant whether the estates created by the will were permissible under the law. If so, what was the nature of the rights of Smt. Kalawati, Smt. Shanti Devi and the plaintiff, if any, created under the Will ? 3. Whether Smt. Kalawati became an absolute owner of the property mentioned in the will either upon the death of the testator or at any time thereafter and remain as absolute owner till her death ? 4. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary pari ties ? 5. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fees and Jurisdiction ? 6. Is the suit for mere declaration with respect to portions of the properties in dispute which are in possession of the tenants, maintainable ? 7. To what mesne profit, if any, are the plaintiffs, entitled to ? 8. Relief. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(7) In support of rival contentions parties produced both oral and documentary evidence. I heard counsel for the parties at considerable length on the various questions of fact and law in controversy between the parties. My conclusion on these issues are as follows :- Issue No 1. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(8) This issue is based on the plea of defendant No. 1 denying the factum of the execution of the will. The pica was, however, not seriously pressed on behalf of defendant No. 1. Even otherwise, the onus of the issue was on defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 1 failed to produce any evidence in support of it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, produced five witnesses. None of these witnesses were either attesting witness or identified the signature of the testator on the will, Ex. Public Witness 512, which was proved by Public Witness 5, Harnam Dass Advocate, father of the plaintiffs who merely stated to the fact that the will was handed over by Kalawati, who was the mother-in-law of the witness, to his wife Shanti Devi. He also proved certified copy of the sale deed. Ex Public Witness 5U, by which one of the properties mentioned in the will was sold by Kalawati. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The other four witnesses merely identified the signature of two attesting witnesses to the will, namely. Sham Sunder, pleader and Alopi Prasad. Pwi, however, stated that the signature of Sham Sunder used to be in "bigger and bolder letters" and the signature purported to be of Sham Sunder on the document were not his signature. The will purports to have been executed in 1927 and no one, who could identify the signature of the tester, had apparently survived by the time the evidence was recorded in the year 1981. The will was registered with the Sub-Registrar and was apparently acted upon by Kalawati during her life time when she sold one of the three properties, forming subject matter of the will. The document is more than 30 years old and would attract the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. For all these reasons, I would answer the issue in favor of the plaintiffs and hold that Umrao Singh had executed the will, Ex. Public Witness 5|2, on January 9, 1927, which was duly registered with the Sub-Registrar on January 27, 1927. Issue NO. 4.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(9) This issue is based on the plea of defendant No. 1 that inasmuch as Shanti Devi, the mother of the plaintiffs, was survived besides the plaintiff, by her husband, Harnam Dass, Advocate, and a daughter of Harnam Dass. Advocate, from his previous marriage, the suit. was bad for nonjoinder of Harnam Dass and his daughter: who were said to be necessary parties. This issue was also not pressed apparently because the claim to the properties by the plaintiffs' is based on the will and not on the succession to the property of Shanti Devi in which case there would have been merit in the contention that Harnam Dass and her daughter were necessary parties to the suit. While on the pleas of the plaintiff these persons cannot be said to be necessary parties, it would be the other way round, if the plea of defendant No. 1, that Kalawati had held absolute estate and on her death the property devolved on Shanti Devi, and defendant No. 1 in equal share, prevails. Plaintiffs do not claim any right to the properties on the basis of succession in the alternative or otherwise. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If they fail in the plea based on the will, nothing further survives in the suit. On the plea of the plaintiffs, therefore, it cannot be said that these two persons were necessary parties or that this suit is, therefore, bad because of failure to join them as defendants. The issue is answered accordingly. Issue NO. 5 (10) This issue is based on the plea of defendant No. 1 that the suit has been undervalued for the purpose of court fees with reference to the relief for possession of the portion in occupation of defendant No. 1 on the ground that market value of the portion, Which is claimed by plaintiffs to be Rs. 20,000, "is at least Rs. 50,000." Parties were fully aware of the state of the market value of immoveable property in Delhi and the plaintiffs did not seriously dispute that the valuation of the property at Rs. 20,000 was on the lower side. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Since defendant No. 1 could be hardly said to have put an exaggerated value of the portion, plaintiffs had no serious objection to the suit for the purpose of possession being valued at Rs. 50,000. I answer the issue accordingly and direct that the plaintiff would pay additional court fees on the basis of the valuation claimed by defendant No. 1. Additional court fees would be paid within three months. Issue NO. 6.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(11) This issue is based on the plea of defendant No.1 that a mere declaration in respect of the portion of the property in occupation of tenants was insufficient and that the plaintiffs were apparently bound to seek the relief of recovery of possession. This is a p!ea which is only to be recounted to be rejected. If an authority in respect of the proposition was necessary, reference may be made to 1936 Lahore 929(1). Mere declaration in respect of the portion in occupation of the tenant was sufficient. No further relief was called for. Issue is decided accordingly. . Issue NO. 7.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(12) This issue is based on the plea of the plaintiffs that they were exclusive owners of the properties and that defendant No. 1 has no right, title or interest in the properties and, being in possession of a part of the properties was bound to pay damages |mesne profit for use and occupation to the plaintiffs until dispossesed. Defendant No. 1 denies the claim of mesne profit, inter alia, on the ground that defendant No. 1 and Shanti Devi the mother of the plaintiffs, became joint owners of the property on the death of their mother Kalawati and that the plaintiffs succeeded on the death of their mother, along with other heirs of the mother, to half share of the property which had devolved on their mother and that there was therefore, no liability to any damages |mesne profit. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The answer to this issue would depend on how one looks at issue No. 2 and 3, which are based on the principal question in controversy between the parties. Issue No. 7 would not survive if the Court comes to the conclusion that Kalawati held the properties as an absolute owner and the same devolved in equal share on her daughter, Shanti Devi, and her son, defendant No. 1. If on the contrary, the plea of defendant No. 1 is overruled as to the nature of the estate of Kalawati and it is held that Kalawati held a life estate, and on the death of Shanti Devi property passed to the plaintiffs in terms of the will, defendant No. 1 would certainly be liable to pay damages) mesne profits. Once it is found that defendant No. 1 is liable to pay damages mesne profit, the question of computation would then arise. The decision of this issue is deferred until the decision of principal issues, to which I would presently devote attention. Issues NO. 2 and 3.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(13) These issues are based on the pleas of defendant No. 1 that, for diverse reasons, the properties in dispute were held in absolute estate by Kalawati or by operation of law the limited estate in her favor galvanised into an absolute estate, and that the bequest in favor of the plaintiffs . failed, with the result that on the death of Kalawati, her estate devolved on Shanti Devi, her daughter, and defendant No. 1, her son, in equal shares and the plaintiffs having, therefore, merely succeeded, along with certain others, to the share of Shanti Devi, were not entitled to the declaration that the properties exclusively belonged to the plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(14) The first question that calls for decision is the nature of the bequest in favor of Kalawati in terms of the will and in particular whether the bequest in favor of Kalawati purported to be an absolute estate in her favor or created a mere life estate in her favor, followed by another life estate in favor of Shanti Devi and the bequest of the absolute estate in favor of the plaintiffs. Having regard to the clear language of the will, the intention of the testator incorporated in it, and the surrounding circumstances, the answer to the question must be in favor of the plaintiffs. It is not possible to construe the will as confering any absolute estate of Kalawati and the document points only to one conclusion that the testator created a life estate in favor of Kalawati followed by another life estate in favor of Shanti Devi before the devolution of the absolute estate in favor of male heirs of Shanti Devi. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The will, Ex Public Witness 5j2, which appears to be a handiwork of an experienced scribe, is in Urdu language and by it the testator clearly and unequivocally creates two life estates, first in favor of the widow of his pre-deceased adopted son, Kalawati and on her death in favor of the said widow's daughter Shanti Devi and provides that on the death of Shanti Devi the estate would absolutely pass to the male progeny of Shanti Devi, who would hold it absolutely. It is significant that while Kalawati has been given the right to alienate one of the three properties, that right has been denied to her in relation to the other properties, now forming subject matter of the suit, in clear and unequivocal terms. The third property Was alienated by Kalawati during her lifetime pursuant to the power reserved in the will by sale deed of which a photo copy was proved on record as Ex Public Witness 5/1. True, the will describes Kalawati as "Malik Kamil" i.e. full owner, and purports to confer on her "Kul Ekhtayarat Malkana" i.e. all rights of an owner, but it is not possible to ignore that the expression "Kul Ekhtayarat Malkana" is clearly qualified by the expression that follow i.e. "Ilava Muntquil Kame Ki" i.e. without the power of alienation. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is well settled that document has to be read as a whole with a view to ascertain the true will and intent of the author. The language of the will leaves no manner of doubt that Kalawati had no power of disposal over the properties, except one property, and provision in respect of that property contains, a specific power to dispose it of during her lifetime. That the remaining properties are to come after her death in limited estate in favor of her daughter and after her to the daughters male progeny in absolute right eliminate altogether any doubt that one may have with regard to true intent to give to Kalawati a life estate and absolutely to the male progeny of Shanti Devi. The intention of the testator that, except one property of which the power of disposal was specifically conferred on Kalawati, the rest of the estate must be preserved for the male progeny of Shanti Devi is clearly manifest in the document. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is no inconsistency or contradiction in the provision to make Kalawati "Malik Kamil", full or absolute owner, and with all the absolute powers of an owner except the right to alienate the property. The right to alienate immoveable property is not the only attribute of absolute ownership, it is one of the attributes of it and where that attribute is specifically excluded in the will I see no reason why the true intent of the testator should be allowed to be dissolved and should not be given effect to it in the absence of any legitimate legal impediment The provision of life estate in favor of the widow of a predeceased son, who was entitled to maintenance and a similar restricted estate in favor of her female issue to ensure that the estate ultimately passed absolutely to the latters male progeny were also consistent with contemporary Hindu law, convention and beliefs. It must, therefore, be held that Kalawati was the recipient of a life estate in the two properties, forming subject matter of the suit, and the will did not create any absolute estate in favor of Kalawati in respect of these two properties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(15) If the bequest in favor of Kalawati could not be construed as an absolute estate on the construction of the will, it is obvious that defendant No. 1 would have no defense to the suit unless the bequest of a life estate in favor of Kalawati was invalid for any reason or it galvanised into an absolute estate by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Counsel for defendant No. 1 sought to invalidate the bequest of life estate for a variety of reasons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(16) In the first instance, it was urged, on the authority of the Privy Council in the case of Magalutchmee Ummal vs. Gopoo Madaraja Chetty and others 6 Mia 309(2). that the testator was not competent to make the bequest in favor of Kalawati. The testator was admittedly the sole surviving coparcener and was competent to alienate the same during his life time or to make a bequest of it in favor of any person. In the case before the Privy Council, the testator, though a sole surviving coparcener, had authorised his widow to adopt a son in the event of the child, of which she was then pregnant, being a female and it was in this context that their Lordships observed that, "As power had been given to the widow to adopt a son, Appacooty Jyen was, by the Hindoo Law, incompetent to make any testamentary disposition." No such situation obtained in the present case. Cousel, however, alternatively sought to invalidate the testamentary disposition on the ground that there was no power to make a testamentary dispositin in view of the testator's admitted obligation to maintain Kalawati, the beneficiary, being a predeceased son's widow. It is no doubt true that Kalawati in Hindu law, as it then stood, was not an heir of the testator but was certainly entitled to maintenance. Even if any testamentary disposition. which may deprive such a widow of her right of maintenance be invalid, it would be doubtful if it would have that effect where the beneficiary of the testamentary disposition was no other than the wiodw entitled to mainte-nance herself. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Even otheriwse, right to receive maintenance in relation to a property is not a right to property and unless the disposition was intended to defeat the right of maintenance, it would not be invalidated even though the disposition, testamentary or otherwise, may be subject to the right of maintenance. It is well-settled that the claim, even of a widow, for maintenance is not a charge upon the estate of the deceased husband until it was charged upon the estate either by a decree of a court or by an agreement or by the will by which the property was bequeathed. If that be so, the widow's right is liable to be defeated by the transfer of the husband's property to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the widow's claim for maintenance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is also liable to be defeated by a transfer to purchaser for value even with notice of claim unless the transfer was made with the intention of defeating the widow's right and the purchaser had notice of such intentions. It is recognised in Hindu Law that widow's right to receive maintenance, unless made a charge upon the property, is enforceable only like any other liability in respect of which no charge exists but where maintenance has been made a charge upon the property and the property is subsequently sold, even there, the transfer is not invalidated but the purchaser must hold it subject to the charge. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This would be true even of a disposition by a Will. That the claim for maintenance is not a charge on the estate, has since been recognised by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act also recognises that a widow's right of maintenance, not being a charge, could not be enforced against transferee for value unless the transfer was made in fraud of the right of maintenance. It is no doubt recognised that if the person who is under an obligation to maintain widow has property the right of the widow to maintenance "becomes an equitable charge on his property" but the effect is that any person who takes the property "carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow" but even so the right does not invalidate the bequest or the transfer. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Whatever, therefore may be the other effect of it, the testamentary disposition, without making a provision for the maintenance of a widow, entitled to such maintenance, would not invalidate the disposition. It is hardly possible for defendant No. 1 to urge that the testamentary disposition in the present case was made without making a provision for the maintenance of Kalawati since admittedly Kalawati was among the recipients of the bequest of life estate under the Will, besides an absolute estate in another property. There was really no conflict in the present case between the disposition and the right of Kalawati to maintenance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The provision for her maintenance is writ large in the form of the life estate itself, apart from, what is more the right to alienate one of the three properties, a right which admittedly was exercised by Kalawati during her lifetime. Having regard to all the circumstances the conclusion would be justified that bequest in favor of Kalawati was not only not in derogation of her right of maintenance but was in furtherance or recognition of that right and to effectuate it. I would have occasion to deal with this aspect in some detail elsewhere in this judgment in the right of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Tulsamma. It is, therefore, difficult to cast any could on the validity of the bequest on the ground that it was prejudicial to the interest of Kalawati herself.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(17) It was then urged, on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council, in the case of Tagore, (1872) Ix Bengal Law Reports 377(3), that the bequest of a life estate simpliciter in favor of a Hindu widow was invalid being inconsistent with the traditional widow's estate or limited estate of a Hindu widow, as known to Hindu Law. There is no force in this contention. The testator was a sole surviving co-parcener, and was under no obligation to make any bequest in favor of Kalawati, a widow of a pre-deceased son, apart from a provision for her maintenance or any bequest that may be in the nature of such a provision. If that be so, he was free, subject to the aforesaid provision, to give or withhold any benefit from the widow. True, there is a clear distinction between life estate simpliciter and the limited estate of a widow or a widow's life estate, as known to Hindu Law. It is well known that a widow or other limited heir is not a tenant for life but is owner of the property inherited by her subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving on the next heir of the last full owner upon her death.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The whole estate is for the time vested in her and she represents it completely. As observed by the Privy Council, in the case of Janki Amal 1916, 43 Indian Appeals 207 (4), " her right is of the nature of right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited and in the familiar language of Mayne's Hindu Law, "so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession." As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagat Singh vs. Teja Singh 1962 Sc 83(5), : "WHENa widow succeeds as heir to her husband. the ownership in the properties both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successionis. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. it is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law. It is for this reason that it has been held that when Crown takes the property by escheat it takes it free from any alienation made by the widow of the last male holder which is not valid under the Hindu law, vide: Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata, 8 Moo Ind App 529 (PC). Where, however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriction imposed by Hindu law on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to decide what form the alienation should assume."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is no doubt true that the share taken by a Hindu widow in property inherited by her from her husband is called "widow's estate" or "woman's estate" and the estate taken by every other limited heir is similar in its incidence to a widow's estate. But that is the position of succession by a widow in Hindu Law and it has no impact on the manner in which an absolute owner, like the sole surviving coparcener, may devise his property during his lifetime or to make a testamentary disposition of it. Such testamentary disposition need not conform to any pattern known to Hindu Law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(18) TAGORE'S case is no doubt a landmark decision in which in the year 1872, the Judicial Committee, with respect, engrafted on Hindu Law the doctrine, which was never a part of it, that a Hindu could not make a gift or bequest for the benefit of an unborn person. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramanathan Vishwanathan and ors, 1970 Sc 1759 (6), the aforesaid decision was the result of a misconception with regard to the true meaning of the Sanskrit script on which it was based. The doctrine in Tagore's case was eventually altered by the three Acts. namely, the Hindu Transfer and Bequests Act of 1914, the Hindu Disposition of Property Act of 1916 and the Hindu Transfers and Bequest (City of Madras) Act. 1921, as a result of which no bequest is invalid by reason only that any person, for whose benefit the bequest is made, was not born at the date of the testator's death. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was, however, pointed out by the Supreme Court that the decision of the judicial Committee has, nevertheless, stood a great length of time and on the basis of that decision, rights had been regulated, arrangements as to property had been made and titles to property had passed and it was, therefore held. that it was a proper case in which the maxim "Communis error facit jus" may be applied. It is, however, true that the general observations of the Judicial Committee, nevertheless, still hold good. Thus a man cannot create a new form of estate or alter the line of succession allowed by law for the purpose of carrying out his own wishes or policy, and a private individual who attempts by gift or will to make property inheritable otherwise than the law directs, is assuming to legislate and that the gift must fail and the inheritance take place as the law directs. None of these general observations, however, appeared to be of any assistance in the present case. Tagor's case itself is an authority for the proposition that a Hindu may create a life estate or successive life estates provided the donee is a person capable of taking under the deed or the will. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These observations must also be seen in the context in which they were made. There is no question of altering the line of succession or creating a new form of estate in the present case. Kalawati was then not an heir and the testator as the sole surviving co-parcener was, therefore, entitled to create a life estate or successive life estate without in any manner inviting criticism that by that provision, testator was either creating a new form of estate or altering the line of succession allowed by law. A life estate simplicitor even in favor of a widow, who was not an heir, could not be said to amount to creating a new form of estate merely because it is distinguishable from the widows' estate or women's estate, known to Hindu law. The challenge to the validity of the bequest on this ground must, therefore, fail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(19) If Kalawati was the recipient of a life estate under a valid will, executed by her father-in-law, and continued A to be possessed of the estate till after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, did the nature of the estate continue to be the same as in the terms of the Will, as envisaged by sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act or did it get enlarged into an absolute estate on the requisite condi tions being satisfied as contemplated by sub-section (1) of that Section, is the last question that the suit poses for decision. Counsel for the parties, who addressed elaborate arguments on the question, martialling large- number of decisions of the various High Courts and of the Supreme Court in support of the rival contentions, and within the parameters of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Tulasamma, 1977 S.C. 1944(7) (supra), sought to justify the rival contentions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(20) This is how Section 14 runs : "14.(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation. In this sub-section, "property" includes both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance, or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(21) Counsel for the plaintiff claimed that, even though having regard to the very wide amplitude of sub-section ( 1 ) of the Section, the life estate could have been enlarged into an absolute estate under that sub-section, it, nevertheless, continued to be a life estate because, having regard to the facts and circumstances in which the estate was acquired, the case fell into the exception engrafted in sub-section (2) of that Section because of the admitted fact that Kalawati claimed under the Will of her father-in-law. Counsel for defendant No. 1, however, urged that sub-section (2) of that Section would be inapplicable and the acquisition would be outside the exception engrafted in that sub-section by virtue of the fact that the Will could not be said to be the foundation or the origin of the right and that the grant of the life estate under the Will was in recognition of or intended to effectuate a pre-existing right of 'Kalawati in or against the property arising out of her admitted right to maintenance out of the properties left by the testator. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(22) It is a debatable point if Freud was right when he threw up his hands after a life-long study of human psycho- logy and confessed that he had not been able to understand the nature of a female. It is. however, true that the place of a female in Hindu society and her nosition in Hindu Law has, for centuries, been mystifying. On the one hand, she was enthroned as the virtual incarnation of a Goddess and given a place of primacy in the family hierarchy but on the other, subjected to both social indignities and economic inequities and almost condemned to the position of serfdom. It is perhaps a measure of the same mystery that the same female, who was worshipped as a symbol of love and sacrifice, as a mother, was condemned as being worse than a d&mon. as a mother-in-law. Amogn? the economic inequities to which a Hindu femile was subjected for centuries has been the concept of widow's estate or a woman's estate, known to Hindu Law, which recognised only a limited right of alienation. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This inequity, which was defended for centuries on the ground that it was either intended to protect the female against evil influences or to ensure that the property was) preserved for the reversioners or the remainders of the last male owner, was sought to be set at naught by the provision of Section 14. The Section was intended to wipe out the disparities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property and to abridge the stringent provision against proprietory rights which were often considered as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognise her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. The Section, as indeed the Act, was intended to carry out a long overdue social purpose in the liberation of the Hindu female</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The provisions, of the Section, however, threw up a number of controversies of construction and, in particular, as to the amplitude of .sub-section ( 1 ) and the scope of the exception engrafted in sub-section (2) and as to the incidence and characteristics of a Hindu females' right to maintenance and, in particular, if the widow's right to maintenance, even though not right to property, can be considered, nevertheless, a pre-existing right in or against property which have bed evilled Courts for almost two decades, with an impressive array of High Courts taking contrary view. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">The controversy, has, by and large been resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Tulasamma (supra) in which while answering most of the questions that arose, the Supreme Court lamented that while the controversy remained raging for almost two decades the legislature did not think it fit to intervene to clarify the position or, if "necessary, to amend the law, leaving the battle to be judicially fought in restoring an equal status of Hindu women in the matter of disposition of property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The various questions raised in the present case appear to have been partly answered in the decision of the Supreme Court but it appears that, having regard to certain distinguishing features of the present case, some further questions are thrown up, which may justify one answer with reference to the facts and circumstances of cases, with which the Supreme Court in the above decision, as indeed, the various High Courts, were concerned, but the wider observations of the Supreme Court, as indeed, of some of the High Courts may justify a different answer. In a sense, the difficulty in the present case apparently starts where the decision in the case of Tulasamma ends. The husband of Tulasamma, who died in a state of jointness with his step brother, leaving joint property, made a specific claim to maintenance, the claim matured into an ex-parte decree and at the execution stage, there was a compromise in terms of which cert in properties were allotted to Tulasamma, with no power of alienation. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was in this context that the question arose if the properties held by Tulasamma would attract sub-section (1), because she was possessed of the properties on the crucial date, or sub-section (2) would be attracted because she got a restricted state under the terms of the compromise and, therefore, her interest could not be enlarged into an absolute estate. By the time the matter came to the Supreme Court, more than half a dozen decisions of the various High Courts were arrayed on one side and there was an equally impressive array on the other. The conflict of Judicial opinion largely turned on the nature of the right of maintenance of a Hindu widow and the extent to which it could be said to be interest in property and, if property could be said to have been acquired by virtue of an instrument even if it was in recognition of a pre-existing right to or in relation to property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bhagwati, J. who spoke for himself and Gupta, J, as he then was, held that sub-section (1) of Section 14 was wide in its scope and ambit and used language of great amplitude and that the sub-section which, by itself, was wide enough had been further amplified and its reach and ambit expanded by the explanation to it, which specifically included in the expression " property", both movable and immovable property, ac-quired by a female Hindu by inheritance or "devise", or at a partition, or "in lieu of maintenance" or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner, whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of the Act. Bhagwati, J. pointed out to the social objectives sought to be achieved by the provision and abserved that the Court had in a series of decisions given "a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-section (1) of S. 14 with a view to advancing the social purpose of the legislation" and called attention to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Gumalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerawa, , and Mangal Singh v. Battno, Air 1967 S. C. 1786(9). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was, thus held that sub-section (1) was large in its amplitude and "covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu, 'including acquisition in lieu of maintenance". It was further held that sub-section (2) of the Section was more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and this sub-section excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section ( 1) and being in the nature of an exception to the provision which was calculated to achieve a social purpose of bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, "ITmust be considered strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of ameliorative provision contained in sub-section ( 1 ). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob subsection (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1)". <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was conceded that the language of sub-section (2) was apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under any instrument and this would apparently cover a case where property was given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument etc. prescribed limited interest. It was, however, pointed out that such an interpretation would "virtually emasculate sub-section (1)" for in that event, a large number of cases, where property is given to a Hindu female, at a partition or in lieu of the maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficient provision enacted in sub-section (1)". It was, therefore, held that sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) "so as to leave as large a scope as possible to sub-section (1) and, so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as grant, without any pre-existing right, under a gift. Will, instrument, decree,. order or award, the term of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property". </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was further held that "where, however, property is required by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribed a restricted estate in the property". Support for this line of approach was sought from an earlier decision of the Court in Badri Parshad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, . In that case, the award gave a restricted estate to the widow in the properties allotted to here but sub-section (1) was held applicable because, inter alia the properties given to her under the award were or the basis of a pre-existing right which she had as an heir of her husband and not as a new grant made for the first time. A question was, therefore, posed if in the case of Tulasamma, properties were acquired by her under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right or they were acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone and to nothing else. The Court then examined the nature of the right of maintenance and the extent to which it conferred a right in relation to property and observed that the right of the widow to be maintained is, of course, not jus in rem since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but is certainly jus ad rem i.e. right against the joint family property and that when specific property was, therefore, allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">That is how the question posed was answered in favor of Tulasamma and it was held that the properties were acquired by her under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right and not for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise. The decisions of the various High Courts, which had taken the contrary view were over-ruled and the cases which had taken a view consistent with the view of the Supreme Court were approved. The theme, as indeed, the reasoning found further elaboration at the hands of Fazal Ali, J. was delivered the main- judgment. Fazal Ali, J. analysed some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and the decisions of the various High Courts in which contrary view had been taken by the High Courts. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">One of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, to which Fazal Ali, J. was himself a party, i.e. Smt. Naraini Devi vs. Smt. Ramo Devi. , which was directly in point and in which a contrary view had been taken, was overruled and it was pointed out that the various aspects, namely, the nature and extent of the Hindu women's right to maintenance the limited scope of sub-section (2) and the effect of the explanation to sub-section (1), which influenced the decision in Tulasamma, were neither brought to the notice of the Court nor were argued, and it was ignoied that by the explanation to sub-section (1), "property given to a widow at a partition or in lieu of maintenance had been placed in the same category" as a share in the property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(23) It follows, therefore, that sub-section (2) would. operate to exclude the property out of the wide spectrum of sub-section (1) on the conditions of sub-section (2) being satisfied, if and only if the instrument is the source or the foundation for the grant and the beneficiary was either a stranger to the property or to the family or had no preexisting right to or in relation to or against that property, whether as an heir or as a widow entitled to maintenance. The essential condition to attract the provision of sub-section (2) of the Section is not satisfied in the prestnt case in that, Kalawati was no stranger to the family of the testator, and. the last sole surviving co-parcener. She was the widow of a pre-deceased son and was entitled to be maintained out of the property sought to be bequeathed. The limited estate conferred on her by the testator was a clear recognition of the obligation of the testator to provide maintenance for her out of the property and in clear recognition of her right to be maintained out of the property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">She certainly nad no right in the property or even to the property as an heir but by virtue of her undisputed right of maintenance, she could look to that property and could have perfected her title to it if a charge had been created. That the grant was in recognition of a pre-existing right is writ large in the terms of the will itself because in the Will, the testator describes Kalawati as indeed her daughter, Shanti Devi, as his "Waris" i.e.. heirs. True, in the law of succession, as itstood then, neither Kalawati nor Shanti Devi were the heirs of the testator and the only right that Kalawati had in relation to the property was the right of maintenance as the widow of a pre-deceased son. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">But this reference to her right in relation to property underscores, if such an emphasis was necessary, the claim that the grain was in recognition of a pre-existing right of maintenance. True, there are no express words in the Wili which could be construed as property being allotted to Kalawati in lieu of maintenance or in lieu of arrears of maintenance but this is so implicit that nothing would turn on the absence of express words of allotment. The basic question ?s of any existing relationship between the female and the property possessed by her, which is antecedent to the instrument and that test, to my mind, is fully satisfied.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(24) Learned counsel, for the plaintiffs, who had initially almost laughed away the claim of the defendant No. 1 based on the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, had apparentiv realised that the contention of the defendant could prove fatal to the case of the plaintiffs and that the cuntention could not be easily brushed aside in view of the way the Supreme Court had construed the two sub-section Learned counsel therefore, made a valiant effort to bypass the provisions of subection (1) of Section 14 and to bring the case within the restricted parameters of sub-section (2) of the Section and sought to distinguish the decision in the case of Tulasamma on the ground that, that case did not involve the grant under a Will as also to read down the decision of the Supreme Court in the context of the facts of that case and sought, to justify the conclusion in favor of plaintiffs with reference to some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the decisions of the various High Courts. touching the question as to the nature and characteristics of the right of maintenance and the circumscaces in which a widcw may be deprived of the right. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Learned council also". sought to take advantage of the unfortunate circumstance of the unchastity of Kalawati to support his contention (25) In the first instance, it- was ueged that the case of Tulasamma involved a family settlement, following disputes between different members of the family, and the settlement in terms, allotted the property to Tulasamma in recognition of a pre-existing right of maintenance and that that decision would have no application to the present case, where the grant was made by a Will and the grant made no express reference to the right of maintenance and no specific property was allotted to or referable to any right of maintenance of Kalawati. True, in the case of Tulasamma, the proceedings were initiated by Tulasamma by a petition for maintenance, which ultimately culminated in a compromise and in the settlement, Tulasamma was allotted the scheduled: properties but was to enjoy only a limited interest therein With no power of alienation and the properties were to revert to the plaintiff in that case after her death and she continued to remain in possession after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This contention, however, overlooks the important circumstance that the propositions of law laid down in that case are not confined to cases where specific property is allotted to a female on a settlement or otherwise. The decision is based on a wider principle and the test laid down in both the Judgments clearly is, if the instrument by which the female comes by the property, is the foundation of the right to the property or the instrument is a mere recognition or materialisation of a pre-existing right i.e. a right which existed prior to the instrument. It is no doubt true that the principle enunciated is certainly wider than the strict facts and circumstances that called for a decision in that case; but I think, the wider observations of the Supreme Court, as indeed, the wider construction placed by the Court on the provisions of sub-section (1) of the Section and restricted contruction of sub-section (2) of that Section, had a clear object, namely, to act in aid of the social purpose underlying the enactment. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It would, therefore, be of no consequence as to what the nature of the instrument was or if there is an express reference to the pre-existing right and whether or not a specific property was allotted in lieu of maintenance. What is important is if the relationship of the female with the family or the property or the right in relation to the property, was antecedent to the instrument. That test, as I hage said above, it clearly satisfied in the present case. Some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court which were, unfortunately, not commented upon in the case of Tulasamma, either because they were not referred to or were otherwise not considered relevant, do not appear to provide any basis for the contention.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(26) One of these cases is . This was the case of a life estate granted by a Will to a daughter aid, with respect, it was rightly held in that case that Section 14(1) would not be applicable and the life estate would not be enlarged into an absolute estate because there was no antecedent right to the property. A daughter, in the law that stood then, had neither the right to the property nor any right in relation to the property by virtue of any possible claim of maintenance. It was the case of a married daughter.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(27) The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Karmi, , no doubt supports the plaintiffs because there, a Hindu widow, who was certainly entitled to maintenance, got a life estate under the Will of her husband, but the contention that the life estate under the Will became absolute estate under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, was repelled. This judgment was never considered by the Court in the case of Tulasamma. It is a short judgment running into barely one page. The Bench included Justice Shah and Grover, JJ., who were party to the earlier judgment in the case of Badri Prasad, , which is one of the earliest judgments of the Supreme Court in which, on the basis of the explanation to the Section. it was brought out that sub-section (2) "can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the famale Hindu who is in possession of the property." </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The larger questions canvassed before the Court in the case of Tulasamma, as also in the case of Badri Prasad, as to the nature and characteristics of the right of maintenance and as to how the right of maintenance conferred a right in relation to the property, even though not constituting a right in the property, were neither posed nor answered in the case of Mst. Karmi. There is no discussion as to why the right of the wife to maintenance was not an antecedent right in relation to the property and the reasons why it could not be said that the bequest in the Will was in recognition of the pre-existing right to maintenance. In view of the other decisions of the Supreme Court, including the decision in the case of Tulasamma, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Karmi was impliedly overruled, even though not expressly referred to. If the question before the Supreme Court in the case of Karmi was considered in the context of the principles enunciated in the case of Tulasamma as indeed, some of the earlier cases referred to in that Judgment, the decision in the case of Karmi would have been different and I say so with utmost respect.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(28) In the case of Kunji Thommen, 1970 Kerala 284 (14), the Kerala High Court reiterated the principle laid down earlier by that High Court in the case of Saraswati Amal, 1966 Kerala 66(15) but applied sub-section (2) on: the peculiar facts of that case and held that the allotment of properties in the partition was not on the basis of any preexisting right. The decision in that case really turned on the conclusion that there was no moral obligation on the father-in-law to maintain a widowed daughter-in-law, who was not dependant on the father-in-law, and had independent means of her own. The Court, however, considered the contention alternatively "on the assumption, that there was a legal obligation." It was, however, found that the partition was effected to benefit other members of the family, who had no right to the property, and that the widow in that case could not have claimed any interest in the properties during the life time of the last holder. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is interesting to notice that because of the decision of the legal propositions, this case was approved in the Judgment of Bhagwati, J. for himself and Gupta, J. as he then was, but this case finds no mention in the list of cases approved by Fazal Ali, J. in his judgment even though in para 51 of the Judgment,, it is noticed that this case reiterates the principle laid down by the Kerala High Court earlier but ''on the facts of that particular case, the High Court held that under the family settlement the widow did not get any right to maintenance but was conferred a new right which was not based on her preexisting right and on this ground the High Court felt that the widow would not get an absolute interest in view of the explanation of Section 14(1)." The decision of the Kerala High Court would not be a authority for the facts and circumstances in this case where there was an admitted right to maintenance before the Will and the Will records the fact that the testator regarded Kalawati as his "waris". This expression clearly implies the recognition of an existing status and right in relation to the property of the testator.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(29) The decision of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Ram Devi, 1978 Allahabad Law Reports 715(16), on which reliance was placed is of little assistance to the plaintiffs for a variety of reasons. In the first instance, the peculiar facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The widow never came to possess the property in that case. She claimed the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, merely on the basis that she had the right of being maintained out of the joint family estate and of residence in the joint family house and that these rights constituted property which she possessed and by virtue of that possession, she became full owner of the property by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It was in this context that it was held that "bare right of being maintained out of the joint family estate and of residence in the joint family house could not be said to be such a property as may have been possessed by the widow within the meaning of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 so as to make her a full owner of any property, unless some property had been specifically earmarked and settled on her in lieu of that right of maintenance." No property had, therefore, been given to her in lieu or in recognition of any such right of maintenance. Secondly, the learned Judge did not purport to express any considered opinion in the view that he took that the suit must be tried afresh. That is why the learned Judge added that "I need not express any concluded opinion in the matter." Moreover, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tulasamma is an authoritative enunciation of the law as to the nature and characteristic of the right of a widow of being maintained out of the joint family estate and as to the circumstances in which there is a preexisting right to the property as distinguished from the insrument which may be the only foundation of the right.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(30) It is no doubt true that when the Bill which ultimately became the Act, was referred to a Joint Committeee, Clause 18(2) of the Bill corresponding to the present sub-section (2) of Sectitn 14, referred only to acquisition of property by a Hindu female under "gift or Will" and it was only subsequently that the other modes of acquisition were added so as to include property under an instrument, decree, order or Award; and while dealing with -this circumstance, Bhagwati, J. in his Judgment pointed out that this seemed to indicate that the "LEGISLATIVEintendment was that subsection (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or will." <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is, however, difficult to read into these observations that an acquisition under a gift or a Will must always connote acquisition for the first time or necessarily exclude a pre-existing right to or in relation to such property. If this were so, sub-section (1) could not have been so widely construed in spite of the explanation to it but it has been so construed. The use of the expression devise" in the explanation would .appear to be significant when considering the case of a Will. It is also good to remember in this context that a Will may be made, and Wills are invariably made, in favor of legatees, who may be heirs even without the Will or may have rights in relation to the property after the death of the testator and such Wills are intended to merely give effect to that right or to put the right beyond any possible controversy. Section 14(1) is wide enough to cover the case of any acquisition, irrespective A of the mode by which it is acquired, including a Will or a gift, and the acquisition under a Will or a gift, as indeed, any other instrument would fall outside the purview of subsection (1) and be covered by sub-section (2) only if the condition that the instrument was the foundation for the acquisition was satisfied and not otherwise. On a reference to the judgment of Fazal Ali, J., it would be found that of the three conditions for the application of sub-section (2), enumerated in para 40 of the Judgment, condition No. 3 is "THATthe instrument must creates or confer a new right, title or interest on the Hindu female and not merely recognise or give effect to a pre-existing right which the female Hindu already possessed." <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This is sufficient authority for the proposition that acquisition, even under a Will. would be outside the purview of the exception if it merely recognised or gave effect to a pre-existing right of a female Hindu in: relation to the property. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(31) Based on some of the statutory provisions of the law relating to a Hindu female, as indeed, the law relating to maintenance and transfer of property, and a large number of cases which took the traditional view of nature and characteristics of Hindu widow's right to .maintenance and the effect of deprivation of the right on the validity of the transfer of property, counsel for the plaintiff sought to emphasise the "inchoate" nature of the right, its illusory character and the imponderables involved in perfecting the right of maintenance to a right to in or against property. A distinction was also sought to be drawn between the right of an heir to property and the mere right of a maintenance holder in or against the property. It, however, appears to me that with the decision in the case of Tulasamma, these contentions have ceased to have any relevance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The decision in the case of Tulasamma is based on a welcome recognition of the true nature and scope of right of maintenance, the relationship between the right of maintenance and right to property, even though no specific charge is created and there is neither allotment of any property nor a decree in relation thereto and, what is more, the right of maintenance in relation to property has been virtually put at par with the right to property on inheritance. This has been possible on an analysis of the authorities on the subject of right of maintenance of a Hindu female and the Shastric Hindu Law on the subject as also because of the legislative device introduaced in the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14. It is useful to notice in this context that one of the questions posed before the Court in the case of Tulasamma as : "whether a Hindu widow has a right to property in lieu of her maintenance and if such a right is conferred on her subsequently by way of maintenance, it would amount to mere recognition of a pre-existing right or a conferment of a new title so as to fall squarely within Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act." </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This is how Fazal Ali, J. summarised the position of the Hindu women's right to maintenance : "27.Thus on a carefull consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidence and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance : (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow, (2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e. it is a jus and rem not'just in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is amatter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 and is, therefore, a preexisting right; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a' sort of co-owner in the property of her husband though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(32) It is interesting to notice In this context that the claim or the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu female has been held to be and is considered really, "Asubstitute for a share which she would have got in the property of her husband". If that be so, the Supreme Court, with respect,. rightly posed the question that if that was the position, "where a Hindu female who gets a share in her husband's property, acquires an absolute interest by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, could it be intended by the Legislature that in the same circumstances, a Hindu female who could not get a share but has a right of maintenance, would not get an absolute interest ?" <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(33) It may be useful to remember that the view taken by the High Courts of Bombay, Andhra Pradesh, Patna, Mysore, Punjab, Calcutta and Kerala, to the effect that the widow's claim to maintenance, even though granted subject to certain restrictions, would be covered by Section 14(1) and not by sub-section (2) approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Tulasamma, is based on the premises that the right of Hindu widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly " a right against property though not a right to property", and the provision of sub-section (2) could not be interpreted in a way so as to destroy the concept and defend the purpose which is sought to be effectuated by subsection (1) in conferring an absolute interest on the Hindu women and in doing away with what was heretobefore known as the Hindu Women's estate and that the proviso would not apply to any grant or transfer where it is "merely in recognition or declaration of a pre-existing right", and would apply only to a case "where a new right which the female did not possess at all is sought to be conferred on her under certain limitations or exceptions." <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(34) It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court that the contrary view expressed by the Madras, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad and Jammu & Kashmir High Courts proceeded on the ground that a widow's claim to maintenance was merely "an inchoate or incomplete right having no legal status, unless the widow gets a property in lieu of maintenance or unless the charge is created in a particular property, the claim for maintenance cannot be legally enforced; and that where under a grant a property is allotted ti. a widow in lieu of the maintenance, it is not the recognition of any pre-existing right but amounts to conferment of a new right for the first time." While rejecting the contrary view, it was observed by Fazal Ali, J. that "the nature and extent of the right of the widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right and it is wrong to say that such a right comes into existence only if the property is allotted to the widow in lieu of maintenance and not otherwise." </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">These observations, to my mind, provide a .complete answer to the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiffs. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the provision of Section I was intended to remove the disability attaching to the Hindu female's right to property and the legislation has a commendable social object. The provision must, therefore, not only be construed in the light of that objective but must also be applied so as to further the social object sought to be achieved. To accept the contention of the plaintiffs would be to frustrate the objective of the legislation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(35) It was then urged that in any event, provision for the maintenance of Kalawati could have been adequately made by one of the properties and the Will having left one property in her favor as an absolute estate, with the right of alienation and Kalawati having, during her lifetime, alienated that property pursuant to the legacy, the right to maintenance could not be extended against the other properties, forming subject-matter of the Will and now forming subject-matter of the present suit. This argument or facts appears to be quite attractive but is unable to stand closer scrutiny.' It is the plaintiffs case that Section 14(1) would not be attracted and the operation of sub-section (2) of Section 14 could not be excluded because no property was specifically allotted to Kalawati by way of or. in lieu or expressly in recognition of the right of maintenance and I have held that there was no express or specific allotment of a particular property for that purpose. If that be so, the right of maintenance would .be a light against ail the properties audit could not therefore, besaid that that right had been satisfied because of aspecific property allotted for the purpose of maintenance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is true that one of the-properties was subject-matter of an absolute estate and it is a common case that Kalawati sold that property during: her lifetime and may have utilised the proceeds for her maintenance and that of her daughter but there is nothing to indicate that the need of the maintenance of Kalawati and her infant child had thereby been exhausted or that on the disposal of that property, the right of maintenance against the rest of the property ceased to exist. The bequest in the Will has to be seen in its totality and manifests a clear intention that the properties were being given to Kalawati partly as absolute estate and partly as a life estate because she was a "Waris" of the testator and she being a ^-deceased son's widow, the testator felt an obligation. to maiatain her and her daughter. It is, therefore, not possible to apportion the right of maintenance against any particular part of the property or to 'hold that part of the property would be covered by sub-section (2) of Section 14 and the rest would be outside Its provision.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(36) Lastly, it was urged that Kalawati forfeited her right of maintenance in relation to the property because of unchastity and that if the bequest in her favor was in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of the right or for its implementation, then, consequent on the forfeiture of the right of maintenance, there was a divesting of property and on such forfeiture, she could not be said to be holding or possessed of the property in recognition of the right of maintenance. Plaintiffs had not raised this contention in the pleadings apparently because in the written statement the claim of the defendant that by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14, the life estate flowered into an absolute estate, had not been raised, and a grievance was made that if such a plea bad been specifically raised, it would have been open to the plaintiffs to set up a defense of unchastity. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">However, plaintiffs had laid a basis in the plaint itself lor a possible plea that Kalawati was unchaste and that defendant No. 1 was an illegitimate son in that it was specifically stated in the plaint that defendant No. 1 was born to Kalawati after more than 10 years of the death of her husband. The averment was, however, not elaborated further. In his written, statement, defendant No. 1 was evasive with regard to the claim of legitimacy and that is why before the issues were framed on May 14, 1980, defendant No. 1 was examined by the Court, apparently at the instance of the plaintiffs, with regard to the date of his birth and the date of death of Onkar Prasad. Defendant No. 1 was again evasive because he neither disclosed his date of birth nor the date of the death of Onkar Prasad. The issues framed on May 14, 1980 included the issue, if defendant No. 1 was the son of Onkar Prasad. Subsequently, when plaintiffs by I.A 57\181 sought the deletion of certain 'issues and refraining of others, defendant No. 1 in his reply raised a specific plea calling in aid the provision of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and maintained that Kalawati was entitled to maintenance as the widow of a pre-deceased son and, therefore, had a pre-existing right in relation to the property. Plaintiffs thus had the necessary opportunity to raise the plea of chastity at that stage as disentitling Kalawati to any maintenance but failed to do so. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">However, during the trial of the suit, both the parties were not unaware of the allegation of unchastity, the material in relation to it and its lively impact on Kalawati's right to mantenance and its possible implication on the nature of the estate bequested to and possessed by her when the Act came into force. Counsel for the parties were therefore, allowed to agitate this question.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(37) Whether Kalawati remained chaste or not is a question that would present little difficulty even though there are on record, plaintiff's admissions, as also that of the plaintiff's father, an eminent Advocate himeslf, that defendant No. 1 was the son of Onkar Prasad. Umrao Singh executed the will in 1927. He died in 1928. His adopted son. Onkar Prasad had admittedly died by then, leaving Kalawati as awidow and an infant child Shanti Devi, a daughter. It is obvious from the will that when Umrao Singh executed his will in 1927, Kalawati had no son. It is nobody's case that Kalawati was pregnant of defendant No. 1, during the lifetime of Umrao Singh, and the factum of pregnancy was concealed from him. This is patent -because otherwise the existence of a son of a pre-deceased son or the possibility of the birth of one would have not only been mentioned in the will but would have made all the difference. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the Will, the testator exhibited an anxiety that Kalawati, a widow holds a life estate, except in relation to one house, followed by a life estate for her daughter and the property ultimately going to the male progeny of the daughter, the anxiety being that the property ultimately is in the hands of a male heir from Kalawati's daughter. If Kalawati had a son or was expecting a child, the whole context would have changed. The defendant No. 1 was admittedly born to Kalawati and from what has been said above, it inevitably follows that he could not have been born from Onkar Prasad, otherwise. his mention could not possibly have been omitted in the Will. If Onkar Prasad died in 1922, as alleged by plaintiffs, the position is worse but even if he deid sometime thereafter. but admittedly before the death of his father, it hardly improves the position for defendant No. 1 it is no doubt true that a number of documents have been placed on record in which defendant No. 1 has been described as the son of Onkar Prasad and the plaintiff's father was the author of those documents. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">But it is difficult to ignore that until the Differences arose between the parties, they had friendly relations obviously because, in any event, Shanti Devi. the mother of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 had a common mother, even though not a common father. Legitimacy is basically a matter of acceptance by the family. So long as defendant No. 1 had been accepted as the son of Onkar Prasad, there was hardly any problem. The fact that he was describing himself as son of Onkar Prasad and was being described as such by his sister and the other relations .is, therefore, quite understandable. Illegitimacy does not merely stigmatised defendant No. 1. it really stigmatised his mother, who was also Shanti Devi's mother. Moreover, whether legitimate or not, there was no other respectable way in which defendant No. 1 coil Id describe himself. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The reference in the written statement to the fact that property was. purchased at an auction by the plaintiffs in the name of defendant No. 1 as a benamdar, as contended by the plaintiffs, but built upon and in the occupation of the plaintiff, clearly shows that in spite of the conflicting claims to property, no love was lost between them until lure for more embittered their relations. Defendant No. 1 has not clearly disclosed the date of his birth but from the affidavits in which he has given his ages, it is clear that he could not have been born either during the lifetime of Onkar Prasad or within Isss than one year of his death. Learned counsel for defendant No. 1 did not seriously contest the obvious conclusion that defendant was an illegitimate child of Kalawati, born in 1930 or thereabout, long after the death of Onkar Prasad. This circumstance, unfortunately, leads to an irresistible conclusion that around that time, Kalawati became unchaste.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(38) What then is the effect of this unchastity an the bequest made in her favor and, in particular, on the claim that on the passing of the 1956 Act. the life estate flowered into an absolute estate. The unfortunate circumstance of the 'unchastity of Kalawati, to my mind, had no impact either on the validity of the bequest or on the operation of Section 14. True a Hindu female entitled to maintenance would forfeit the right to maintenance in the event of unshastity almost as if continued chaste life was a condition of the grant of maintenance. Such was-the adherence to the matrimonial ethics as also the subjugation of the Hindu female. A Hindu male could perhaps have his dissipations, both in sex and otherwise, with impunity without attracting any evil consequences in his material life but not so a Hindu widow. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The forfeiture of the right to maintenance, however, could not have any retrospective effect on the vesting of the property by virtue of the Will in recognition of the right of maintenance. There was. an admitted right to maintenance when Umrao Singh died in 1928. On the death of Urnrao Singh, the vesting of the estate in Kalawati became complete. Maintenance of Kalawati was no doubt the motivation for the grant as also its object but the vesting having taken place, there was no question of any divesting of Kalawati because of unchastity. A provision to that effect in the Will would perhaps have made qualitative difference but there is no such provision. In any event, even if there, was divesting on forfeiture of right of maintenance, it would, in no way, improve the case of the plaintiffs. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The grant was still in recognition of a right that existed when the grant was made and the condition of sub-section 2 of Section 14 would still not be satisfied. If the forfeiture of the right of maintenance invalidated the grant by any process of reasoning the plaintiffs would be in no better position because on such invalidity and divesting, Kalawati remained possessed of the property without the colour of a title, and perfected that title by continued adverse possession over the years. This would have also flowered into absolute estate either with or without the aid of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Unchasity of Kalawati, therefore, had no impact on the nature of the estate held by her and as to its transformation on the coming into force of the Act of 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(39) If Kalawati held the property as an absolute estate by virtue of sub-section (1 ) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, either because the devise of a life estate in her favor in the will of the testator was a grant in recognition of of an existing right arising out of the right of being maintained out of the property or she held the property over the years by way of adverse possession, it follows that on her death, the second bequest in favor of Shanti Devi, as in. deed, the further bequest in favor of the plaintiffs stood frustrated, and the property passed by succession to two heirs of Kalawati i.e. defendant No. 1 and her sister, Shanti Devi. This would disentitle the plaintiffs to the declaration sought by them. Whether the plaintiffs succeeded to the half share that fall to the share of Shanti Devi as her sons or there were other heirs of Shanti Devi entitled to take the property along with the plaintiffs, is a further question with which I am not concerned in the present suit, the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit being solely based on the right flowing from the Will.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(40) For all these reasons, the suit fails and is hereby dismissed but, in the peculiar circumstances, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-34974727479904175232020-01-27T17:12:00.002+05:302020-01-27T17:12:23.706+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">NARESH KUMARI (DEAD) BY LRS, & ... VS. SHAKSHI LAL (DEAD) BY LRS, &...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 5.02.1999</span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Summarised Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The question in issue is, whether a female Hindu buying a house from a widow, a widow's estate prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1956 Act'), would become full owner of such house by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act? In other words, it raises the question of interpretation of Section 14(1) and (2), as to, whether the transferee of such widow's estate, on the facts of this case, would fall under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14? In case it falls under Sub-section (2), it would not mature her right in such property and thus it would revert back to the reversioners of the husband of the widow but if it falls under sub-section (1) she would become full owner of such property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Facts of the Case :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">It is necessary to give some of the basic bare facts to appreciate and adjudicate the controversies of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">One Smt. Kesri, widow of Radhakishan, sold the house in dispute to Smt, Naresh Kumari, the appellant No. 1, on 29th January, 1954 for Rs. 3,000. Sakshi Lal and Ashwani Kumari, the respondents, are reversioners of Radhakishan. Earlier, the said reversioners challenged the said sale and sought declaration of the title over the said house, by filing a suit for declaration, challenging the claim of the appellants. Their case was that Smt. Kesri had only a limited interest in the property and thus she had no right to sell the property without any legal necessity. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">On 13th June, 1955, this suit was decreed by the Trial Court holding that the transfer, by virtue of the said sale made by the widow was without any legal necessity and hence void against the reversioners interest. Aggrieved by this, Smt. Nirmal Kumari appealed before the first appellate court. During its pendency, on 17th June, 1956 the aforesaid Hindu Succession Act came into force and on 22nd May, 1957 Smt. Kesri died. Finally, on 11th June, 1958, the appeal Was also dismissed.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">After conclusion of the first leg of litigation, thereafter on 10th June, 1959, the reversioners of Radhakishan, the respondents before us, filed another suit for possession of the house in dispute on the basis of the decree as aforesaid. The defendants, the appellants before us, have contested the suit on the ground that on the date Smt. Kesri died, namely, 22nd May 1957, since Hindu Succession Act came into force, Smt. Kesri became full owner of the said property and hence she being trans-feree from her and being in possession of this property became full owner. For such transfer she, in fact, invested Rs. 3,000. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff- respondents. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Kangra Division, thus the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. The second appeal by the plaintiff was allowed by the High Court by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and restoring the decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by this order, the present appellants-Smt. Naresh Kumari & Ors. have filed this appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In the present case, this does not arise, as transfer already held to be void in the earlier suit. A possible argument, though not argued, that in case the transfer was bad as void, the property would be deemed to have reverted back to Smt. Kesri and on coming into force of the 1956 Act she became full owner. Even if that be, alienee could only succeed if there be any transfer to her after this date. There is mote in the present case, her claim is only through the sale deed executed when she had only limited right. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">On the contrary, we find that the order and decree in the first suit results into giving an alienee a restricted right. Thus, the said transfer would be circumscribed and restricted by the order passed in the first suit. Thus, even on this ground it could not be said that the alienee- appellants had unrestricted right. It is also not in dispute that the appellants received the property not in lieu of her any pre-existing right, but received right in the property for the first time through the sale deed. In view of this, the appellants' case would fall under sub-section (2). Thus, the appellants' right in the said property could not be upheld.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In view of our aforesaid findings, none of the submissions on behalf of the appellants could be accepted. The appeal is devoid of any merit and thus fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. Cost on the parties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">NARESH KUMARI (DEAD) BY LRS, & ... VS. SHAKSHI LAL (DEAD) BY LRS, &...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 5.02.1999</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench : K. Venkataswami, A.P. Misra</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CASE NO. : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Appeal (civil)</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">1798 of 1980</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITIONER : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">NARESH KUMARI (DEAD) BY LRS, AND ANOTHER</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RESPONDENT : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">SHAKSHI LAL (DEAD) BY LRS, AND ANOTHER</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATE OF JUDGMENT : 05/02/1999</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">BENCH : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">K. VENKATASWAMI & A.P. MISRA</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT :</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT 1999(1) SCR 438 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J. The question in issue is, whether a female Hindu buying a house from a widow, a widow's estate prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1956 Act'), would become full owner of such house by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act? In other words, it raises the question of interpretation of Section 14(1) and (2), as to, whether the transferee of such widow's estate, on the facts of this case, would fall under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14? In case it falls under Sub-section (2), it would not mature her right in such property and thus it would revert back to the reversioners of the husband of the widow but if it falls under sub-section (1) she would become full owner of such property.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is necessary to give some of the basic bare facts to appreciate and adjudicate the controversies of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">One Smt. Kesri, widow of Radhakishan, sold the house in dispute to Smt, Naresh Kumari, the appellant No. 1, on 29th January, 1954 for Rs. 3,000. Sakshi Lal and Ashwani Kumari, the respondents, are reversioners of Radhakishan. Earlier, the said reversioners challenged the said sale and sought declaration of the title over the said house, by filing a suit for declaration, challenging the claim of the appellants. Their case was that Smt. Kesri had only a limited interest in the property and thus she had no right to sell the property without any legal necessity. On 13th June, 1955, this suit was decreed by the Trial Court holding that the transfer, by virtue of the said sale made by the widow was without any legal necessity and hence void against the reversioners interest. Aggrieved by this, Smt. Nirmal Kumari appealed before the first appellate court. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">During its pendency, on 17th June, 1956 the aforesaid Hindu Succession Act came into force and on 22nd May, 1957 Smt. Kesri died. Finally, on 11th June, 1958, the appeal Was also dismissed. After conclusion of the first leg of litigation, thereafter on 10th June, 1959, the reversioners of Radhakishan, the respondents before us, filed another suit for possession of the house in dispute on the basis of the decree as aforesaid. The defendants, the appellants before us, have contested the suit on the ground that on the date Smt. Kesri died, namely, 22nd May 1957, since Hindu Succession Act came into force, Smt. Kesri became full owner of the said property and hence she being trans-feree from her and being in possession of this property became full owner. For such transfer she, in fact, invested Rs. 3,000. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff- respondents. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Kangra Division, thus the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. The second appeal by the plaintiff was allowed by the High Court by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and restoring the decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by this order, the present appellants-Smt. Naresh Kumari & Ors. have filed this appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The relevant provision is Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act is quoted hereunder :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. -(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Explanation. - In this sab-section, `property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. Thus Section 14(1) enshrines long awaited, cherished and socially desirable protective right to a Hindu widow when her limited right in the estate of her husband, in lieu of her maintenance flowered into full right. She is conferred as full owner in such estate. The right to the maintenance of wife by a husband is recognised from the very inception, recognised even in the ancient vedic scriptures. This obligation was cast on the husband even were he had no property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">However, when such benevolent principle was not followed, the law created on equitable charge on the estate of the husband, whether self acquired or a share in the ancestral property, for her limited right of maintenance. This charge was to place an obligation on the person inheriting such property of her husband to maintain the widow even where such property goes in their hands. Even before this 1956 Act, to secure justice to such widows. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and The Hindu Married Women's Act to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 were made. Each of these Acts did not give any new right to the widows but gave recognition of their pre-existing rights. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This made explicit for a widow to claim her maintenance out of the estate or share in a estate of her husband. In Kalishanker Das and Another v. Dhirendra Nath Patra and Others, [1955] 1 SCR 467, this Court recorded that what is the widow's right in widow's estate, including the right of reversioners in such estate under the Hindu Law what existed prior to the 1956 Act:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is a well settled doctrine of Hindu law that nobody has a vested right so long as the widow is alive and the eventual rever-sioner does not claim through any one who went before him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The interest of a Hindu widow in the properties inherited by her bears no analogy or resemblance to what may be described as an equitable estate in English law and which cannot be followed in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. A Hindu widow has got only qualified proprietorship in her estate which she can alienate only when there is justifying necessity and the restrictions on her powers of alienation are inseparable from her estate. For legal necessity she can convey to another an absolute title to the property vested in her. If there is no legal necessity the transferee gets only the widow's estate which is not even an indefeasible life estate for it can come to an end not merely on her death but on the happening of other contingencies like re-marriage adoption, etc. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">If an alienee from a Hindu widow succeeds in establishing that there was legal necessity for transfer, he is completely protected and it is immaterial that the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the limited owner herself. Even if there is no necessity in fact, but it is proved that there was representation of necessity and the alienee after making bona fide enquiries satisfied himself as best as he could that such necessity existed, the actual existence of a legal necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of the sale. Therefore, if there is no necessity in fact or if the alienee could not prove that he made bona fide enquiries and was satisfied about its existence, the transfer is not void but the transferee would get only the widow's estate in the property which does not in any way affect the interest of the reversioner,"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It seems legitimately, wisdom of legislature thought that widows' limited right to maintenance though being recognised right from very inception under the Hindu Law, followed by recognition through legisla-tions, yet widows in receiving such limited right, faced difficulties in the hands of reversioners thus enacted the 1956 Act. Under it their limited right matured into full right. By sub-section (1) of Section 14, right in any property, possessed by a female Hindu, whether such property was ac-quired before or after coming into force of the 1956 Act, is recognised to be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, under it, the concept of limitation to the ownership right of a widow in such property dissolved. This was with an intention to eliminate the ordeal faced by widows for a long period of time. However, the periphery of such women's absolute right under Sub-section (1) is shrunk to a limited extent to what is contained under Sub-section (2), So what is covered under sub- section (2) would not fall within the sphere of sub-section (1). Thus, it becomes necessary, while interpreting, sub-sections (1) and (2) to keep in mind that this being a social and beneficial legislation for a female Hindu, its interpretation should not be such which curtails the benefit conferred under it. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, interpretation to sub-section (1) should not be restrictive but liberal in nature. On the other hand, sub-section (2) which curtails the sphere of sub-section (1) has to be given restrictive interpretation so as not to erode the sphere of widow's right conferred under sub-section (1). The language in sub-section (1) makes it clear that all what has to be shown by a female Hindu is that she had a right in the property in question and she is possessed of that property. The possession may be physical, constructive or formal in a legal sense on the date of the coming into operation of the Act. But this is not the since qua non for the acquisition of full ownership in the property. Under this sub-section when a female Hindu is put in possession of any property pursuant to her right to maintenance, her limited right or interest in the property thus far, by virtue of Section 14(1), blossoms into full ownership. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the other hand sub- section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of exception or proviso to sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) makes a widow, who had a limited interest, to be a full owner regardless whether acquisition was prior to or after the coming into force of the 1956 Act. We find, on the other hand that sub- section (2) excludes a woman's right from the field of sub-section (1), under this, where property is acquired by a female Hindu by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under an order or decree of a civil court or under an award and where there is a term in such gift, will or instrument including the order or decree or an award prescribing a restricted enjoyment in such property, it will not mature any full right in such property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">But where there is no such restriction in such property received by the transferee or beneficiary under such document or decree, it would not fall into the field of sub-sec-tion (2) but would fall under sub- section (1), The main contention for the respondents in the present case is that since the transfer by a sale deed by the widow, Smt. Kesri, of the house, in which at that time, when the 1956 Act has yet not come, she had only a limited right, she had no right to sell the house in question except for the legal necessity, which stood rejected in the first leg of legal proceedings between the same parties, hence the appellants could not be conferred a full right in the disputed property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The said transfer at the best could confer on her a limited right to enjoy, that too during the life time of Smt. Kesri, On the other hand, contention on behalf of the appellant-Smt. Naresh Kumari is that the transfer by a sale deed made by Smt. Kesri in her favour does not contain any restriction for the enjoyment of the estate, hence there being no restriction under the said document, it would not fall under sub- section (2) but would fall under sub-section (1) thus she became full owner thereof. Let us see the field of sub-section (2). The ingredients of this sub-section are, (a) property must have been acquired by way of gift, will or an instrument, decree or order of a civil court or an award; (b) that such document, order or decree must prescribe a restrictive right in such property and (c) such instrument, document or order must confer a new right or interest in such Hindu female not by way of recognition of or by way of giving effect to any pre-existing right which she already pos-sessed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The question of interpretation of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 has been in focus by decisions of this Court in the past, V. Tulsamma & Ore. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR P. 261, this decision exhaustively with precision has dealt with the history and the law on the subject preceding the enactment of the 1956 Act and has also interpreted these two sub-sections, the relevant portions are quoted hereunder :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the hus-band and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confers the pre-existing rights.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Section 14(1) and the explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio- economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has field of its own without interfering with the operation of S. 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by S. 14(1) of in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision, (4) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and S. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre- existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-sec-tion has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of S. 14(1) and the restrictions places, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-s. (2) and would be governed by S 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(5) The use of express terms like `property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition', `or in lieu of maintenance' `or arrears of maintenance' etc. In the Explanation S. 14(1) clearly makes Sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(6) The words `possessed by' used by the Legislature in S. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the proper-ty would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of S. 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(7) That the words `restrict estate' used in S. 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in S. 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other land of limitation that may be placed on the transferee."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Himi (Smt) D/O Lachhmu (Smt.) and Another v. Hira Devi (Smt.) widow of Budhu Ram and Others, [1996] 10 SCC P. 642, this Court followed the aforesaid V, Tulsamma case (supra).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In C Masilamani Mudaliar and Others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathas-wami Tihirukoil and Others, [1996] 8 SCC P. 525, this Court while inter-preting sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 held that in case where a Hindu female acquires and possesses the property in recognition of her pre- existing right, sub-section (1) will apply and in case where she gets the right for the first time under an instrument or order without any pre- exist-ing right, sub-section (2) will apply.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Within the sphere of this legal principle, now we revert to the facts of the present case. It is not in dispute that in the first leg of litigation between the parties, when Smt. Kesri, widow of Radhakrishan was alive and was a party, the respondents, reversioners of Radhakrishan, succeeded in their suit by getting declaration of this disputed house, that the sale deed by Smt. Kesri to Smt. Naresh Kumari was without legal necessity hence void. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed which became final. The present issue has arisen when the respondents reversioners filed their second suit for possession over the same property about which they got the decree as aforesaid. The question on these facts is, whether still appellants can claim to fall under sub-section (1) of Section 14? There could be no doubt before a benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14, even by the widow (Smt. Kesri), could be conferred, she has to show that she is possessed of this property in dispute in lieu of her limited right of maintenance. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The question is whether she was possessed of this property, to claim full right under sub- section (1) which she acquired before the 1956 Act came into force? The admitted fact is, she transferred all her right to the appellants through the said sale deed before the 1956 Act came into force. Thus, she could not be said to be possessed of this property. Thus, by her own conduct she herself relinquished all her right and even lost possession in it through the said transfer. Thus, she would not be said to be possessed of this property before coming into force the 1956 Act. Then how can she get benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14? It may be examined from another angle. It is not in dispute that any female Hindu could only alienate her limited right in an estate prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act, which is in her possession, only for a legal necessity, If alienation is without any legal necessity or is contrary to law the alienee would only get a transitory limited right to enjoy the property, during the life time of the widow which is the only residuary right she possessed which could be deemed to have been transferred. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, after the widow's death such property even from alienee would revert back to the reversioners of her husband. In Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Others, [1991] 3 SCC P, 410, this Court held :<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"A Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband, Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were produced from assailing its validity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">But if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow's estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under Section<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">14. And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner's interest. The alienee's possession may be good against the world, his right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but his interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the life time of his donor or transferor. It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This authority completely demolishes the case of the appellants. After having lost the battle in the first suit where it was held that Smt. Kesri sold the property to appellants without any legal necessity. After transfer of the property through the sale, as aforesaid, she could not be said to have continued in possession of such property. The sale was prior to the coming into force of the 1956 Act. So, prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act, she could not be said to be possessed of this property under sub- section (1) of Section 14. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the other hand, in the absence of any valid transfer by Smt. Kesri the reversioners would get the right in the said property after her death and alienee would have no right over it thereafter. Thus, the submission on behalf of the appellants that as the sale deed dated 29th January, 1954 does not restrict the enjoyment of the estate, hence it would fall outside the purview of sub-section (2) and would fall under sub- section (1) of Section 14 is misconceived and cannot be accepted. Alienee could have matured her right in the property, if transfer by Smt. Kesri would have have been after she had become full owner under Section 14(1), after coming into force of that Act. It is only in cases of valid transfers the question of examining whether such deed or document of transfer confers the transferee a restrictive right or not, arises.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the present case, this does not arise, as transfer already held to be void in the earlier suit. A possible argument, though not argued, that in case the transfer was bad as void, the property would be deemed to have reverted back to Smt. Kesri and on coming into force of the 1956 Act she became full owner. Even if that be, alienee could only succeed if there be any transfer to her after this date. There is mote in the present case, her claim is only through the sale deed executed when she had only limited right. On the contrary, we find that the order and decree in the first suit results into giving an alienee a restricted right. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Thus, the said transfer would be circumscribed and restricted by the order passed in the first suit. Thus, even on this ground it could not be said that the alienee- appellants had unrestricted right. It is also not in dispute that the appellants received the property not in lieu of her any pre-existing right, but received right in the property for the first time through the sale deed. In view of this, the appellants' case would fall under sub-section (2). Thus, the appellants' right in the said property could not be upheld.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In view of our aforesaid findings, none of the submissions on behalf of the appellants could be accepted. The appeal is devoid of any merit and thus fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. Cost on the parties.</span></div>
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www.tjaindia.comhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11207451459129957983noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7541232528116587042.post-58779339498843349672020-01-27T17:10:00.000+05:302020-01-27T17:10:03.991+05:30<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 20pt;">VELAMURI VENKATA SIVAPRASAD ... VS. KOTHURI VENKATESWARLU (DEAD) BY ...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BANERJEE, J. Some specific questions arise for determination in this appeal by the grant of special leave against a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">: </b>Firstly, whether re-marriage of a widow prior to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would divest her of even the limited ownership of her deceased husband's property, having due regard to the provisions of Section 2 of Hindu Widow's Re-marriage Act, 1856 (hereinafter referred to as`the Act of 1856'); and secondly, whether disqualification of inheritance, if any, by reason of re-marriage would stand obliterated by reason of the provisions of the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The factual score in the Appeal presently before us reveals that one Rosaiah was the owner of a large extent of properties. He died in February, 1937 leaving behind him his wife Lakshmamma and mother Venkayamma. Rosaiah executed a will on 11th January, 1937 wherein he bequeathed all his properties to his mother Venkayamma. Apart from providing some maintenance, Rosaiah did not provide anything else to his wife Lakshmamma. As a matter of fact in the will he stated that his wife Lakshmamma was not obedient to him and that her father with her aid was trying to knock off all his properties and that his wife was also not living with him. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">He however in the will provided that, in case his wife was prepared to take a boy of his mother's choice, in adoption, she could do so but the boy so adopted should be under the guardianship of his mother until attainment of majority and in that event would be entitled to certain properties as specified in the will. Factual score further depicts that after the death of Rosaiah, Lakshmamma filed a suit (OS No. 52 of 1939) for a declaration as regards her entitlement to all the properties of her husband. The mother, in her turn, also filed another suit for administration of the estate, on the basis of the will mentioned above (OS No. 42 of 1940). It appears from the records that there was in fact a compromise decree between both the mother and the wife of Rossiah which was recorded by the Court on 19th April 1942.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Observation of Court:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We do feel it expedient to record our concurrence therewith and as such come to the conclusion that the suit cannot be termed to be barred by the laws of limitation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Having considered the matter from all perspectives, we do feel it expedient to record that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court clearly fell into an error in not considering the true effect of Section 2 of the Act of 1856. According to us final decision rendered by the learned Single Judge on non-applicability of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act remains well sustained, though on a different line of reasoning as indicated hereinabove. Accordingly, it must be held that the Division bench was in error in applying Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act on the fact situation in the present case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Judgement :<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Division bench. The order as passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. No order as to costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">VELAMURI VENKATA SIVAPRASAD ... VS. KOTHURI VENKATESWARLU (DEAD) BY ...<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 20pt;">DATED : 24.11.1999</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Bench : S.B. Majmudar, M. Srinivasan, Umesh C. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">CASE NO. : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Appeal (civil)</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">425 of 1982</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">PETITIONER : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">VELAMURI VENKATA SIVAPRASAD (DEAD) BY L.RS.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">RESPONDENT : </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">KOTHURI VENKATESWARLU (DEAD) BY L.RS. AND ORS.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/11/1999</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;"><b>JUDGMENT :</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">JUDGMENT 1999 Supp(4) SCR 522 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BANERJEE, J. Two specific questions arise for determination in this appeal by the grant of special leave against a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court: Firstly, whether re-marriage of a widow prior to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would divest her of even the limited ownership of her deceased husband's property, having due regard to the provisions of Section 2 of Hindu Widow's Re-marriage Act, 1856 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act of 1856'); and secondly, whether disqualification of inheritance, if any, by reason of re-marriage would stand obliterated by reason of the provisions of the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The factual score in the Appeal presently before us reveals that one Rosaiah was the owner of a large extent of properties. He died in February, 1937 leaving behind him his wife Lakshmamma and mother Venkayamma. Rosaiah executed a will on 11th January, 1937 wherein he bequeathed all his properties to his mother Venkayamma. Apart from providing some maintenance, Rosaiah did not provide anything else to his wife Lakshmamma. As a matter of fact in the will he stated that his wife Lakshmamma was not obedient to him and that her father with her aid was trying to knock off all his properties and that his wife was also not living with him. He however in the will provided that, in case his wife was prepared to take a boy of his mother's choice, in adoption, she could do so but the boy so adopted should be under the guardianship of his mother until attainment of majority and in that event would be entitled to certain properties as specified in the will. Factual score further depicts that after the death of Rosaiah, Lakshmamma filed a suit (OS No. 52 of 1939) for a declaration as regards her entitlement to all the properties of her husband. The mother, in her turn, also filed another suit for administration of the estate, on the basis of the will mentioned above (OS No. 42 of 1940). </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It appears from the records that there was in fact a compromise decree between both the mother and the wife of Rossiah which was recorded by the Court on 19th April 1942. In the compromise memo Lakshmamma has been referred to as the plaintiff, while Venkayamma, the mother as the first defendant. Clause (a) of the said compromise expressly affirmed the will put forward by the mother, Venkayamma as true and valid and the properties of Rosaiah were categorised into three schedules, appended to the said Memo of compromise. Properties mentioned in Schedule-1 were jointly given to both the said ladies with absolute rights. While properties mentioned in Schedule-II were given to both of them jointly with a life estate only. Schedule-Ill contains three items. Items 1 and 2 were given to the mother, while item 3 was given to the wife. Clause (f) of the said memo of compromise provided as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(f) The 1st defendant is agreeable that plaintiff shall continue the lineage of late Rosaiah by adopting a boy of her choice within 7 years from now, from the family of Velamuri people or from the family of any other person of the (same) Gotram or from out of the boys of her younger sister as provided within the will executed on 11.1.1937 by the late Rosaiah and receiving him as the adopted son of her husband. As soon as the adoption takes place, the immovable property mentioned in Schedule-II, attached hereto and retained by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant with life- interest the 2nd item in its entirety and half of 3rd item mentioned in Schedule III other than the portion necessary for the residence of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant till their life-time and the plate and cup being used by the plaintiff and the iron safe, pot ( ) and `Panakapu Binde' being used by the 1st . defendant present out of the silverage given to Late Rosaiya at the time of the marriage shall be developed on the adopted son himself and he himself shall have absolute rights to the said items......"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Admittedly there is no adoption by Lakshamamma within the period prescribed as contemplated in clause (f) above and by reason therefore, Venkayamma the mother, filed a fresh suit (OS 93 of 1950) for a declaration that since Lakshmamma failed to take on adoption, as provided by clause (f) above, she was not entitled to do so thereafter, and for a further declaration that she herself was entitled to adopt a boy. In the plaint filed and as the records depict, Venkayamma levelled specific allegations of unchastity against Lakshmamma and contended that by reason of the fact of leading a life of unchastity, Lakshmamma lost all her rights in her husband's estate. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The said suit was however dismissed and an appeal being AS No. 344 of 1953 was preferred to the High Court against the dismissal of the suit (No. 93 of 1950). The facts reveal that the appeal came up for hearing on 8th March, 1958 and it is on the date of hearing counsel for the appellant Venkayamma conceded that by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act No. 78 of 1956) even a success in the appeal would not entitle the appellant to adopt. The Appellate Court on the wake of the aforesaid, dismissed the appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In 1969 as the records depict, the present suit (O.S. No. 44 of 1969) was filed by Venkayamma and her daughter Sitarammamma asking for a declaration of title to the suit properties and for possession of the properties mentioned in the plaint Schedule `A' and `B' and for mesne profits on the ground that since Lakshmamma did not take the adoption and also because of her re-marriage in 1953, she had lost all her rights and the same in any event stood forfeited so far as the husband's properties were concerned and that Venkayamma was otherwise exclusively entitled to the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Incidentally, be it noted that Venkayamma in the suit elated that she has relinquished all her rights in favour of Sitharamamma and therefore the latter was impleaded as the second plaintiff. Besides, the allegation of re-marriage, Venkayamma also attributed unchastity to Lakshmamma. In the said suit, nine defendants were impleaded. 1st defendant is Lakshmamma while defendants 2 to 4 were impleaded on the ground that they have been inducted into possession of the `B' schedule properties in suit by the 1st defendant. Defendants 5 to 7 were impleaded on the ground that they were the alienees from the first defendant and the 8th defendant was impleaded because he was supposed to be the adopted son of the first defendant, while the 9th defendant was said to be the joint purchaser along with defendants 3 and 4 of some of the suit properties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the written statement, Lakshmamma's defence was that she did take a boy being the 8th defendant by way of a valid adoption. While denying the re- marriage she pleaded the bar of res-judicata with respect to the allegation of unchastity. The 8th defendant in his written statement asserted his own adoption whereas the other alienees substantially adopted the defence taken by Lakshmamma. The Trial Court on final disposal recorded a definite finding as regards the issue on unchastity being barred by the doctrine of res-judicata. But in regard to the issue of re-marriage in August, 1953, the same was found to be otherwise correct as a matter of fact. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Trial Court further held that whatever properties were given to Lakshmamma under the memo of compromise became her absolute properties by virtue of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act.'Two other issues were raised before the Trial Court namely; the issue of adoption of 8th defendant and the suit being barred by the laws of limitation. The last issue of limitation was answered in the affirmative, the plea of adoption was negatived and the Trial Court came to a conclusion that no such adoption can even be valid also.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The factual score further reveals that Venkayamma died pending the suit and the 3rd plaintiff was brought on record as her adopted son: The 2nd plaintiff Sitharamamma also died after the judgment of the trial court and before the filing of the appeal. The appeal before the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was preferred only by the 3rd plaintiff in the suit being the adopted son of Venkayamma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We may now deal with the twin issues noted at the beginning of the judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Re-first Issue:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Conversion of limited ownership into an absolute one under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act did come up for judicial scrutiny intermittently before this Court and the law in regard thereto stands settled by the decision in Tulasamma's case V. Tulasamma &Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (d) by LRs., [1977] 3 SCC 99.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Admittedly the decision in Tulasamma's case (supra) is holding the field till date without even any semblance of dissention in all subsequent decisions. We also do not wish to sound any different note in that regard. In paragraph 20 of the Report Fajal Ali, J. laid down certain propositions as regards Hindu women's rights to maintenance and we cannot resist but to quote the same herein below in extenso as useful refresher:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"(1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property cares with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co- ownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Undisputably the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in particular Section 14 has introduced far reaching changes having due regard to the role and place of womanhood in the country on the basis of the prevailing socio-economic perspective. It is now a well-settled principle of law that legislations having socio-economic perspective ought to be interpreted with widest possible connotation as otherwise, the intent of the legislature would stand frustrated. Recognition of Rights and protection thereof thus ought to be given its full play for which the particular legislation has been introduced in the Statute Book. Gender bias is being debated throughout the globe and the basic structure of the Constitution permeates equality of status and thus negates gender bias. Gender equality is one of the basic principles of our Constitution. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The endeavour of the law court should thus be to give due weightage to the requirement of the Constitution in the matter of interpretation of statutes wherein specially the women folk would otherwise be involved. The legislation of 1956 therefore, ought to receive an interpretation which would be in consonance with the wishes and desires of framers of our Constitution. We ourselves have given this Constitution to us and as such it is a bounden duty and an obligation to honour the mandate of the Constitution in every sphere and interpretation which would go in consonance therewith ought to be had without any departure therefrom. Tulasamma's case obviously having this in mind decided the issue and attributed the widest possible connotation to the words used in Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The decision in Tulasamma's case from time to time came up for consideration before this Court and the same stands accepted without any variation as noted herein before. One of the latest decisions where Tulasamma's case has been considered, is the decision of this Court in the case of Raghubir Singh v. Gulab Singh, [1998] 6 SCC 324, wherein Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, Chief Justice speaking for the Bench in paragraphs 24 and 26 of the Report observed:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right", which existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognised the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a "statutory" backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband she has a right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the document or the instrument. So far as sub- section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc., which create an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application to cases where the instrument/document either declares or recognises or confirms her share in the property or her "pre-existing right to maintenance" out of that property. As held in Tulasamma case sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It would be convenient, however, at this juncture to note the exact language of Section 14. Section 14 reads as below: "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Explanation- In this sub-section `property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or order an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Having due regard to the language as above introduced by Section 14 question of attributing a different interpretation, apart from what has been given in Tulasamma's case, does not arise but needless however to note that in order to have the provision applicable there shall have to be some right existing and not de hors the same. In Raghubir's case (supra) the Shastric law has been taken recourse to in order to ascribe a pre-existing right so far as the widow is concerned by reason of the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife during the life time of the husband and the solemn obligation of the husband towards the wife. Hindu marriage is not a mere formality or a contract but has its due religious sanctity even in the present day society. Homam i.e. oblation to fire and Saptapadi (seven steps together ) are being observed in order to have a holy union between the husband and the wife. In this context, the observations in the decision of Raghubir Singh's case seem to be apposite and in paragraph 14 of the Report, Dr. Anand, CJ observed:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"According to the old Shastric Hindu law, marriage between two Hindus is a sacrament-a religious ceremony which results in a sacred and a holy union of man and wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a part and parcel of the body of the husband. She is, therefore, called ardhangani. It is on account of this status of a Hindu wife, under the Shastric Hindu law, that a husband was held to be under a personal obligation to maintain his wife and where he dies possessed of properties, then his widow was entitled as of right, to be maintained out of those properties. The right of a Hindu widow to be maintained out of the properties of her deceased husband is, thus a spiritual and moral right, which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of husband and wife, though the right is available only so long as the wife continues to remain chaste and does not remarry."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There is therefore no difficulty in appreciating the observations of this Court in Tulasamma's case or in Raghubir's case but the issue here as noticed above, is slightly different on the factual score and neither of the decisions can lend any assistance to the respondents herein.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court unfortunately has not been able to appreciate the admitted re-marriage of Lakshmamma in the year 1953. Re-marriage is a fact which ought to be taken note of in the matter under consideration and it is this change of status, by reason of remarriage, falls for determination in the present appeal. While there is no amount of doubt that by reason of the well settled law as laid down by this Court, to the effect that a limited right of maintenance permeated into an absolute right under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act but would the effect be the same, in the event of there being a re-marriage of the widow prior to 1956? The Act of 1956, incidentally is prospective in its operation and no element of retrospectivity can be attributed therein. The effect of remarriage is available in the Act of 1856. Section 2 thereof reads as below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"2. All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to re-marry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Incidentally, the Act of 1856 was in the Statute Book until the year 1983 and it only stands repealed by Act 24 of 1983. Section 2 of the Act 1856, therefore, has taken away the right of widow in the event of re-marriage and the Statute is very specific to the effect that the widow on re- marriage would be deemed to be otherwise dead. The words "as if she had then died" (emphasis supplied) are rather significant. The legislature intended therefore that in the event of a re-marriage, one loses the rights of even the limited interest in such property and after re-marriage the next heirs of her deceased's husband shall thereupon succeed to the same. It is thus a statutary recognition of a well reasoned pre-existing shastric law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">An attempt has however been made as regards overriding effect of Hindu Succession Act in terms of Section 4(1) thereof. Section 4(1) provides as below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"4. Overriding effect of Act-(l) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(a) any text rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus insofar as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Mr. Nageshwara Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that by reason of the overriding effect of the Act of 1956, question of reliance on Section 2 of the Act of 1856 does not arise. On the next count it was contended that re-marriage envisaged under Section 2 must be a valid re-marriage and since Lakshmamma got married to a person while he was having a spouse living, being Lakshmamma's own sister's husband, that is to say Lakshmamma got married to her own brother-in-law in the year 1953, question of there being a valid re-marriage does not and cannot arise. It is on this count, the learned counsel contended that the act of 1949 (The Madras Hindu Bigamy Prevention and Divorce Act) which declares all marriages wherein one spouse has a spouse living, be a nullity and as such question of there being any valid marriage in terms of the Act of 1856 does not and cannot arise.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The above contentions fall squarely within the ambit of the second issue noticed above and as such we refrain ourselves from making any comment thereon at this juncture and reserve the same for consideration in the later part of this judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the issue as regards the applicability of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) hearing out the first appeal has the following to observe:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The next question arises is, whether the life estate created in Lakshmamma under Ex.A-1 gets enlarged by virtue of Section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act. For a proper appreciation of this question, it is necessary to notice a few dates. The Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937 came into force on 1st April, 1937. However, it was not applicable to agricultural properties. It was made applicable to agricultural properties only in 1946 by virtue of the Act passed by the Madras Legislature. In any event, Rosaiah having died in February, 1937, prior to the enforcement of the Principal Act itself, Lakshmamma cannot claim any right under the said Act. She would have been entitled to widow's estate according to Hindu Law. but she was deprived of even that, by virtue of the will (Ex. A-3) executed by Rosaiah, and the truth and validity of which will was affirmed by Lakshmamma hereself in the Memo of Compromise, Ex.A-1. Once that will is true it has to be given effect to and, according to it, Lakshmamma had only a right to maintenance, and nothing more. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Therefore, when she was given certain properties, either absolute or for her life, under the said Memo of Compromise, it must be said that rights in her in respect of the said properties were created for the first time under and by the said Memo of Compromise that she had no pre-existing rights in the said properties. If so, according to the decisions of this Court and other High Courts, emphasising the distinction between and applicability of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, it is sub- section (2) alone that applies, and not sub-section (1). In other words, there is no more question of enlargement of her right vide G.Konraiah v. G. Subbrabayudu, (1968) II An.......455 were the earlier decisions of this Court and other High Courts also are noted and referred to. To the similar effect is the Decision of the Madras High Court in Hussain Uduman v. Venkatachal Mudaliar, (1974) II, MLJ 275. Similarly the decision of the Supreme Court, Karmi v. Amrru, AIR 1971. Supreme Court 745 affirms that where a life estate is created by a will executed by a husband in favour of his wife, such a life estate does not got enlarged by virtue of Section 14(1) but that it is governed by sub-section (2) only."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As regards the issue of re-marriage and the validity of the adoption so far as the 8th defendant is concerned, learned Single Judge observed that the findings have not been questioned in the appeal by anyone and as such no exception can be taken in regard thereto. Insofar as the question of the suit being barred under Section 113 of the Limitation Act, the learned Single judge has been pleased to answer the issue in the negative and on the basis of the aforesaid, the learned Single Judge allowed the appeal in the manner following:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is declared that the 1st defendant has only a life-interest alongwith the 1st plaintiff, in the properties mentioned in Schedule II to Ex.A-1 and that, she has a life interest only even in item 3 of Schedule III to Ex.A-1 and that, the alienations made by her in favour of the other defendants are not binding upon the plaintiffs, insofar as the said alienations pertain to the properties mentioned in Schedule II or to item 3 in Schedule III, appended to Ex.A-1. In so far as the properties mentioned in Schedule 1 to Ex.A-1 are concerned, the 1st defendant has an absolute interest, alongwith the 1st plaintiff herein. Plaintiffs are, however, not entitled to immediate possession of the properties mentioned in Schedule II and item 3 in Schedule III to ExA-1, inasmuch as the 1st defendant has a life-interest therein. They shall, however, be entitled to the possession of the said properties after the life-time of the 1st defendant. The relief of mesne profits too accordingly fails."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Subsequently, however, the matter was taken up in Letters Patent Appeals and the Appellate Court by a judgment dated 31st March, 1978 in LPA Nos. 19 and 20 of 1977 was pleased to reverse the judgment of B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. and confirmed the decree in Original Suit No. 87 of 1966. As regards the LPA No. 19 of 1977 the Appellate Bench has the following to observe:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"First we will take up LPA No. 19/1977. Shri M. Chandrasekhara Rao has submitted that the adoption of the 8th defendant by the 1st defendant is true and valid and, therefore, the sale deed executed by him in favour of defendants 3,4 and 9 is also valid. On a consideration of the evidence on record we hold that the 1st defendant had re-married in August, 1953. If so, there is no question of her making an adoption to her first husband, late Rosaiah. Consequently, we affirm the findings of Jeevan Reddy, J., and dismiss LPA No. 19/1977."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">As regards LPA No.20/1977 the Appellate Court relying upon Tulasamma's case (supra) came to a conclusion that pre-existing rights of Lakshmamma for maintenance from out of the property of her late husband cannot be disputed and as such came to the conclusion that Lakshmamma got an absolute right in the properties given to her in Schedule II and item 3 of Schedule III by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14 and as such the alienation made by her under the sale deed in favour of defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4 is otherwise valid and it is this judgment which is presently in appeal under discussion before this Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It has to be kept in view that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, in the light of the explanation thereto, clearly indicates that if a Hindu widow is given in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance, any property with limited interest, the, said interest would mature into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Act. It has further to be kept in view that under the will of Rosaiah, the first wife's pre-existing right of maintenance was recognised and in recognition of the very same right by the compromise decree she was given limited interest to recover maintenance from the earmarked properties mentioned in the same decree. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It has, therefore, to be held in the light of the judgment in Tulasamma's case that if her right of maintenance had survived till the coming into operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, then her limited interest on the properties concerned over which the said right was exercised as per consent term could have matured under Section 14(1) of the Act and to that extent the Division Bench judgment upsetting the view of the learned Single Judge cannot be found fault with. However, in the light of the admitted fact on record on re-marriage of Rosaiah's widow in 1953, her right to claim maintenance from the ex-husband's properties got extinguished prior to 1956, as will be further seen from our discussion on the second issue. Hence, the ultimate decision rendered by the learned Single Judge will remain well-sustained and the Division Bench judgment upsetting the same cannot be sustained on this ground. Issue No. 1, therefore, will have to be answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Re: Second Issue: Addressing on this issue, Mr. Rao contended that the re- marriage, spoken of in Section 2 of the Act of 1856, cannot but mean a valid re-marriage and since Lakshmamma got married to her brother-in-law in the year 1953, the marriage, Mr. Rao contended cannot but be termed to be a void marriage as such a nullity and thus application of Section 2 does not and cannot arise. At first blush the submission seemed to be attractive but on a closer scrutiny of the matter in issue we are afraid we cannot lend concurrence to the submission of the respondent in that regard, the reasons for the same being as below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">I. In the contextual facts the doctrine of sincerity has its due application. Lakshmamma cannot take advantage of her own immoral conduct and illegality to confer upon herself a right to continue to get maintenance from the properties of her deceased husband under the consent decree.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">II. The Act of 1949 being penal in nature, was introduced in the Statute Book to prohibit bigamous marriages and to provide for a right of divorce on certain grounds as mentioned therein statutory prohibition cannot be treated to be in aid of conferment of right: it is a prohibitory statute and not a conferring statute.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">III. Any mechanical and literal applicability of the Act of 1949 would lead to incongruity as well as absurdity since in the event the widow is married to a person without having a spouse living-the widow divests herself of any right to deceased's properties by reason of Section 2 of the Act of 1856, but in the event the widow is married to a person with a spouse living, the same tantamounts to no marriage and resultantly entitlement under the general law would be available to the widow: what has been prohibited would, in effect, amount to conferment of a right of inheritance on the deceased husband's property- this is contrary to all cannons of law.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In detailing out the reasons as noticed above, reference may be made at this stage itself to a decision of the House of Lords in the case of G. (The Husband) v. M. (The Wife) (LR 10 AC 171), wherein, EARI OF SELBORNE LC observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"I think I can perceive that the real basis of reasoning which underlies that phraseology (sincerity) is this, and nothing more than this, that there may be conduct on the part of the person seeking this remedy which ought to estop that person from having it: as, for instance, any act from which the inference ought to be drawn that during the antecedent time the party has, with a knowledge of the facts and of the law; approbated the marriage which he or she afterwards seeks to get rid of, or has taken advantages and derived benefits from the matrimonial relation which it would be unfair and inequitable to permit on her, after having received them, to treat as if no such relation had ever existed. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Well now, that explanation can be referred to known principles of equitable, and, I may say, of general jurisprudence. The circumstances which may justify it are various, and in cases of this kind many sorts of conduct might exist, taking pecuniary benefits for example, living for a long time together in the same house or family with the status and character of husband and wife, after knowledge of everything which it is material to know. I do not at all mean to say that there may not be other circumstances which would produce the same effect; but it appears to me that in order to justify any such doctrine as that which has been insisted upon at the bar, there must be a foundation of substantial justice, depending upon the acts and conduct of the party sought to be barred."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">There must thus have to be a foundation of substantial justice depending upon the acts and conduct of the party sought to be barred-as stated by the Lord Chancellor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is in this context the will is to be noticed: In the will Rosaiah being the testator stated that his wife Lakshmamma was not obedient to him and that her father with her aid was also trying to knock off all his properties and that his wife was also not living with him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Subordinate Judge Narasaraopet in paragraph 21 of the judgment in the main suit recorded as below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"21. Smt. G. Samanthakamani, P.W. 2, deposed that the first defendant bore a child to Sri Veeraraghava Sastri in 1952 and that the name of that child is Kasi Visweswara Hanumath Prasad. She stated further that in the year 1954 she gave birth to a daughter and that some time thereafter, the first defendant gave birth to a son in the same year. She deposed that in the year 1953, her husband Veeraraghava Sastri married the first defendant Seelanagaram in a choultry near the temple. After hearing the contents of Ex.A.11, P.W.2 stated that it is not true that Kasi Visweswara Hanumath prasad is her natural son and that it is not true that he was given in adoption to first defendant's husband, the adoption being made by the first defendant. The evidence of Sri A. Sreeramchandra Murthy, P.W. 4, is to the effect that Sri G. Veeraraghava Sastry has two wives that Smt. Laxmidevamma is one of them, that the said Laxmidevamma has a son called Prasad or Prasad Babu and she was delivered of a male child in February or March 1954."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The factual score therefore, depicts that the sister of Lakshmamma in no uncertain terms stated before the Court that the first defendant bore a baby son through Sri Veeraraghava Sastri in 1952 and her (the sister's) husband married Lakshmamma in 1953. Thereafter Lakshmamma gave birth in 1954 to a daughter and subsequently to another son in the same year-this is the person who is said to have retained the right of maintenance from the deceased husband's estate by reason of the Act of 1949: This is, to say the least, a travesty of correct legal position. There is some moral estoppel also. It is only the estate which was attractive to her and the subsequent purported adoption by Lakshmamma to her late husband when there were already two sons, through the brother-in-law bore ample testimony of her immorality disentitling her any continued maintenance from her deceased husband's estate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the score of adoption the learned Subordinate Judge on a consideration of the materials available, found "that the adoption of the 8th defendant by the 1st defendant to late Veeraragahava Sastri is neither true nor valid." Incidentally P.W.I before the learned Subordinate Judge stated that the 8th defendant is the natural son of the first defendant: the lady has thus three children and in spite thereof attempted to have an adoption established in favour of her own son before a court of law in the name of the deceased husband, simply by reason of the fact that deceased Rosaiah permitted certain properties to be given to the adopted son-the interest is only property: In our view the tests as laid down by Lord chancellor in G. v. M. (supra) stands amply satisfied in the contextual facts. The doctrine of sincerity, therefore, plays as a bar to such a construction being put on a prohibitory statute.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is pertinent to note here that the courts ought always to adopt a construction of the statute which will enure to the benefit of the society and eschew such a construction which may adversely affect the society. Morality and law cannot but be equated with each other: what is legal is moral and as such morality cannot be differentiated from the law. One School of thought recorded that while it is true that what is legal is moral but the converse is not true. We however, do not dilate on this issue excepting reiterating what is stated herein before in this judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The general doctrine of approbation and reprobation which is an aspect of equitable estoppel is not peculiar to English law and as a matter of fact Section 23 (1) (a) of the Act of 1956 does gives statutory recognition to the said equitable principle. The language used in Section 23(1) (a) to wit- "......<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong...." is rather significant.,Indeed, Derett in his book "Critique of Modern Hindu Law" at page 314 holds the view that "It is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and is international".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, the learned author has the following to state:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The latter part of clause (a) read with the words at the end of sub- section (1) "then and in such a case, but not otherwise" makes it abundantly clear that the court cannot pass a decree granting any relief under the Act in favour of a petitioner who is in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief and it is not enough that the petitioner has established the ground on which relief is sought; and if that is so his or her own wrong or disability is an absolute bar to the relief sought by the petitioner. The rule is based on the principle of justice that a wrongdoer should not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own wrong or disability while seeking relief at the hands of the court in any matrimonial proceeding."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">(Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 16th Edn. Page 713) Interestingly this Court also applied the latin maxim `qui approbat man reprobat' (one who approbates cannot reprobate) in Indian conditions as a basic inhibitory principles of law. (see in this context New Bihar Biri leaves Co. and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1981) SC 679 at 692 paragraphs 50 and 51).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The present case is not strictly concerned with petitions for determination of status under the Hindu Marriage Act but rather with questions of Hindu personal inheritance in the context of the conduct of one of the parties. No doubt the `doctrine of insincerity' must be applied with great care and even where approbation is proved, the Court has discretion as to what weight is to be given to it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The contention on behalf of the respondent as regards the marriage being void in terms of the provisions of the Act of 1949 on the wake of the observations as above, thus, cannot hold good in any event. Voidness of a marriage cannot be termed to be an absolute nullity. A lucid discussion on the topic is available in Wade's Administrative Law 7th Ed. Wherein it is stated as below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"...Here also there is a logical difficulty, since unless an order of the court is obtained, there is no means of establishing the nullity of the list. It enjoys a presumption of validity, and will have to be obeyed unless a court invalidates it. In this sense every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage Lord Radcliffe said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Void is therefore meaningless in any absolute sense. Its meaning is relative, depending upon the court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of legal relativity is borne in mind, confusion over `void or voidable' can be avoided."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The passage above stands approved by this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer and another, [1997] 1 SCC 9.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In the case of State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (dead) and others, [1996] 1 SCC 435 this Court in no uncertain terms laid down that the word `void' has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. This Court observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is fundamental or otherwise..."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">It is in this context one may also consider that Hindu Marriage Act provides annulment of the marriage under Section 11 and the same statute under Section 16 legitmised the children of otherwise void marriages. It is thus a statutory recognition of limited voidness and not a nullity. The reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., AIR (1965) SC 1564, wherein this Court while dealing with the prosecution under Section 494 read with 114 I.P.C. observed that in the event the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The Court was considering as to whether the subsequent marriage needs to be a valid marriage in order to impose punishment under Section 494 I.P.C. In paragraph 15 of the report this Court observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">."(15) It follows, therefore, that the marriage between appellant No.l and Kamlabai does not come within the expression `solmenised marriage' occurring in S.I7 of the Act and consequently does not come within the mischief of S.494,I.P.C. even though the first wife of appellant No.l was living when he married Kamlabai in February, 1962."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The decision in our view does not lend any support to the contention of the respondent herein and the same is clearly distinguishable on facts. The observations of this Court were made in the context of a prosecution, wherein the punishment would be seven years imprisonment together with fine and it is in this perspective that the nitti natti of marriages were dealt with and the Court came to a conclusion that marriage was not properly solmenised and as such the accused cannot be said to be guilty of an offence under Section 494. The liability is criminal and the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubts- such however is not the case presently under consideration. It is this perspective that the matter has to be considered as to whether prohibitive statute ought to be read as conferring statute and in view of the discussion above we answer the first and the second point of reasons as noted above so as not to confer any entitlement in favour of Lakshmamma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">On the third count also let it be noted that this prohibitive statute can not possibly have its operation extended in the contextual facts as otherwise the same would lead to a total absurdity in the facts of the present case and which in any event ought always to be avoided. Finally and in any event this issue however cannot be re-agitated at this juncture by reason of the fact that the same stands concluded by the Trial Court as well as by the first appellate court. It may also be noted that in the companion Letters Patent Appeal No. 19 of 1977, the Division Bench has confirmed the finding that 1st defendant remarried in 1953 and hence she could not validly adopt defendant No. 2. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Accordingly, Letters Patent Appeal No. 19 of 1977 was dismissed. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">This judgment inter partes has become final. No Special leave Petition is filed by the appellants against the said decision even though they claim their interest through defendant No.l. Hence, the finding that defendant No.l remarried in 1953 has become res judicata between the parties. In any case at this point of time no factual controversies can be raised, neither can be decided in the jurisdiction conferred onto this Court by the Constitution. In that view of the matter, we are also not inclined to lend any concurrence to the submissions on behalf of the respondents.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Turning attention to the issue of vesting of the property and subsequent divestation if there be any, by reason of any unchastity or re-marriage, it would be profitable for us to notice the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ramaiya v. Mottayya, AIR (1951) Madras 954. In a very illuminating judgment, in paragraph 12 Viswanatha Sastri, J. observed:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"It is a well settled rule of Hindu Law- a rule that is inconformity with popular sentiment that-unchastity disqualifies a widow from succession to her husband's estate. The textual authorities on this point will be found assembled in the judgment inkery Kolitany v. Monscram Kolita, 13 Beng. L.B.I, the text requires that the widow must be chaste not only when the inheritance of her deceased husband opens but also thereafter. A text attributed to Vridha Manu says:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The wife alone, being sonless and keeping the bed of her lord unsullied and leading a life of religious observance, may take his entire estate."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Katyayana also declares:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"Let the sonless widow, preserving unsulled the bed of her lord and bidding with her venerable protector, enjoy with moderation the (husband's) property until her death"<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Other texts state as "half the body" of her deceased husband the widow takes his property in default of male issue. The above text show that not only that the sonless widow's right in her husband's property is a mere right of enjoyment but that the exercise of that right is dependent on her chastity. The use of the present participle form implies that chastity is imposed as a permanent condition of the widow's enjoyment of her husband's estate and that: a violation of that condition would involve a forfeiture of the right. But European writers, like Colebrooke and English Judges who had to administer the Hindu law, in their concern for ensuring certainty of titles to property and their leanings against a divestiture of estates once vested, declared the law to be that a sonless widow who was chaste at the time of her husband's death inherited his estate and that a widow who had once inherited the estate of her husband was not liable to forfeit it by reason of her subsequent unchastity. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The law was, thus settled by the Judicial Committees in Maniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitany, 5 Cal. 776 P.C. and this has been the accepted rule of Hindu law ever since. Unchastity disentitles a Hindu widow to maintenance. Maintenance being a recurring right her continued chastity is a condition of her right to receive maintenance and she would forfeit her right by reason of her unchastity even though maintenance has been decreed to her by a Court. Lakshmichand v. Mt. Anandi, 57 All 672 P.C. Kandasami v. Murugammal, 19 Mad. 6 and Nagamma v. Virabhadra, 17 Mad. 392. If there has been a lapse from chastity the widow would be entitled only if she reforms her ways, and even then only to a starving maintenance. Satyabhama v. Kesavacharya, 39 Mad. 658. The widows of coparceners in a joint Hindu family are in fact and in law members of the family with rights in or over the family property by way of maintenance. Raghunanda Deo v. Brozokishore Patta Deo, 1 Mad 69 at p.81; Kalyani Vittaldas v. Commissioner of income-tax, l.L.B. (1937) 1 Cal 653 (PC) and Vedathunni v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 56 Mad 1 at pp.4, 5. The requirement of Chastity as a condition of their maintenance from the family property is therefore intelligible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The observations of the learned Judge in paragraph 13 of the judgment pertaining to the issue as regards the effect of unchastity vis a vis the husband's separate or self acquired property under the Shastric Law and the effect of subsequent legislation thereon are also worth noting. Paragraph 13 reads as below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"13. The Act was doubtless intended to "give better rights to women in respect of property" as stated in the preamble. But in what cases and to what extent? The rights of a Hindu widow in relation to the property or interest of her husband, as they stood before the Act, and as they now stand, have to be considered. A Hindu widow succeeded to the self-acquired property of her husband or the property held by him as the last surviving coparcener or as the holder of a share on partition if he happened to die without leaving sons (including in that term grandsons and great grandsons). The sonless widow was disqualified from inheriting her husband's separate or self acquired property if she was unchaste or living in adultery at the time the inheritance opened. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The Act did not touch this class of cases and did not abrogate the rule of Hindu law as to disqualification of a widow arising out of her unchastity in such cases. If in the cases above mentioned the husband had left sons (in comprehensive sense) the widow would before the Act have been excluded by the sons from inheriting her husband's estate and would only be entitled to maintenance for her life out of that estate. If her husband had died as a member of a joint Hindu Family owning property, his interest in the family property ceased on his death. The widow would but for the Act; be excluded from succession to the undivided interest of her husband which passed by survivorship to the remaining coparceners. She would have had a right, however, to be maintained from the joint family property in the hands of the surviving coparceners, who might be her son or her husband's uncles, brothers, nephews or other agnatic relations. With reference to these two classes of cases above specified, S.3 of the Act conferred new rights of succession on widows in supersession of the above mentioned rules of Hindu law. The rule that a widow succeeded only on failure of male issue was abrogated and she was given the same share as a son in her husband's separate or self acquired property. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Where the husband died a member of an undivided Hindu family, his undivided interest in the family property passes to his widow even if he left male issues. The rule of survivorship was to this extent abrogated. The interest taken by a widow in her husband's estate by virtue of S.3 of the Act was the same as the interest which she look in her husband's separate or self acquired property in the absence of male issue, that is to say a Hindu widow's estate with all the incidents attached by law to that estate. The liability to forfeiture on remarriage would attach to that estate from its commencement and continue throughout the widow's life. The condition of chastity however attaches to the estate only at its commencement. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Through the Act conferred new rights of succession on Hindu widows in the two classes of cases referred to above it did not purport to abrogate the pre-existing rule of Hindu law excluding an unchaste widow from succession to the property of her husband. It would be a queer state of law that sonless widow has to be chaste ` in order to inherit her husband's separate or self acquired property but a widow need not be chaste if she happens to have sons or other coparceners of her husband in competition with whom she claims to take her husband's estate. This however, would be the result of the argument of the appellant as regards the construction of Ss.2 and 3 of the Act."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Be that as it may the law as declared by Privy Council has been consistently followed that subsequent unchastity will not make a widow forfeit the property which she has succeeded to her husband on his death neither we express any contra view in regard thereto. In the contextual facts of the matter under consideration however, and since the factual situation of re-marriage of Lakshmamma in the year 1953, stands proved, it has to be held that Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Re-marriage Act, 1956 gets attracted. As a result thereof, Defendant No.l's right to get maintenance from their deceased husband's property came to an end on civil death qua her ex-husband's estate latest by 1953. Hence there was no subsisting legal right of maintenance available to Defendant No.l qua her deceased husband's estate in any of his properties nor was there a subsisting limited interest of hers in any of those properties which get matured into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act when it came into force. As such the legal situation is different in the present case and the law as laid down and as noticed above does not render any assistance to the Respondent herein. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Similar is the situation in regard to another decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Chinnappavu Naidu v. Meenakshi Ammal and another, AIR (1971) Mad.453. The decision last noted dealt with the effect of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856 and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court came to a conclusion that by reason of Section 4(1)(b) of the latter Act, of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 14 prevails over Section 2 of the 1856 Act and as such re-marriage will not create any divestation. The re- marriage spoken of in the Madras High Court decision however, did take place after introduction of the Succession Act of 1956, as such this decision also does not lend any assistance to the respondent by reason of the factual differentiation in the matter presently before us.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Incidentally, be it noted that the Succession Act of 1956 obviously is prospective in operation and in the event of a divestation prior to 1956, question of applicability of Section 14(1) would not arise since on the date when it applied, there was already a re-marriage disentitling the widow to inherit the property of the deceased husband. The Act of 1856 had its full play on the date of re-marriage itself, as such Succession Act could not confer the widow who has already re-married, any right in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">The Succession Act has transformed a limited ownership to an absolute ownership but it cannot be made applicable in the event of there being a factum of pre divestation of estate as a limited owner. If there existed a limited estate or interest for the widow, it could become absolute but if she had no such limited estate or interest in lieu of her right of maintenance from out of deceased husband's estate, there would be no occasion to get such non-existing limited right converted into full ownership right.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Strong reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of C. Masilamani Mudaliar and Ors. v. The Idol of Shri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswsami Thirukoli and Ors., AIR [1996] SC 1697. The facts in the last noted decision depict that Somasundaram Pillai died in September, 1950. The Legatees Sellathachi and another had come into possession of the properties. Janaka Thathachi died in the year 1960. In 1970, Sellathachi had appointed a power of attorney-holder who had alienated the suit properties and the appellants had purchased them under registered sale deed. The suit was filed for declaration that the legatees having succeeded to limited estate under the will, the alienations made by Sellathachi were illegal. The Trial Court decreed the suit. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The learned Single Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit and in LPA No. 161/88 dated July 2, 1992, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the decree of the single Judge holding that the legatees had suceeded to restricted estate under sub-section 2 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 (for short, the "Act") and that, therefore, their rights have not blossomed into absolute estate. The question before this Court was whether the widow had become the absolute owner under Section 14(1). This Court held that the right to maintenance stands as a charge on her husband's property and can be termed to be pre-existing legal right which stands transformed into absolute right in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This Court held that the right to maintenance to a Hindu female receives statutory recognition under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and she is entitled to realise maintenance from the property of her husband and even in the hands of stranger except the bonafide purchaser for value. It may be noted here that even though strong reliance was placed on this decision but by reason of the contextual facts as noticed above the decision is clearly distinguishable since re-marriage in 1953 as noted above makes all the difference having due regard to the Act of 1856.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">In Lakhmi Chand v. Mt. Anandi, AIR (1935) Privy Council 180 similar is the treatment of Hindu Law about the widow's estate by reason of subsequent unchastity. The law as declared by the Privy Council in ILR 5 Calcutta thus stands well accepted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Two other decisions of this Court were strongly relied upon by the Respondent. The first of the two is the decision in the case of Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K), [1991] 2 SCC 375. This Court while dealing with an application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed that the object of Section 125 is to prevent vagrancy and destitution and provides a remedy for supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife and when an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of a neglected wife depicitng her as a kept-mistress on the subsequent specious plea that he was already married, the Court would insist on strict proof of earlier marriage. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">This Court observed: "Therefore, the law which disentitles the second wife from receiving maintenance from her husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for the sole reason that the marriage ceremony though performed in the customary form lacks legal sanctity can be applied only when the husband satisfactorily proves the subsistence of a legal and valid marriage particularly when the provision in the Code is a measure of social justice intended to protect women and children. We are unable to find that the Respondent herein has discharged the heavy burden by tendering strict proof of the fact in issue. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We are, therefore, unable to agree that the appellant is not entitled to maintenance." Relying upon the observation of this Court the learned Advocate contended that the social obligation to maintain the wife thus, cannot be negated. We, however, while concurring with the broad principles of law, express our inability to agree with the contentions as raised in the present appeal in the present factual situation as discussed above. The observations of this Court were made vis- a-vis Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and cannot possibly lend any assistance in the matter of interpretation of Section 14(1) of 1956 Act or Section 2 of the Act of 1856.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Incidentally, Section 24 of the Succession Act of 1956 placed certain restrictions on certain specified widows in the event of there being a remarriage: while it is true that Section speaks of a pre-deceased son or son of a pre-deceased son but this in our view is a reflection of the Shastric law on to the statute. The Act of 1956 in terms of Section 8 permits the widow of a male Hindu to inherit simultaneously with the son, daughter and other heirs specified in class I of the Schedule. As a matter of fact she takes her share absolutely and not the widow's estate only in terms of Section 14. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Re-marriage of a widow stands legalised by reason of the incorporation of Act of 1956 but on her re-marriage she forfeits the right to obtain any benefit from out of her deceased husband's estate and Section 2 of the Act of 1856 as noticed above is very specific that the estate in that event would pass on the next heir of her deceased husband as if she were dead. Incidentally, the act of 1856 does not stand abrogated or repealed by the Succession Act of 1956 and it is only by Act 24 of 1983 that the Act stands repealed. As such the Act of 1856 had its fullest application in the contextual facts in 1956 when Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act was relied upon by Defendant No. 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The other ground of objection raised by Mr. Nageshwara Rao i.e. the plea of limitation: Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and on the issue of limitation B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. as the first appellate Court in the instant matter had the following to state:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">"The last question that remains to be considered, pertains to bar of limitation. This issue has been considered by the trial court under issue No. 12 and it found that the suit is not barred, in-so-far as defendants 1-7 are concerned, but that it is barred as against the 8th defendant (alleged adopted son of the 1st defendant) and 9th defendant. This is for the reason that the 8th defendant was not originally impleaded only on 29.12.1971 in pursuance to an order of the court in IA No. 2657/71. But it must be noticed that the alleged adoption was made on 30.11.1965, while the present suit was instituted on 1.10.1965. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The sale deed in favour of defendants 3,4 and 9, is dated 10.1.1966 under a notice (Ex.B-36) and that, once they came to know of the adoption, they ought to have filed a suit for declaration (that the said adoption is not true or valid) within three years of the adoptions or at any rate, within three years of their knowledge of the adoption; since the 8th defendant has been impleaded only on 29.12.1971, and because of Section 21 of the Limitation Act the suit must be deemed to have been instituted as against the 8th defendant only on the date of such imp leading, the suit must be held to be barred as against the 8th defendant. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">The said argument, however, fails to take notice of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 21, which provides that nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 21 shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit. Since the adoption has been made pending the suit, and also because the alienation in favour of the 9th defendant is pending the suit, the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 21 that the suit shall be deemed to be instituted as against the impleaded party only on the date of such impleadings, is inapplicable. If so, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. In . fact, the Trial Court has found that no such adoption ever took place, and which finding is not questioned in this appeal. It cannot therefore, be said that the suit is barred by limitation."<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We do feel it expedient to record our concurrence therewith and as such come to the conclusion that the suit cannot be termed to be barred by the laws of limitation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">Having considered the matter from all perspectives, we do feel it expedient to record that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court clearly fell into an error in not considering the true effect of Section 2 of the Act of 1856. According to us final decision rendered by the learned Single Judge on non-applicability of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act remains well sustained, though on a different line of reasoning as indicated hereinabove. Accordingly, it must be held that the Division bench was in error in applying Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act on the fact situation in the present case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 21.4667px;">We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Division bench. The order as passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. No order as to costs. </span></div>
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